Hedging, rather than balancing or
bandwagoning, is the modal behavior of non-great powers under uncertainty. Yet
despite its prevalence as a state alignment choice, hedging remains an
undertheorized subject in the study of international relations. This book
offers one of the first theoretical works on strategic hedging in world
politics. Conceptually, the book traces hedging’s multidisciplinary roots as an
instinctive human behavior, arguing that strategic hedging is best understood
as an insurance-seeking behavior under high uncertainty, which entails three
defining attributes: active neutrality, inclusive diversification, and adaptive
offsets. Theoretically, the book develops a two-level framework to explain
when, how, and why states hedge rather than balance or bandwagon. Empirically,
it tests the propositions against a set of Indo-Pacific countries at different
junctures. The book concludes that structural-level conditions largely explain
shifts in alignment decisions (e.g., from non-hedging to hedging, or vice
versa), while domestic factors account for variation in the specific forms
hedging takes (heavy versus light hedging).