On October 13, 2022, the Centre on Asia and Globalisation hosted the S.T. Lee Distinguished Lecture as part of the 2022 Festival of Ideas at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. The speaker was Alastair Iain Johnston, the Governor James Albert Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs at the Government Department of Harvard University, who spoke on “China’s Approaches to International Orders.”
Professor Johnston began by explaining that there is no singular international rules-based order; rather, there are often multiple contradictory orders, and China’s compliance with international order depends on the specific type of international order. Referring to eight types of order, including constitutive, military, development, financial, environmental, etc. He then elaborated on specific orders China supports, opposes, or remains moderate.
China strongly supports fundamental orders like sovereignty and territory norms, which is the nature of main characters in the international system, Johnston said. For example, China has been a firm advocate for the United Nations and perceives it as centrality in global governance because China, as well as the US, believes the UN to be the primary institution for sovereignty. They also both remain conservative on the reform of the UN Security Council and oppose institutions like the International Court of Justice that may eliminate their sovereignty, Johnston said.
On the other hand, China opposes political development-related orders (referring to those international rules and norms of how states should treat their people), which is the main divergence between the superpowers. Increasingly stressing state sovereignty and non-interference, China opposes liberal norms including freedom of speech/assembly, liberalization, and other democratic practices. Johnston highlighted that the Liberal Democracy Index reflects no change over time in China regarding democratic practices compared with other countries.
The order that China remains moderate is that of trade: China pros the “free-ish trade” and has been opening up (reducing taxes, more and deeper free-trade agreements, etc.) particularly after its entry into WTO in 2001. At the same time, however, China’s persistence on state-owned enterprise limited its import on the sector that is strategically important, which is nonresponsive to the WTO requirements.
In general, Johnston suggests that revisionist states like China have been challenging status quo states like the US on the rules-based system. Instead of the rules-based order, China believes in a community-common destiny and highlights the “peace genes” of Chinese people, which Johnston found true historically.
Moreover, he believes the narrative of shaping status quo vs. revisionist states could be problematic because it may prevent self-awareness about US revisionist behaviors, reduce the search for areas of cooperation, and reinforce the sense of ingroup exceptionalism thus contributing to the security dilemma dynamics, he said.
When asked how people would see the competition of exceptionalism between the two orders and whether they are coexistable, Johnston said it is as what it is, but we can classify orders as sovereignty-enhancing or -perforating for interpretation.
This event summary is prepared by Zero Lin, Master's candidate in International Affairs at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, and currently working with the Centre on Asia and Globalisation under the Research Attachment Programme.