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China-India Brief #203

April 30, 2022 - May 12, 2022

China-India Brief #203BRIEF #203

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
April 30, 2022 - May 12, 2022


Guest Column

Bangladesh's Balancing Act Amid China-India Rivalry for Regional Influence
By Anu Anwar


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At the height of the Cold War in 1981, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere quoted an African proverb at the Commonwealth conference: “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”, which was recently echoed by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who added that, “when they make love, the grass suffers also”. However, this conventional wisdom seems flawed in the case of the China-India rivalry for regional influence in Bangladesh. Instead of losing—Bangladesh boasting South Asia’s second-largest economy—is reaping the benefits so far.

During its early years, Bangladesh suffered through military coups and economic stagnation. These conditions kept Bangladesh isolated globally for decades. China, before launching its massive infrastructure connectivity program—the Belt and Road Initiative—had exhibited little interest in South Asia beyond its long-standing alliance with Pakistan. No other extra-regional powers showed serious geopolitical interest in Bangladesh either. The absence of major powers served to further strengthen India’s position in Bangladesh, in addition to its geographic proximity, as well as the role it played in helping Bangladesh gain independence from Pakistan. Bangladesh, however, had always intended to expand its engagement with other international actors, which did not materialize until China’s entry as a major player in South Asia.

Defence cooperation has been the main building block in the Sino-Bangladesh relationship. China's economic footprint in Bangladesh is a relatively new and an ever-expanding dimension of their bilateral relations. Since the early 1980s, the two armed forces have engaged in frequent high-level official visits and have held joint training and exercises to strengthen cooperation. China has become Bangladesh’s top source of military hardware. Dhaka, likewise, is China's second-largest arms export destination, behind only Pakistan. In the 2010–2019 period, China accounted for 72 percent of Bangladesh's total arms imports.

Greater momentum came in 2013, with the launch of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Dhaka formally joined the BRI during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Bangladesh in October 2016, when relations were upgraded to a strategic partnership. The visit also saw China pledging investments totaling $38.05 billion, roughly equal to 10 percent of Bangladesh's gross domestic product—the largest sum ever pledged to Bangladesh by a single country. China has become Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, direct foreign investor, trade importer, and military hardware supplier. In 2020, China also granted duty-free access to its market for 97 percent of Bangladeshi products.

This large amount of Chinese investment and increasing defence cooperation with Dhaka made New Delhi feel it was falling behind. In response, India has deployed a wide variety of tools—rather asymmetric but significant—to counter China’s influence. In 2017, India announced a $4.5 billion Line of Credit (LOC) for Bangladesh—the largest amount ever committed by India to Bangladesh—though the disbursement rate has been extremely slow. New Delhi also expressed interest in offering submarine training for the Bangladesh Navy. Besides offering incentives, India has also used other means to caution Bangladesh not to align itself to closely with Beijing. For instance, after Bangladesh purchased two Ming class Type 035G submarines from China in 2017, India responded by ‘gifting’ a submarine to Myanmar—a country that Bangladesh has traditionally had frosty relations with—in a move likely meant to signal New Delhi’s displeasure with Dhaka.

Being a fraction of China’s economic size, India is unable to compete with China on the economic and security front. Instead, India has been leveraging on its long-standing cultural and political ties with its neighbour. Relations between the two countries’ political, cultural, and civil society elites offer India unmatched access to all levels of Bangladeshi society. The Indian state of West Bengal in particular, shares the same culture and language as Bangladesh, and has played an instrumental role in improving bilateral relations. In recent years, India has revived historical ties, reinforced cultural linkages, and increased diplomatic exchanges at an unprecedented level. This has created a certain degree of leverage in New Delhi’s favour.

While China and India seek to expand their influence in the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh is using both to make necessary improvements to its economy and military. As the China-India strategic rivalry intensifies, both countries are doubling down on their approach to bring strategically located Bangladesh into their own orbit.

China, along with increasing investment and defence support, may also open its economy to billions of dollars in imports from Bangladesh, which will help Dhaka to diversify its exports to new destinations beyond North America and Europe. India, for its part, has been ramping up its strategic cooperation with the United States and Japan under initiatives like the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which has helped to address some of India’s traditional shortfalls, such as a lack of capital. Japan, a traditional infrastructure investor, now increasingly collaborates with India in Bangladesh in an attempt to counter China’s regional influence.

However, Bangladesh has recognised that both India and China will be primarily self-serving in their investments. To avoid being a passive victim of this geopolitical competition in the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh is using its geo-strategic position tactfully. Dhaka has pursued strategic ambiguity, maintaining good working relations with both China and India, which is crucial for its stability and development. In recent years, Dhaka has also reached out to Washington proactively as a “third-way-balancing” effort that aims to use US-Bangladesh ties as leverage to set better terms with both China and India, diffuse tension, and reduce dependency on both Asian powers
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Anu Anwar is a Fellow at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, an associate in research at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University, and a Ph.D. student at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.


Guest Column

Securitisation and development: India’s strategic option to counter China’s BRI 
By Anjan Kumar Sahu


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China’s unprecedented economic and military development poses an immediate threat to India’s economic and security interests. Despite their strong economic cooperation, recurring conflict over territorial disputes and unconventional security issues, including disagreement over the sharing of Brahmaputra River water, has been a constant source of mutual distrust. One of China’s boldest foreign policy programmes in recent years has been the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. A gargantuan economic and connectivity policy, the BRI demonstrates China’s extraordinary global ambition. It is massive in terms of infrastructural development, financial investment, participation of countries and spatial connectivity covering the continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. In his book Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order, Bruno Maçães claims that China would soon displace the Western-led international system and establish a Sino-centric world order.

India sees China’s meteoric rise as a threat. From New Delhi’s perspective, China has consistently sought to counter and weaken its international position. Beijing’s support to Pakistan in the United Nations on the issue of terrorism, resistance to United Nations Security Council reform (that would open the way for India’s membership), its aggressive and unilateral policies to control the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region, its move to expedite the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that passes through India-claimed territory, all serve to affect India’s immediate security-political-economic interests. India faces an arduous task to counterbalance China given the huge economic and military disparity between the two. And if more countries integrate with the emerging Chinese-driven economic system, India will see its strategic influence deteriorate further. India’s international leadership role would diminish and its ability to shape world affairs would be greatly reduced.

As a rising power, New Delhi is unlikely to accept any policy that threatens its sovereignty and security interests. To contend with Beijing, Indian policy makers have and will likely continue to advance a negative securitisation narrative of the BRI. This entails framing China’s economic development design as an ‘existential threat’ to the present international liberal order. In this view, China’s BRI is not restricted to global economic integration only. On the basis of pursuing greater economic connectivity, China has expanded its military presence overseas in ways that could serve its strategic interests as well. China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti demonstrates the country’s larger ambition. Thus, the amalgamation of economic and military objectives is a priority for Beijing and is regarded by Delhi as a threat to the present international order.

This is an advantageous time for India to push a negative narrative about China as international sentiment towards Beijing has grown increasingly sceptical in various parts of the world. For instance, many Western countries blame the Chinese government for allegedly concealing the initial outbreak of COVID-19 and allowing the virus to spread worldwide. Undeniably, Beijing has been able to rehabilitate its international image somewhat through its ‘mask-diplomacy’ and vaccine-diplomacy as well as its early success at managing the pandemic within its own borders. However, COVID-19 appears to have slowed the momentum of many of its BRI projects. The pandemic caused economic and unemployment crises in many parts of the world, severely limiting labour and material resources for infrastructural development projects. In 2020, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) reported that 15 BRI projects worldwide worth over $2.4 billion were either stalled or cancelled owing to issues like a lack of funding and mobility restrictions. In addition, the recent surge of COVID infections in Shanghai and more lately in Beijing have likely affected the Communist Party’s image at home. The Communist Party’s recent appeal to the Chinese people in April 2022 to support President Xi Jinping amidst harsh lockdown measures to contain the latest resurgence of COVID-19 cases indicates a rising domestic dissatisfaction with Xi’s leadership.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also intensified the debate over China’s global leadership role, including apprehension about the BRI. Beijing’s explicit support to Moscow has created a chasm between China and the Western countries, including the US. From Beijing’s perspective, it was the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) that contributed to the Ukraine war, and it has criticised the sanctions against Russia calling them “illegal”. Beijing’s stance has caused unhappiness among some of its Asian neighbours, such as Japan and South Korea. The negative response to China’s stand on the Ukraine war is evident in many European countries where Russian aggression is perceived as a major threat to regional stability. Moreover, Russia allegedly asked China for military equipment to support its invasion. European countries could curtail their economic and political engagement with China, including on the BRI, to send a strong message to the latter for supporting Russia. The emerging global support for Ukraine underlines the widening diplomatic gulf between China and the rest of the world.  

Considering the above international developments and domestic situation in China, India could continue to highlight the negative aspect of China’s global economic development plan. European countries have been critical of India’s reluctance to criticise Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, India’s strong condemnation of civilian deaths in Ukraine is partially in consonance with the European countries’ stand on the war.

The sharpening rivalry between China and the US is fertile ground for Indian diplomacy. Both New Delhi and Washington know the necessity of a strategic partnership between the two democracies as a counterweight to China and to maintain a free and liberal world order. India could therefore increase its criticism of the BRI both bilaterally and in multilateral forums. As the Western countries, including the US, expressed their growing discontent over China’s stand on Ukraine, they have continued to emphasize their increased strategic cooperation with India, especially the engagement between the US and India. The recent Indo-US 2+2 dialogue is a case in point. Likewise, India is likely to deftly use the ‘Quad’ (India, Australia, Japan, the US) to build the negative narrative around the BRI. In doing so, India might be able to serve its strategic objectives by reducing global support to the BRI and draw diplomatic and political support in case of any potential disputes between the two Asian rivals.

However, the execution of these strategic moves is not easy. India must improve its image which has been damaged by its internal instabilities, its handling of COVID-19, and its economic downturn. Matters have been complicated by the Ukraine war. Delhi will have to work hard not to miss the opportunity to improve its position vis-a-vis China.


Anjan Kumar Sahu, PhD., teaches at the Department of Public Policy, Law and Governance, Central University of Rajasthan, India. His areas of interests are security studies, climate change, India and China. His papers on climate change have been published Asian Politics and Policy, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, China Report and International Politics. Email id: decb64_YW5qYW5fcHBsZ0BjdXJhai5hYy5pbg==_decb64


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

US Intelligence Says India-China Relations Will "Remain Strained"
NDTV, May 11

"Relations between New Delhi and Beijing will remain strained in the wake of the lethal clash in 2020, the most serious in decades," the US intelligence community told US Senate.

Ladakh standoff shows China intends to keep boundary issue alive, says Army Chief Gen Pande
The Indian Express, May 10

Pande said that through the dialogue between the Corps Commanders from the two sides, “many friction areas have been resolved after talking to each other.”

Indian professionals in China ask EAM Jaishanker to help them reunite with their families
Hindustan Times, May 2

Many have been separated from their partners and children for over 26 months because of the Chinese government’s strict rules for entering China.

Indian students conditionally allowed to return to China after 2 years of Covid-19 pandemic
Hindustan Times, April 29

The return of the Indian students to China will be done on a need-assessed basis and people familiar with the development said there is no guarantee that everyone will be able to return to their courses in China.

 

News Reports

China and India in the Region

Ahead of Quad summit, US hopes Russia’s war and China’s assertiveness have shaken India
South China Morning Post, May 10

Washington has made strides in deepening security ties with New Delhi and regards it as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific. India maintains ties to Russia, its leading arms supplier, but regards China as its leading regional threat, analysts say. 

China-backed projects testament to Sri Lanka’s mismanagement
The Times of India, May 10

Many of the white-elephant projects that helped fuel the crisis now gather dust.

With EU trying to move away from Russia & China, Modi’s visit is India’s chance to boost ties
The Print, May 4

Modi's trip saw the first instance of a joint statement involving India mentioning Russia for Ukraine invasion.

Sri Lanka extends credit line with India as China voices support
Reuters, May 3

Sri Lanka has extended a credit line with India by $200 million in order to procure emergency fuel stocks, the country's power and energy minister said on Monday (May 2), as China said it supported efforts for the island nation to restructure its debt.


News Reports

Trade and Economy

China's Xiaomi battles probes in key India market
Channel News Asia, May 12

Chinese smartphone giant Xiaomi Corp faces legal headaches in India as a federal financial crime-fighting agency and tax authorities investigate its business practices.

China may chalk up more debt as lockdowns hit the economy
CNBC, May 11

To meet its 5.5% growth target for this year, China may end up borrowing and incurring more debt.

India initiates anti-dumping probe against imports of optical fibre from China, Indonesia, Korea
The Economic Times, May 9

India has already imposed anti-dumping duty on several products to tackle cheap imports from various countries, including China.

Record trade with India delivers mutual benefits
China Daily, May 3

Bilateral trade hit an all-time high of more than $125 billion in 2021, and the momentum was sustained in the first quarter of 2022, when the trade value reached $31.96 billion.


News Reports

Energy and Environment

WHO says China's zero-COVID strategy unsustainable
Channel News Asia, May 11

China has imposed draconian measures, trapping most of Shanghai's 25 million people at home for weeks as the country combats its worst outbreak since the pandemic began.

Indian PM Modi urges states to prepare heat action plans as country swelters
Yahoo News, May 6

India’s prime minister Narendra Modi has urged states to work on an action plan to combat the worsening heatwave situation in the country as temperatures in the last two months broke all records.

China’s oil giant says it’s not seeking discounted Russian fuel
Business Times, May 6

PETROCHINA isn’t seeking any discounted Russian oil and gas and is only purchasing fuel from the country through its existing contracts, company executives said Friday (May 6).

China sets up world's highest automatic weather station at over 8,800m altitude on Mount Qomolangma
Global Times, May 4

Thirteen members of the Chinese Earth Summit Mission 2022 scientific expedition team successfully established an automatic meteorological monitoring station at an altitude of over 8,800 meters, the world's highest of its kind, on Mount Qomolangma on the China-Nepal border.

India boosts coal production to tackle power crunch amid searing heatwave
Financial Times, May 4

India is boosting coal production to record highs in an effort to overcome a fuel shortage that has strained power supply, leading to blackouts during a searing heatwave on the subcontinent.


Analyses

How the Ukraine Conflict Is Impacting India’s Economy
Brink, May 12

By Venkatachalam Anbumozhi, Director of Research Strategy and Innovations at the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia

Two months into the conflict, India’s business leaders and policymakers are seriously evaluating the impact of this crisis just as business has started to come out of the pandemic.

India Is Reluctant to Condemn Russia. Its History with China Looms Large.
Barron’s, May 10

By Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Associate Professor at Boston University; and Zoe Jordan, Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations

For India, the Ukraine war risks distracting from the rise of China and, at worst, bolstering it.

How Narendra Modi deftly walked Ukraine tightrope to bring India and Europe closer
Firstpost, May 8

By Chintamani Mahapatra, Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University

It was essential for Prime Minister Narendra Modi to make a trip to certain European countries to explain India’s position on the Ukrainian war that is so divergent from that of the EU.

Japan draws India closer amid intensifying power politics
East Asia Forum, May 7

By Chietigj Bajpaee, PhD candidate at King’s College LondonThe renewed polarisation of the international system following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the intensification of the US–China strategic rivalry is increasing pressure on other countries to pick sides..

 

Books and Journals

China’s Evolving Strategic Discourse on India: From Doklam to Galwan and Beyond
Stimson Policy Paper, May 4, 2022


By Antara Ghosal Singh, Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

The China-India border standoff that began in May 2020 continues to date at various friction points in the mountainous terrain of Ladakh in the Himalayas. A deadly clash between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley in June 2020, which was the worst fighting in over four decades and resulted in fatalities on both sides, has come to define the crisis. Almost two years into the standoff, there is still little clarity on its fundamental cause. However, a close analysis of China’s domestic debates on India in the years preceding the Galwan clash and thereafter provides a clear understanding of the Chinese perceptions that underlay the border crisis. This analysis also offers clues on the way forward. The standoff reveals China’s policy dilemma over India. Beijing wants to effectively check a rising New Delhi by asserting its strength and psychological advantage in bilateral ties. But on the other hand, China is anxious about the impact of the current crisis on its regional and global geostrategic objectives. New Delhi should recognize its prominence in Chinese strategic debates and better leverage its position to shape Beijing’s behavior and extract benefits from it.


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Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

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ANWAR, Anu

ANWAR, Anu

SAHU, Anjan Kumar

SAHU, Anjan Kumar