DESCRIPTION OF THE AOCAI INDEX
Welcome to the Anatomy of Choice Alignment Index (AOCAI) interactive site. This index seeks to measure the alignment positions of each of the ten Southeast Asian countries vis-à-vis China (CN) and the United States (US), across twenty indicators – split equally into five broad domains – over a span of thirty years (1995-2024). The Index is one component of the Anatomy of Choice: Southeast Asia between the Superpowers project, led by Professors Khong Yuen Foong of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, and Joseph Chinyong Liow of the College of Humanities and Social Science, Nanyang Technological University. The project, supported by a Singapore Social Science Research Thematic Grant (2020-2025), aims to track and explain the alignment postures and movements of the ten Southeast Asian countries in the context of the U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry in Asia.
For the purposes of the Index, we define alignment as a form of “structured collaboration between states” on issues of mutual concern 1. The latter include political-diplomatic interactions, military-security issues, economic exchange, cultural/soft power links, and messaging/signalling. The strongest form of alignments would be formal military alliances (e.g., U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty 1951). Other manifestations of alignments include free trade agreements, military partnerships that allow the use of one’s military facilities (e.g., Cambodia’s allowing China to use its Ream naval base), comprehensive strategic partnerships (involving deepened cooperation across sectors, e.g. Vietnam-U.S. 2023), formalized cultural exchanges (e.g., Confucius Institutes or U.S Information Agency) and direct or indirect expressions of agreement/disagreement.
Amid the escalating geo-political and geo-economic competition between the superpowers, the pressure to choose sides for entire regions and individual countries has intensified, even if many continue to proclaim their desire to ‘not want to choose sides’ in the unfolding tug-of-war, and even though the regional organization ASEAN has long espoused its aspirations for ‘neutrality’ and ‘non-alignment’ in great power conflicts. While there exist numerous qualitative interpretations about Southeast Asia’s alignment positions – various characterisations in the academic literature of the foreign policy of the region and of its constituent countries suggest that they are practicing a form of ‘hedging’ – the AOCAI represents the first systematic attempt to quantify where each country might lie, both between the US and CN, and in relation to their fellow counterparts within the region, over the last thirty years. With a total of twenty indicators, split evenly across five domains – namely Political-Diplomatic, Military-Security, Economics-Trade, Soft Power, and Signalling – the index enables users to combine, compare, and contrast multiple aspects through which alignment(s) may be manifest.
The Index allows users to compare countries across different time periods, offering an idea of when and how the alignment positions of countries have (or have not) changed over time, within, between, and across domains. The default pre-set is for III Periods, by 10-year blocks: 1995-2004 vs 2005-2014 vs 2015-2024 , although users are free to adjust the time periods, the selected domains, and their weights – in order to explore the data. The utility of comparing a country or countries across different periods is that one is able to get an idea of the direction of travel, and the extent or magnitude with which they have shifted over time.
1 "Structured collaboration between states" is from Thomas Wilkins, "Alignment, not alliance—the shifting paradigm of international security cooperation: Toward a conceptual taxonomy of alignment" Review of International Studies, January 2012, 38:1, p, 67.
Being able to observe what position a country/countries is at, where they are heading, and during which periods, offer users both a broader and deeper understanding of their alignment trajectory across various domains. It may also further allow for cautious speculation as to where different countries are heading.
The Index also allows the user to alter the weights of the five domains. Each of the domains is weighted equally—20 percent—by default. Users who believe that the economic dimension deserves greater weightage than soft power, for instance, can increase the weight of the former to say, 30 percent, “lock” it and decrease the weight of soft power to 15 percent, “lock it,” and observe how those changes impact on the alignment positions of the SEA-10. Weights of the four indicators within each dimension, however, cannot be changed.
The AOCAI is a dynamic project which is open to incorporating new and updated information into the calculus. Aside from periodic updates, as and when new data become available, the project may also consider featuring other relevant indicators in the future.
The map view offers an overview of the overall alignments of the ten countries across the entire thirty years. More in-depth comparisons and analysis within or between countries can be undertaken in the 'Comparison' and 'Country' pages respectively.
METHODOLOGY
SOURCES and ALIGNMENT BANDS
The AOCAI relies on open-source research and other established databases/datasets, with some indicators using a combination of both. The Alignment Index is visualized in two ways on this website: as a horizontal line or a circle. Either way, we consider 0 as indicating complete alignment with China and 100 as complete alignment with the U.S. Between those two extremes are five bands which characterize the alignment postures of the SEA-10:
- 0-33: Strongly aligned with China
- 34-44: Aligned with China
- 45-55: Hedging or Non-Aligned
- 56-66: Aligned with US
- 67-100: Strongly aligned with US
While it would have been mathematically elegant to have five equal bands (0-20, 20-40, etc.), our interest in obtaining a more granular feel of the alignments of the Southeast Asia-10 (SEA-10) persuaded us to adopt the above categorization. We accentuate the middle—especially the three 11-point bands (34-44, 45-55, 56-66)—because we take seriously the SEA-10’s assertions that they do not want to choose between the U.S. and China; that they would prefer not to be aligned with either of the superpowers. But we also assume that the latter is difficult to achieve and that some would at least lean in the direction of one of the superpowers, or perhaps even align with it. Hence our bands are constructed to show alignment movements (around the middle) with greater precision, as well as demarcate qualitative thresholds such as a country’s movement from “hedging” to being “aligned” with either superpower.
The rationale for depicting the 45-55 band as hedging behavior, where a country straddles the two superpowers to maintain equal strategic distance between the them, is that it is a good compromise between being too narrow and being overly broad. The real test of the appropriateness of any (hedging) band is whether the alignment positions of those who fall within and outside of the band accord with existing intuitions of where those countries are. The “outside of the band” test is especially revealing: our argument is that the specification of the “hedging” or “straddling” band is reasonable if countries like Myanmar and Laos (known to be solidly in China’s camp) or the Philippines (solidly in U.S. camp) lie outside of the band. Our hedging range passes this test. Finally, it is also worth noting that our demarcation thresholds are not the final word on the matter, although we believe that they accord with our intuitions of the alignment moves of most of the SEA-10 over the last few decades. Users who have questions about our demarcations may want to focus on the Index’s findings about the direction of travel of the SEA-10’s alignments (over time) and interpret those findings in ways they find appropriate.
CALCULATING ALIGNMENT POSITIONS
The alignment position of each country for a particular year is taken to be the average score of the twenty indicators. Alignment Position in Year X = Average of [Indicator 1 Alignment + Indicator 2 Alignment … + Indicator 20 Alignment]. Likewise, to derive its alignment position over a range of years, the scores of each of those years are averaged: Alignment Position over Years X+Y+Z = Average of [Alignment Position Year X + Alignment Position Year Y + Alignment Year Z].
For the vast majority of indicators, in order to derive the alignment position of a given country in a particular year – with ‘0’ denoting full alignment with China, and ‘100’ full alignment with the US – the formula used to compute the respective ratios is: Value of US/(Value of US + Value of CN). To illustrate, if for a given year a country Imports $3 billion worth of products from US compared to $9 billion from CN, then its alignment is 3/(3+9) = 0.25 – ‘25’ on our spectrum, indicating heavy alignment with CN in Imports. In another example, if a country conducts 4 Military Exercises with CN, compared to 6 with the US in a certain year, its alignment is 6/(6+4) = 0.60 – ‘60’ on our spectrum, indicating alignment with the US for that indicator.
A minority of indicators involve computations that differ from (and indeed are the inverse of) the abovementioned formula. Whereas the nature of most of the indicators is such that a higher value connotes greater closeness (‘pull’ effect), for certain indicators such as Aggressive Acts, Foreign Debt, Negative Sent, and Negative Received, a higher value is conversely indicates greater distance (‘push’ effect). Therefore, the formula employed is Value of CN/(Value of US + Value of CN); the numerator changes from ‘Value of US’ to ‘Value of CN’. For example, if in a given year a country encounters 2 Aggressive Acts from CN and 1 from the US, then its alignment is (2)/(2+1) = 0.67 – ‘67’ on our spectrum, indicating heavy alignment with the US. Likewise, if a country Receives 16 Negative Signals in a given year from CN, compared to 64 from US, its alignment position is (16)/(16+64) = 0.20 – ‘20’ on our spectrum, indicating heavy alignment with CN.
The ‘default’ setting, upon which most of the analyses is predicated, is that each of the five domains – Political-Diplomatic, Military-Security, Economics-Trade, Soft Power, and Signalling – are treated (weighted) with equal significance. Some might contend that certain domains, such as Military-Security or Economics-Trade, ought to weigh more heavily in or on the alignment position of a country, compared to, say, Soft Power – the Index allows users to set their preferred ‘weights’ for each of the domains, which will alter the calculus – and therefore the alignment positions accordingly. The ability for users to choose their preferred weightings for the various domains makes the AOCAI truly interactive, given the innumerable combinations that are available.
LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH
In the initial phase of the project, we came up with a list of nearly 80 potential indicators, although a majority ended up being jettisoned during the winnowing process, as operationalizing and measuring ‘alignment’ is challenging for a number of reasons. Firstly, ‘alignment’ is a relational concept: it requires at least a majority of countries to have meaningful data between CN and the US; in instances whereby only a minority of countries had such data, we ended up not including such indicators.
Secondly, a key issue we confronted was the lack of reliable data for a majority of countries stretching back three decades. This has resulted in the need to ‘satisfice’ on some occasions. For example, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) indicator – which uses data from the Financial Times fDi Markets Crossborder Investment Monitor Database – has data for 22 years (2003-2024); data is not available for 1995-2002. While we initially considered excluding FDI as one of the Economics indicators, its importance persuaded us to devise a way to approximate the values for the missing years by way of extrapolating backwards: this was done by taking the average FDI of the first three years in the dataset (2003, 2004, and 2005) from China and the US respectively. Other indicators that would have been good to have include Foreign Aid/Assistance, but while data on US foreign aid is available, Chinese data pre-2001 and post-2017 is lacking, which means that this indicator cannot be incorporated in the AOCAI,
A third limitation is conceptual: namely, the starting assumption that alignment between US-CN (1) is necessarily zero-sum in nature; one superpower’s gain translates to the others’ loss; and (2) can be isolated and treated separately from the alignments of (and with) third-party countries, particularly with respect to US-allies in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia. On the first point, much of the literature on Southeast Asia’s alignments in general, and hedging behaviour in particular, focuses on its ‘omnidirectionality’ of engagement, with the ultimate goal being ‘omni-enmeshment’, which presupposes that alignments with the superpowers can be ‘positive-sum’. In other words, strengthening ties in a particular domain with one superpower need not necessarily translate into the weakening of relations in said domain with the other. The nature of the AOCAI’s alignment spectrum generally does not allow for such a possibility.
On the second point, our approach acknowledges that the AOCAI’s alignment spectrum cannot account for (inter)relations and potentially overlapping alignments with third-parties. The practical effect of this is such that it may underestimate the actual extent of US influence in the Indo-Pacific region, which oftentimes is extended via its allies and close partners. Since China remains by-and-large a ‘lonely superpower’, the omission of Southeast Asia’s alignments and interrelations with Russia or North Korea is likely to be minimal at best. However, given that many, if not most, of Southeast Asian countries have developed fairly substantial ties with countries like Australia, Japan, South Korea, and even India – economically and politically, if not necessarily militarily – the Index’s inability to account for such cooperative ventures may undercount the true extent of US influence in the region. The AOCAI also does not measure collective regional action to engage one or both of the superpowers. ASEAN’s post-Cold War efforts to court and enmesh Beijing and Washington – separately or together – are numerous, although its particular effects upon individual Southeast Asian countries are diffuse, and in any case cannot be captured or measured by our Index.
Future research could endeavor to expand the list of countries beyond SEA-10: aside from Timor Leste, countries in Northeast Asia, South Asia, Oceania could all conceivably be included, which would undoubtedly enrich the picture considerably. The US-China competition is, after all, almost certain to become the defining feature of international relations for the foreseeable future; having an idea of how countries line up on a spectrum between them, and indeed in relation to neighbours and regional states, is likely to be an invaluable resource.
DESCRIPTION
Five broad domains are used to capture a country’s overall alignment vis-à-vis China (CN) and the US: Political-Diplomatic, Military-Security, Economics-Trade, Soft Power, and Signalling.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, SEA-10 has on average shifted towards CN (-5.5). Countries like Indonesia (-12), Cambodia (-10), Laos (-8), and Thailand (-7) have shifted most. At the other end, Vietnam (+4) is the sole country to have bucked the trend and shifted towards the US.
III & V PERIODS
Comparing between different periods, the average rate with which countries are shifting towards CN has steadily decreased over time. Two countries seem to buck this trend: Cambodia and Malaysia have shifted towards CN significantly faster in more recent periods compared to earlier periods.
ANALYSIS
On average, SEA-10 as a whole has gradually shifted away from the ‘hedging range’ (45-55) and into alignment with CN. Indeed, when their collective average alignment over the last decade 2015-2024 is considered, the region is at (41). That being said, the rate at which SEA-10 has shifted towards CN has steadily decreased compared to the 2000s, with only two countries – Cambodia and Malaysia – bucking this trend; their shifts towards CN has accelerated in recent periods. Although Vietnam remains slightly closer to CN overall, its shift towards the US is particularly notable: it is the sole country that appears to be actively ‘rowing against the tide’. At the other end, Indonesia and Cambodia’s shift towards CN has been rather pronounced: while Indonesia’s overall position suggests a certain non-aligned/equidistant posture, it has shifted from being slightly more US aligned in earlier periods to being slightly more CN-aligned in recent periods. Thailand meanwhile has shifted from being non-aligned/equidistant in earlier period towards being more aligned with CN, particularly over the past couple of decades. Cambodia, like Laos, has simply moved deeper into alignment with CN. The Philippines is the only country that remains closest to the US overall. Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore have moved in CN’s direction at a near-average rate, although they remain in a middling position—the hedging range--overall.
DESCRIPTION
Four indicators are used to estimate each Southeast Asian country’s Political-Diplomatic alignment between CN and the US: UNGA Voting Alignment, Partnership Level, Bilateral Visits, and Multilateral Groups.
OVERVIEW
For the 1995-2024 period, all countries are significantly closer to CN on average (34). This ranges from Myanmar (24) and Laos (29) at one end, to Philippines (46) and Singapore (41) at the other.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, SEA-10 has on average not moved on this dimension (0). However, countries like Cambodia (-12), Indonesia (-4), and Thailand (-4) have shifted towards CN, whilst Myanmar (+11), Vietnam (+7), and Singapore (+6) have shifted towards US. Nevertheless all countries lean closer to CN overall on average, regardless of the time period.
III & V PERIODS
In the early-2000s, SEA-10 experienced a shift towards CN in this domain. However, since the early 2010s, there has been a movement – albeit rather marginal – towards the US, even if all countries remain closer to CN overall on average.
ANALYSIS
Countries are on average more aligned with CN in this domain. Interestingly, while there was a marginal average shift towards CN when 1995-2004 is compared with 2005-2014, this was reversed when the latter period is compared with 2015-2024; i.e. the movements over the last decade demonstrate a marginal shift towards the US. Overall, and in relative terms, Cambodia has shifted most notably towards CN in this domain, whilst Vietnam, and Myanmar to a lesser extent, have shifted towards the US.
Political-Diplomatic Indicators:
1. Voting Alignment
Reflects the ratio of Voting Alignment of a given country between CN and the US at the United Nations General Assembly between 1995-2023 (September), based on the Universite de Geneve’s UNGA-DM dataset, as calculated by Xi Lu & Jun Jie
2. Partnership Level
Reflects the ratio of the level of partnership formally institutionalized with CN and the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on open-sourced research
DESCRIPTION
Reflects voting alignment ratios of a given country between CN and the US at the United Nations General Assembly between 1995-2023 (September), based on the Universite de Geneve’s UNGA-DM dataset, as calculated by Xi Lu & Pei Junjie. Votes are ‘weighted’: If country X follows the voting of superpower Y on a particular resolution which ends up being in the minority, this is treated as more consequential (heavier) than if that vote had ended up being in the majority.
RATIONALE
Votes cast at the United Nations General Assembly are reflective of a country’s political or diplomatic position on issues that have been put forth for deliberation in the international arena. A country’s alignment may be discerned by observing voting patterns – whether it tends to adopt positions that more similar to one or the other superpower – by considering the totality of votes cast in a calendar year.
LIMITATIONS
Data for 2024 has yet to be published, hence the alignment scores for 2024 are unavailable for this indicator.
FORMULA
Considering all voting sessions within a given year, if country X votes the same as US in 50 votes (for each of these 50 votes, there are a₁ ~ a₅₀ countries that also vote the same as both the US and X), and country X votes the same as CN in 30 votes (for each of these 30 votes, there are b₁ ~ b₃₀ countries that also vote the same as both CN and X), then the weighted score is therefore computed as:
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2023, all countries are on average more aligned with CN in terms of their UNGA voting patterns. This ranges from Laos (18) and Vietnam (20) at one end, to Singapore (30) and Philippines (29) at the other.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2023, countries have on average shifted towards the US (+9), with the exception of Cambodia (-2). The greatest shifts come from Myanmar (+16), Vietnam (+14) and Singapore (+13). All countries nevertheless remain considerably more aligned with CN overall for this indicator.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2023, countries initially shifted marginally towards CN (-2), before shifting somewhat significantly in the direction of the US (+10).
V PERIODS
The 2001-2006 period witnessed the largest shifts towards CN on average by the SEA countries. Since then, countries have on average shifted towards the US, with some of the largest average shifts from SEA occurring during the 2013-2018 period.
ANALYSIS
In relative terms, countries are voting comparatively less closely in alignment with CN at the UNGA over the last decade or so, particularly Myanmar, Vietnam and Singapore. Cambodia by contrast has bucked the trend, and votes more closely with CN.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of the level of partnership formally institutionalized with CN and the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on open-sourced research. A four-point scale is used to measure the bilateral cooperation status of each country vis-à-vis CN and the US, which ranges from sanctions (‘null’) at one end to an alliance (‘4’) at the other.
RATIONALE
The establishment or institutionalization of a strategic partnership, of which there are varying levels, can be regarded as a reflection of the strength of bilateral relations, or otherwise as a formal political-diplomatic statement of intent. Upgrades or downgrades to partnership levels between countries typically follow significant milestones reached, or diplomatic redlines crossed. Comparing a country’s partnership level with CN and the US is thus a good proxy for estimating its alignment between them.
LIMITATIONS
Upgrading from a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (level ‘3’ by our categorization) to an Alliance (level ‘4’) may in actuality represent a significant qualitative leap that cannot be captured by our ‘quantitatively-graded’ scale, since it is mathematically treated as being of equal magnitude to an upgrade from Level 1 to Level 2.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, Philippines (70) and Thailand (70) and Singapore (59) are closest to the US, whereas Myanmar (8), Cambodia (35), Laos (36), and Vietnam (38) are closer to CN. The remainder are middling, albeit with a slight lean towards CN.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, with the exception of Myanmar* (+15), Singapore (+1), and Vietnam (+1), all countries have shifted towards CN, with most notable being Cambodia (-21), Thailand (-19), Philippines (-15).
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, countries initially shifted in CN’s direction (-8), but subsequently barely shifted moving into 2015-2024.
V PERIODS
The period between 2001-2006 and 2007-2012 saw some the largest movements on average by SEA towards CN. By contrast, 2013-2018 was the only period that saw movements – albeit marginal – towards the US.
ANALYSIS
Much of Southeast Asia’s shift towards CN took place in the 2000s and early-2010s. As a whole, countries like Cambodia, Thailand, and Philippines have shifted most towards CN, while Myanmar, Singapore and Vietnam by contrast have shifted towards the US. Myanmar’s gains are due to a brief period when US sanctions were lifted (2012-2020). Since the civil war in 2021, sanctions have been reimposed. Myanmar has been and remains the closest to CN in terms of Partnership Level.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of high-level (Head-of-State or equivalent) bilateral visits to-and-from CN and the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on open-sourced research. An official visit is defined as being attended by at least one Head-of-State or Head-of-Government. This count excludes bilateral meetings in a third-country, Hong Kong visits, courtesy calls, and those involving business leaders.
RATIONALE
Countries that share close relations, or that are regarded as important, are likely to engage in more frequent interactions at the political or diplomatic level. A country’s alignment between CN and the US may be assessed through the relative amount of bilateral visits that they conduct with the superpowers.
LIMITATIONS
Frequency of intercourse may be partly a function of geographical proximity rather than quality of relationship; quantity may not necessarily mean quality.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, all countries are more aligned with CN on average (28). This ranges from Laos (18) and Cambodia (20) at one end, to Philippines (45) and Brunei (41) at the other.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, there has been a marginal shift towards the US on average (+2), with the largest movements coming from Myanmar (+17), Philippines (+16), and Singapore (+14). At the other end, Indonesia (-18) and Cambodia (-17) saw the largest shifts towards CN.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, countries initially shifted in the US’ direction (+5), before continuing to do so (+2), albeit marginally, moving into the latter period. The US has therefore made consistent gains in this indicator, although it has slowed moving into 2015-2024.
V PERIODS
With the exception of 2013-2018, when CN made marginal gains, Southeast Asian countries have on average been shifting towards the US across different periods. The biggest shift towards the US took place in 2019-2024.
ANALYSIS
Countries have shifted slightly in the US’ direction over the last decade or so, particularly over the last 6 years. Vietnam and Myanmar have shifted the most in the US’ direction, while Cambodia and Indonesia have by contrast seen the largest shifts in CN’s direction. Note nevertheless that overall, all countries with the exception of the Philippines are more aligned with CN for this indicator.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of a given country’s membership in multilateral groups containing CN, the US, or both, between 1995-2024, based on open-sourced research. A total of 30 multilateral groupings are considered: 14 contain CN but not the US, 3 contain the US but not CN, and 13 contain both. Dialogue partners are included, while observer states are excluded.
RATIONALE
A country’s membership in, or choice to join, particular multilateral groupings is indicative of its political and diplomatic leanings/preferences. It also reflects the ability of the two superpowers to attract other states to join the groups that they convene. By comparing the relative number of multilateral groups that a country has joined and that includes the US and/or CN, one can estimate the extent of its alignment between them.
LIMITATIONS
CN is heavily overrepresented in this calculation since it features in 27/30 groups, whereas the US is involved in only 16/30 groups. There is also considerably less variation in the overall results of this indicator relative to others.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, all countries more aligned with CN, with an of average (40).
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, there has been a slight shift towards CN on average (-3), with the largest shifts coming from Cambodia (-7) and Myanmar (-6). At the other end, Vietnam (+2) and Brunei (+1) have bucked the trend. All countries are more aligned with CN for the indicator.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, countries initially shifted in the direction of CN (-4), but subsequently have barely shifted moving into 2015-2024. All countries are more aligned with CN for the indicator.
V PERIODS
Countries shifted most towards CN in the 2001-2006 period; this is where a majority of the shift takes place. Since then, countries have barely shifted, although there has been a slight uptick in the 2019-2024 period.
ANALYSIS
Countries have shifted slightly towards CN overall, particularly Cambodia and Myanmar. Vietnam by contrast is the only country to have bucked the trend. Much of the shift has taken place in the early-2000s. All countries remain more aligned with CN for the indicator.
DESCRIPTION
Four indicators are used to estimate each Southeast Asian country’s Military-Security alignment between CN and the US: Aggressive Acts, Arms Supply, Military Exercises, and Security Dialogues
OVERVIEW
For the 1995-2024 period, most countries are closer to the US, with the exception of Myanmar (29), Laos (39), and Cambodia (47). The Philippines (85), Malaysia (79), Indonesia (73), and Singapore (72) are closest to the US
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, SEA-10 has shifted slightly towards CN on average (-3), although they remain on average more aligned with US as a whole. Myanmar (-17), Laos (-16), and Indonesia (-13) have shifted most, whilst Vietnam (+10), Philippines (+6) and Brunei (+3) have bucked the trend and shifted towards the US
III & V PERIODS
SEA-10 has generally undergone a gradual – albeit somewhat marginal – shift towards CN. Note nevertheless that most countries remain considerably more aligned with US in this domain
ANALYSIS
Countries are on average more aligned with US in this domain – this is the sole domain in which the US is comparatively dominant. Interestingly, while countries have shifted marginally towards CN in this domain, the ‘rate of change’ has slowed over the last decade or so. Myanmar and Laos have shifted most towards CN in this domain, whilst Vietnam and Philippines have moved towards the US.
Military-Security Indicators:
1. Aggressive Acts
Reflects the ratio of aggressive acts involving a given country and CN or the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on the Correlates of War (CoW) dataset for 1995-2014, the CSIS’ South China Sea Incidents Tracker for 2015-2020, and the International Crisis Group South China Sea Conflict Tracker for 2020-2024
2. Arms Supply
Reflects the ratio of arms supplied by CN and the US respectively for a given country between 1995-2024, based on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) dataset
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of aggressive acts involving a given country and CN or the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on the Correlates of War (CoW) dataset [1995-2014], the CSIS’ South China Sea Incidents Tracker [2015-2020], and the International Crisis Group South China Sea Conflict Tracker [2020-2024]. Examples of such acts include ‘Show of Troops’, ‘Seizures’ and ‘Raids’.
RATIONALE
A country subjected to military actions or pressures by one of the superpowers experiences a security threat. It is thus likely to be repulsed (pushed away) from aligning with the source of the perceived threat and to reach out to the other superpower. In other words, the more aggressive acts experienced within a dyad, the less aligned they are likely to be in terms of military-security.
LIMITATIONS
Findings are not particularly differentiated, since half of the countries have experienced aggressive actions for neither CN nor the US.
FORMULA
CN/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, the Philippines (77) and Vietnam (75) are strongly aligned with the US; with Malaysia (53) and Indonesia (52) with slight inclinations towards the US. The rest of the countries are non-aligned (50).
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, there has been a shift towards the US on average (+5), which has been driven primarily by Philippines (+7), Malaysia (+7), and Vietnam (+3).
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, countries initially barely shifted, but this was subsequently followed by a shift towards the US (+4) during the 2015-2024 period.
V PERIODS
Countries shifted most towards CN during the 2001-2006, but since then, and albeit marginally, countries have consistently shifted towards the US’ direction, with the greatest shift coming in the 2013-2018 period.
ANALYSIS
SEA-10 has on average shifted towards US, although most of this movement is being driven by a handful of countries, namely Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia. Most countries do not suffer, or engage in, aggressive acts with either superpower.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of arms supplied by CN and the US respectively for a given country between 1995-2024, based on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) dataset. The value (in USD$ millions) of arms supplied from each superpower is compared for each year.
RATIONALE
The source and amount of arms supplied is traditionally regarded as being indicative of positive bilateral security relations: the superpowers are more likely to send/sell materiel to their friends rather than their foes. Secondary states that receive a majority of their arms from a particular superpower may also be reluctant to adopt positions that might antagonize the latter. Therefore, the ratio of arms supplied is a useful proxy for the military alignment of a country vis-à-vis CN and the US.
LIMITATIONS
Certain countries rely on neither superpower for the majority of their arms. Also, in a given year, if for example a country receives no arms from CN, but receives a minuscule amount of arms from the US, said country is nevertheless treated as being in full alignment with the latter, which might be a questionable proposition.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, with the exception of Myanmar (2), Cambodia (35), and Laos (37), all other countries are more aligned with the US, with Singapore (98), Philippines (93), and Indonesia (79) being closest.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, there has been a shift towards CN on average (-5), particularly Indonesia (-23), Laos (-20) and Cambodia (-17). Countries like Vietnam (+10) and Philippines (+7) have on the other hand bucked the trend and shifted in the US’ direction.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, SEA on average moved significantly in the direction of CN (-11), before barely moving over the last decade.
V PERIODS
The largest shift towards CN (-13) occurred in the 2007-2012 period, whereas the largest shift towards US (+10) took place in 2013-2018. The 2019-2024 period saw a shift towards CN (-7).
ANALYSIS
Although most countries remain aligned with the US in terms of arms supply, CN has made not-insignificant gains in certain countries.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of military exercises conducted with CN and the US respectively for a given country between 1995-2024, based on Evan Laksmana’s dataset and supplemented with open-sourced research. List contains multilateral and multinational exercises, but excludes those falling under ASEAN’s auspices. Observer states are also excluded, while multiple iterations/editions of the same exercise in a given year are treated as singular.
RATIONALE
Countries that share historical security ties, common threat perceptions, or military outlooks are likely to conduct more military-to-military exercises. In other words, the greater the number of military exercises conducted, the closer in alignment they tend to be in the military-security domain.
LIMITATIONS
All exercises are treated equally – no attempt has been made to ‘weight’ the exercises conducted in terms of importance/significance.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, with the exception of Myanmar (28), Laos (30), and Vietnam (50), all other countries are comparatively more aligned with the US, particularly Philippines (98), Indonesia (95), and Singapore (95).
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, most countries have shifted towards CN on average (-11), with the exception of Cambodia (+12) and Vietnam (+7). Much of the shift towards CN is driven by three countries: Myanmar (-44), Laos (-40), and Thailand (-21).
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, SEA initially shifted marginally towards CN (-3), before doing so significantly (-11) in the latter decade. Note nevertheless that countries remain more aligned with the US overall.
V PERIODS
The largest shift towards CN took place in the 2013-2018 period (-10), with most other periods experiencing shifts, albeit to smaller degrees, towards CN. By contrast, the period 2001-2006 was the sole period which saw a marginal shift in the US’ direction (+2).
ANALYSIS
Although most countries remain more aligned with the US in terms of military exercises – the US is the most dominant here out of all AOCAI indicators – CN has made not insignificant gains in countries like Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand to a lesser extent. That being said, the US continues to enjoy a significant quantitative advantage in military exercises.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of security dialogues/consultations that a given country held with CN and the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on open-sourced research. Multilateral and multinational dialogues/consultations are excluded, along with those that are convened under ASEAN’s auspices.
RATIONALE
Countries that conduct more security dialogues are likely to be more aligned with each other in the military-security domain: the willingness to convene, confer, and exchange information/intelligence signify a degree of shared trust and interests. It may also reflect the depth of existing security cooperation existing between such countries.
LIMITATIONS
Informal and ad-hoc meetings are generally excluded, although it is not necessarily always clear how to distinguish between institutionalized and non-institutionalized dialogues. Furthermore, certain cases may not strictly qualify as security dialogues per se, as many often have non-security-related matters on their agenda.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, countries are slightly more aligned with the US on average (55), with Myanmar (37) and Laos (39) at one end, to Malaysia (91) and Philippines (70) at the other.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, countries have on average barely shifted towards CN (-1). Nevertheless, there is quite a diversity of shifts: Myanmar (-27), Indonesia (-25), Malaysia (-14) and Cambodia (-13) have shifted most towards CN, whereas Thailand (+37), Brunei (+17) and Philippines (+14) have shifted most towards the US.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, countries initially barely moved, before shifting marginally towards CN in the latter period. However, the V PERIODS analysis below demonstrates that there have been significant shifts.
V PERIODS
The 2001-2006 period saw a significant shift towards CN (-10). 2007-2012 by contrast saw a significant shift towards US (+10). Moving into 2013-2018, countries again saw a significant shift towards CN (-10). The latest period of 2019-2024 saw the US see modest gains (+4).
ANALYSIS
Countries have rather differentiated alignment positions in terms of Security Dialogues. Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Malaysia have generally shifted in the direction of CN, whereas Brunei, Philippines and Thailand have shifted in the direction of the US.
DESCRIPTION
Four indicators are used to estimate each Southeast Asian country’s Economics-Trade alignment between CN and the US: Imports Value, Exports Value, Foreign Investment Flows, and External Debt.
OVERVIEW
For the 1995-2024 period, countries are on average closer to CN (43), particularly Myanmar (15) and Laos (17). Vietnam (40) and Cambodia (42) lean slightly closer to CN, whereas Thailand (56) and Philippines (55) lean slightly closer to the US. Singapore (53), Malaysia (52), Indonesia (50), and Brunei (50), are meanwhile middling.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, SEA-10 has shifted significantly towards CN on average (-22) – by far the largest movement of all our domains – particularly Indonesia (-34), Cambodia (-31), Brunei (-31), and Philippines (-30). On the other hand, Myanmar (-11), Laos (-12), Vietnam (-14), and Singapore (-15) have shifted least.
III & V PERIODS
The largest shifts towards CN in this domain took place in the 2000s until the early-2010s, although it has decreased over the last decade – indeed over the last five years it has on average stalled completely.
ANALYSIS
Notably, the ‘rate of change’ has slowed over the last decade or so. Countries like Indonesia, Cambodia, Brunei, and Philippines have shifted significantly towards CN whereas Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam and Singapore have shifted to a lesser degree.
LIMITATIONS
Foreign Aid from CN and the US would be telling indicators; however data for both countries spanning the entire duration 1995-2024 were not available.
Economics-Trade Indicators:
1. Imports
Reflects the ratio of imports from CN and the US respectively for a given country between 1995-2024, based on the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solutions (WB-WITS) database and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF-IMTS) trade database
2. Exports
Reflects the ratio of exports to CN and the US respectively for a given country between 1995-2024, based on the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solutions (WB-WITS) database and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF-IMTS) trade database
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio imports from CN and the US respectively for a given country between 1995-2024, based on the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solutions (WB-WITS) database, and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF-IMTS) trade database. The value (in USD$ millions) of imports from each superpower is compared for each year respectively. Includes trade with Hong Kong but excludes Taiwan.
RATIONALE
A country that imports a significant amount of goods/services from a particular superpower is likely to be more aligned with the latter, or may otherwise be reluctant to adopt measures that may antagonize its counterpart for fear of jeopardizing trade relations. Comparing the ratio of a country’s imports between CN and the US is thus a useful proxy of its economic-trade alignment with the superpowers.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, all countries lean towards CN, ranging from Myanmar (2), Laos (6) and Cambodia (7) at one end, to Singapore (47) and Philippines (40) at the other.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, there has been a significant shift towards CN on average (-19), particularly from Philippines (-35), Malaysia (-32), Brunei (-32) and Thailand (-31). Countries like Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam has seen less significant shifts, primarily because they were already (i.e. have long been) aligned with CN in this domain, from the 1990s.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, countries initially shifted significantly towards CN (-18), before continuing to a lesser extent (-6) moving into 2015-2024.
V PERIODS
Countries have consistently shifted towards CN – in 2001-2006 it was (-13), 2007-2012 (-9), and 2013-2018 (-7) – although this has stalled (0) in 2019-2024. The latter period is notable for witnessing the US make unprecedented gains, in relative terms, in countries like Brunei, Laos, and Singapore. Note nevertheless that almost all countries, with the exception of Singapore, are heavily heavily-aligned with CN in this indicator.
ANALYSIS
Countries are on average significantly more aligned with CN in imports, with the partial exception of Singapore. This indicator has undergone one of the largest shifts in CN’s direction overall, particularly countries like Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Thailand. Countries like Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam has seen less significant shifts, primarily because they were already (i.e. have long been) aligned with CN in this domain, from the 1990s. The 2019-2024 period is notable for having seen shifts towards CN stall.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio exports from CN and the US respectively for a given country between 1995-2024, based on the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solutions (WB-WITS) database, and the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF-IMTS) trade database. The value (in USD$ millions) of exports to superpower is compared for each year respectively. Includes trade with Hong Kong but excludes Taiwan.
RATIONALE
A country that exports a significant amount of goods/services to a particular superpower is likely to be more aligned with the latter, or may otherwise be reluctant to adopt measures that antagonize its counterpart for fear of jeopardizing trade relations. Comparing the ratio of a country’s exports value between CN and the US is therefore a useful proxy of its economic-trade alignment with the superpowers.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, Myanmar (22), Laos (22) and Singapore (33) are closest to CN, while Cambodia (74) and Philippines (57) are closest to US. The rest of the countries are middling.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, there has been a significant shift towards CN on average (-23), particularly from Brunei (-65), with only Cambodia (+7) and Vietnam (+2) bucking the trend.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, countries initially shifted significantly towards CN (-24), before continuing to do so to a much lesser degree (-4) moving into the latter period.
V PERIODS
Countries shifted most significantly in 2001-2006 (-11) and 2007-2012 (-18). This continued to a significantly lesser degree moving into 2013-2018, and has since stalled in 2019-2024, with the US making marginal gains (+1).
ANALYSIS
Countries have rather differentiated alignment positions in terms of exports. Nevertheless, this indicator has undergone one of the largest shifts in CN’s direction overall, particularly from Brunei and Laos. On the other hand, Cambodia and Vietnam have generally bucked this trend by shifting in the US’ direction.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of foreign capital expenditures from CN or the US respectively in a given country between 2003-2024, based on the Financial Times fDi Markets Crossborder Investment Monitor database, which “tracks companies announcing, opening or considering greenfield FDI in a new physical project or expansion of an existing investment which creates new jobs and capital investment.” Joint ventures are only included if they lead to a new physical operations and if they are majority owned by the foreign investors. Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) and other equity and non-equity investments are not tracked.
RATIONALE
Inbound foreign investment flows from a superpower to a secondary country is traditionally regarded as a strong indicator of the former’s firms’ economic and return-on-investment confidence in the latter. The desire and willingness of secondary countries to attract such capital investments are also indicative of their interest in, and need for, US or CN participation in their economic growth. Therefore, the higher the amount of foreign investment flows, the closer the alignment between the countries.
LIMITATIONS
*Absence of data for 8 of the 30 years (1995-2002) necessitated taking the average of the first three years (2003-2005) with capital expenditure FDI data as a way of estimating the values for the missing years. This means that the alignment ratios for the earliest 8-years are at best a guestimate, and ought to be treated with a certain degree of caution. Also, what the fDi Markets Crossborder Investment Monitor treats and tracks as capital expenditure may differ from how other databases define, quantify, or register FDI.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, countries are slightly more aligned with US on average (57). Countries like Singapore (83), Malaysia (68), Philippines (68), and Brunei (68) are closest to the US, whereas Myanmar (37), Laos (40), and Cambodia (41) are closest to CN.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, countries have shifted significantly towards CN (-23) on average, particularly Cambodia (-54), Malaysia (-43), and Indonesia (-31). Countries like Philippines (-5) and Thailand (-7) have shifted least.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, countries initially shifted significantly towards CN (-24), but did so to a much lesser degree (-4) moving into the latter decade. The mid-2000s to ealy-2010s saw Cambodia and Brunei shift significantly towards CN, while over the last decade Cambodia and Malaysia have shifted most prominently.
V PERIODS
The largest shifts towards CN occurred in the 2000s and into the 2010s, but has since declined – indeed the past six years has witnessed a shift towards the US.
ANALYSIS
Countries have rather differentiated alignment positions in terms of foreign investment flows. Nevertheless, this indicator has undergone fairly significant shifts on average in CN’s direction, particularly Cambodia and Malaysia. That being said, the most recent period (2019-2024) has seen a shift back towards the US on average.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of foreign debt owed to CN and the US respectively by a given country between 1995-2023, based on the World Bank Debt Statistics database on Long Term External Debt Stocks. The value (in USD$ millions) of debt owed is compared for each year. Countries with no foreign debt with either superpower are treated as equidistant.
RATIONALE
The willingness of a superpower to act as a creditor – of long term external debt stocks – to a secondary state is indicative of the closeness of economic cooperation and alignment between the pair, as it implies that the creditor either trusts that the debt will be repaid in the future, or is otherwise willing to write-off said debt. Therefore, the higher the debt quantum owed by a country to a particular superpower, the closer it is in economic-trade alignment.
LIMITATIONS
Data for 2024 has yet to be published at the time of writing.
FORMULA
CN/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2023, Laos (0), Myanmar (0), and Vietnam (33) are more aligned with CN, Thailand (74), Indonesia (69) and Philippines (61) with the US, while Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore are equidistant (50).
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2023, countries have moved significantly towards CN on average (-23), with Cambodia (-74), Indonesia (-56), and Philippines (-55) driving the shift. Brunei, Laos, Malaysia and Singapore saw no movement.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2023, countries initially moved towards CN (-9), which accelerated moving into the latter period (-18).
V PERIODS
The greatest shifts towards CN took place during the 2007-2012 (-11) and 2013-2018 (-12) periods, and this movement has continued to a lesser degree into 2019-2024, (-7).
ANALYSIS
Cambodia, Indonesia and Philippines have shifted significantly towards CN in this indicator. Nevertheless, because such countries have been indebted to the US since the 1990s – foreign debt owed CN only began to feature in the mid-2000s – the overall position 1995-2024 of countries like Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand remains US-aligned, even though the former two have been actively reducing/repaying their US debt whilst taking on CN debt, which has translated into their shifting towards CN in relative terms.
DESCRIPTION
Four indicators are used to estimate each Southeast Asian country’s Soft Power alignment between CN and the US: Regime Type, Visa-free Travel, Inbound Tourists, and Cultural Institutions
OVERVIEW
For the 1995-2024 period, countries are on average somewhat closer to CN (46). Myanmar (29) and Laos (32) are closer to CN, whilst Philippines (77) and Indonesia (55) are closer to US, with the rest of the countries in middling positions
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, SEA-10 has shifted towards CN on average (-10), particularly Thailand (-20). Vietnam (-3) on the other hand has shifted least
III & V PERIODS
Much of the shift towards CN took place in the mid-2000s until the late-2010s. Since the late-2010s, SEA-10 has in fact moved – albeit extremely marginally – towards the US
ANALYSIS
All countries have shifted towards CN in this domain, with Thailand shifting the most, whilst Vietnam has shifted least
LIMITATIONS
Measuring an intangible quality like Soft Power is difficult, and any attempt to do so is likely to contain inaccuracies. The AOCAI would benefit from incorporating additional indicators such as ‘Public Perception’, although the only reliable survey that has sought to tap the sentiments of SEA-10 – the Yusuf Ishak Institute of Southeast Asian Studies State of Southeast Asia Survey – has only been administered since 2019, and therefore cannot be incorporated into the main index.
Soft Power Indicators:
1. Regime Type
Reflects the degree of openness of a country’s governance system between 1995-2024, based on the Freedom House Democracy Index dataset
2. Visa-Free Travel
Reflects the ratio of visa-free travel agreements (if any) with CN and the US respectively for a given country between 1995-2024, based on the VisaIndex database and open-sourced research
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the degree of openness of a country’s governance system between 1995-2024, based on the Freedom House Democracy Index dataset. The latter’s original 1-7 scale (1 being most free/open/democratic, and 7 being most repressive/closed/authoritarian) has been converted to 0-1 (0 being most repressive/closed/authoritarian, and 1 being most free/open/democratic), per our Alignment Index.
RATIONALE
A key aspect of the superpower competition revolves around regime type and political ideology: the US has often been regarded as an exemplar and exponent of democratic openness and freedom, while CN has traditionally been seen as an autocracy with restricted freedom. Countries with governments or political systems which are more open (‘democratic’) are presumed to be comparatively more attracted to or otherwise inclined towards the US, whereas those that are more closed (‘autocratic’) are expected to be closer to CN. In other words, countries/governments are assumed to gravitate towards socio-political systems that are comparatively more akin or similar to their own, which is part of the ‘pull’ effect of the soft power projected by the superpowers. This (regime type) indicator probably incorporates expectations by the secondary states about the relationship between regime type and ability to deliver the economic goods: both US-style democratic capitalism and “socialism with Chinese characteristics” seem capable of delivering economic prosperity.
LIMITATIONS
Regime type or political openness may not necessarily be correlated with alignment choices; may be more a function of elite-preferences rather than Soft Power.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, most countries are more aligned with CN on average (33), with only Philippines (67) and Indonesia (58) being more aligned with US.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, countries have shifted slightly towards to US on average (+3), particularly Indonesia (+20), Myanmar (+18), and Singapore (+11). Only Thailand (-31) and Philippines (-7) have bucked the trend, whilst Cambodia and Laos have not moved.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, countries initially shifted towards the US (+6), but then shifted marginally towards CN (-2) moving into the latter period.
V PERIODS
Countries shifted most towards the US in the 2001-2006 period (+8). By contrast, countries shifted most towards CN in the 2019-2024 period (-4).
ANALYSIS
Although most countries are comparatively closer to CN overall, there has been a general shift towards the US, given the improvement in democracy scores of certain countries. The most recent period of 2019-2024 has nevertheless seen a shift towards CN on average, which is notable.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of visa-free travel agreements (if any) with CN and the US respectively for a given country between 1995-2024, based on the VisaIndex database and open-sourced research. The ratio is obtained by answering the following four questions:
- Do citizens of country X have visa-free status when visiting CN?
- Do citizens of CN have visa-free status when visiting country X?
- Do citizens of country X have visa-free status when visiting US?
- Do citizens of US have visa-free status when visiting country X?
If the answer to A & B are NO, and C & D are YES, alignment is ‘100’ – full alignment with the US. If the answer to A & B are YES, and C & D are NO, alignment is ‘0’ – full alignment with CN. If A, B & C are YES, and D is NO, alignment is ‘25’. If B, C & D is YES, and A is NO, alignment is ‘75’. If A & C are NO, and B & D are YES, alignment is ‘50’ (equidistant). Likewise, countries that have visa-free travel agreements with neither superpower – or both – are treated as equidistant ‘50’.
RATIONALE
Offering visa-free travel arrangements for the citizens of another country is indicative of a certain degree of socio-political-economic and diplomatic trust. This need not necessarily be a two-way street – citizens of a certain superpower may enjoy visa-free status to visit a particular country, even though the latter’s citizens are not given reciprocal privileges when visiting said superpower. Visa-free travel provisions is therefore a useful proxy for Soft Power alignment – the more available/accessible visa-free provisions are, the closer the alignment between countries.
LIMITATIONS
Certain countries lack information on the specific year in which a visa-free travel agreement first came into force. Accounting for periodic fluctuations is also difficult. Data from earlier periods may be less reliable.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, most countries are more aligned with the US on average (63), with the closest being Brunei (82), Singapore (78), and Philippines (75). Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar and Vietnam are non-aligned.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, countries have shifted slightly towards CN on average (-3), driven predominantly by Brunei (-13) and Singapore (-10). Half of the countries have not moved.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, countries initially shifted marginally towards CN (-3), and subsequently bare moved (-1) in the latter period.
V PERIODS
Countries have generally shifted marginally towards CN in all periods, with the exception of 2013-2018, when there was no change.
ANALYSIS
Brunei, Singapore and to a lesser extent Malaysia and Thailand have shifted towards CN.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of inbound tourists from CN and the US respectively to a given country between 1995-2024, based on the ASEAN Statistics Division Data Portal and official statistics from individual SEA countries.
RATIONALE
The popularity or attractiveness of a particular country as a travel destination for citizens of a particular superpower is indicative of the former’s soft-power pull, or of strong socio-cultural and/or people-to-people ties. The greater the number of inbound tourists from a certain superpower to a particular country, the closer the soft power alignment between them.
LIMITATIONS
‘Outbound tourists’ could be used to complement this indicator, although data spanning both countries across the entire duration of 1995-2024 is unavailable. Indicator does not capture tourist expenditure or receipts, which could be more indicative/consequential. A handful of datapoints are missing for certain countries.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, countries are more aligned with CN on average (36), with only Philippines (78) being more aligned with the US, whilst Indonesia (48) remains middling.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2023, countries have shifted significantly towards CN on average (-24), particularly Indonesia (-47), followed by Laos (-33), Myanmar (-32) and Cambodia (-31).
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2023, countries initially shifted significantly in CN’s direction (-20), and continued to do so in the latter period, although to a lesser extent (-9).
V PERIODS
Countries have since the 2000s consistently shifted towards CN, with the greatest shifts coming in 2007-2012 (-15) and onto 2013-2018 (-13). Since then, however, the latest period has seen countries shift towards the US (+9), likely due to the near-complete collapse of CN’s outbound tourism during the pandemic. That being said, all countries with the exception of the Philippines are significantly more aligned with CN on this indicator.
ANALYSIS
Countries have on average shifted significantly towards CN for this indicator. Overall, only the Philippines is more aligned with the US, whilst Indonesia is middling – the rest of the countries are heavily aligned with CN. The recent period is notable for the US making unprecedented gains, although this is likely to be a temporary occurrence due to domestic restriction imposed by CN on outbound tourists during the pandemic.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of key cultural institutions from CN and the US located in a given country between 1995-2024, based on open-sourced research. CN’s prime overseas cultural institution is taken to be the Confucius Institute, with US’s comparable institution being the American Corner/Centre. Countries playing host to both – or neither – are treated as equidistant.
RATIONALE
Certain cultural institutions are intimately tied to the soft power projection of the two superpowers – the Confucius Institute for CN, and the American Corner/Centre for the US. Their presence and proliferation within a particular country may be treated as a form of implicit or explicit endorsement of its activities. Therefore, the greater the ratio of cultural institutions in a particular country, the closer the soft-power alignment between them.
LIMITATIONS
Whether the Confucius Institute is indeed comparable to the American Corner/Centre may be questionable.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, countries like Singapore (17), Myanmar (28), and Thailand (28) are on average more aligned with CN, while Philippines (88) and Vietnam (87) are more aligned with the US.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, countries have shifted significantly towards CN on average (-17), particularly Singapore (-33), Myanmar (-32), and Thailand (-31). Only Cambodia has bucked the trend (+3).
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, countries initially shifted in CN’s direction (-8), continuing to do so (-8) moving into the latter period.
V PERIODS
The 2001-2006 period saw countries shift towards the US (+7), although 2007-2012 witnessed a significant shift in the direction of CN (-15), which proceeded into 2013-2018 (-7) albeit to a lesser extent. Since then, countries have barely shifted.
ANALYSIS
Countries have generally shifted in CN’s direction for this indicator, with the exception of Cambodia. The US initially saw some gains in the early-to-mid 2000s, but since then countries have consistently moved towards CN.
DESCRIPTION
Four indicators are used to estimate each Southeast Asian country’s Signalling alignment between CN and the US: Negative Sent, Positive Sent, Negative Received, and Positive Received.
OVERVIEW
For the 1995-2024 period, all countries are closer to CN on average (37), particularly Cambodia (28), Laos (28), and Myanmar (28), with only the Philippines being non-aligned (50).
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, SEA-10 has shifted towards US on average (+7) – the sole domain to have seen the US achieve gains – particularly Vietnam (+21), the Philippines (+16), and Myanmar (+14). Singapore (-7) and Indonesia (-1) are the only countries to have bucked the trend and moved in CN’s direction.
III & V PERIODS
Compared to 1995-2000, SEA-10’s alignment experienced a rather significant movement towards CN during the 2001-2006 period – this could be due either to the US’ War on Terror, and/or to CN’s WTO ascension. Subsequently however, SEA-10’s alignment experienced a significant movement towards the US during 2007-2012, a fact which continued (albeit to a lesser degree) into 2013-2018, which could be due to the Obama administration’s Pivot to Asia, and/or due to the CN’s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea.
ANALYSIS
Countries have generally shifted towards the US in this domain – particularly Vietnam. At the other end, Singapore is the only country which has shifted towards CN in this domain.
Signalling Indicators:
1. Negative Sent
Reflects the ratio of negative signals sent to CN and the US respectively by a given country between 1995-2024, based on the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset for 1995-2022 and Political Event Classification, Attributes, and Types (POLECAT) dataset for 2023-2024, as derived by Kai Quek & John Koo
2. Positive Sent
Reflects the ratio of negative signals sent to CN and the US respectively by a given country between 1995-2024, based on the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset for 1995-2022 and Political Event Classification, Attributes, and Types (POLECAT) dataset for 2023-2024, as derived by Kai Quek & John Koo
3. Negative Received
Reflects the ratio of negative signals sent to CN and the US respectively by a given country between 1995-2024, based on the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset for 1995-2022 and Political Event Classification, Attributes, and Types (POLECAT) dataset for 2023-2024, as derived by Kai Quek & John Koo
4. Positive Received
Reflects the ratio of negative signals sent to CN and the US respectively by a given country between 1995-2024, based on the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset for 1995-2022 and Political Event Classification, Attributes, and Types (POLECAT) dataset for 2023-2024, as derived by Kai Quek & John Koo
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of negative signals sent by SEA to CN and the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset for 1995-2022 and Political Event Classification, Attributes, and Types (POLECAT) dataset for 2023-2024, as derived by Kai Quek & John Koo. Because of the way the data is recorded, there may be a ‘time-lag’ of up to a year for the signalling positions to be captured.
RATIONALE
The ratio of negative signals sent from a particular country to the superpowers offers useful insights on the degree of dissatisfaction and/or concern with the state of the bilateral relationship in a particular year. The greater the number of negative signals sent to a particular superpower, the farther apart the alignment between them in the signalling domain.
LIMITATIONS
ICEWS records multiple reports on same event for salient issues, which may produce some distortions/inaccuracies. Data for Brunei in particular, and Laos to a lesser extent are incomplete, and may produce a somewhat misleading picture for those two countries.
FORMULA
CN/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, most countries are more aligned with CN on average (36), with the exception of Brunei (59). Countries like Philippines (51) and Singapore (50) are middling.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, most countries have shifted significantly towards the US on average (+16), particularly Vietnam (+51), Laos (+25), Myanmar (+25). On the other hand, only Singapore (-10) and Indonesia (-1) have bucked the trend and moved towards CN.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, countries shifted in the US’s direction (+5), and this continued doing so even more significantly moving into 2015-2024 (+14).
V PERIODS
The 2001-2006 period saw countries shift towards CN’s direction (-8), but by contrast, the US saw significant gains in the subsequent 2007-2012 (+9) and 2013-2018 (+16) periods. The 2019-2024 has seen a marginal shift towards CN.
ANALYSIS
Countries have generally shifted towards the US for this indicators, even if most countries remain more aligned with CN overall. Most of the shift towards the US came in the decade between the late-2000s to the late-2010s, which could be due to the US’ rebalance to Asia, or CN’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of positive signals sent by SEA to CN and the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset for 1995-2022 and Political Event Classification, Attributes, and Types (POLECAT) dataset for 2023-2024, as derived by Kai Quek & John Koo. Because of the way the data is recorded, there may be a ‘time-lag’ of up to a year for the signalling positions to be captured
RATIONALE
The ratio of positive signals sent from a particular country to the superpowers offers useful insights on the degree of satisfaction and amity in their bilateral relations in a particular year. The greater the amount of positive signals being sent to a particular superpower, the closer the alignment between them in the signalling domain.
LIMITATIONS
ICEWS records multiple reports on same event for salient issues, which may produce some distortions/inaccuracies. Data for Brunei in particular, and Laos to a lesser extent are incomplete, and may produce a somewhat misleading picture for those two countries.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, most countries are somewhat more aligned with CN on average (42). Countries like Philippines (51), Vietnam (50), Singapore (48), and Indonesia (47) are middling.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, there has been a slight shift towards the US (+4) on average, particularly Brunei (+12), Myanmar (+10), and Philippines (+10). Countries like Laos (-14), Indonesia (-2), and Singapore (-2) have on the other hand bucked the trend.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, and subsequently 2015-2024, countries initially shifted marginally in the US’s direction (-4), before shifting marginally towards CN in the latter period (-2).
V PERIODS
Countries shifted towards CN in the 2001-2006 period (-5), before shifting in the US’s direction in 2007-2012 (+6). The 2013-2018 period barely saw any movement (+1), whereas the 2019-2024 period saw marginal a shift towards CN (-4).
ANALYSIS
Most countries are considerably more aligned with CN overall in this indicator, with the exception of Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia, which are in middling positions. The US saw the greatest gains in the 2007-2012 period, but in the most recent period of 2019-2024, countries have on average shifted in the direction of CN.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of negative signals received by SEA from CN and the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset for 1995-2022 and Political Event Classification, Attributes, and Types (POLECAT) dataset for 2023-2024, as derived by Kai Quek & John Koo. Because of the way the data is recorded, there may be a ‘time-lag’ of up to a year for the signalling positions to be captured
RATIONALE
The ratio of negative signals received by a particular country from the superpowers offers useful insights on the degree of dissatisfaction and/or concern in their bilateral relations in a particular year. The greater the number of negative signals being received from a particular superpower, the farther apart the alignment between them in the signalling domain.
LIMITATIONS
ICEWS records multiple reports on same event for salient issues, which may produce some distortions/inaccuracies. Data for Brunei in particular, and Laos to a lesser extent are incomplete, and may produce a somewhat misleading picture for those two countries.
FORMULA
CN/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, most countries are significantly more aligned with CN on average (28), with the exception of Brunei (48) and Philippines (46), which are middling.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, countries have shifted towards the US on average (+9), particularly Philippines (+25) and Vietnam (+20). At the other end, Singapore (-12) has bucked the trend and shifted towards the US, whereas Indonesia (0) has barely moved.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, countries initially shifted towards the US (+7), but subsequently barely shifted (-1) moving into the 2015-2024 period.
V PERIODS
Countries shifted towards CN (-8) in the 2001-2006 period, but then significantly shifted in the US’ direction (+12) moving into 2007-2012. This shift would slow in 2013-2018 (+2), and by 2019-2024, countries would see a shift in CN’s direction (-5).
ANALYSIS
Countries are closer overall to CN in this indicator. The US made significant gains in the 2007-2012 period, and to a lesser extent during 2013-2018, but countries have since shifted towards CN. Philippines and Vietnam have undergone notable shifts towards the US, whilst Singapore or the other hand is the only country to have shifted towards CN.
DESCRIPTION
Reflects the ratio of positive signals received by SEA from CN and the US respectively between 1995-2024, based on the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset for 1995-2022 and Political Event Classification, Attributes, and Types (POLECAT) dataset for 2023-2024, as derived by Kai Quek & John Koo. Because of the way the data is recorded, there may be a ‘time-lag’ of up to a year for the signalling positions to be captured.
RATIONALE
The ratio of positive signals received by a particular country from the superpowers provides useful insights on the degree of satisfaction and amity in their bilateral relations in a particular year. The greater the amount of positive signals being received from a particular superpower, the closer the alignment between them in the signalling domain.
LIMITATIONS
ICEWS records multiple reports on same event for salient issues, which may produce some distortions/inaccuracies. Data for Brunei in particular, and Laos to a lesser extent are incomplete, and may produce a somewhat misleading picture for those two countries.
FORMULA
US/{US+CN}
OVERVIEW
For the period 1995-2024, countries are on average slightly more aligned with CN (42). Countries like Philippines (51), Vietnam (50), Singapore (49), and Indonesia (48) are middling.
II PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2009 with 2010-2024, countries have on average barely shifted (+1). Myanmar (+9), Philippines (+9), and Vietnam (+4) have shifted towards the US, whilst on the other hand, countries like Laos (-11), Singapore (-3) and Cambodia (-3) have shifted in CN’s direction.
III PERIODS
Comparing 1995-2004 with 2005-2014, countries initially shifted marginally towards the US (+3), but then subsequently shifted marginally towards CN (-4) moving into the 2015-2024 period.
V PERIODS
The 2007-2012 period saw a marginal shift in the direction of the US (+3), although subsequently in 2013-2018 countries would shift marginally towards CN (-2), which would continue into 2019-2024 (-4), albeit to a larger extent.
ANALYSIS
Countries have on average shifted in the direction of CN in the last decade or so, even if the US made marginal gains in the 2007-2012 period. With the exception of countries like Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia, which are in an overall middling position, the rest of the countries are considerably more aligned with CN.