China-India Brief #174

The current standoff along the China-India border is a stark reminder that despite outward appearances of cooperation and friendship, the relationship between Asia’s two largest giants remain highly contentious and volatile. In mid-June last year, a violent clash in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley resulted in the deaths of twenty Indian and an unknown number Chinese soldiers—the first fatal confrontation along the border since 1975. Amidst mutual recriminations of blame, tensions escalated as both sides began amassing men and equipment along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Chinese forces were even reported crossing the border at several points and occupying strategic positions on the Indian side. Despite multiple rounds of negotiations to reach a peaceful solution, no breakthrough has been achieved, and both sides have remained locked in a tense standoff since. Yet, even if the crisis is peacefully resolved, it is unlikely that China and India will simply bury the hatchet and move on. Rather, the latest standoff is expected to have long-lasting implications for bilateral ties, which look set to become even more hostile and confrontational.

This crisis comes just two years after the much publicized ‘Wuhan reset’ in 2018, where the leaders of both countries promised to restart bilateral cooperation and restore normalcy to ties, which had reached a low point after the months-long standoff at Doklam. On the surface at least, the post-Wuhan relationship did see a concerted push towards greater political dialogue and engagement. Regular high-level summits were held between Beijing and New Delhi, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a clear attempt to cultivate a personal relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping. At the time, however, many observers were skeptical of the hype surrounding the supposed ‘reset’. As I argued in a 2019 op-ed, the consensus reached at Wuhan was borne mainly out of political necessity, rather than a genuine commitment towards reconciliation.

Indeed, even amidst the flowery pronouncements of cooperation, the two powers remained on opposite sides of a number of critical issues. India remained staunchly opposed to, and highly critical of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its involvement in the Quad and support for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept was also seen as a blatant effort to rally global opposition against China. Moreover, New Delhi’s growing relationship with Washington (personified by the budding friendship between Modi and Donald Trump), raised concerns in Beijing, which was engaged in a global struggle over trade and technology with the superpower. 

The situation along the border has also been steadily deteriorating. Compared to China which has been strengthening its border infrastructure since the late 1990s and early 2000s, India has only begun to do the same in recent years. However, the latter has been making up for lost time with a greatly accelerated roadbuilding programme. As the militarily weaker power, India’s only hope of turning back a serious Chinese incursion is to achieve localized military superiority at critical points along the border. One way to do this is to have a good network of transport and logistical infrastructure that allows troops to be swiftly deployed to areas where they are needed. The completion of the 255 km Darbuk-Shayok-Daulat Beg Oldie road in April 2019, for instance, facilitates the movement of men and equipment from the Indian city of Leh right up to Karakoram Pass near the LAC. Though China has been continually developing its own border infrastructure, India’s expanding network of roads, tunnels and bridges has apparently raised concerns in Beijing. The Chinese foreign ministry has repeatedly criticized New Delhi’s border activities as being provocative and even labelled it as the “root cause of tensions”. 

Unsurprisingly, the latest standoff has only served to widen the gulf between the two powers. Rather than backing down, India needs to be seen as holding its own against China, or at least, achieve an advantageous settlement, in order to repair the damage to its image as a rising power. Indeed, its failure to protect its own borders and expel the Chinese from its territory is likely being seen as a sign of weakness in the eyes of its smaller neighbours, and a dent to its pretensions to regional leadership. Even in India itself, there has been an angry public reaction to the bloodshed at Galwan and criticisms of the government’s handling of the crisis. 

The Modi government, therefore, has made it a point to respond in a much more muscular fashion, both as a means to restore its global and domestic image, and to discourage further Chinese adventurism. A military escalation would be out of the question though, for obvious reasons. So, India has looked to other means of retaliating. Economically, India has steadily increased the pressure on its neighbour, through the banning of Chinese apps, blocking Chinese foreign direct investments into India, and excluding Chinese companies from public procurement bids. 

Internationally, India has also strengthened cooperation with ‘likeminded’ partners. Since the start of the crisis, it has signed major security agreements like the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) with the US and the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan. India has also begun working on a supply-chain initiative with Japan and Australia to counter China’s dominance in international supply chains. And in November, India invited Australia to return to the Malabar naval exercises for the first time in thirteen years, sending a clear message of defiance to Beijing. 

While India has carefully avoided military escalation, it has nonetheless accelerated efforts to strengthen its own military capabilities. Almost immediately after the clash at Galwan, India asked Russia to expedite delivery of purchased defence platforms including missile defence systems and fighter jets. As tensions escalated, India placed orders for additional military equipment from Israel, Russia, and the US. At the same time, it has moved to bolster domestic defence production by progressively banning the import of certain weapon systems and platforms under the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan initiative. The push for more indigenous systems like the recent purchase of eighty-three locally produced Tejas combat aircraft is a means to reduce India’s dependence on external manufacturers and supply-chains. In addition, missile-testing has also been stepped up. Between September and October last year, India tested ten missiles within a span of thirty-five days, with more tests since then. Such highly publicized arms purchases and missile tests (regardless of their actual military value) signals to China that India ‘means business’, and instils a sense of pride and patriotism amongst ordinary Indians, bolstering public support for the Modi government. 

China, similarly, will be unwilling to back down from India. Over the last few years, it has come under increasing external pressure from the US and its anti-Chinese coalition of the Quad. Certainly, repairing ties with India would be one way for China to weaken this informal alliance. However, India’s increasingly assertive attitude has likely convinced Beijing that India needs to be taught a lesson and put in its place. Coming down hard on its neighbour would also allow China to reassert its hegemonic authority in the region, and send a reminder to smaller countries not to step out of line. 

Beijing’s decision-making is also driven by its domestic situation. The Chinese communist government often employs nationalism to legitimise its political authority. Under normal circumstances, this would already make it difficult for Beijing to back down in international disputes. But today’s circumstances are anything but normal, with China facing global condemnation over its handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, tensions with Taiwan, and imposing of draconian laws in Hong Kong. Moreover, with its ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomats adopting increasingly defiant and strident tones against external criticism, it will be almost impossible for China not to stand firm against India or to accept an unfavourable outcome. 

Yet, only Beijing knows if it has overreached in this instance. Regardless of its intentions, China has succeeded in turning India’s public opinion virulently anti-Chinese. Where before there was merely skepticism and suspicion towards China, there is now outright hostility. This in turn, has given New Delhi the freedom to pursue bolder and more aggressive policy choices that would have been impossible in different times. Even if the current crisis is resolved peacefully, these policy decisions are unlikely to be reversed anytime soon, and will have long-lasting effects on bilateral ties moving forward. Certainly, just like the post-Doklam relationship, both sides will inevitably go back to their balancing efforts, manoeuvring to curb each other’s rising influence. But what will be different, will be that now the gloves will come off, and there will be less qualms about offending each other’s sensitivities, or even about showing outright belligerence. And most dangerously, the failure of the ‘Wuhan reset’ will serve as a constant reminder that talks of cooperation or engagement are not to be taken seriously, and that believing in genuine reconciliation between China and India would merely be indulging in naïve romanticism. This portends a relationship that will become much more contentious and antagonistic, before we ever see a return to ‘normalcy’.

Byron Chong is a Research Associate at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG). He holds a Masters in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. His research interests include China-India relations and international security.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

India, China continue to maintain close communication: MEA on Ladakh standoff
Livemint, January 14

The MEA spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said the two sides have agreed to hold the next round of military talks and are in constant communication in this regard.

China pulls 10,000 troops from India border, source says
South China Morning Post, January 12

China has withdrawn 10,000 troops from its disputed border with India in recent weeks, with Beijing calculating a slim chance of conflict in the Himalayan region this winter, according to sources and reports.

Trust With China "Profoundly Disturbed", US Ties On Upswing: S Jaishankar
NDTV, January 12

Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said on Tuesday that trust with China had been deeply impaired after last summer's border clash which resulted in the first combat deaths in 45 years.

India hands back Chinese soldier caught in Ladakh
Reuters, January 11

The Indian military on Monday said it had handed back a Chinese soldier held near a remote Himalayan border where thousands of troops from the two nuclear-armed neighbours have been facing off for months after a deadly clash.

Indian sailors stuck in China owing to Covid-19 set to return soon
Hindustan Times, January 9

Indian sailors stranded in China owing to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic will soon return to India, as a crew change has been arranged.

Sri Lanka revives port deal with India, Japan
Channel News Asia, January 14

Sri Lanka's President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on Wednesday (January 13) announced the revival of an Indian and Japanese investment project to develop a deep-sea terminal in Colombo harbour, next to a controversial US$500-million Chinese-run container jetty.

Memo: India key to US plan in Indo-Pacific, counter to China
The Indian Express, January 14

A newly declassified internal document of the outgoing Trump administration highlights how India figures as a key player in the US strategy on Indo-Pacific.

China backs Myanmar on Rohingya response with eye on Biden
Nikkei Asia, January 13

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi promised Beijing's support on Myanmar's handling of ethnic conflicts while meeting with the country's top officials, as part of China's efforts to shore up ties with neighbors ahead of the US presidential handover.

China worked to prevent India from chairing key UNSC terrorism-related body
Times of India, January 12

Chairing the sanctions committee for Al Qaida would have been significant for India at a time it seeks support from the international community for holding Pakistan accountable for its support to cross-border terrorism

As Nepal faces political turmoil, China and India are scrambling
South China Morning Post, January 10

The country has become a battleground for strategic rivalry between its neighbours.

India-Australia ties become comprehensive strategic partnership in pandemic-riddled 2020 as China looks on
The Economic Times, December 27

India and Australia, against the backdrop of their frosty relations with China, unveiled a ''shared vision for maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific'', a region which has been witnessing growing Chinese military assertiveness triggering concerns among major players.

EIU report: Vietnam rises as an alternative to China, beating India
Financial Express, January 14

Of the 14 countries in Asia, as many as 12 (except for Indonesia and Bangladesh) have outscored India in the FDI policy and labour. In foreign trade and exchange controls, only Pakistan performed worse than India, and in infrastructure, only Bangladesh scored less than it.

India's imports from China drop 20% as border tensions simmer
Nikkei Asia, January 13

India's goods imports from China likely plunged roughly 20% in 2020, official data shows, as a border dispute stoked bilateral tensions and helped spur New Delhi to build up domestic industries.

IMF projects China's economy to grow by 7.9 pct in 2021
Xinhua, January 9

China's economy is projected to expand by 7.9 percent in 2021 following 1.9 percent growth in 2020, as economic activity continues to normalize and domestic COVID-19 outbreaks remain under control, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said.

EU seeks to rebalance China ties with investment agreement
Channel News Asia, December 30

The agreement has been nearly seven years in the making and is likely to take at least another year to enter into force. It forms part of a new relationship with China, which the EU views as both a partner and a systemic rival.

Chinese economy to overtake US 'by 2028' due to Covid
BBC, December 26

The UK-based Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) said China's "skilful" management of Covid-19 would boost its relative growth compared to the US and Europe in coming years

India sets up high-level group for South Asia energy security
Livemint, January 5

The government has set up a high-level group tasked with helping build a South Asia-focused energy security architecture.

Planned Chinese Dam Along South Asian River Triggers Concerns in India, Bangladesh
Voice of America, January 3

China’s planned super dam on a major river that flows into India and Bangladesh threatens to turn into another in a series of flashpoints with New Delhi, and has sparked concerns in Bangladesh, which is critically reliant on the river for its fresh water supply.

China's ban on Australian coking coal to benefit India's steel producers, says India Ratings and Research
The Economic Times, December 26

The production cost of India's steel producers using the blast furnace route would remain contained in the near term due to China's ban on Australian coking coal, India Ratings and Research (Ind-Ra) said.

How will Biden’s strategy on South Asia differ from Trump’s?
East Asia Forum, January 10

By Michael Kugelman, Deputy Director for the Asia Program and Senior Associate for South Asia, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC.

While Biden may engineer a full-scale foreign policy reset, his administration’s likely South Asia policy will be an anomaly — a rare example of considerable continuity with Trump.

A US-Russia-China tightrope: In a complex, changing world, countering China is a multifaceted problem for India
Times of India, January 10

By Anita Inder Singh, Founding Professor, Centre for Peace and Conflict

An expansionist, economically and militarily strong China looms large over India’s north-eastern border, its Indian Ocean neighbourhood, and its ties with the US and Russia. If India wants to counter Chinese imperialism, it must face squarely the complexity of the security threat posed by China.

India self-isolates as China's economic might enfeebles West
Nikkei Asia, January 7

By Rupa Subramanya, independent researcher and commentator

New Delhi shows little understanding of China's growing power.

Will China-India relations see a turnaround in 2021?
Global Times, January 5

By Qian Feng, Director of the Research Department, National Strategy Institute, Tsinghua University

Although talks between New Delhi and Beijing have yet to make headway to end a border standoff, the Indian military itself wants to end the border standoff as soon as possible.

Why China Is Winning Against India
Foreign Policy, January 1

By Sushant Singh, Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research

The military standoff in the Himalayas is often seen as a stalemate between two nuclear powers. But New Delhi cannot afford the status quo.

Why China’s new hydropower project could have security implications for India
South China Morning Post, December 25

By Kuldip Singh, Senior Consultant in India‘s National Disaster Management Authority

Beijing’s planned dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo river (the Brahmaputra in India) could be another sore point between the neighbours, who are locked in a border dispute. New Delhi’s security concerns include China’s geoengineering and weather modification programmes and the sudden release of water.

Brahmaputra: a conflict-prone river takes a step backwards
War on the Rocks, December 23

By Joel Wuthnow, Senior Research Fellow, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, US National Defense University; Satu Limaye, Vice-President and Director, East-West Center; and Nilanthi Samaranayake, Director, Strategy and Policy Analysis Program, CNA

The Brahmaputra River is a source of life for more than 130 million people in China, India, and Bangladesh, but also a persistent irritant.

The India-China Nuclear Dynamic: India’s Options
ORF Issue Brief, December 22

By Rajesh Basrur, Professor of International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University 

The ongoing India-China face-off in Eastern Ladakh may appear to be a small-scale confrontation between conventional forces. But it is still one between nuclear-armed states, and the threat of escalation cannot be denied. In its wake, India has carried out a series of missile tests, while China too has fired a number of ballistic missiles near the Paracel and Spratly Islands, apparently to warn the US, but hardly something New Delhi can ignore. This analysis makes three key points: the threat from China is likely to persist; India needs to adapt balancing responses to the threat to the requirements of a nuclear weapons environment; and Indian policymakers should be mindful of the possibilities of actual military combat, be it a marginal war, or a trans-domain conflict that involves use of advanced technologies influencing both the nuclear and conventional spheres.