China-India Brief #173

Guest Column

Washington Focuses on China While Delhi Drifts

By Raffaello Pantucci    

Image credit: Flickr/Gage Skidmore

There is a sense in Asia that the arrival of the Biden administration in Washington foreshadows a softening of the US’s stance towards China. Nowhere is the concern more acute than in Delhi, where India fears it might find itself without its preeminent ally against China at a moment when confrontation is all the vogue. But India’s concerns are misplaced. The problems Delhi may have with Washington are not likely to be the product of a shift in America’s view on China. Rather, they will emanate from a more coherent and focused American approach towards dealing with Beijing, as towards Delhi over its numerous domestic problems. 

There will be a change in Washington’s approach towards China, but it is more likely to be a tactical shift than an adjustment in perspective. Beijing has been formally classified in American strategic thinking as the principal adversary in a global confrontation (Moscow scores as a problem just behind it). President Trump’s attempt to cast his political adversary as ‘Beijing Biden’ never resonated. Comment pages and think tank output over the past few years have gone to great lengths to emphasize that the aggressive posture towards China emanating from Washington was in fact a bipartisan push. Few on either side of the aisle has dared to articulate a narrative of cooperation or engagement, with a hawkish perspective that portrayed China as a new Soviet-style adversary on the world stage being the dominant view. 
 
But while this firm shift against China took place in Washington in the shade of an erratic Trump administration, Delhi found itself getting into an ever-tighter fix with Beijing. Constant border irritations escalated to the point that in the summer of 2020 Indian and Chinese soldiers fought a medieval-style battle in contested territory leading to unknown numbers of dead. Fury boiled over as hawks screamed for vengeance and confrontation.  
 
Yet the result has been as inconsistent as could have been expected. On the one hand, there has been a sharpening. The security establishment in Delhi is now minded towards confrontation with greater alacrity. Visions of cooperation with China in Afghanistan are gone, the long-dormant Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor is stalled (if not defunct), and Delhi is seeking to slowly push China out of its domestic cyber infrastructure in every possible way. India’s military establishment is using this moment to burnish its budget and buy as many new tools as it can. 
 
On the other side of the coin, however, India has continued to engage with China. Most specifically through various multilateral formats that the two share. At the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS Summits, India has appeared at the appropriate level and sought to avoid bringing its bilateral clash with China to the table. This reflects a broader reality that Delhi continues to acknowledge, namely, that no matter what happens, it will still find itself bordering China, a country on its way to being the world’s second (or possibly) largest economy.  
 
India has always been amongst the most hesitant partners of the Australia-India-Japan-US Quad. Its defence arrangements with the US have improved considerably over the past few years with a series of major agreements, but remain quietly complicated by India’s close relationship with Moscow. Delhi has always sought (understandably) to have its cake and eat it: it engaged with Russia and the US at the same time. It benefitted from stratospheric Chinese growth while also hinting at joining anti-Chinese alliances. And since Beijing saw its future as one intimately bound to Delhi in some way and did not see India as much of a threat, China was willing to let this prevarication go, until the recent confrontation which seems to have tipped the scales in both Delhi and Beijing towards the hawks. 
 
But Delhi’s hedging is going to become more complicated under a Biden administration, though not necessarily for reasons of Biden softening on China. Far from Washington changing on China, we are likely to see a continuation of an aggressive policy towards Beijing under President Biden. The difference will be that it is likely to be delivered with greater coherence and consistency than under President Trump. In fact, we are likely to see a more hardnosed and transactional relationship between the US and China – one  that no longer looks with optimistic lenses towards a world they would like to build together or fantastical bargains that cannot be maintained, but rather a relationship built on realpolitik focused on national interests. Biden will be more able to work with China on certain issues, but these will be framed through a context of importance to Beijing rather than being about American nationalism or global goods. Trade relations will be dealt with in a way that genuinely prioritizes American industries and holds China to account for promises that it has failed to fulfil. The US will continue to push on human rights and will not offer any break on these in exchange for other issues. This will all be delivered alongside Western allies who have been desperately waiting for American leadership. And crucially, the President will not personally hint in meetings at offering a break in his policies to China and will stand behind what his staff have negotiated. 
 
Beyond the difficulties India will have hedging with China is that the Biden hardliners will also come down on Delhi. While India has largely gotten a pass on domestic problems which have been bubbling up under Prime Minister Modi during the Trump administration, under President Biden human rights questions in Kashmir as well as problems in domestic political discourse will be raised. And it is unlikely that Washington will be willing to bargain these away in exchange for a deeper partnership against China. In addition, Washington might actually ask for a harder line towards Russia, something President Trump refused to broach, while fissures between Washington and Delhi on issues like technology openness and access might become bigger. Delhi will find itself under greater pressure from Washington and be unable to exploit space between China and the US.  

Delhi may look at a new Biden administration as a spanner in the works of its relationship with China, casting blame on soft Democrats unwilling to confront Beijing. But this will miss the real problem, which is that the US’s perspective on India has shifted while clarifying on China. Delhi will find itself still hedging with China while Washington has marshalled a new clarity and direction in its policy towards Beijing and the world.

Raffaello Pantucci is a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI and a Senior Fellow at RSIS.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

Xi replaces PLA commander who started Ladakh standoff; fingers crossed in Delhi
The Hindustan Times, December 21

General Zhao Zongqi of the People’s Liberation Army’s powerful Western Theatre Commander, and seen as the man responsible for the seven-month long military standoff with India in eastern Ladakh, has been replaced with General Zhang Xudong, who has never served along the Indian border.

70 Sino-Indian events as good as cancelled
The Economic Times, December 19

Celebrations planned for the 70th anniversary of India and China establishing diplomatic ties has practically being abandoned following tensions along the line of actual control and outbreak of Covid-19.

India in touch with China over two stranded ships in Chinese waters: MEA
Livemint, December 17

MEA spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said that the bulk cargo vessel MV Jagannath has been on anchorage near Jingtang port in China since June 13, and has 23 Indian nationals on board.

MOFA: China's policy towards India hasn't changed despite 'difficulties' and 'challenges'
CGTN, December 11

China has acknowledged that its ties with India are facing "difficulties and challenges" but at the same time asserted that Beijing's policy towards New Delhi hasn't changed despite the ongoing months-long border crisis.

‘Most difficult phase’ — Jaishankar says India-China ties ‘significantly damaged’ this year
The Print, December 9

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar says today’s China is ‘much more nationalistic’ and that it cannot be business as usual with Beijing as long as there is a border stand-off.

India, Vietnam sign seven agreements during virtual summit
Hindustan Times, December 21

India and Vietnam signed seven agreements for cooperation in areas such as defence, petrochemicals and nuclear energy and unveiled a joint vision for peace and prosperity against the backdrop of concerns in both countries about China’s aggressive actions across the region.

Suga and Modi call for unity in democracy to combat COVID-19
Nikkei Asia, December 21

Indian PM proposes new Buddhist library to 'guide world against challenges'.

Moscow’s relationship with China, Pakistan independent of its ties with India — Russian envoy
The Print, December 21

Nikolay Kudashev, Russian Ambassador to India, says Moscow would encourage enhanced dialogue between India and China as it believes this is ‘key to regional security and stability’.

China expanding role in South Asia, region to be more contested in coming decades: US think tank
The Hindu Business Line, December 17

China-India relations will become more competitive, says report.

China and Pakistan conduct joint air drills -- with eye on India
Nikkei Asia, December 10

China and Pakistan are conducting joint air force exercises in the southern desert of the Islamic Republic near the border with India in a not-so-subtle message to a country with which both have long had tense relations.

Diversifying imports: India to trim reliance on China in 1,100 items
Financial Express, December 18

The commerce ministry has identified alternative source of imports and shared its analysis with India’s overseas missions to “explore sourcing and export opportunities in their respective countries”.

India to name 'trusted telecom sources', may blacklist Chinese vendors
Business Standard, December 16

The committee will declare a list of trusted sources and products for telecom service providers.

‘Fear of China’ pushing Australia and India towards trade pact
South China Morning Post, December 11

China’s blocking of Australian exports and its border stand-off with India have fuelled efforts for a deal showing ‘how to stand up to Beijing’, experts say.

ADB sees shallower Asia slump amid better China, India prospects
The Straits Times, December 10

Developing Asia's economy will contract this year by less than previously estimated as it begins recovering from the coronavirus pandemic, according to the Asian Development Bank.

‘Politics come first’ as ban on Australian coal worsens China’s power cuts
Financial Times, December 21

Factories and street lights shut down to save energy as embargo contributes to shortages.

India, China to lead 2021 growth in global power demand: IEA
ET Energy World, December 15

India, along with China, will lead the growth in global demand for electricity in 2021, although consumption will recover at a slower pace than after the global financial crisis of 2008, the International Energy Agency said in its first ‘Electricity Market Report’ released on Monday (December 14).

China, India stress climate commitments at global summit
Channel News Asia, December 13

China and India edged forward in their commitment to lower carbon pollution on Saturday (December 12), issuing a string of promises that experts said fell short of action needed from the two emerging giants.

China solar capacity growth hits 40 GW in 2020 – official
Reuters, December 10

China’s total solar capacity had increased more than fivefold since 2015 and could double in the next five years, said Wang Bohua, vice-chairman of the China Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA).

Delhi now sees European powers as natural partners in constructing a durable balance of power in Indo-Pacific
The Indian Express, December 22

By C. Raja Mohan, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

A strong coalition of Asian and European middle powers must now be an indispensable element of the geopolitics of the East. Such a coalition can’t be built overnight. But Delhi could push for a solid start in 2021.

US wants India to ‘get off the fence’ over China. But forgets Cuban crisis lesson
The Print, December 21

By Tara Kartha, Former Director, National Security Council Secretariat

Indian Army’s confrontation with Chinese PLA in Ladakh can hardly be called ‘sitting on the fence’. But that’s not good enough for US officials.

India slinging dirt on China with cyber hack accusation is foolish
Global Times, December 21

By Liu Zongyi, Secretary-General, Research Center for China-South Asia Cooperation, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

Against the backdrop of rising trade protectionism in India, "covert cyber warfare" hype feeds into the dangerous economic nationalism erupting in the South Asian country, serving New Delhi's continuous attempts to exclude Chinese products and investments from its market.

Russia and China team up on the Indian Ocean
The Interpreter, December 16

By Oriana Skylar Mastro, Center Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University; and Foreign and Defense Policy Fellow, American Enterprise Institute

Two recent naval exercises demonstrate the potential for Russia-China cooperation in the Indian Ocean, and how the two present a much greater threat to a continued US role and influence in the region than either would individually.

China’s Economy May Be ‘Slowing Down’, But Don’t Write Off BRI Yet
The Quint, December 16

By Manoj Kewalramani, Associate Fellow-China Studies at The Takshashila Institution

Ever since it was launched, there’s been a raging debate about the sustainability of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).