China-India Brief #151

Guest Column

Contrasting Interpretations of Mamallapuram Summit: A Similar Expectation with Different Emphases 

By Feng Renjie and Lei DingKun    

Photo from Prime Minister's Office of India

As part of a continuing endeavour to enhance China-India relations after the Wuhan Summit, the second informal summit was held at Mamallapuram, Tamil Nadu, on October 11–12, 2019, during which Indian Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi had a candid exchange of views on various aspects of the bilateral relationship. This could be seen as a continuing effort to enhance strategic communication and manage differences at the top level with prudence and maturity. However, compared with the Wuhan Summit last year, it seems that the backdrop to the Mamallapuram Summit was clouded with uncertainties and contradictions (Joshi 2019).  First, the contentious situation in the border areas of India and Pakistan had been escalating before the summit. Second, China’s stance on Kashmir at various international forums such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has elicited serious concern in India (PTI 2019; Krishnan 2019). Third, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to China in the run-up to the summit could be seen as a snub to India and added to the complex atmospherics of the summit. Fourth, Prime Minister Modi’s high profile visit to the US and warm reception by President Donald Trump took place as tensions escalated between Washington and Beijing.

Given such a complicated ambience, the fact that this second informal summit was held on schedule is significant. Clearly, both leaders attached exceptional importance to the bilateral relationship and to prudently manage disputes. Our analysis draws on  the views of scholars from India and China on the summit. The Indian viewpoint can be seen in the writings of retired bureaucrats and military officers, researchers from think tanks such as the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), and academics. The Chinese view can be accessed from the writings  published in the leading think-tanks in China such as the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), etc.

Looking at the views of Indian and Chinese analysts, it is possible to identify several common stances. Both sides agreed that the structure of the informal summit makes it an important supplement to the formal diplomatic channels, particularly as a way of ensuring implementation of agreements. Ambassador Nirupama Rao, the former Foreign Secretary, contended that “in many senses, the Summit is necessary, because things has been a little bit rocky in the few months” (The Wire 2019). Manoj Joshi also pointed out that “Cooperation with China will enhance India’s diplomatic clout in Washington” (Joshi 2019). 

In formal and structured bilateral meetings, the results of negotiations have, to a large extent, been “pre-cooked”, that is, they have been decided beforehand (The Wire 2019), with representatives of both delegations reading prepared scripts at the actual meeting. Furthermore, although the leaders meet on the side-lines of multilateral events, such as the G20, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), BRICS Summit, etc., they usually have only 20 to 30 minutes to discuss issues with each other, and half the time is taken by the interpreters (NDTV 2019). The informal summit has two advantages which makes it a significant and efficient channel for direct engagement between Modi and Xi. First, there are no rigid processes to constrain the agenda: both leaders can discuss any issue they perceive as important in bilateral relations and beyond (The Wire 2019). Second, the format gives Modi and Xi sufficient time to have a tête-à-tête with only the interpreters present.

Yet, perceptions differ on the outcome of the summit. Indian perspectives have not been uniform. Overall, they can be summarized in three categories. The first is the argument that the summit is instrumental in developing a healthy bilateral relationship between India and China. While profound differences do exist, the summit demonstrated that both sides can work together on various issues. Chakravarty (2019) noted that “the Mamallapuram Summit’s outcomes may be limited, but it signals the desire of the two leaders to remain engaged despite differences. It is in the spirit of not allowing differences to become disputes”. The second is a more critical view of the summit and is the perspective held by the majority of Indian analysts. They acknowledge the positive implications of the informal summit in terms of avoiding strategic miscommunication, making progress towards lowering the trade deficit, and enhancing people-to-people connections. However, they argue that on more critical issues, China is unlikely to make substantial compromises. The reason is that China currently has the upper hand vis-à-vis India. With its massive GDP (which is  five times larger than India’s), China’s international status as a permanent member in UNSC, etc., Beijing has the ability to make decisions that can harm India  without fear of repercussions. For example, Mohan (2019) argues “China can afford to displease India”. The third Indian view is the belief that the informal summit is essentially a diplomatic show and addresses none of the substantial concerns of India, nor brings any meaningful change. Gupta (2019) argued that “while they (Modi and Xi) hobnobbed in the seaside town of Mamallapuram in southern India earlier this month, they did little to resolve underlying border tensions and other contentious issues”. Ganguly (2019) suggested that the solution to addressing India’s concerns is for New Delhi to have a tighter relationship with the US.

On the Chinese side, the interpretation of the summit has been mostly similar, with some differences. Most Chinese scholars spoke enthusiastically about the consensus achieved at the meeting. For example,  Liu (2019)  emphasized the implication of two stable emerging economies on international security and development. Qian (2019) highlighted the importance of further communication between two ancient civilizations. Liao (2019) acknowledged the common efforts of India and China in rejuvenating the two civilizations. Hu (2019) applied the wooden bucket theory (the capacity of water in a bucket is determined by the shortest of the planks) to reveal underexplored areas in which India and China could work together to enhance bilateral relations.  Lin (2019) pointed out how critical it was for the two giants to speak in one voice and play a more significant role as emerging powers on the international stage.

Reading through their interpretations on the summit and inspired by their insights, we further propose three entry points on how to think about the summit. First, China has attached great importance to its relationship with India and the South Asian region as a whole. This summit should be viewed within the overall context of current international dynamics, especially against the backdrop of the surge in isolationist and protectionist behaviour, including the US’s withdrawal from several key international organizations as well as Brexit. With multilateralism facing different challenges at the international level, China and India, in spite of the complexities in their relationship, share the view that they have a common interest in preserving multilateral cooperation and advancing a rules-based, inclusive international order, through reforms that reflect the realities of the twenty-first century.

The second entry point on understanding the summit is to note the emphasis on trust-building between the two militaries. Although both sides organise the “hand-in-hand” counter-terrorism exercise annually, the scale of these military interactions lags far behind those conducted by India with ASEAN, the US, Japan and Australia, or those between China and Russia and the Central Asian countries.  China and India can do a lot more to increase their level of mutual trust, but the continuation of the exercises indicates that both countries want to avoid the zero-sum game of great power competition.

The last entry point on the significance of the summit is how India can balance its strategic relationships. Although India has always tried to maintain strategic autonomy, the US has increasingly made efforts to influence New Delhi, including India’s role in the “Indo-Pacific”. Under the Trump administration, US policies towards India have also been driven by the President’s insistence on balanced mutual gains and benefits. Even though the recent interactions of the two leaders at the “Howdy Modi” in the Houston event with the Indian diaspora have enhanced the Modi-Trump chemistry, this has not changed the fact that the two countries have very different stances on certain issues. Therefore, it is in India’s interests to balance its relations with both the US and China—upgrading its overall strategic cooperation with the former, while constructively engaging the latter. The informal summits could serve this purpose. For the two giant neighbouring countries, maintaining regional peace, stability, and prosperity is essential for their own long run goals and ambitions.


References

Chakravarty, P. R. (2019) “Modi-Xi Mamallapuram summit not purely informal,” The New Indian Express (October 13), available online at https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2019/oct/13/modi-xi-mamallapuram-summit-not-purely-informal-2046691.html.

Ganguly, S. (2019) “The Leaders of the World’s Two Biggest Countries Meet—and Come Away With Little Progress,” Foreign Policy (October 14), available online at https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/14/modi-xi-india-china-little-progress/.

Gupta, A. (2019) “Xi and Modi Trade Confrontation for Comity at Another Informal Summit,” World Politics Review (October 23), available online at https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28285/xi-and-modi-trade-confrontation-for-comity-at-another-informal-summit.

Hu, S. (2019) “Comments on Five Key Points of Second Informal Summit of Leaders of India and China,” China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (October 14), available online at
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/T59QNDWa4qe3PxFi8ZJFtw.

Joshi, M. (2019) “Modi & Xi at Mamallapuram: How India can Increase Diplomatic Clout,”The Quint (October 10), available online at https://www.orfonline.org/research/modi-xi-mamallapuram-how-india-can-increase-diplomatic-clout-56426/.

Krishnan, A. (2019) “Modi-Xi Summit Can be a Success, if only India and China Can Get Pakistan out of Their Mind,” The Print (October 11), available online at https://theprint.in/opinion/narendra-modi-xi-jinping-summit-success-india-pakistan/304045/.

Liao, Q. (2019) “Insights: The Fruitful Outcomes from Chennai, Xi-Modi Informal Meeting 3.0 is Likely to be in China Next Year,” Shanghai Observer (October 13), available online at https://www.jfdaily.com/news/detail?id=181940.

Lin, M. (2019) “'Xi-Modi meeting' staged again, easing uncertainties behind the scenes,” Fudan University (October 13), available online at http://brgg.fudan.edu.cn/articleinfo_1252_1.html.

Liu, J. (2019) “President Xi and PM Modi strolls through town,” The Global Times (October 10), available online at https://world.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnKnbNp. 

Mohan, C. R. (2019) “With China, India must recognise power imbalance, liberate itself from prolonged illusions, false hopes,” The Indian Express (October 11), available online at https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/narendra-modi-xi-jinping-meeting-india-china-relation-jammu-kashmir-6063189/.

NDTV (2019) “PM Modi-Xi Jinping Meet: Can India Trust China?” Youtube (October 11), available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCIK41-F23k.

PTI (2019) “Pakistan gets backing only from China at UNSC meeting on Kashmir: Report,” Livemint (August 16), available online at https://www.livemint.com/news/india/pakistan-gets-backing-only-from-china-at-unsc-meeting-on-kashmir-report-1565960303149.html.

Qian, F. (2019) an Interview Taken by CNR,“Expert: The Informal Summit will Enhance the Endogenous Motivation for Cooperation” (October 12), available online at http://china.cnr.cn/news/20191012/t20191012_524811883.shtml. 

The Wire (2019) “Can Informal Summits Stabilise India-China Relations?” Youtube (October 19), available online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Po1FkOOGAbk.

Feng Renjie is a PhD candidate at the Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has previously worked at the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS) as a Research Intern. 

Lei Dingkun is a PhD candidate at the Department of International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

In ramp-up, 75% roads on China border ready
The Economic Times, January 20

India is ramping up its infrastructure development along the border with China. The Border Roads Organisation has constructed 75 percent of the entire length of strategic roads along this border assigned to it, with plans afoot to finish 11 more by this year and nine more by next year, government officials said.

New India-China military hotline to become operational between DGMO and Western Theatre Command
The Economic Times, January 11

A new military hotline between India and China which has been pending for a long time will soon become operational, Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane said on Saturday (January 11). He explained that the proposal for the hotline has been accepted by both sides after all procedural issues were resolved.

China-India Youth Dialogue launched to mark 70th anniversary of ties
Xinhua, January 10

The China-India Youth Dialogue has been held at the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, which was attended by a group of Indian students from various streams.

Northern Army commander meets PLA's ground forces' commander in China
India Today, January 8

Northern Army Commander Lt Gen Ranbir Singh, who is heading a military delegation to China, on Wednesday (January 8) Gen Han Weiguo Commander People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Ground Force and exchanged views on measures to further enhance peace and tranquility along the borders, the Indian Army said.

China's PLA begins major military exercises in Tibet
The Economic Times, January 6

The Chinese army has begun major military exercises in the high-altitude Tibet bordering India, deploying latest weapons including the Type 15 light battle tank and the new 155-MM vehicle-mounted howitzer, a media report said on Sunday (January 5).

China prepared for what they wanted to become, India should start: Jaishankar
Livemint, January 6

A "big" lesson India can learn from China is to imbibe its problem solving mindset as India evolves from a civilisational society into a modern nation state like its giant northern neighbour, Indian foreign minister S. Jaishankar said on Monday (January 6).

On India China border dispute, Army chief Naravane hints at eventual solution
Hindustan Times, January 2

The new army chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane on Wednesday said maintaining peace and tranquillity along the India-China border could lead to an eventual resolution of the border dispute.

China, India vow to work on border issues as violence erupts in Kashmir
South China Morning Post, December 22

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi says the two sides reached consensus on strengthening cooperation and trust during meeting in New Delhi. Indian statement says two countries should respect each other’s ‘sensitivities’.

News Reports

China and India in the Region

India worried as China-Myanmar deepen ties
Livemint, January 20

China and Myanmar, over the weekend, signed 33 bilateral agreements that are expected to strengthen ties between India’s eastern neighbor and Beijing.

In a first, China, Pakistan navies deploy submarines in strategic Arabian Sea drills
The Economic Times, January 8

Navies of China and Pakistan, holding nine-day exercises in the Arabian Sea to enhance their all-weather strategic partnership, have for the first-time deployed submarines, providing a rare major exposure to the Chinese navy in the region.

China may deploy aircraft carrier in Indian Ocean Region, says Navy commander
The Times of India, January 6

China will deploy its aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in the coming years, said Flag Officer Commanding in Chief of Southern Naval Command Vice Admiral AK Chawla on Sunday (January 5).

Russia, China, Iran start joint naval drills in Indian Ocean
Reuters, December 27

Iran, China and Russia began joint naval drills on Friday in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman, in what Moscow said was an unprecedented exercise in naval cooperation and training.

China calls for restraint as India, Pakistan troops exchange fire along LOC
The Economic Times, December 27

China on Friday (December 27) urged India and Pakistan to exercise restraint and refrain from taking action to escalate tensions, amid reports of incidents of exchange of fire by the armies on both sides along the Line of Control (LOC).

Sri Lanka not to renegotiate Hambantota Port agreement with China: president
Xinhua, December 20

Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa has said he will not renegotiate the Hambantota Port agreement with China and will look to ensure that the security of the port lied with the Sri Lankan side.

China postpones UN Security Council discussion on Jammu and Kashmir, diplomats say
South China Morning Post, December 18

Talks on flashpoint Indian territory put back because UN peacekeepers were not ready to brief security council. China’s request was made after Pakistan sent letter voicing concerns about increasing tensions with India.

India, Maldives vow to deepen maritime ties, boost anti-terror cooperation
Business Standard, December 13

India and the Maldives on Friday (December 13) vowed to boost anti-terror cooperation and expand their maritime security ties to deal with common challenges in the Indian Ocean, a region where China has been rapidly expanding its military presence.

News Reports

Trade and Economy

India-China trade dips by nearly $3 billion in 2019
Deccan Herald, January 14

The bilateral trade between India and China declined by about USD three billion last year while India’s trade deficit continues to be high amounting to USD 56.77 billion as both countries experienced an economic slowdown.

SoftBank-backed Oyo cuts 1,800 jobs in India and China
Nikkei Asian Review, January 13

India's Oyo Hotels & Homes has let go of about 1,800 employees in India and China, trimming fat in key markets while strengthening a push into the US.

India can explore USD 82 billion export potential in 20 products in China: Report
The Economic Times, January 2

India can explore an annual USD 82-billion export potential in twenty products, including electrical equipment and ferro alloys, in the world's second largest economy China, according to a report. Indian exporters have a competitive advantage as far as these twenty goods are concerned.

Huawei gets nod for 5G trials in India
CGTN, December 31

The world's second-largest internet market has opened doors for all equipment suppliers, including Huawei, to participate in the upcoming 5G trials in India.

Asia will have world’s largest GDP in 2020 — China and India to contribute the most
The Print, December 29

In 2020, Asia’s GDP will overtake the GDP of the rest of the world combined. By 2030, the region is expected to contribute roughly 60% of global growth. Asia-Pacific will also be responsible for the overwhelming majority (90%) of the 2.4 billion new members of the middle class entering the global economy.

Chinese apps edged out by domestic rivals in India as competition heats up in world’s No 2 smartphone market
South China Morning Post, December 27

Chinese apps in India were overtaken by locally developed offerings this year in terms of total number of installations, as the world’s second largest smartphone market continues to draw major international players in a range of categories.

News Reports

Energy and Environment

Asia's appetite for coal grows, with China the key decider
Nikkei Asian Review, January 13

Although renewable power generation is expected to rise significantly in Asia, India's vast electricity needs will still underpin global demand for coal until 2024, according to a recent report released by the International Energy Agency. The IEA said, however, that China will be the biggest decider of coal's future after 2024, as it accounts for half of global consumption.

India's oil demand growth set to overtake China by mid-2020s: IEA
Reuters, January 10

India’s oil demand growth is set to overtake China by mid-2020s, priming the country for more refinery investment but making it more vulnerable to supply disruption in the Middle East, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said on Friday (January 10).

Govt may extend safeguard duty on Chinese solar power equipment
Business Standard, January 6

With India being one of the few major markets seeing a demand for solar power, Beijing would flood the market if safeguards were removed, they have said.

India leads the world in pollution-related deaths, followed by China and Nigeria
South China Morning Post, December 19

Indonesia and Pakistan round out the top five, according to the Global Alliance on Health and Pollution report. The report also found ambient air pollution to be responsible for 40 per cent of all pollution-related deaths, led by China, India and Pakistan.

India poised to stockpile oil in exchange for IEA role
Nikkei Asian Review, December 8

The International Energy Agency will consider requiring India to stockpile crude oil in exchange for involvement in the organization's decision-making, turning to an energy-hungry Asian nonmember to help stabilize global prices.

Analyses

Can India and Indonesia team up to counter China in the Indo-Pacific?
South China Morning Post, January 17

By Natalie Sambhi, Executive Director of Verve Research, and Research Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre

India and Indonesia can work together to strengthen norms of maritime behaviour that would cover the disputed South China Sea. China is likely to resist the move, but, with careful diplomacy, Beijing could be encouraged to accept this emerging order.

Toward an Indo-Pacific concert of democracies
The Japan Times, January 14

By Brahma Chellaney, geostrategist, scholar, author and commentator

In his second term, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sought to initiate a new practice on New Year’s Day: To discuss a shared vision of peace and prosperity in India’s subregion, Modi on Jan. 1 telephoned leaders of all neighboring nations other than his country’s two adversaries, China and Pakistan.

Modi thinks he is Xi Jinping, but protests show India is not China
South China Morning Post, January 4

By Debasish Roy Chowdhury, Jefferson Fellow and winner of multiple Hong Kong News and SOPA awards

Opposition to India’s new citizenship initiatives challenges the rise of a paramount leader with unprecedented powers. Attempts to institute a monolithic order run up against India’s political and cultural diversity, and deeply ingrained democratic values.

India raises own version of Indo-Pacific to maximize interests
Global Times, December 29

By Long Xingchun, Director of the Center for Indian Studies at China West Normal University; and Research Fellow at the Charhar Institute

The US Indo-Pacific strategy only needs India rather than the entire Indian Ocean and its coastal areas. Nor does it aim to strengthen economic cooperation with countries along the Indian Ocean. The fundamental target is China. The strategy serves US interests rather than those of Indo-Pacific countries including India.

How CPEC hurdles can be overcome
Global Times, December 19

By Liu Zongyi, Secretary-General of the Research Center for China-South Asia Cooperation at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; Visiting Fellow of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China; and Distinguished Fellow of the China (Kunming) South Asia & Southeast Asia Institute

In essence, CPEC is in need of the synergies between Chinese and Pakistani development strategies. It is undeniable that CPEC will have geopolitical impact. In the context of the complex and delicate situation in South Asia, the geopolitical influence is likely to be magnified. However, both sides should have a clear understanding of this and should not overstate the geostrategic value of the CPEC.

Maldives: ‘China factor’ still hurts, but intra-party equations this time?
Observer Research Foundation, December 17

By N. Sathiya Moorthy, Distinguished Fellow and Head of ORF’s Chennai Imitative

Incumbent President Ibrahim Mohamed ‘Ibu’ Solih seems to be getting caught in the cross-fire – if it is not China, or both.

China and India’s maritime rivalry has a new flashpoint: the Andaman Sea
South China Morning Post, December 14

By Yogesh Joshi, Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

The revelation that the Indian Navy had forced a Chinese research vessel out of Indian waters is the latest sign of Beijing’s interest in the waterway. China is looking to deny India the strategic and military use of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, through means such as expanding its submarine fleet.

Books and Journals

Is there a U.S.–China–India triangle? – Beijing’s official views
India Review, Vol. 18, Issue 4 (2019)

By Alexander Korolev and Fengshi Wu

Alexander Korolev is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sydney; Fengshi Wu is an Associate Professor in Politics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sydney.

This research examines China’s official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China’s official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime’s official media outlets would speak of China–India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia–India–China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China’s security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States.