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China-India Brief #177

February 12, 2021 - February 28, 2021

China-India Brief #177BRIEF #177

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
February 12, 2021 - February 28, 2021


Guest Column

China-India Contestations and the Indo-Pacific Paradigm
By Netajee Abhinandan      


CIB177_2_900x600Image credit: Flickr/Amit Sharma

Relations between China and India have been on a downward slide since May 2020. The two neighbours are engaged in a bitter territorial dispute in Ladakh. Tensions were raised after a violent clash in Ladakh’s Galwan valley on June 15 last year, and have only just begun to cool with the recent disengagement agreement. This conflict, however, should not be viewed merely as a localized border dispute, but as part of a larger strategic tussle that has been brewing for quite some time, and is now focused on the Indo-Pacific.

Despite continuous political engagement at the highest level and an expanding economic partnership, China and India have been at loggerheads to gain greater strategic space and influence. With the involvement of big players like the US, Japan, China, Australia, India and the major economies of Southeast Asia, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as one of the newest but most volatile regions of the world. Overall, a confluence of factors in Beijing’s regional environment—the Indo-Pacific’s increasing geo-strategic importance, India’s growing proximity with the US and ASEAN countries, India’s continued opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and the Modi government’s efforts to consolidate control over Jammu and Kashmir—have contributed to Beijing viewing India as a strategic competitor and not as a friend.   

Indo-Pacific: The New Strategic Paradigm   

The Indo-Pacific concept, promoted by US President Donald Trump in 2017 to counter China’s growing presence in the maritime zones of Indian and Pacific Oceans, has gained significant ground as a strategic paradigm. The very term Indo-Pacific—referring to the nations bordering the Indian and Pacific Oceans—is the manifestation of the maritime dimension of the issues confronting the region that connects Europe and the Americas with Asia. This way, the Indo-Pacific is a key geostrategic and economic area not only for the littoral states, but also for the US, the EU, as well as other great powers outside the region. However, China is not comfortable with the advancement of this new framework as it fears losing control and influence in the region. 

China is keen to initiate a new regional order that would establish its predominance and allow it to have greater sway over trade and resources in the region. It has consolidated its control over the South China and East China Seas, despite protests from countries like Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, and an adverse international judicial pronouncement at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), and has moved swiftly to militarize the whole region. Using its economic prowess, it has made deep inroads into countries surrounding the Indian Ocean like Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, by launching huge infrastructural projects under initiatives like the BRI. China’s large economic projects in the Indian Ocean, mostly ports, roads and airports, being referred to as the ‘string of pearls’ stretching from the South China Sea to Pakistan, have allowed it to enhance its strategic presence along the region’s key sea lines of communications (SLOCs) while guaranteeing access to developing markets and international trade. 

In addition, in recent months, China has intensified its drive to claim territory—both land and maritime—against India, Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Japan, Indonesia and Bhutan, leading to conflicts and contestations. With the US hardening its stand against China, and India fighting hard to counter Chinese territorial claims, conflict—either between China and the US or between China and India—looks more likely than ever. The US considers the Indo-Pacific as a priority theatre which can in no way be allowed to be dominated by any power unfriendly towards Washington. It has been very vocal in calling for a “free and open” Indo-Pacific and deriding China for its obtrusive policies and actions in the region. The US is keen to work closely with India to maintain ‘strategic stability’ in the Indo-Pacific and establish a rules-based democratic order that would accommodate the interests of all the littoral countries, especially its long-standing allies in Southeast Asia, as well as Japan and South Korea.

After outlining a set of maritime security principles under the ‘Joint Strategic Vision for Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’ in 2015, India and the US have moved forward in cementing their maritime partnership by finalizing a number of key agreements that include the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), and the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). Through these agreements, both countries intend to enhance their logistical cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and also counter China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Nonetheless, India and the US are yet to fashion a joint architecture to face the Chinese challenge.  

Strategic Opportunities and Constraints for India 

Prior to Galwan, India has never been terribly enthusiastic about either the Quad or the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). However, China’s repeated intrusions into Indian territory, coupled with its rather obdurate approach during the border negotiations, and most recently, the violent clash at Galwan that claimed the lives of twenty Indian soldiers, have convinced India of the utility of the Indo-Pacific paradigm as a means to protect its strategic interests vis-à-vis China, and at the same time, to play a more proactive role in Asian politics. Though both sides were able to sort out their differences and reach a mutually acceptable military disengagement in Ladakh, the crisis has likely convinced New Delhi that it cannot afford to trust Chinese assurances, and that remaining indifferent to Chinese activities in the maritime zones of the Indo-Pacific would only be to the detriment of its own economic and strategic interests.

In fact, the Indo-Pacific, as a geo-strategic construct, offers the most vital strategic paradigm for India to work upon in the context of China’s push for greater political and economic control in the IOR. That is why India has been making assiduous efforts to enhance the level of engagement with Southeast Asian countries and build strong partnerships with countries like Japan and Australia based on shared maritime interests. Last September, India signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan that would “allow the two countries to use each other’s maritime bases and facilities for repair and replenishment of supplies besides facilitating scaling up of overall cooperation”. It is significant to note that India has signed similar agreements to share military logistics with France, Australia, South Korea, Singapore, and the US, enhancing the security arrangement with these countries.

Having said that, India’s failure to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) would, to some extent, adversely affect its economic initiatives and engagement with Southeast Asia. Also, it would be very difficult for India to remain engaged with China and Russia—both openly opposed to the Indo-Pacific narrative—while at the same time pursuing a close partnership with the US, Japan and others. It is a tightrope walk that will put India’s diplomatic skills to the test.


Dr. Netajee Abhinandan is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Ravenshaw University, and has received his M.Phil and Ph.D in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University.  He is the Founder-Director of Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies (KIIPS), a premiere think-tank, based in Bhubaneswar, Odisha. He is also associated with Yunnan Minzu University, Kunming, China as a Visiting Professor.


Guest Column

Business as Usual is not yet an option for India-China Relations
By Don McLain Gill      


CIB177_1Image credit: Flickr/cell105

On February 10—after nearly nine months of grueling negotiations—Chinese and Indian forces began a phased disengagement from the southern and northern banks of the Pangong Tso in Ladakh. Under this agreement, the PLA will move east of Finger 8 on the Srijap plain and the Indian Army will move back to the Dhan Singh Thapa post in Finger 3. The entire area between Finger 4 and 8 will be demilitarized with patrolling schedules decided through consultations between commanders at a later stage.

On the surface at least, this looks like a step in the right direction. India-China relations had fallen to its lowest point in decades after the deadly Galwan Valley clash last June resulted in the deaths of 20 soldiers of the Indian army and another 4 on the Chinese side. Beijing certainly wants relations with Delhi to return to normal—Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian iterated as much when he stated in late January that the border issue between China and India should not be linked with the overall bilateral relations. But from India’s perspective, it cannot be business as usual until Beijing agrees to revert to the status-quo ante of April 2020.   

For one, the disengagement agreement seems to be restricted only to the area around Pangong Tso. PLA deployments elsewhere, such as across the Karakoram pass in Xiadullah, and the Daulet Beg Oldi (DBO) sector, have not changed. Another major area of concern for India is the strategically located Depsang Plains, where Chinese troops continue to block Indian Army patrols from going up to Patrolling Points 10 to 13 beyond the Y-junction. Thus, much still needs to be discussed between the two sides, and given a widening trust-deficit, extreme caution and verification must be considered.

Moreover, the shock of the bloodshed alone ensures that the current standoff will long remain in India’s public consciousness. In a statement given by Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla in September 2020, he said: “We have had an unprecedented situation on the India-China border, we have never had this sort of situation since 1962. We have lost the lives of soldiers which has not happened in the last 40 years.” Moreover, weighing in on the undeniable link between the border issue and the overall India-China relationship, Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar highlighted that, “Any expectation that they can be brushed aside, and that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic.” By unilaterally altering the status quo, in the Indian view, China has undone nearly three decades of painstaking diplomacy and negotiation to maintain peace and stability along the LAC.

China’s renewed assertive actions along the border were likely motivated by two key developments. The first was when India declared the territory of Ladakh as a Union Territory of India in August 2019. The second revolves around India’s steady improvement of infrastructure along the 3,488 km LAC from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. These infrastructural enhancements are expected to significantly boost the mobility of Indian troops and weapon systems in forward areas. As India continues to rise in both economic and military capabilities, China’s dominance will be inevitably challenged. To offset this potentiality, it would seem that China has continued to embark on a series of assertive and unilateral actions against India. 

From its unwillingness to accommodate India as a permanent member of  the United Nations Security Council and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to blocking the listing of Jaish-e-Mohammad chief, Masood Azhar as a global terrorist by the United Nations, in addition to undermining India’s territorial integrity by the development of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) flagship project, which passes through territory disputed by India and Pakistan—China has demonstrated its consistency in making decisions that often come at India’s expense. Though it is in Delhi’s interest to have positive and stable relations with Beijing, these Chinese policies have geopolitical implications for India. 

To alleviate the strained bilateral relations, Foreign Minister Jaishankar outlined eight important points that must be followed by both sides. Among the eight points, he included strict adherence to all agreements on border management, the need to fully respect the LAC, the importance of showing sensitivity to each other's interests, and ensuring that peace and tranquillity along the frontier prevails. In addition to these points, he also highlighted three particular and important “mutuals”—mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interests—which will serve as determining factors for the overall ties between the two Asian powers. 

India seeks to have and maintain peace with all its neighbours based on the rule of law. In Delhi’s view however, by creating an atmosphere of mistrust and uncertainty, China’s actions have directly contravened the principles of a rule-ordered region. Until peace and respect on both sides are achieved, China-India relations will not be able to find their way back to normalcy. India has insisted it is always willing to openly discuss security issues with its neighbours based on principles of democratic and transparent engagement, and respect towards internationally agreed upon norms. The question from Delhi’s point of view is whether China will tone down its assertive and unilateral actions and invest in continuous open discussions to secure the future of the region.


Don McLain Gill is an international affairs researcher and author based in the Philippines. He is a Fellow at the International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC), and is currently completing his master’s in International Studies at the University of the Philippines Diliman. He has written extensively on issues of regional geopolitics and Indian foreign policy.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

India, China foreign ministers to set up hotline as border crisis eases
Channel News Asia, February 26

The decision was reached at a lengthy call between the two foreign ministers on Thursday (Feburary 25), India's foreign ministry said in a statement.

Pangong Lake: India and China complete pull-back of forces
BBC, February 22

India and China have completed the pull-back of troops from part of their disputed Himalayan border, a joint statement issued by the Indian defence ministry says.

India and China hold fresh round of border talks after ‘smooth completion’ of pullback from Pangong Tso
South China Morning Post, February 21

A joint statement said commanders from both sides had held their tenth round of negotiations along their disputed frontier on Saturday (February 20).

Revealing truth on border clashes with India to help understand events: spokesperson
Xinhua, February 19

China has published relevant reports and revealed the truth on the border clashes with India, and this will help people understand the truth and the rights and wrongs of these events, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying said.

China admits 4 soldiers died in Himalayan clash with Indian soldiers
Financial Times, February 19

The revelation in China’s official military newspaper was made as both sides began pulling back troops to defuse the bloody border confrontation in eastern Ladakh.

Haven't conceded any territory as a result of agreement with China: India
Business Standard, February 12

India has persistently maintained right to patrol up to Finger 8, including in current understanding with China, says Ministry of Defence.


News Reports

China and India in the Region

India Beats China at Its Own Game in Vaccine Diplomacy Fight
Bloomberg, February 26

India’s huge capacity to make coronavirus vaccines is helping the country take on China in the battle to gain political influence across the developing world.

Pakistan, India pledge to end skirmishes along Kashmir frontier
Channel News Asia, February 25

Pakistan and India on Thursday (February 25) pledged to end all firing along their disputed Kashmir frontier, according to a joint statement from their militaries, after months of violence between the nuclear-armed rivals.

China backs India’s hosting of BRICS as summit offers forum to ease border tensions
South China Morning Post, February 23

China has said it supports India’s chairmanship of the BRICS summit this year, signalling goodwill after the two countries agreed to cool tensions in their months-long border stand-off.

India pips China, inks deal to develop, support, maintain harbour at naval base in Maldives
Deccan Herald, February 21

India elbowed China out and sides agreed on the terms of reference with Maldives for the project in September 2019.

Quad stresses on ‘rules-based order’ in Indo-Pacific amid India-China troubles, Myanmar coup
The Print, February 18

At the virtual meet, four Quad nations — India, US, Australia and Japan — emphasised on respect for territorial integrity, transparency and peaceful resolution of dispute, MEA said.

India pitches for connectivity from Arabian Sea to South China Sea
Zee News, February 15

The External Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar on Monday (February 15) pitched for connectivity from "The Arabian Sea to the South China Sea".


News Reports

Trade and Economy

China returns as top India trade partner even as relations sour
The Straits Times, February 23

China regained its position as India's top trade partner in 2020, as New Delhi's reliance on imported machines outweighed its efforts to curb commerce with Beijing after a bloody border conflict.

After 9-month freeze, Centre starts clearing China FDI plans
The Times of India, February 22

The Indian government has begun clearing FDI proposals from China on a “case-by-case” basis ending the nine-month freeze on such clearances.

Border tensions: Funds from China down to a third of 2019
The Indian Express, February 22

Overall private equity and venture capital (PE-VC) investment in India from funds based in China and Hong Kong fell sharply to $1.05 billion in 2020, compared to $3.5 billion in 2019.

 

News Reports

Energy and Environment

India seeks economic energy in Russian Far East, countering China
Nikkei Asia, February 22

New Delhi hungry for region's resources and wary of tighter Moscow-Beijing ties.

China urges to strengthen recycling of renewable resources
Reuters, February 22

China will speed up recycling and utilisation of renewable resources such as metals scrap in an effort to build low-carbon development and meet its carbon neutrality goal, the State Council said on Monday (February 22).

India’s coal power use may have already peaked, says report
Livemint, February 16

The third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases has a chance to leave the dirtiest fossil fuel behind.

China targets rare earth export curbs to hobble US defence industry
Financial Times, February 16

Beijing asks industry executives if proposed restrictions will harm western contractors.

China makes fight against climate change more affordable for world: Bill Gates
China Daily, February 15

Microsoft co-founder Bill Gates has applauded China's determination to prioritize the climate and its contributions to carbon reduction, saying the world benefits from the country's efforts to make green energy more affordable.


Analyses

Did India Just Win at the Line of Actual Control?
Foreign Policy, February 24

By Harsh V. Pant, Director of research, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi, and Professor of International Relations, King’s College London; and Yogesh Joshi, Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

Only a truly effective and general military deterrent will help India stand up to China’s bullying, and New Delhi today seems more determined than ever to move in that direction.

The future of India-China relationship is now all about the flux in US-China ties
The Print, February 22

By Zorawar Daulet Singh, Founder, Northcap University in Gurgaon; and Adjunct Fellow Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi

As the prospects for armed conflict at LAC recede, Indian strategists must now begin the process of making sense of the troubled India-China relationship.

Will China-India ties ease with troop pullout and upcoming investment deals?
Global Times, February 18

By Qian Feng, Director, Research Department, National Strategy Institute, Tsinghua University

It is in India's own interest to lift the ban on Chinese investment.

India and US must know the new Cold War is a different beast – China isn’t USSR
The Print, February 16

By Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor in International Politics, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi

In the last Cold War, India had a US, USSR and China card. That has changed now – it can no longer afford to be a prized ally standing aloof.

China has already won Asia's arms race
Nikkei Asia, February 14

By William Bratton, Author of "China's Rise, Asia's Decline"; former Head of Equity Research, Asia-Pacific at HSBC

Regional powers must act to curtail Beijing's military supremacy.

 

Books and Journals

The Frontier Complex_160x243The Frontier Complex: Geopolitics and the Making of the India-China Border, 1846–1962 
Cambridge University Press, January 2021


By Kyle J. Gardner, Associate at McLarty Associates. 

Kyle J. Gardner reveals the transformation of the historical Himalayan entrepôt of Ladakh into a modern, disputed borderland through an examination of rare British, Indian, Ladakhi, and Kashmiri archival sources. In so doing, he provides both a history of the rise of geopolitics and the first comprehensive history of Ladakh's encounter with the British Empire. He examines how colonial border-making practices transformed geography into a political science and established principles that a network of imperial frontier experts would apply throughout the empire and bequeath to an independent India. Through analyzing the complex of imperial policies and practices, The Frontier Complex reveals how the colonial state transformed, and was transformed by, new ways of conceiving of territory. Yet, despite a century of attempts to craft a suitable border, the British failed. The result is an imperial legacy still playing out across the Himalayas.


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ABHINANDAN, Netajee

ABHINANDAN, Netajee

GILL, Don McLain

GILL, Don McLain