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China-India Brief #201

March 23, 2022 - April 13, 2022
China-India Brief #201BRIEF #201

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Published Twice a Month
March 23, 2022 - April 13, 2022

Guest Column

India’s soft power challenge to China’s regional engagement 
By Chietigj Bajpaee


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India and China both abstained on votes condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the UN Security Council. This challenges the notion that India’s credentials as the world’s largest democracy distinguishes it from China, despite soft power forming a key component of India’s international identity. Focusing on India’s eastward engagement, this article discusses New Delhi’s efforts to employ soft power as a means to offset China’s hard power advantages in its regional engagement. 

Soft power in India’s ‘Act East’ Policy 

This year marks three decades of India’s ‘Look East’ Policy (LEP) (which was renamed the ‘Act East’ Policy in 2014). The policy was launched in the early 1990s as part of a concerted effort to revive the importance of Southeast Asia (and later the broader East Asian and Indo-Pacific regions) in the country’s foreign policy agenda. The Look East/Act East policies entailed complementing the country’s longstanding historical, cultural and ideological linkages (attractive soft power) with growing economic interdependence and security cooperation (coercive hard power) in its regional engagement. 

India’s soft power has often been perceived as a double-edged sword in Southeast Asia: while it has been a source of leverage in India’s eastward engagement, it has also been a source of historical baggage. Attempts by India’s early strategic thinkers to anchor the country’s regional ambitions to its civilisational identity through such geographic constructs as ‘Greater India’ generated concern and resentment in the region. Some countries saw India’s behaviour as patronising or overbearing, especially in the immediate post-colonial period when countries were seeking greater autonomy and independence. As time went on, notions of India’s civilisational leadership lost further credence as the country came to be seen as an economic laggard in the region. 

As such, during the early years of the LEP, there was a tendency to downplay historical and cultural connections, or make them secondary to more pragmatic considerations such as strengthening economic integration, institutional interaction and security cooperation. As then Indian External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha noted in a speech in 2003:

In the past, India’s engagement with much of Asia, including Southeast and East Asia, was built on an idealistic conception of Asian brotherhood, based on shared experiences of colonialism and of cultural ties. The rhythm of the region today is determined, however, as much by trade, investment and production as by history and culture. That is what motivates our decade-old ‘Look East’ policy.


Over time however, New Delhi made renewed efforts to leverage India’s soft power to strengthen its regional engagement. Two factors drove this shift: at the level of domestic politics, the rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) fuelled a push to use India’s cultural attributes, notably its Hindu/ Buddhist heritage in the conduct of the country’s foreign policy. At the level of regional geopolitics, recognition that China had the upper hand in terms of its hard power strengths (including economic inducements and military coercion) prompted New Delhi to leverage its soft power capabilities, including its democratic credentials and linkages to diaspora communities to challenge and dilute the emergence of a Sino-centric regional order. 

Cultural/civilisational linkages renewed under BJP

Soft power gained newfound importance under BJP-led governments. As part of its Hindu nationalist (Hindutva) ideology, civilisational linkages have been one of the cornerstones of the BJP’s foreign policy agenda.. This has entailed a renewed emphasis on cultural and historical linkages with East Asia, which has manifested in efforts to promote the country’s Buddhist heritage. Examples of this include supporting heritage conservation projects in the region, such as the restoration of Hindu and Buddhist temples and monuments, which has been overseen by the Archaeological Survey of India, as well as cultural exhibitions led by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR). 

Under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi that assumed power in 2014, India has also hosted several events aimed at promoting inter-cultural understanding, such as the Conference on Cultural and Civilizational Links that held its inaugural meeting in 2015. The government has also offered scholarships for students in several East Asian countries to study Buddhism at Indian institutes of education. Undergirding these developments is the BJP’s active use of religion as a foreign policy tool (although it does not hold a monopoly on such practices, as noted by the initiative to revive India’s ancient Nalanda University that began under the Indian National Congress government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh). 

Another important facet of India’s soft power diplomacy is diaspora diplomacy. Although a constant feature of Indian foreign policy, outreach to diaspora communities gained newfound importance under BJP governments as overseas Indians came to be seen as a strategic asset in the conduct of the country’s foreign and economic policies. With a fifth of India’s total overseas Indian population based in ASEAN countries, numbering approximately six million people, there was growing recognition in New Delhi of the need to leverage the country’s sizable diaspora population to strengthen India’s economic and strategic foothold in Southeast Asia. This became evident with the establishment of the Division of Overseas Indian Affairs within the Ministry of External Affairs in 2016 (which followed the earlier establishment of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs in 2004). It also entailed renewed responsibilities towards protecting the interests of these populations, as noted by the Vande Bharat operations that repatriated stranded Indian nationals following the lockdowns of the COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2020.

Challenging China through soft-power 

Undergirding these efforts is an attempt to frame India’s soft power diplomacy as a counter to China’s hard power strengths in Southeast Asia. For instance, while China has also sought to leverage its Buddhist heritage—such as by hosting the World Buddhist Forum and World Fellowship of Buddhists—there are claims that India’s ‘Buddhist diplomacy’ has stronger foundations. After all, India can boast itself as the birthplace of Buddhism (as well as its role in providing sanctuary to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhists fleeing persecution in China). Moreover, as India has committed to secularism, it is not averse towards Buddhism like Communist China, which is officially an atheist state.

Regional governance initiatives are another area where New Delhi has sought to offer a soft-power challenge to China. New Delhi’s reaction towards China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been negative given concerns that the BRI seeks to encircle India by deepening engagement with countries around its periphery. India’s concerns have been exacerbated by worries that neighbouring states are facing growing debt burdens from China, which could constrain their foreign policies, including their relations with New Delhi. These concerns drove India’s decision to boycott China’s Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2017 and 2019. 

Aside from its negative stance on China’s BRI, India has also sought to develop and participate in regional initiatives that place greater emphasis on its soft power credentials. India has developed several initiatives, including Project Mausam that was launched in 2014 to renew cultural links and contact among countries in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR); SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), which was launched in 2015 as a means of strengthening maritime connectivity and developing the ‘Blue Economy’ in the IOR and later the broader Indo-Pacific; and the Cotton or Spice Routes. These complement earlier initiatives, such as the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) that was launched in 2000 with a mandate to focus on soft power issues, including promoting tourism, transport, communication, education and cultural links. 

New Delhi has also connected with like-minded states through several regional initiatives. For instance, India is a founding member of the Indonesia-led Bali Democracy Forum that was established in 2008 and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or ‘Quad’) comprising four of Asia’s major democratic states (Australia, Japan, India and the United States), which was revived in 2017 (after its short-lived inception in 2007). In 2015, India and Japan also spearheaded the creation of the Samvad Dialogue, which aims to strengthen interaction “on the positive influence of traditions of non-violence, tolerance and democracy in Asia”.

While these initiatives have been portrayed in largely benign terms at an official level, they demonstrate an implicit effort by New Delhi to develop and participate in regional governance initiatives with a greater emphasis on soft power as a counter to China’s hard power strengths. In doing so, India hopes to leverage on soft power advantages rooted in its cultural linkages and democratic credentials.

China vs. India in soft power engagement

Notwithstanding these developments, India maintains self-imposed limits on the exercise of soft power. This is evidenced by New Delhi’s limited role in human rights and democracy promotion where India has generally pursued a less overt form of action: India is generally allergic to regime change and more supportive of technical assistance and institution-building as a way of strengthening democracy. 

New Delhi’s approach has limited its cooperation and alignment with fellow democracies, such as the United States. Even before their very public disagreements over the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States and India already maintained different approaches in their engagement with other countries on human rights. Myanmar is a key example: while New Delhi favoured a pragmatic approach echoing the ASEAN position of ‘constructive engagement’ with the military junta, Washington sought to isolate the regime. Clearly, geopolitical concerns trumped ideological considerations over democracy promotion. In the case of Ukraine, New Delhi is reluctant to decouple from Russia given its overwhelming dependence on Russian military hardware, deep-rooted relations with Moscow, and efforts to deter Russia’s deepening relations with India’s key strategic rivals, China and Pakistan. In the case of Myanmar, New Delhi’s position has been driven by efforts to counter-balance China’s foothold in Myanmar and seek the support of the Burmese government in meeting security and development objectives in India’s northeast region. These considerations drove New Delhi’s decision to reorient relations with the military junta in the 1990s, and limit criticism of regime’s human rights abuses towards the country’s Rohingya Muslim minority population and suspension of the democratic process in 2021.

The disconnect between India’s status as the world’s largest democracy and the government’s reluctance to employ democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool underlines the country’s unwillingness to leverage soft power capacities as more explicit instruments of foreign policy. The self-imposed limit on India’s soft power engagement has prompted some to refer to India as a “defensive soft power” that uses its soft power capacities largely for “image building rather than as an instrument to exert influence”. The more assertive use of soft power is referred to as “smart” or “sharp” power, whereby a state employs deliberate efforts to shape and manipulate international opinion through the combined and strategic use of hard and soft power. 

Finally, distinctions between India’s soft power advantages and China’s hard power strengths are not always so clear-cut as Beijing has demonstrated itself adept at employing both hard and soft power. Constraints on New Delhi’s ability to deploy soft power can be partially attributed to resources: for example, India’s Division of Overseas Indian Affairs and the External Publicity and Public Diplomacy Division under the Ministry of External Affairs remain poorly funded relative to their Chinese counterparts. China also maintains more Confucius Institutes than India has overseas chairs of the ICCR. At the regional level Indian initiatives, such as SAGAR, Project Mausam, and the Cotton/ Spice Routes, have made limited progress relative to China’s BRI. While India may have a better ‘brand’ than China, it has not yet done enough to leverage this advantage. 

This is further evidenced by the annual ‘State of Southeast Asia’ survey report, which shows that India ranks behind China and other major powers (including the United States, European Union, and Japan) on both hard and soft power indicators in the perceptions of Southeast Asian states. These indicators include economic power, political/strategic influence, trust, and other signals of soft power (such as preferred destinations for study and holidays). Surprisingly, India even lags behind China in areas where Beijing’s authoritarian political model and aggressive ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy ought to give New Delhi an advantage, such as leadership in upholding the rules-based order and international law. The survey results suggest that India has more work to do to improve its image in the region, despite its credentials as a democratic state, the country’s long-standing historic and cultural linkages, and the absence of any territorial disputes in the region (unlike China). 

Conclusion

As noted, India’s soft power deficiencies can be partially attributed to resource constraints. However, political will is also an important consideration. Here India’s longstanding proclivity for non-alignment/strategic autonomy in its foreign policy is important as it has often marginalized the country on key regional developments. In this context, it is important to note that hard and soft power are not necessarily mutually exclusive but rather two sides of the same coin. In other words, despite drawing distinctions between coercive hard power and attractive soft power, in reality both often complement each other with one being used to strengthen or reinforce the other. For instance, linkages to diaspora communities can be used to strengthen regional economic integration by attracting foreign investment and remittances. Military and economic resources can also be employed as soft power if it is for co-optive rather than coercive purposes (e.g. humanitarian assistance). As such, India requires both the intent and capabilities to deploy its influence in Southeast Asia if it is to strengthen its soft power influence vis-à-vis China.

As the international system faces renewed bifurcation amid the deteriorating relationship between the US/EU/NATO/West and Russia/China, there will be a growing emphasis on value-driven diplomacy. This will put pressure on New Delhi to live up to its soft power credentials, including its status as the world’s largest democracy.

 

Chietigj Bajpaee, PhD, has worked with several public policy think tanks and political risk consultancies in Europe, the United States and Asia. He is author of China in India’s post-Cold War Engagement with Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2022).

Guest Column

How China and India govern their cities 
By Xuefei Ren 


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As I write this essay, Shanghai is struggling with containing an Omicron surge and its 26 million residents are under lockdown. Residents are running low on food, and young children who tested positive have been separated from parents and taken to quarantine centers. China is sticking to its zero-COVID policy and is determined to achieve “dynamic clearance” of COVID-19 (动态清零) at any cost. The chaos during the Wuhan lockdown in early 2020 is being replayed in Shanghai, China’s model city of COVID control until now. Lockdown, a key measure China has been using to contain COVID-19, is a paramount example of the country’s territorial approach to urban governance. In my book, Governing the Urban in China and India, I argue that territorial logic is the central feature of urban governance in China, which contrasts with the associational approach to urban governance in India. 

China and India are often compared, but the focus of the comparisons tends to be on regime types. For example, urban scholars often explain the different ways in which Chinese and Indian cities function from the perspective of political systems, that India is a democracy and China is not. Regime types can explain many variations, but not all. I was interested in exploring other meaningful differences besides political regimes. So I started doing fieldwork in cities and towns in China and India to better understand their governance systems.

The main finding from my book project is the territorial vs. associational logics in urban governance in China and India. China has a strong layer of territorial institutions at the municipal level, such as the hukou system and the criteria by which it evaluates and promotes local officials. Policy making and implementation is strongly shaped by these territorial institutions. By contrast, India does not have similar territorial institutions at the municipal level. Municipal corporations in India are weak, and policy making and implementation is contingent upon coalition building among the state, the private sector, and civil society groups. Indian cities represent associational approaches to urban governance. 

So how are the territorial and associational forms of urban governance played out in policies? 

Housing policies offer useful insights into the differences between the territorial and associational approaches to urban governance. I studied urban villages in Guangzhou and slums in Mumbai to understand the politics of compensation. When these informal settlements were redeveloped, who was compensated and who was not? In Guangzhou, compensation criteria consisted of several territorial institutions—hukou, rural land ownership, and membership in village enterprises. These overlapping territorial institutions guaranteed generous compensation packages for local landlords in Guangzhou but excluded migrant tenants. In Mumbai, the official “cut-off date” for determining eligibility for compensation—January 1, 2000—was constantly challenged by slum dwellers. In fact, sometimes developers faked documents on behalf of slum dwellers to make residents eligible for compensation, so that construction projects could move ahead.

Air pollution control presents another illustration of the territorial vs. associational approaches to urban governance. In Beijing, the municipal government is the key actor in the city’s clean air campaign. It adopts the “target responsibility system,” by setting a time-bound pollution reduction target and holding local officials responsible for meeting the target. In Delhi, the government is a minor player in environmental protection, and instead, it is the environmental NGOs (non-governmental organisations) which have been leading the city’s clean air campaign, by working closely with the Indian Supreme Court, government agencies, and the private sector. 

In a nutshell, the territorial form of urban governance is a system by which the state allocates resources and responsibilities unevenly across administrative jurisdictions. A requisite of the system is strong municipal authorities, a key feature of Chinese urbanization since the 1990s. By contrast, India lacks strong municipal authorities and, in their absence, a confluence of actors—the private sector, state agencies, civil society groups—jockey for power and influence on the municipal stage.

These different approaches to urban governance have produced different forms of inequality. In China, territorial forms of urban governance have exacerbated regional disparity. The gap between China’s top-tier cities and elsewhere is further widening, as local officials turn inwards and only care about their jurisdictions. In India, inequality is structured both spatially and through networks. The rich and the middle class are more likely to mobilize politicians and local bureaucracies to access urban amenities. The poor are less likely to succeed, and their best chance is right before elections as politicians roll out favors to get votes.

The territorial tendency of governing urban affairs has further strengthened in China during the pandemic. As the Shanghai example shows, China’s COVID-19 playbook centers on territorial measures, from lockdown and “grid governance” (网格化管理) to mass testing and digital surveillance. These measures will have long-lasting effects on Chinese cities after the Omicron surge ends. The cities in China and India after COVID-19 will present new frontiers for comparison.

Xuefei Ren, PhD, is Professor of Urban Studies and Sociology at Michigan State University. She is a Public Intellectual Fellow at the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.


News Reports

Bilateral relations

Government gives financial nod to widen Uttarakhand road connecting to China border
The Times of India, April 11

The road transport and highways ministry has given financial approval for the widening of 76 km road from Tawaghat to Kali Mandir, the origin of river Kali in Uttarakhand near the China border.

India said no to China proposal on pullback from Hot Springs
The Indian Express, April 10

Government sources said China proposed that Indian troops, who have been in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with Chinese troops at PP 15 for almost two years now, move back to the Karam Singh Post between PP 16 and PP 17.

Chinese hackers reportedly target India's power grid
ABC News, April 7

India’s power sector has been targeted by hackers in a long-term operation thought to have been carried out by a state-sponsored Chinese group, a US-based private cybersecurity company says in a new report.

India tells visiting Chinese minister that border face-off impedes ties
Channel News Asia, March 25

India sees the complete disengagement of Chinese and Indian troops from a face-off on their remote border as key to better relations, its foreign minister said on Friday (March 25), following talks in New Delhi with his Chinese counterpart.

 

News Reports

China and India in the Region

US will stand by India against China's belligerence on border, Austin tells Rajnath
The Times of India, April 12

Singh, on his part, stressed the need for co-development and co-production of high-tech weapons by India and the US, while exhorting American defence and aerospace companies to take advantage of his government’s initiatives to set up production facilities in India. 

Power shift in Pakistan won’t affect China ties, ‘hard-core friend’ Beijing says
South China Morning Post, April 11

Relations with Pakistan are unlikely to be affected, China said, after Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan was removed from office by a historic no-confidence motion amid a major political crisis in the South Asian nation.

China and India condemned the Bucha killings in Ukraine but avoided blaming Russia
Business Insider, April 8

China and India also did not support a resolution to boot Russia from the UN Human Rights Council.

India's hazy Ukraine stance lures suitors from West, Russia, China
Nikkei Asia, April 6

Ministers and officials from the West, China and Russia have descended on India in the past few weeks. They all had one objective in common: Obtain Indian support regarding the war in Ukraine, or at least deter New Delhi from taking the other side.

India tries to pry Sri Lanka loose from China’s embrace
CNBC, March 31

India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar was in Sri Lanka this week to offer help to the struggling Sri Lankan economy in an attempt to pry it away from a decades-long Chinese embrace.


News Reports

Trade and Economy

India, Australia sign economic deal to deepen trade ties
The Straits Times, April 2

India and Australia signed a wide-ranging economic pact on Saturday (April 2), cutting duties on more than 85 per cent of goods exported to the South Asian nation, as both governments secure alternative supply chains and counter an assertive China.

India, China lead Asia's insurtech industry rise, says report
Business Standard, March 30

Mainland China-based insurtechs raised $673.7 million in 2021 and $1.42 billion in 2020.

Shopee’s exit from India after five months amid suspected China ties leaves sellers in the lurch
South China Morning Post, March 29

The platform attributed the retreat to ‘market uncertainties’, but it comes after India banned the mobile game Garena Free Fire, also owned by Singapore’s Sea.

Chinese businesses hold expectations on investment in India after FM’s visit
Global Times, March 29

While China-Indian relations are expected to improve, Wang's visit obviously sent a positive signal to ease the tensions between the two Asian countries, industry insiders said.

India's Chinese imports slip 7.2% to $65.21 bn in 2020-21; exports up 26%
Business Standard, March 25

Imports from China declined 7.2 per cent to USD 65.21 billion in 2020-21 from USD 70.31 billion in 2018-19.


News Reports

Energy and Environment

Russian Oil Continues To Flow To India And China
Oilprice.com, April 9

China and India are emerging as Russia’s main crude buyers.

US does not want 'rapid acceleration' in India energy imports from Russia
Channel News Asia, March 31

Lured by steep discounts following Western sanctions on Russian entities, India has bought at least 13 million barrels of Russian crude oil since the country invaded Ukraine in late February.

China's first gigawatt-scale wind project's output tops 1 billion kWh
CGTN, March 28

The total output of China's first gigawatt-scale offshore wind farm has exceeded 1 billion kilowatt-hours, which can replace around 307,600 tonnes of standard coal, equivalent to the normal electricity consumption of 500,000 families of three for a year.

China and Nepal study feasibility of cross-border power grid
Reuters, March 27

China and Nepal will conduct a feasibility study to construct a high-voltage power transmission line across the Himalayas to facilitate the exchange of electric power, officials said.


Analyses

Wang Yi hurt India-China ties
Deccan Herald, April 12

By Srikanth Kondapalli, Dean of the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University

Wang’s ill-prepared, ill-advised, ill-timed and badly executed visit to New Delhi has ended up reducing China’s influence in the region, rather than enhancing it.

A new lease on life for China-India relations?
Asia Times, April 7

By Yun Sun, Director of the China program and Co-Director of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center in Washington, DC

For many Indians, ending China’s border aggression is a precondition for the re-normalization of relations.

Across South Asia, U.S. and India Push Back Against China
Foreign Policy, April 6

By C. Raja Mohan, Senior Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute

Beijing’s strategic initiatives on the subcontinent are sputtering.

China signals desire to improve ties with India, but is that what New Delhi wants?
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), March 30

By James Crabtree, Executive Director of IISS–Asia

China-India ties are at their worst level in decades, but could a limited rapprochement be in sight? While small improvements are conceivable, substantial barriers remain to broader normalisation, as India looks to deepen ties with the US and its partners.

In Trade, China Has a Sharp Edge Over India, and Sharp Things Can Be Weaponized
The Diplomat, March 28

By Krzysztof Iwanek, Head of the Asia Research Centre, War Studies University, Poland

It is not an Indian boycott of Chinese goods that would be a real challenge for New Delhi, but Beijing’s blocking of exports to India.

 

Books and Journals

SurvivalIndia and US FONOPs: Oceans Apart
Survival, Volume 64, no.1 (2022), pp. 131-156

By Kate Sullivan de Estrada, Associate Professor at the University of Oxford, Fellow of St Antony’s College and an Associate Fellow at IISS; and Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, Senior Fellow at IISS 

India and the United States have recently and rapidly consolidated a significant bilateral defence partnership, have a clear appetite for bilateral and quadrilateral maritime cooperation, and appear to share a common commitment to the rules and norms that govern the maritime domain. Yet the US decision to undertake and publicise a freedom-of-navigation operation targeting India in April 2021 again highlighted the two countries’ divergent interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and of customary international law. This divergence has its origins in differences in Washington’s and New Delhi’s historical engagement with UNCLOS and their preferred means of achieving security and status in the Indo-Pacific. Such differences currently preclude a deep bilateral consensus on maritime order and a common multilateral position within the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

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BAJPAEE, Chietigj

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REN, Xuefei

REN, Xuefei