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China-India Brief #197

January 27, 2022 - February 08, 2022

China-India Brief #197BRIEF #197

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
January 27, 2022 - February 08, 2022


Guest Column

The BrahMos Sale and the Bigger Picture
By Don McLain Gill


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After delays caused by the economically crippling effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, India has finally reached an agreement to supply the Philippines with BrahMos supersonic cruise missile systems jointly developed with Russia. While the current versions have a range of up to 500 km, the export variant of the BrahMos missile only has a 290 km range due to restrictions under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Given these developments, it is necessary to underscore the future implications, challenges, and opportunities of such a deal on regional security, Philippine defence, and Indian foreign policy. 

This deal comes at a time when India seeks to bolster its defence industry. Being one of India’s biggest defence sales, the roughly US$ 375 million BrahMos deal will not only significantly improve the status of India’s defence export plans, but will also serve as an important platform for New Delhi to inch closer to its goal of being a major security provider in the Indo-Pacific, while pursuing its vision of self-reliance by reducing its dependence on the import of arms. 

India’s defence exports have seen a significant increase, reaching INR 8,434.84 crores (US$ 1.1 billion) in 2020-21 from just INR 1,521 crores (US$ 203 million) in 2016-17. In addition, India plans to boost exports of aerospace and defence goods and services to US$ 5 billion by 2025. However, despite the progress, there are still several concerns that need to be addressed and improved. Ranked as the 24th largest arms exporter in the world, India’s journey to effectively penetrate the global defence market has been quite arduous despite its large domestic defence manufacturing and research capabilities.

The sale of the BrahMos system to the Philippines and the advanced-level talks with Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam on similar deals thus serve as a much-needed boost to the global image of India’s defence industries. Additionally, as India seeks to bank on its position as an Indo-Pacific power, its strategic engagements with its neighbours in the east are of paramount importance. Among them, the Philippines holds a critical place given its geostrategic relevance, its adherence to the rules-based order, and its bittersweet relationship with China against the backdrop of the ongoing South China Sea disputes. 

For much of the post-Cold War period, India and the Philippines had maintained a relatively modest bilateral relationship due to the lack of major engagements in the security and economic realms. Since 2014 however, their partnership has witnessed a significant boost with the establishment of a number of praiseworthy agreements and interactions. Moreover, with India’s rising economic and military capabilities, it is increasingly viewed as an important strategic partner for Southeast Asian countries amid the intensifying US-China power competition. 

Furthermore, enhancing its partnership with the Philippines will greatly complement India’s warm relations with other key Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and Myanmar. This will also allow India to broaden the scope of its collaboration with other key Indo-Pacific powers like Japan, Australia, and France. 

Amid the growing assertiveness of China throughout the region, and particularly in the South China Sea, acquiring the BrahMos is a significant step in the right direction for the Philippines to develop its naval capabilities. In parallel, the Southeast Asian country has also been significantly recalibrating its foreign and security policy. Recent events—including when Chinese coast guard ships blocked and used water cannons on Philippine supply boats heading to a disputed shoal occupied by Filipino marines in the South China Sea—have led the Philippine government to bank on the Mutual Defence Treaty with the US and deepen its partnership with like-minded countries.

With BrahMos missiles capable of flying at speeds of Mach 2.8, it will be difficult for air defence systems to intercept it. Moreover, its capabilities also allow it to target advanced fighter jets, such as the Chinese J-20. While the BrahMos will provide a strategic edge in the country’s military modernization program, Manila’s foreign policy will still need to remain grounded in pragmatism given the small number of BrahMos systems purchased (just three batteries), and China’s constantly improving military and technological capabilities. 

To ensure that it remains ahead of advancements in air defence technology, India is already undertaking efforts to develop new versions the of BrahMos missile with even greater speed and range. Moreover, with India already having its foot in the door vis-à-vis the Philippines’ defence market, it will be easier for both countries to pursue long term collaborative projects in capacity building and security cooperation. 

However, such a move is seen negatively by China as it seeks to cement its sphere of influence. Even as early as 2017, India’s proposal to sell Akash missiles to Vietnam had been met with apprehension in Beijing. In an article titled ‘Indian arms sale to Hanoi disturbing if aimed at China’, the state-run Global Times stressed that “if the Indian government genuinely treats its enhancement of military relations with Vietnam as a strategic arrangement or even revenge against Beijing, it will only create disturbances in the region and China will hardly sit with its arms crossed”.

Is such a reaction from China warranted given that it itself continues to deepen its strategic footprint in South Asia? China has not only significantly increased the frequency of its naval activities in the Indian Ocean, but has also been developing strategically located ports and infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bangladesh. Moreover, China has been fast-tracking its infrastructure developments along the disputed border with Bhutan. Most importantly—in line with the issue at hand—China has also been a major supplier of arms and defence equipment to India’s immediate neighbors. 

India’s strategic engagements in Southeast Asia need to be viewed, however, through a lens that goes beyond interpreting its every move in the Pacific as an attempt to counter China. India’s great power ambitions and its desire to solidify its role as a major pillar of the rules-based order will inevitably require it to boost its partnership with key countries to its east. This is not to say that its power competition with China remains an unimportant part of its regional strategy. Rather, India has now been illustrating its willingness to send strong messages to China whenever the latter seeks to harm its national interests and sovereignty. 

While India used to freely hand over olive branches to China, and often tried to craft policies that revolved greatly around compromise, the Modi government has demonstrated its firm resolve to safeguard its regional interests. Indeed, as former Army chief Gen V.P. Malik (retd) noted, “The other thing that I have noticed with the present Prime Minister [Modi] and the set up is that today we are not taking things lying down. Even if we are surprised, whether it was Uri, Pulwama, something on Eastern border, we are now sending a message that we will take action against you”.

In a broader sense, the BrahMos sale represents a successful attempt by India to showcase its capacity as a security provider for Southeast Asian countries given the complex geopolitical landscape surrounding them. As China and the US continue to complicate the trajectory of interstate relations in this geographic space, India’s role as a strategic partner becomes even more important. With an interest in preserving the stability of the Indo-Pacific’s rules-based order, and having no vested territorial interests in Southeast Asia, India is viewed as a reliable and unbiased economic and defence partner that can cater to the needs of Southeast Asian countries without having them fall deeper into the intensifying US-China competition. However, consistency and proactivity will be needed from both sides to sustain this positive momentum.


Don McLain Gill is a Resident Fellow at the International Development and Security Cooperation (IDSC), and the Director for South and Southeast Asia at the Philippine-Middle East Studies Association (PMESA). He is a geopolitical analyst and author who has written extensively on India-Southeast Asia relations and Indian foreign policy. He is also the co-author of the newly released book, The Rise of Philippinedization: Philippinedization is not Finlandization.


Guest Column

The BrahMos missile deal: Manila’s defence build-up and diversification meets Delhi’s security forays in China’s backyard
By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III 


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The purchase of three BrahMos missile batteries by the Philippines confirms its commitment to modernise its military and diversify its security partners in keeping with its “independent foreign policy”. For India, the acquisition provides a promising security anchor for its ‘Act East’ policy and could be a harbinger for increased security engagement with Southeast Asia. China has long been a major arms supplier to India’s neighbours, and the BrahMos contract could be seen as India returning the favor by making forays into China’s backyard. That both Delhi and Manila, as well as other Southeast Asian capitals, have outstanding territorial and maritime rows with Beijing adds another complexion to the sale. 

The $374.9 million deal is groundbreaking for the Philippines and will significantly strengthen its shore-based anti-ship missile capabilities. It showed the country’s resolve to sustain its multiyear military modernisation programme despite the difficulties posed by the pandemic. While other arms deals in the region, notably Thailand’s plan to purchase two more Chinese-built submarines, stalled because of public backlash, the government of President Rodrigo Duterte prevailed over criticisms to make the deal happen. The acquisition cements his administration’s contribution to the long-term capability development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), presiding over a sustained increase in defence spending in the last five years. Setting aside the theatrics and his rapprochement with Beijing, he will go down in history as having invested enormously in elevating the AFP’s hardware inventory. 

The purchase further attests to the country’s desire to work with as many partners, both traditional allies and non-traditional partners, to beef up its capabilities. This opened doors for India and BrahMos’ co-developer, Russia, to play a role. In recent years, the Philippines had procured combat aircraft from Brazil, surface-to-air missiles from France, strategic sealift vessels from Indonesia, combat utility helicopters from Poland, and anti-submarine helicopters from the United Kingdom. The country’s biggest coast guard ships are being built in Japan, with which it also signed a deal for air search radars, Tokyo’s first defence export. Manila also acquired two missile-capable frigates and a corvette from South Korea, with orders for two more. From its longstanding treaty ally, the United States, it received offshore patrol vessels, drones, and transport aircraft. Manila is also expecting the arrival of Turkish attack helicopters and fast patrol boats from Israel, raring to get Russian heavy-lift choppers, and is eyeing to acquire submarines. Indeed, from being a window shopper, the Philippines became a serious arms buyer. 

The top-level support given to AFP’s modernisation drive was not lost to major arms suppliers, which purposefully placed arms donations and dangled deal sweeteners like markdowns, financing, and local production to get their piece of the pie. The BrahMos deal announces India’s arrival on the scene. Catching up with neighbours and enhancing its security posture in the coveted West Philippine Sea are two factors driving Manila’s defence build-up. 

The Philippine sale is BrahMos’ first international breakthrough and is a huge confidence booster for the Indian defence sector. Interest from other regional littoral states like Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam show a budding market for Delhi’s missile exports fueled by, among others, unease over Beijing’s growing footprint in contested waters. Satisfaction with BrahMos’ performance in the field and its associated logistical support and maintenance will go a long way in positioning India as a reliable arms exporter to the region and beyond. 

China certainly plays into the equation. India and several maritime Southeast Asian countries, namely, the South China Sea littoral states of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, share disputes with China. This communion adds motivation to their defence cooperation. Delhi long expressed concern about Beijing’s potential dual-use ports in the Indian Ocean and the steady flow of Chinese arms to its neighbours. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database details China’s burgeoning arms sales to India’s neighbourhood. For instance, China’s all-weather friend, Pakistan, secured air-to-air missiles, guided bombs, a coastal defence system, air search radars, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters, torpedoes, and drones and placed orders for submarines. Under license, Islamabad also produced anti-tank, surface-to-air, and anti-ship missiles, tanks, aircraft, frigates, corvettes, and offshore patrol vessels. It will also produce four of eight ordered Chinese submarines at home. For its part, Bangladesh bagged surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, fighter aircraft, frigates, and two submarines from China. Defence cooperation resulted in the license-production of patrol craft, corvettes, and locally-assembled tanks. Beijing also sold armored personnel carriers to Nepal, light transport and trainer aircraft, and a frigate to Sri Lanka and donated a patrol boat and two maritime patrol aircraft to Seychelles. 

This flurry of arms deals engendered unease in Delhi. It gave fresh impetus to step up defence spending, support the indigenous defence industry, and cultivate security partnerships abroad. While Thailand is expecting delays in the delivery of its first Chinese-made S26T Yuan-class submarine and hoping to weather public opposition to buying two more, India already donated a retrofitted Kilo-class submarine to its neighbour Myanmar. Naypyidaw also bought air search radars and ASW sonars and torpedoes from Delhi. India also extended credit lines to Vietnam to procure Indian defence equipment and is building 12 high-speed guard boats for Hanoi, seven of which will be made in the Southeast Asian country. Delhi also provided training for Vietnamese sailors manning Kilo-class subs. Before the celebrated BrahMos contract, private Mumbai-based defence firm Larsen & Toubro also bagged a deal to upgrade light armour units of the Philippines’ navy and air force. In 2016, Kolkata-based Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE) took part in a bid to supply Manila with frigates, though it eventually lost to South Korea’s Hyundai Heavy Industries. 

Surely, India’s nascent arms venture into Southeast Asia is dwarfed by its neighbours’ shopping list of Chinese hardware, notably by Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, the BrahMos deal signals Delhi’s eagerness to shed inhibitions to supply arms to Southeast Asia and double down in supporting exports of its homegrown defence goods. Hence, expect China and India to not only compete in the lucrative Asian arms market, but to also carry on cultivating defence partners in each other’s backyard for strategic gains.


Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation in Quezon City, Philippines.


The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.



News Reports

Bilateral relations

India launches last-minute diplomatic boycott of Beijing Olympics over Chinese soldier
CNN, February 4

India on Thursday (February 3) announced a diplomatic boycott of the Winter Olympics in Beijing after a commander involved in 2020 border clashes between the two countries appeared as an Olympic torchbearer in the customary torch relay leading up to the Games.

China continues to illegally occupy 38,000 sq km of Indian territory: Govt
The Times of India, February 4

In a written response in the Lok Sabha, minister of state for external affairs V Muraleedharan also saod that Centre has taken note of the "illegal" bridge being constructed by China on Pangong lake in Ladakh.

Indian teen tortured by Chinese troops; kicked and given electric shocks, family says
South China Morning Post, February 3

The boy was blindfolded with hands tied behind his back and taken to a camp where he was abused, and ‘lost all hopes of returning home’, his father said.

India to have ‘vibrant’ border villages to counter China’s territorial claims
Deccan Herald, February 1

The Indian government is set to roll out a Vibrant Villages Programme to develop the sparsely populated habitats along the disputed India-China boundary.

Chinese FM sends message of sympathy to Indian FM
CGTN, January 30

In his message, Wang said that upon learning of Jaishankar's infection with COVID-19, he would like to extend sincere sympathy to him and wish him a speedy recovery.

 

News Reports

China and India in the Region

Opposed To "Unilateral Actions" On Kashmir: China After Xi-Imran Khan Meet
NDTV, February 7

In the past, India strongly rejected references made to Jammu and Kashmir in a previous joint statement by Pakistan and China and asserted that the union territory as well as Ladakh have been and will remain its integral and inalienable part.

Russian diplomat thanks India, China for being ‘brave’ to ‘withstand US hand-twisting’ before UNSC vote on Ukraine
The Print, February 1

India, Kenya, and Gabon had abstained, while China had voted against a procedural vote in the UN Security Council ahead of a meeting on the situation in Ukraine.

India ramps up warship patrols in Indian Ocean to keep pace with China but funding gap remains
South China Morning Post, January 28

About 125 foreign vessels were in the Indian Ocean at any given time, according to Indian naval officials.

After Russia nod, India inks deal to supply BrahMos to Philippines to help it bolster defence against China
Deccan Herald, January 28

The Philippines on Thursday (January 27) signed a contract worth about $370 million to procure the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles manufactured in India in collaboration with Russia.

India's Modi hosts virtual summit with Central Asian leaders
The Straits Times, January 27

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi pledged closer ties and security cooperation with five Central Asian nations as he hosted their leaders at a virtual summit days after neighbour and rival China hosted a similar meeting.


News Reports

Trade and Economy

China smartphone brands, including Xiaomi, Vivo and Oppo, continue to lead India smartphone growth in 2021: report
South China Morning Post, February 3

Chinese brands accounted for four of the top five smartphone brands in India last year, according to to a new report by research firm Counterpoint.

India's imports from China grew by 8% from 2014
Business Today, February 3

Chinese imports to India have increased by 7.94 per cent from $60.41 billion in 2014-15 to $65.21 billion in 2020-21, according to India’s commerce minister.

Low R&D spend one of the reasons why India lags behind China, US in patents: Economic Survey
The Economic Times, January 31

The average pendency for final decision in acquiring patents in India is 42 months as of 2020. This is much higher than 20.8, 20, 15.8 and 15 months respectively for USA, China, Korea and Japan.

How India and its South Asian Neighbours Fared During the US-China Trade War
The Wire, January 29

Contrary to expectations, India’s gains from trade diversion in manufactures over 2017-19 were only $1.2 billion, while Bangladesh’s were only $390 million.


News Reports

Energy and Environment

China, Russia enhance ‘growing energy partnership’ with gas deal during Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin meeting
South China Morning Post, February 4

A series of agreements were confirmed, including a deal for Russia to supply China with 10 billion cubic metres (353 billion cubic feet) of gas per year via a new pipeline.

Climate change will lead to extreme winds, tall waves along Indian coasts, finds study
India Today, February 4

The study published in the journal ‘Climate Dynamics’ Springer, states that extreme wind waves will impact coastal regions along the east and west coast of India and countries bordering the Indian Ocean rim having implications on coastal flooding and shoreline changes.

India to spend $2.6 billion on solar to curb reliance on China
The Times of India, February 1

India outlined plans to spend an additional 195 billion rupees ($2.6 billion) to boost local manufacturing of solar modules, stepping up a campaign to cut imports from China.

China Non-Fossil Fuel Power Capacity To Hit Record This Year
Oilprice.com, January 28

China will, by the end of the year, have more renewable and low-carbon power generation capacity than fossil fuel capacity, the country’s Electricity Council has reported.


Analyses

PLA has a new book on 1962 India-China War
Sunday Guardian, February 5

By B. R. Deepak, Professor, Center of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

The 1962 war with India has been described as ‘a complete victory’ and is often cited as a ‘lesson’ taught to India.

Modi’s Foreign-Policy Juggling Act
Foreign Policy, February 4

By Derek Grossman, Senior Defense Analyst, RAND

Modi put India on the map as a great power—but strategy problems are piling up.

How India and Southeast Asia can save global growth as US and China stagnate
South China Morning Post, February 3 

By Brian P. Klein, former US diplomat

India and the ‘Asean-5’ could emerge as saviours of global growth, thanks to their young, tech-savvy populations and low wages.

How India can adapt to global geoeconomic churn
The Indian Express, February 2

By C. Raja Mohan, Visiting Research Professor, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore

Until now, India had the luxury of treating its foreign, economic and strategic policies as separate domains. It needs to integrate its financial, trade, technological, security and foreign policies.

India’s Geopolitical Challenges in 2022
Council on Foreign Relations, February 1

By Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Associate Professor, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University

There are irritants that, if not tended to, could prove stumbling blocks for the US-India relationship in 2022.

Arunachal Pradesh in Beijing’s Security Calculus: Watching the Eastern Sector of the Sino-Indian Border
South Asian Voices, January 27

By Jagannath Panda, Research Fellow and Coordinator of the East Asia Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

Arunachal Pradesh is swiftly emerging as a point of heated discord between India and China.

 

Books and Journals

India-Australia-Indonesia Maritime PartnershipIndia-Australia-Indonesia Maritime Partnership: Shared Challenges, Compelling Opportunities
Observer Research Foundation, February 2022


By Premesha Saha, Associate Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF; Natalie Sambhi, Founder and Executive Director, Verve Research; and Evan A. Laksmana, Senior Research Fellow, Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore 

This report seeks to outline the common maritime security challenges facing India, Australia, and Indonesia, and proposes policy options for strengthening trilateral cooperation to address them. A 2020 study conducted by the authors of this report, titled Anchoring the Indo-Pacific: The Case for Deeper Australia-India-Indonesia Trilateral Cooperation, has argued that the core of their trilateral cooperation should be within the maritime domain, with the Indo-Pacific region as the primary theatre and the three states as anchors. Given the regional uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific, as well as the limitations of existing multilateral institutions and bilateral partnerships, stronger cooperation and alignment between the three nations can boost regional stability and provide strategic benefits for all. Therefore, these countries, and how they interact with one another, are key to the long-term strategic stability of the region.


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GILL, Don McLain

GILL, Don McLain

PITLO, Lucio Blanco, III

PITLO, Lucio Blanco, III