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China-India Brief #181

April 16, 2021 - May 11, 2021

China-India Brief #181BRIEF #181

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
April 16, 2021 - May 11, 2021


Guest Column

The Indo-Pacific Shadow in China-India Relations
By Zhang Li      


CIB181Image credit: PxHere

Almost from its very inception, the Indo-Pacific has been perceived differently by Chinese and Indian elites: Beijing sees it an unwelcome specter, a coalition targeting China, while New Delhi accepts it as part of its broader interactions with Washington. Their asymmetric approaches to the emergence of this geopolitical entity have an impact on the trajectory of China-India relations, apart from its implications for their respective ties with the United States.

India’s strategic relations with the US have experienced a steady uptick in the Indo-Pacific context. As the designated “major defence partner”, India has secured its access to advanced US military hardware and technologies; and New Delhi and Washington have gradually moved towards military interoperability through a series of foundational defence accords. The security-centered engagement between them has been upgraded through an institutionalized “two-plus-two” (foreign and defence chiefs) consultation. And the established partnership has also been bolstered by their growing resonance in the maritime domain, including New Delhi’s occasional echoes of support, albeit discreetly,  for “freedom of navigation and over flight”, either implying or specifically referring to the South China Sea.

Going beyond bilateral links with the US, New Delhi has increasingly stepped up its involvement in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) along with the US, Japan and Australia, and has helped make the grouping an operational platform by supporting high-profile dialogue and tangible collaboration. To endorse Canberra’s participation in its annual Malabar naval exercise alongside Washington and Tokyo in 2020, India went the extra mile to bring all the Quad members together to showcase defense solidarity, which has raised Beijing’s concern about a looming hostile bloc with a military element.

New Delhi’s stubborn boycott of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) magnifies Beijing’s sensitivity to the role India is trying to play in the Indo-Pacific, especially in maritime South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Beijing sees acceptance of the BRI as a touchstone in its partnerships with its neighbours, whereas New Delhi fears that the BRI would dilute its clout and privileges in the region. Tellingly, New Delhi, alongside Washington and Tokyo, has tried to stymie the BRI and search for connectivity substitutes, under the banner of the Indo-Pacific.

Nevertheless, the Indian perspective on the Indo-Pacific seems to differ from America’s standard version, despite New Delhi’s interest in being part of the framework. New Delhi has tried to keep some distance from Washington’s strategy by purposely highlighting the “inclusiveness” of the Indo-Pacific and the central role of ASEAN in it and cautiously averting a conflation of the Indo-Pacific with the Quad. Unlike the US, India visibly gives strategic priority to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean rather than the western Pacific Ocean region, despite the seemingly shared Indo-Pacific discourse.

New Delhi’s reservations about the Indo-Pacific strategy are due to the lack of assurances it has when it comes to confronting China, as well as its own continued insistence on having “strategic autonomy”. Though India has been willing to solicit support from other big powers in order to gain leverage over China when discussing issues like the border dispute and the enduring Beijing-Islamabad bond, there is a fear that such an approach may backfire and cause relations with Beijing to worsen. Added to this is the tempting dividend New Delhi expects to earn through pluralistic diplomacy and a more balanced security portfolio. At times, that is reflected in the preference to stick to its own ways in defiance of Washington, e.g., risking CAATSA-mandated sanctions by staying firm on purchasing Russian S-400 missiles, bargaining with the US on its energy imports from Iran (albeit in vain), and being highly critical of the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, just to name a few.

Yet, New Delhi has tended to support the Indo-Pacific idea given its difficulties vis-à-vis China and the boundary dispute in particular. During his address at the Shangri-La Asian Security Dialogue in 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declined to portray the Indo-Pacific as an antagonistic strategy, in contrast to the US representative’s harsh words for Beijing. This event occurred just a few weeks after Modi’s parley with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Wuhan where both sides agreed to ‘reset’ bilateral relations and to take greater efforts to manage the boundary problem and other differences. But the opposite came true two years later. Shortly after the lethal Galwan clash in June 2020, New Delhi rushed to seek external support, both diplomatically and materially, in an attempt to augment its strategic capabilities against China. Accordingly, New Delhi appeared more determined than ever before to expand its involvement with the US-driven Indo-Pacific strategy and the Quad, reminiscent of how the Nehru government reacted during and after the 1962 border war.

From Beijing’s view, there have been mixed, often confusing, signals from New Delhi regarding the nature of its strategic relationship with the US and India’s role in the Indo-Pacific strategy. India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar recently reminded Beijing not to view India through an American lens. Yet, India has continued to move forward in tandem with the US on using the Indo-Pacific concept to check China’s influence in the region, while under the pretense of preserving a rules-based international and regional order.

New Delhi’s strategic ambiguity may be beneficial in the unfolding rivalry between China and the US. A two-pronged threat from India and the US may increase the pressure on Beijing to make some concessions on bilateral issues with New Delhi. At the same time, India could encourage Washington to be more accommodating towards India’s aspiration and interests. But navigating the US-China competition in this way would be a dangerous game for India since it is far weaker than either power which could lead to its being drawn into their squabbles. Moreover, strategic ambiguity also risks further aggravating India’s already unstable relationship with Beijing. New Delhi’s strategic ambiguity concerning the Indo-Pacific could therefore be a double-edged sword in terms of its ties with China.

Despite the change of administration in Washington, there are no signs that America’s Indo-Pacific thrust will significantly alter. Nor will there be any substantial changes to the partnership with India. New Delhi will continue to calibrate its posture on the basis of cost-benefit assessments and will most likely remain cooperative towards the US. Understandably, Beijing has become increasingly vigilant of any developments in the Indo-Pacific and is ready to respond. All in all, the incompatibility between China and India on the Indo-Pacific—and potential conflicts as a result—will further complicate their relationship in a negative way.


Zhang Li is a Professor at the Institute of South Asia Studies in Sichuan University, China.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

China donates anti-epidemic supplies as India sees record virus cases, deaths
Global Times, May 9

The first batch of donated anti-epidemic supplies from the Red Cross Society of China (RCSC) reached India on Sunday, Chinese Ambassador to India Sun Weidong said, as India was in urgent need of the materials to cope with the surge in new COVID-19 cases and deaths.

Year after Pangong clash, China reinforces positions, rotates troops along LAC
The Times of India, May 5

“China continues to maintain sizable forces in the areas to the rear of the friction points, while it reinforces military positions all along the frontier in the region,” said a senior officer.

China deletes social media posts mocking India's COVID-19 efforts after backlash
The Straits Times, May 2

A social media post by China's top law enforcement body juxtaposing the country's successful launch of a module into space with grim cremation pyres in India was deleted after it sparked online criticism in China.

Keep border issue at ‘appropriate position’, focus on long term ties, China tells India
The Indian Express, April 21

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said, “We hope India will meet China halfway and will focus on the bigger picture of long term development of bilateral relations, put the boundary at an appropriate position”.

China deploys long-range rocket launcher ‘as deterrent to India’
South China Morning Post, April 19

The People’s Liberation Army has deployed an advanced long-range rocket launcher to the Himalayas, in a move aimed at reinforcing China’s border defence and acting as a deterrent to India, according to a military mouthpiece and analysts.


News Reports

China and India in the Region

China Vows to Step In as India Curbs Vaccine Supply to Neighbors
Bloomberg, April 27

India’s neighbors are increasingly looking to China to fill the gap in their stalled coronavirus inoculation drives after New Delhi curbed vaccine shipments to battle a fresh and devastating COVID-19 wave at home.

‘Alarmed’: Several Nations Come to India’s Aid Amid COVID Crisis
The Quint, April 26

Nations, including the US, the UK, Germany, Afghanistan and Pakistan, have come to India’s aid and expressed solidarity.

US Senate committee approves China strategic competition bill; backs enhanced security ties with India
The Economic Times, April 22

It urges the US government that in close consultation with India, identify areas where it can provide diplomatic and other support as appropriate for India's efforts to address economic and security challenges posed by China in the region.

Australia ends China deals on national interest grounds
AP News, April 22

Australia’s cancellation of two infrastructure deals with China prompted Beijing on Thursday (April 22) to accuse its leaders of a “Cold War mentality” and threaten a possible response.


News Reports

Trade and Economy

EU, India try again to clinch trade deal, sidelining China
Associated Press, May 8

The European Union and India agreed Saturday (May 8) to restart negotiations on a bilateral free trade deal, eight years after their first attempt failed and as both sides seek alternatives to China.

5G trials: Govt keeps Chinese companies out
The Times of India, May 5

In a clear signal that business relations with China will remain restricted, Chinese telecom vendors Huawei and ZTE were absent from India’s latest 5G trials.

Australia, Japan and India form supply chain initiative to counter China
The Straits Times, April 28

The Japanese, Indian and Australian trade ministers have met to officially launch a Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, following reports that the three nations are working together to counter China's dominance on trade in the Indo-Pacific.

China Joins U.S. as Engine of Global Recovery With Record Growth
Bloomberg Quint, April 16

China’s economy strengthened in the first quarter of the year as consumer spending rose more than expected, putting it on course to join the U.S. as twin engines for a global recovery in 2021.


News Reports

Energy and Environment

Debris from Chinese rocket lands in Indian Ocean near Maldives
The Straits Times, May 9

A large segment of a Chinese rocket re-entered the Earth's atmosphere and disintegrated over the Indian Ocean on Sunday (May 9), the Chinese space agency said, following fevered speculation over where the 18-tonne object would come down.

'Cooling gap' widens, despite rising heat, as COVID-19 pandemic hikes poverty
The Straits Times, May 6

The widening cooling gap is expected to be worst in South Asia - where countries including India are now battling both more severe heatwaves and runaway COVID-19 infections.

Avalanche kills eight Indian workers in Himalayan region near China border
Channel News Asia, April 24

The avalanche is believed to have been triggered by glacier collapse in the Himalayas late Friday (April 23), two months after a devastating glacial burst in the same region left more than 200 dead.

China and India, 2 of the world's biggest greenhouse gas polluters, stay silent on new emissions targets at global climate summit
Insider, April 23

China and India held back on making concrete commitments to fight climate change at the Earth Day climate summit.

Cyclone Amphan of 2020 resulted in $14 bn economic losses in India: UN report
The Economic Times, April 20

The 'State of the Global Climate 2020' report, released on Monday (April 19), said that extreme weather combined with COVID-19 dealt a double blow for millions of people in 2020.

China should lift birth restrictions to take on India, US economically: Report
Hindustan Times, April 16

A working paper released by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank, made public that India’s labour force will exceed China’s by hundreds of millions in the years ahead.


Analyses

Why India’s maritime interests are closer to China than the US
South China Morning Post, May 6

By Zhou Bo, Senior Fellow of the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University

Like India, China does not accept arbitration on all disputes and is concerned with foreign military activities in its EEZ. Expediency might sell in the short term for India, but it seldom pays off in the long run and, worse still, it might backfire.

India doesn’t have to match climate commitments expected of China. Modi must make it clear
The Print, April 21

By Shyam Saran, Former Indian Foreign Secretary, Senior Fellow CPR; PM’s Special Envoy for Climate Change 2007-2010

At Biden’s virtual climate summit, PM Modi should assert that India with 7% of global carbon emissions can't be treated in the same manner as China with 30% of emissions.

New Normal in Sino-Indian Ties
War on the Rocks, April 21

By Chietigj Bajpaee, worked with several public policy think tanks and risk consultancies in the United States, Europe, and Asia

The United States should pay close attention to this deterioration in Sino-Indian ties, which will have long-term strategic implications for regional order in the Indo-Pacific and the international system more broadly.

India’s Vaccine Diplomacy Reaches Taiwan
Foreign Policy, April 20

By Harsh V. Pant, Director, Studies and Head of the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation; and Premesha Saha, Associate Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation.

As New Delhi and Taipei draw closer together, the map of the Asia-Pacific could change for good.

India can’t afford a ‘China decoupling’ as virus rages
Global Times, April 19

By Tian Guangqiang, Assistant Research Fellow, National Institute of International Strategy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

India is currently at a critical juncture. If the country wants to get out of the predicament, it needs to actively promote cooperation with other emerging economies, including China, in fighting against virus and boosting economic recovery, rather than continuously playing geopolitical games.

China cannot win the great vaccine diplomacy game without vaccines
Nikkei Asia, April 18

By Samantha Kiernan, Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations; and Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Professor at Seton Hall University's School of Diplomacy and International Relations.

At a glance, Beijing is winning at early vaccine diplomacy, as far as projecting soft power and expanding international influence is concerned. China has sent 114 million doses overseas and is out-pledging India, Russia and wealthy democracies in bilateral donations.

 

Books and Journals

The crisis after the crisis: how Ladakh will shape India’s competition with China
Lowy Institute, May 6

By Arzan Tarapore, South Asia Research Scholar at the Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University and a Senior Nonresident Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research

As a result of the Ladakh crisis, India faces a new strategic reality in which China is a clear and abiding adversary. For India, the political relationship is now defined by hostility and distrust, and the LAC will remain more heavily militarised and violence-prone. Given this new reality, India is likely to further defer military modernisation and maritime expansion into the Indian Ocean. In the face of unremitting Chinese naval expansion, India risks losing significant political and military leverage in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, China appears to have escaped significant harm. Its better-resourced military could better absorb the material costs of the mobilisation. It may have been more concerned by the prospect of an increasingly hostile India, but the disengagement agreement has limited even those modest political costs.

The central policy challenge for India is balancing the heightened Chinese military threat on the northern border with the rapidly growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean. It can manage this challenge by focusing on military strategies of denial rather than punishment, focusing on imposing political rather than material costs on China, and accepting more risk at the LAC in exchange for long-term leverage in the Indian Ocean region. How India responds will shape not only its strategic competition with China, but also the interests of likeminded partners including Australia, which depend on an increasingly capable and active India.

Essays on the Rise of China_160x243The 2020-21 Wilson China Fellowship: Essays on the Rise of China and Its Implications
Wilson Center, April 28

Edited by Abraham Denmark, Director of the Asia Program at the Wilson Center; and Lucas Myers, Program Associate at the Asia Program at the Wilson Center

In recent years, the rise of China has transformed the international system, and the downturn in U.S.-China relations increases tensions across a range of issues, from Taiwan to the South China Sea to human rights. Addressing these issues and crafting tailored policy responses will require nuanced and informed analysis of China from the U.S. academic community. With the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Wilson Center aims to bridge the gap between academia and policy by bringing together a cohort of rising scholars focused on China to undertake crucial, year-long research projects on China in our Wilson China Fellowship.

Contributors include Darren Byler, Sara B. Castro, Christopher K. Colley, Rush Doshi, Alexander Dukalskis, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Isaac B. Kardon, Lami Kim, Wendy Leutert, Jessica C. Liao, Adam P. Liff, Xiao Liu, and Oriana Skylar Mastro.


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Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

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ZHANG Li

ZHANG Li