China-India Brief #146

Guest Column

No First Use of Nuclear Weapons and Sino-Indian Relations

By Yogesh Joshi    

Photo from Ministry of Defence, Government of India

In a relationship otherwise dogged by conflicting interests, mutual misperceptions and egoistic rivalries, the Sino-Indian nuclear dyad remains a pillar of stability. Globally, India and China are the only two nuclear-capable states following a policy of No First Use (NFU).  Even during moments of heightened crises, both Beijing and New Delhi have attempted to either deter one another through conventional military means or deescalate through diplomacy. Contesting along the Himalayan frontier for more than seven decades, neither China nor India have ever issued a veiled or overt nuclear threat to one another. In global nuclear history, there is no other example where two nuclear-capable states with a significant territorial dispute have declined to use nuclear weapons for military or diplomatic leverage.

India’s suggestion that it could potentially revise its NFU is therefore profoundly troubling. During his recent visit to Pokhran, the site of the May 1998 nuclear tests, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh signalled that India may reconsider its NFU pledge. Singh’s musings come against the backdrop of similar statements made by several political and military leaders in the last few years. The primary target of India’s nuclear revisionism is Pakistan; New Delhi assumes that threatening Islamabad with pre-emptive or first use would dilute the latter’s penchant for nuclear risk-taking. However, some have argued that early use of nuclear weapons may also provide India certain dividends vis-à-vis China. For one, China’s military modernisation, firepower amassment and improvement in military logistics across the border has left India extremely vulnerable to Chinese military threat; the “Himalayan buffer” has now all but vanished. Indian military strategy of deterrence by denial through conventional attrition warfare will not suffice in the new environment. Leveraging nuclear weapons, including tactical munitions, offers a cheaper alternative to deter China compared to the costly route of raising and dedicating more forces such as the Mountain Strike Corps to the Sino-Indian border. Second, a strategy of first use of nuclear weapons would also communicate India’s resolve to maintain the status quo on the border. Using nuclear weapons first, therefore, makes sense both for deterrence signalling and military strategy.

Such arguments are not new to the Indian nuclear debate. In the decade following the Chinese nuclear test of October 1964, India was extremely vulnerable to Chinese nuclear weapons. This decade of vulnerability witnessed an intense debate within India over the need to go nuclear not only to deter Chinese atomic weapons, but as some influential voices within the military and political circles argued, to upset Chinese conventional superiority on the Himalayan frontier. Indian decision-makers, however, practised a policy of nuclear restraint. Technological incapacity and nuclear moralism are often cited as the reasons for India’s nuclear reticence. However, history shows that India’s political leadership answered the question of Chinese nuclear threat in a pragmatic framework.

First, rather than a direct military threat, New Delhi perceived China’s nuclear weapons as a response to the Cold War. The United States (US) and the Soviet Union, rather than India, were believed to be the intended targets of Chinese nuclear capability. Second, irrespective of Mao’s revolutionary zeal and his rhetorical nonchalance towards the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, Indian decision-makers perceived Chinese nuclear strategy and thought-process to be highly conservative and risk averse. The reason was simple: while India was vulnerable to China, China was equally imperilled by the US and the USSR. Indira Gandhi’s principal advisor summed up this Cold War dynamic in the following words, “However unpredictable China may be, the Chinese would dare not use nuclear weapons against a country not possessing them…they would know in such an event, neither the US nor the USSR could stand by and watch.” The risk of nuclear retaliation by the great powers rather than the credibility of an Indian nuclear deterrent was enough to deter decision-makers in Beijing. Lastly, New Delhi rejected the notion that battlefield use of nuclear weapons would help stem the tide of a Sino-Indian conventional war in India’s favour. Indian decision-makers appreciated the fact that “possession of [a] few tactical weapons” would not thwart Chinese aggression on the Himalayan frontier because of problems inherent in fighting a limited nuclear war. As PN Haksar counselled Prime Minister Gandhi, “every time a tactical exchange takes place, it invariably escalates to a strategic exchange as soon as one of the parties starts having the worst of the tactical exchange.” Archival record shows that during the height of the Cold war, Indian decision-makers were convinced that the “use of atomic weapons by China can be ruled out.” China’s nuclear weapons did not threaten India; its support for the Pakistani nuclear programme in the 1970s and 1980s did. If the past is a guide to policy, decision-makers in New Delhi could do well by understanding the history and practice of India’s nuclear behaviour vis-à-vis Beijing.

Notwithstanding Chinese support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme, which continues to this day, New Delhi must appreciate that in Beijing and Islamabad, it faces two unique nuclear adversaries.

First, Beijing’s outlook on nuclear weapons is highly risk-averse. From the very beginning, China has perceived nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence rather than coercion or compellence. Islamabad, on the other hand, believes nuclear weapons to be instruments of first resort and leverages them for revisionism of all kinds. The difference between China and Pakistan’s nuclear outlook has played itself out in various crises with India. Beijing and New Delhi have self-conscientiously abstained from leveraging their nuclear weapons during crisis-situations. Such behaviour ensures that even during periods of heightened tensions such as Doklam, crisis-instability does not escalate to the nuclear level. On the other hand, India-Pakistan crises are always fraught with nuclear overtones largely because Pakistan adheres to a policy of first use.

Second, Sino-Indian history conclusively illustrates that Beijing fully understand the language of force and appreciates military strength. New Delhi does not require nuclear weapons to signal its resolve in maintaining the status quo on the border. In numerous crises beginning with the 1967 Nathu La incident, Indian conventional military response has been both firm and punishing. And Beijing recognises this. As Shivshankar Menon has suggested, India’s military resolve has often been the edifice of breakthroughs in Sino-Indian border negotiations. Pakistan, on the other hand, suffers from military autism. Its ideological opposition to India and the institutional structure of its civil-military relations forbids any appreciation of material reality when it comes to use of force in interstate relations.

Lastly, Beijing’s political rationality and situational awareness makes it an adversary one can negotiate with, evident in the number of crisis-management instruments the two countries have agreed on in the last few decades. As India’s nuclear profile grows in the coming years, Beijing will become more open to negotiating nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs).  Negotiating crisis management with Pakistan, on the other hand, has proved to be a deeply flawed exercise. Whereas the Lahore Declaration resulted in the Kargil War, the Manmohan-Musharraf talks ended with the Mumbai attacks.

Given these differences between the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear behaviour, relinquishing the NFU to address Islamabad’s nuclear braggadocio is tantamount to throwing the baby out with the bathwater. India’s tactics may or may not influence Pakistani behaviour but will be a terrible strategy vis-à-vis China. In addressing the ugliness of Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition, New Delhi should desist from unravelling the good in the Sino-India nuclear relationship.

Yogesh Joshi is a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.  Previously, he was a MacArthur and Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University. He can be reached at decb64_eW9nZXNoam9zaGlAaXNhcy5udXMuZWR1_decb64. 

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

Xi’s Seaside Summit With Modi Aims to Reset China-India Ties
Bloomberg, October 11

The leaders of the world’s two most populous countries are meeting Friday and Saturday (October 11 & 12) in the southern Indian coastal town of Mamallapuram, on the outskirts of Chennai. This is the second straight “informal” meeting between the leaders, after their interaction in Wuhan in April last year.

India, China Should Resolve Dispute Through Dialogue: Chinese Envoy
Outlook India, October 8

Chinese envoy said both India and China should go beyond the model of "management of differences" and work towards actively shaping bilateral relations through accumulation of positive energy and forging greater cooperation for common development.

India restricts universities from tie-ups with Chinese institutions, days before Modi expected to meet Xi
South China Morning Post, October 3

India has instructed its universities not to enter into academic cooperation agreements with Chinese institutions unless they obtain prior approval. Analysts say the move may be for security considerations or in response to a growing number of Chinese universities trying to gain a foothold in India.

Border personnel meeting between India, China held at Nathula Pass 'with lot of warmth'
The Economic Times, October 1

A border personnel meeting between senior military officials of India and China on the latter's National Day was held “with a lot of warmth” at Nathula Pass on Tuesday (October 1), according to an Indian Army officer.

News Reports

China and India in the Region

Chinese naval destroyer arrives in Japan for int'l fleet review
Xinhua, October 10

Chinese naval destroyer Taiyuan arrived in Sagami Bay, southwest of Tokyo in Japan on Thursday (October 10) to join an international fleet review scheduled for October 14.

China extends hand to Pakistan while reaching out to India
South China Morning Post, October 10

Chinese President Xi Jinping has described ties between China and Pakistan as unbreakable, sending a message of strong support to Islamabad just two days before he meets the prime minister of India.

‘Not for others to comment’: India’s blunt reaction to Imran-Xi talking Kashmir
Hindustan Times, October 9

The Indian response came after Chinese President Xi Jinping said he was watching the situation in Kashmir and would support Pakistan in issues related to its core interests.

Himalayan railway plan at stake as China's Xi pays rare visit to Nepal
Nikkei Asian Review, October 9

Chinese President Xi Jinping is arriving in Nepal over the weekend on a rare trip aimed at consolidating ties with Nepal's communist government, which is keen to deepen its relations with the colossus to the north but also to parlay any ambitions its southern neighbor, India, might be harboring in the region.

News Reports

Trade and Economy

India pursues China-led trade deal despite domestic opposition
Channel News Asia, October 10

India is pressing ahead with talks to join a China-led free trade pact, officials said on Thursday (October 10), despite the fears of some domestic producers that the country would be flooded with cheaper Chinese imports.

Strengthening cooperation in trade facilitation to help reduce trade gap with India: China
The Times of India, October 10

Zhu Xiaohong, Counsellor, Embassy of China has said that both China and India “should continue to strengthen cooperation on trade facilitation, upgrade bilateral, regional and multi-lateral trade facilitation, and create favourable conditions for expanding bilateral trade scale and alleviating trade imbalance.”

Effect of global 'slowdown' is 'more pronounced' in India: IMF chief
The Economic Times, October 9

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has flagged a “more pronounced” slowdown in India as it called for a coordinated fiscal response to arrest the “synchronised slowdown in global growth”.

China hopes for 'more fair' business environment for its companies in India
Business Standard, October 8

More than a thousand Chinese companies have invested $8 billion in India and created 200,000 local jobs, and they must get a "more fair and friendly" business environment, said Beijing's ambassador to New Delhi on Tuesday (October 8).

India can win big from inevitable $350-550bn exports moving out of China: Credit Suisse
The Economic Times, October 6

India could potentially be one of the big winners from the US-China trade war, according to a Credit Suisse survey of 100 companies with global sales of $1 trillion that projects $350-550 billion of exports will shift out of China and that this is “inevitable even if slow”.

China leads emerging economies in latest global competitiveness ranking: WEF report
Xinhua, October 9

China is by far the best performer among the five BRICS economies in terms of competitiveness, said the World Economic Forum (WEF) Wednesday (October 9) in the latest annual report assessing the productivity and long-term growth of 141 economies.

News Reports

Energy and Environment

US cautions against lure of cheap Chinese solar imports
The Economic Times, October 9

Solar energy developers in India should consider quality, service standards, overall costs and geopolitical implications before going for cheap Chinese imports, a top US official said.

India to work with China, Pakistan to gauge impact of climate change
The Hindu, October 8

To better gauge the impact of climate change on the Hindu Kush mountains, which includes the Himalayas, and spruce up data-gathering, the India Meteorological Department (IMD) will collaborate with meteorological agencies in China and Pakistan, among others, to provide climate forecast services to countries in the region.

Iran not disappointed with India for not buying oil from Tehran: Jaishankar
Business Standard, October 2

India has a strong political and cultural relationship with Iran where it operates a strategic port, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has said, rejecting reports that Tehran is disappointed at New Delhi for not buying oil from the oil-rich nation in view of the tough US sanctions.

Amid China Concern, India, US To Launch Energy Initiative In Indo-Pacific
NDTV, October 2

India and America will launch a new initiative for clean energy to fuel economic growth in the strategically-important Indo-Pacific region where China has been trying to expand its sphere of influence, the US State Department has said.

Analyses

Maintaining the India-China stride length
The Hindu, October 10

By Zorawar Daulet Singh, Fellow, Centre for Policy Research (CPR)

The recent calm in India-China relations might have erased images of the turbulent chapter that preceded it. For much of the period between 2014 and 2017, uncertainty regarding the other side’s policies and intentions leading to tension, mistrust, and competition characterised the relationship. It was an unusual spike in the post-Cold War era and only subsided in 2018.

For India, diplomacy with China flows through the barrel of a gun
South China Morning Post, October 10

By Yogesh Joshi, Research Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore

New Delhi is staging a massive military exercise near the Chinese border, just as Xi and Modi prepare for their second informal summit. This is no coincidence – as history shows, Sino-Indian military muscle-flexing is a standard feature before diplomatic engagements.

With Xi’s visit, the spring of China-Nepal ties has arrived
Global Times, October 10

By Lan Jianxue, Deputy Director, Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies

Xi's visit, though a short one, will further propel the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network between China and Nepal, cement mutually beneficial bonds, and upgrade the existing China-Nepal comprehensive cooperative partnership with ever-lasting friendship.

China has pulled ahead of India on far more than the economy
Livemint, October 8

By Niranjan Rajadhyaksha, Member of the academic board of the Meghnad Desai Academy of Economics

In economic terms, China is around a dozen years ahead of India, but the gap is much larger when social indicators are considered.

China-India bid can forge united Asia
Global Times, October 8

By Liu Zongyi, Secretary-General, Research Center for China-South Asia Cooperation at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; Visiting Fellow, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China; and Distinguished Fellow, China (Kunming) South Asia & Southeast Asia Institute

Both China and India attach great importance to this second informal meeting of the leaders. China hopes that the two countries could continue the spirit of the first informal summit in Wuhan last April, make joint efforts for the common purpose of reviving Asian civilization and view the bilateral relations from the perspective of building an Asian community with shared future and a community with shared future for mankind.

Books and Journals

Rethinking India’s Approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Economic & Political Weekly 54(26&27) (June 2019): 10-12

By Zorawar Daulet Singh, author and foreign affairs analyst based in New Delhi. He is also an Adjunct Fellow with the Institute of Chinese Studies and a Visiting Fellow at the Forum for Strategic Initiative.

The second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April 2019 witnessed a transformed discourse on China’s grand connectivity initiative. Evoking an agreeable geo-economic vision, the joint communique spoke of “extensive consultation,” “green,” “people-centred and sustainable development” as well as “high quality, sustainable infrastructure” that is “inclusive and broadly beneficial” (Belt and Road Forum 2019a). There is little doubt that China viewed the forum as a platform to exude more responsive and multilateral norms, with Xi Jinping himself acknowledging some of the problems with the initiative. There are three broader trends that might have convinced Beijing that the time was ripe for an adjustment.