While existing research
emphasizes how electoral incentives affect climate policymaking, we examine how
distributive politics within the bureaucratic system shapes renewable energy
investment. We advance a theory of access-based favoritism, arguing that informal
institutions such as hometown ties provide local governments with privileged
channels to lobby central agencies. Our empirical analysis draws on novel
personnel data on key central regulators and approval records for more than
6,000 renewable energy projects implemented in China between 2003 and 2020.
Using county-level panel data, we find strong evidence of spatially based
bureaucratic favoritism: the hometowns of central bureaucrats are more likely
to obtain renewable energy projects. The results support a political access
mechanism, showing that the effect of lobbying on project approvals is
significantly more pronounced in the hometowns of central bureaucrats than
elsewhere. We further demonstrate that hometown ties facilitate transactional
rather than informational lobbying. Finally, we assess the environmental
consequences of this access-based bureaucratic favoritism, finding mixed
evidence regarding the impact of politically favored projects on carbon
emissions reduction.