On October 16, 2019. Assistant Professor Ryu Yongwook presented on the topic of “Re-Examining ASEAN’s Commitment to the Norm of Non-Intervention” at the 24th Politics and IR Brown Bag. While the so-called “ASEAN Way”, namely, the respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the norms of non-intervention and non-interference have been the modus operandi for most of the time, but in recent decades, especially since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, there have been debates on whether to revise this norm in order to better deal with regional transboundary issues. While the norm of non-intervention is still the most fundamental norm within ASEAN, but the question is whether ASEAN’s commitment to this norm has been the same since 1967? Secondly, if there is a temporal variation in the degree of commitment, then what explains the variation?
It has been discovered that, through a reading of some ASEAN documents, such as the 2007 revision of ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, the organization has been trying to find ways to bypass the norm on non-intervention in order to operate in a more efficient fashion. Initially, more than 1,100 internal official agreements of ASEAN since 1967 are collected, and provisions with the key phrases “non-intervention” and “non-interference” are selected and examined to see what these official agreements say about these norms. However, the provisions containing key phrases of “non-intervention” and “non-interference” all uphold or reaffirm the principle, with some even mention that regional cooperation does not override national priorities. Therefore, this approach could not bring forth any useful evidence on variations or deviations from the norms in question.
Possible approaches in the future include: First, the counting of the number of legally binding agreements versus non-binding agreements rectified by ASEAN, as Dr. Ryu argues that an increase in the former suggest the desire to weaken state sovereignty, even though state sovereignty is upheld at the time of deciding to sign the agreement. However, the problem is that, while some past ASEAN agreements are legally-binding, but member states could choose to withdraw from these agreements and these agreements also respect the norm of non-intervention. Second, it will also be useful to examine the relationship between issue types and how they affect the different levels of commitment to the norm of non-intervention.
During the Q&A, it was pointed out that even if the number of legally binding agreements increased, the finding would still be inconclusive, as many legally binding agreements are “no-cost agreements” for some countries, as the clauses may be irrelevant to them. On the other hand, countries may enter a Prisoner’s Dilemma when they refuse to agree on legally binding agreements, since other countries may do the same, and in turn, harm this country’s interests. So countries may still prefer collective actions within ASEAN. The speaker replied that one way to deal with this problem is to look at issue types. The non-compliance to certain agreements may lead to Prisoner’s Dilemma, while some other issues are about coordination. The strongest evidence for the deviation from the norm of non-intervention by ASEAN would be the compliance to its agreements by member countries which interests may be limited by such an agreement.
The spectrum of “non-intervention” and “non-interference” should also be defined; for example, what are the opposites of these key phrases and what are in between? Also, with the problem of transnational standard-setting in mind, the signing and compliance of ASEAN agreements require members to fit their domestic policies with ASEAN standards. This will surely affect the domestic operations of policies, so in a sense, these ASEAN standards are also “intervening” in the domestic politics of member states. The definition of “interference” can also be blur, since ASEAN provision of assistance to internally-displaced refugees of a member country may or may not be considered as interference. For example, when ASEAN provides help to Rohingyas in Myanmar, are they simple providing humanitarian aid or are they supporting the Rohingyas against the Burmese government?
It was also suggested by the speakers that perhaps we can look at some shocks that ASEAN experienced, such as the September 11 Incident, and if these shocks have made ASEAN to rethink about the norm of non-intervention. However, it was also pointed out by the speaker that some member countries of ASEAN became even more committed to the norm of non-intervention after September 11 Incident. So the causes to such developments are worth delving.