COMMUNITY RELATIONS AMIDST THE

THREAT OF TERROR

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Abstract

This paper analyses data from a survey funded by Channel NewsAsia (CNA) at MediaCorp in 2017, which examined the views of 2,031 respondents on issues relating to race and religious relations in the context of terrorism.

The survey aimed to study how Singaporeans would react following a terror attack in the nation state, perpetrated by groups that used religious labels (either a Christian, Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu group).[1] The survey also asked respondents how long they thought it would take for fellow citizens to remain angry or suspicious of those from the same religion involved in the attack, and the length of time it would take for Singaporeans to feel united as one people. To get a sense of whether certain segments of Singaporeans felt victimised because of global terror attacks, the survey also asked the extent to which respondents felt their community was targeted or viewed with suspicion.

This information is important amid a global and regional backdrop of regular terrorist attacks in recent years, as well as Singapore's leaders making periodic exhortations to sensitise the population to the fact that it is a matter of "not if,

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[1] In coupling the terms "extremist" and each of the four religions represented in this study (Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism), we recognise this association as potentially problematic. The tenets of these religions do not endorse violence. However, because the terms have become commonplace in mainstream discourse and media in relation to terror attacks, this formulation was used in the survey to aid respondents' understanding of the issues that needed to be studied.

but when" an attack will occur in Singapore, and that the multi-racial and multi-religious nation's social fabric is at risk of being torn apart by terrorists if citizens do not stand united.

The first part of our paper details topline findings. We find that there already exist substantial levels of mistrust between races even before the stimulus of a terror attack is introduced. There are more among the majority Chinese population who have some mistrust of minority Malays and Indians. There was more mistrust of all races among Chinese from lower socio-economic status backgrounds.

Broadly, the results also indicate that Singaporeans in general would display stronger negative reactions (such as heightened levels of suspicion or anxiety) after an attack by overseas groups claiming to be Muslims, compared to scenarios where overseas groups claiming to be Buddhists, Christians or Hindus were behind the incident. Analyses of the responses by ethnic group and religious affiliation showed that in both cases, non-Malay and non-Muslim respondents were generally more likely to display a stronger negative reaction to Muslims in the event of an attack by overseas Muslims, compared to Buddhists, Christians or Hindus in the event that an attack was carried out by groups claiming affiliation with that particular religion.

Non-Muslims from higher socio-economic brackets were generally less likely to display negative reactions (and hence display more openness and trust towards

Muslims), if extremist overseas groups claiming to be Muslims carried out an attack. For example, when educational background was used as a proxy measure for socio-economic status, Buddhists, Hindus, Christians and those with no religious affiliations who had higher levels of education were generally less likely to say they would be suspicious of a Muslim stranger in their neighbourhood.

Less educated respondents across all religious affiliations were also more likely to display a stronger negative reaction, regardless of which of the four religions was implicated in the incident.

There was a substantial proportion of non-Muslims who would let others know they do not associate Muslims with these types of terror attacks; about a third of them said they would do so. The same proportion of those not from the same religion as the terrorists would act similarly in the other scenarios involving extremists who were from Buddhist, Christian and Hindu groups.

Half of all respondents felt it would take a year or less for society to recover (such as the time taken for Singaporeans to stand together as a united people), after a terror attack. Among those who professed a religion, on average, Muslim respondents reported the longest time needed for Singaporeans to feel that we are united as one people (3.62 years). Better-educated Malay and Muslim respondents tended to be less optimistic of Singaporean unity in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.

Across four situations to gauge how much a community felt victimised (such as whether people were targeting their community speaking about being vigilant about terrorists), Malays reported the highest frequencies of experiencing such incidents among the three major ethnic groups (usually around twice as high as Chinese or Indians).

The second part of our paper conducted deeper statistical analysis, including ordinary least squares regressions, to investigate the characteristics of several profiles of people. We focused our analysis on issues related to the Malay/Muslim community – Islamophobia, sense of victimisation by Malays, and actions to build solidarity after a terror attack. While terror attacks can be perpetrated by those of any religious faith, since 2001, the great majority of reported attacks have been associated with extremist Muslims. This then justifies focused attention on how Malay/Muslims have to deal with the issue of terrorism and how the broader public views Muslims.

First, regressions showed non-Muslims who were less likely to display Islamophobic tendencies after a terror attack by an extremist Muslim organisation were more likely to be male, aged 21 to 34, and who within the last two years had made friends with Malays, attended a Malay wedding or celebration, or asked Malays about cultural practices. When we did a separate analysis after constructing a scale variable, we found that non-Muslims who were more pre-disposed to exhibiting Islamophobia were more likely to live in 1- to 2-room flats, and have lower levels of education. This might stem from

their comparatively lower interracial ties, to which those who live in more prosperous conditions have more access perhaps because of their educational background and social networks. Many lower-income persons may also not have sufficient opportunities for longer tenures in the education system where many of the value and norms of multi-racialism are emphasised.

In addition, Malays who are younger, of higher socio-economic status, or have had more interracial interactions in the past two years, are more likely to apologise after an attack, or speak to people of other religions to clarify that the terrorists do not represent their community, its beliefs and views. They are also more likely to experience people linking their racial community with terrorism. A potential reason for this could be greater exposure to public sentiments of Islam-motivated terrorist attacks through the media, their interracial acquaintances and friendships, or their longer time spent in educational institutions.

Finally, non-Muslim respondents who have had more interracial interactions were more likely to express solidarity with Muslims after an attack. This suggests that efforts to deepen understanding and integration among different communities in Singapore, through events in the grassroots, schools and other such organisations, should continue as the country seeks to build up social ballast before any terror attack.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS AMIDST THE THREAT OF TERROR

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2017, Channel NewsAsia (CNA) at MediaCorp, conducted a survey with 2,031 respondents on race relations in the context of terrorism.

To our knowledge, this is the first public study of its kind internationally that examines perceptions of how people would react following a terror attack perpetrated by religious extremists, in a context where such incidents have not actually taken place. The survey also asked respondents how long they thought it would take for fellow citizens to remain angry or suspicious of those from the same religion involved in the attack, and the length of time it would take for Singaporeans to feel united as one people. To get a sense of whether certain segments of Singaporeans felt victimised because of global terror attacks, the survey also asked the extent to which respondents felt their community was targeted or viewed with suspicion.

This information is important amid a global and regional backdrop of regular terrorist attacks in recent years, as well as Singapore's leaders making periodic exhortations to sensitise the population to the fact that it is a matter of "not if, but when" an attack will occur in Singapore, and that the multi-racial and multi-

religious nation's social fabric is at risk of being torn apart by terrorists if citizens do not stand united.[2]

Furthermore this study adds to the findings from several surveys on race and religious relations that have been carried out in more recent years. These studies have provided a baseline for our understanding of the level of social harmony in Singapore. Broadly, previous findings have shown that Singaporeans generally perceive that there are good levels of racial and religious harmony here. However when examining a range of measures of harmony, there are clear gaps. Workplace discrimination affects at least a quarter of minority residents (Mathew, 2015). There are racial preferences for a range of relationships (Mathew, 2016).

In a multi-cultural setting like Singapore, managing racial and religious relations is of utmost priority. Thus, since independence, there has been substantial investment made in building up legal and societal institutions to safeguard racial and religious rights, establish and deepen harmonious interracial and interreligious relationships, and prevent race and religion being used to create divisions within Singapore. These range from the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA), which penalises religiously spiteful comments, to education and housing policies that promote integration of the different racial communities in daily life. Safeguarding Singapore's racial and religious harmony has taken on added significance in recent years, due to the threat of terrorism. Singapore, with its developed country status and extensive trading

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[2] See for instance Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's speech at the launch of the SGSecure movement in September 2016 (Lee, 2016).

links, carries the added burden of being a high-value target for terrorists. The Ministry of Home Affairs, in its Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2017, said that the country was specifically targeted by terrorist groups in the past year and the terrorism threat to the country remains the highest in recent years (Lam, 2017). Singapore's diverse religious makeup means it is highly vulnerable to religiously inflammatory narratives in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Thus, managing interracial and interreligious harmony and building a foundation for strong cross-racial relationships is imperative to preventing interreligious distrust and buffering the impact of religiously motivated terrorist attacks.

Terrorism is a global threat with dire consequences. It is currently on the radar of many countries, with recent attacks in Paris, Nice, London, Berlin, Boston, Sydney, Jakarta and several other cities globally, garnering high levels of attention on mainstream media. Many of these attacks were carried out by Muslim or Arab extremists, either acting on their own or in concert with larger extremist Islamist organisations such as al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Jemaah Islamiah (JI). As the countries involved in the attacks, such as the United States (US), France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia are fairly multi-cultural in terms of demographic makeup, terrorist attacks can be detrimental to interracial and interreligious relations within the country.

Singapore has been fortunate to have not experienced any terror attacks on its soil. However there have been several reports of foiled attempts by terror

groups to engage in attacks. A recent one involved Batam-based militants who were planning to launch a rocket at Singapore's Marina Bay Sands integrated resort (Arshad, 2016).

Academic research has shown that the aftermath of a religiously motivated terrorist attack is almost always fraught with tension, especially between people from the community involved in the attack and those from other communities. For example, Disha, Cavendish and King (2011) documented the steep increase in hate crimes against Arab and Muslim Americans in the US following the New York terrorist attacks (which were carried out by 19 militants associated with al-Qaeda) on September 11, 2001. The number of hate crimes against Muslims and Arabs shot up from 28 in 2000 to 481 in 2001. In most cosmopolitan countries with a diverse ethnic makeup, Islam tends to be the religion repeatedly associated with terrorism, though there have been calls by several scholars, journalists and politicians not to conflate the two. They stress that terrorist acts are not the result of theology dogma inciting violence on innocent people but rather a warped interpretation of Islam by some religious adherents.[3]

Several scholars point to the mainstream media's reporting of terrorist attacks as well as stereotypical portrayals of perpetrators of terrorist acts as one main cause for hate crimes levelled against Muslims. Ramji (2016) notes the rise in

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[3] See for instance a May 2017 *Washington Post* article headlined "How terrorists warp the meaning of Ramadan to justify their atrocities" (Bearak, 2017).

popular media portraying Muslims, and Arabs in particular, as gun-wielding terrorists following the 9/11 attacks. Other communities linked with extremist attacks did not receive such prejudiced portrayals. For example, despite right-wing extremists carrying out more deadly attacks (21) than Muslim extremists (11) in the US (Ruiz-Grossman, 2017), most were not labelled as "terrorists". As a result, Ruiz-Grossman concluded that Islam was left to bear the burden of being associated with terrorism. In addition, Bayoumi (2017) pointed to how mainstream news outlets often draw the link between terrorism and Islam and do not have the same practice for other religions. Lone Muslim perpetrators are labelled as "terrorists", while lone Christian or white perpetrators are "mentally unstable".

Increased overt and covert forms of prejudice against religious minorities following a religiously motivated terrorist attack can lead to members of the religious community feeling alienated, despite the denouncing of such attacks (Tindongan, 2011). This can translate into stress, which can further amplify into post-traumatic stress disorders, anxiety and depression — as seen in Muslims in the United States (Rippy & Newman, 2006).

Members of the religious community may also experience an internal conflict (Machtans, 2016). If they criticise Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslims too strongly, would this run the risk of exacerbating Islamophobia? This was a dilemma facing Islamic organisations in Germany: while they feel the need to publicly criticise terrorist attacks by extremists, they also experience

pressure to denounce Islamophobic movements in Germany such as Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (Pegida) (Machtans, 2016).

The heightened fear of Islam manifests itself in public sentiment for greater governmental intervention, often through greater racial profiling. Disha et al. (2011) noted how Gallup polls indicated that 49 per cent of Americans would support a policy that would require Arabs, even if they hold citizenship status, to carry identification. Also, 58 per cent would support a policy that would require Arabs to undergo more extensive screenings at airports. This provides evidence of how perceived associations between particular religions and terrorism translate into very real outcomes. This demonstrates the adverse impact of religiously motivated terrorist attacks on interracial and interreligious relations, to the extent of support for intrusive and discriminatory profiling practices on a national level.

The effect of post-terrorist attack discrimination may at times also extend to those who do not belong to the religious community associated with the terrorist attack. Kumar (2016) noted how in countries such as the US, non-Muslim South Asians too become targets of discrimination, as a result of their appearance. For example, over the years, many Sikhs in the US were targets of hate crimes, having their taxis set on fire or their stores vandalised by xenophobic individuals. This demonstrates the danger of Islamophobia morphing into general xenophobia against individuals with darker complexions. Religious ignorance (for example, a lack of understanding about the differences in the

religious garb between Sikhs and Muslims), coupled with a terrorist attack, may be a breeding ground for overt discrimination, hate crimes and the severe impairment of interracial and interreligious relations.

Taken to the extreme, sentiments of paranoia, distrust and anger towards particular religious groups associated with terrorist attacks may snowball from hate crimes into severely negative outcomes such as mass killings or genocide. The current situation in Myanmar is testament to this. In response to the fear of "Islamisation", Buddhists in Myanmar have resorted to openly carrying out acts of violence against the Rohingyas, who are predominantly Muslim. The number of Rohingya Muslims who have been murdered thus far is extremely high, with over one million displaced refugees also living in refugee camps in neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh as a result of many Rohingya villages being wiped out by the Burmese army (BBC, 2018). This demonstrates a worst-case scenario that could emerge from embodying "anti-Islamisation" sentiments.

2. METHODOLOGY

Fieldwork for the study was conducted from April 21 to May 24, 2017, by Media Research Consultants, a consumer research firm that regularly carries out surveys for the government and business sectors. It is useful to note that the Manchester bombing occurred on May 22, 2017, and news reports may have influenced some respondents' responses though the bulk of data collection had

been completed by then. There were, however, no significant differences for the data collected before and after the incident.

The target respondent group were Singapore citizens aged 21 and above. A random sample of household addresses were obtained from the Department of Statistics. Interviewers approached potential respondents from these household addresses, who completed the survey on their own using the Computer-Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) method. This method was deemed suitable as it decreased the chances of respondents giving answers that were socially desirable to the interviewer directly. Moreover, adult literacy in Singapore is extremely high at 97% of the population (Department of Statistics Singapore, 2018). However, a small number who had difficulties using the CAPI were assisted by the interviewer.

The total sample size was 2,031 — comprising 1,016 Chinese, 504 Malays, and 511 whose ethnicity was classified as Indian or Others. Minorities were oversampled beyond their representation in the population, to ensure that there would be enough data for statistical analysis to be performed. Results and analysis provided in this paper however have been weighted based on the proportion of the different races in the resident population.

3. RESPONDENTS' DEMOGRAPHICS

After weights for race were applied, the profile of the sample mirrored the generation population as closely as possible, especially for race and gender. In

the surveyed sample, 48.6 per cent were male and 51.4 per cent female (see Table 1).

Table 1: Proportions of each gender among survey respondents

Gender	Percentage (%)
Female	51.4
Male	48.6

After weighting, the racial proportions mirrored the proportions in the general population as closely as possible: 74.3 per cent were Chinese, 13.4 per cent Malay, 9.1 per cent were Indian, and 3.2 per cent were classified as Others (see Table 2). This comprised 1,509 Chinese, 272 Malays, and 250 who were either Indian or of other ethnicities.

Table 2: Proportions of each ethnic group among survey respondents

Ethnicity	Percentage (%)
Chinese	74.3
Malay	13.4
Indian	9.1
Others	3.2

However, in sections 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.5.1 and 4.6.1, where results were analysed based on two characteristics of respondents (such as race and housing type), we used the *unweighted* sample as certain groups had very small sample sizes. Using the weighted sample in these instances would lead to some groups numbering 10 or less. Any analyses would thus be unlikely to lead to generalisable conclusions. When we use the *unweighted* sample, the relevant tables carry a note indicating this.

Of the sample, 29.4 per cent were Buddhist; 20.8 per cent were Christian or Catholic; 16.8 per cent Muslim; 6.1 per cent Hindu; 6 per cent had a religion classified under "Others" (such as Sikhism, Judaism, or Taoism); and 20.8 per cent had no religion or were free-thinkers (see Table 3). In a separate question, most survey respondents (77 per cent) reported that they normally associate Singapore Malays with the religion of Islam, and hence Muslims.

Table 3: Proportions of each religious affiliation among survey respondents

Religion	Percentage (%)
Buddhist	29.4
Catholic	4.6
Christian	16.2
Hindu	6.1
Muslim	16.8
Sikh	1.0
Taoist	4.9
No religion/free-thinker	20.8

There was a fair distribution of all age groups in the sample, with the youngest respondent aged 21 and the oldest above 65. In subsequent sections, we analysed respondents' answers based on their age groups. They were divided into three brackets for this analysis — those aged 21 to 34 (whom we defined as millennials), those aged 35 to 49, and those aged 50 and above.

Table 4: Proportions of each age group among survey respondents

Age	Percentage (%)
21 to 24 years old	7.3
25 to 29 years old	9.2

30 to 34 years old	9.6
35 to 39 years old	9.7
40 to 44 years old	10.0
45 to 49 years old	10.0
50 to 54 years old	9.9
55 to 59 years old	9.7
60 to 64 years old	8.8
Above 65 years old	15.7

In terms of residence types, most of the respondents resided in HDB 4-room flats (nearly 32 per cent). The second-most common housing type were HDB 5-room or executive flats (29 per cent), followed by HDB 3-roomers (nearly 17 per cent).

Table 5: Proportions of each housing type among survey respondents

Housing Type	Percentage (%)
HDB 1-room	1.7
HDB 2-room	1.5
HDB 3-room	16.7
HDB 4-room	31.7
HDB 5-room	29.0
Executive Condominium/HUDC	0.5
Condominiums/Private apartments	10.2
Bungalow/Semi-detached/Terrace	8.7

In terms of educational background, 21.8 per cent had some secondary, primary, or no formal education; 23.4 per cent had either completed secondary "N" or "O" Levels, or completed a course in the Institute of Technical Education;

24.1 per cent had either a polytechnic diploma or completed "A" Levels; and 30.7 per cent had a university degree (see Table 6).

Table 6: Proportions of each educational background type among survey respondents

Education	Percentage (%)
No formal education	2.2
Completed "PSLE"	11.5
Some secondary schooling	8.1
Completed "O" Levels/ "N" Levels/secondary	18.1
Completed ITE/ITC/NTC	5.3
Completed "A" Levels/HSC	4.2
Polytechnic/Diplomas	19.9
University Degree/Post-graduate studies	30.7
Professional Certificate	0.1

In subsequent sections, we used respondents' highest level of education as an indicator of socio-economic status for our analysis. Generally, we grouped those with no formal education, some primary schooling, those with a Primary School Leaving Examination ("PSLE") certification upon completing primary school, as well as with some secondary schooling, collectively under the category "PSLE and below". Respondents with "O" Level certification upon

completing secondary school and who have graduated from Institutes of Technical Education (ITEs) were classified as "secondary/ITE" or "O" Level/ITE. Respondents with a polytechnic diploma, "A" Level certification (upon completing Junior College) or other forms of professional qualifications were classified as "'A' Level/Diploma/Professional Qualifications". Respondents with degrees or other postgraduate certifications were classified under "Degrees and above".

4. TOPLINE FINDINGS

4.1 Lack of trust among Chinese of other ethnic groups

The survey first set out to establish the levels of general trust between and within ethnic groups before a terror attack scenario was introduced to the respondent. Respondents were asked what proportion of people of each race they thought would return their wallet if they had dropped it in a shopping mall.[4] We considered that those who could not trust more than half of those of a particular community to return their wallet as showing signs of less trust. Overall, 45 per cent of all respondents felt that either none, almost none, or less than half of Singaporean Chinese would return their wallet. Correspondingly, 53.1 per cent and 57.2 per cent of all respondents felt the same way about Singaporean Malays and Singaporean Indians.

Pre-crisis, the results also point to an existing gap, with the majority Chinese group displaying less trust of minority races. A majority of Chinese respondents

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[4] The question was, "Imagine a situation where you have dropped your wallet at a shopping mall in Singapore. Inside your wallet are your contact details (such as your mobile phone number, and your home address), so it can easily be returned back to you. What proportion of people, of the following races, do you think will return your wallet if they found it?"

(57.2 per cent) felt that either none, almost none, or less than half of Singaporean Malays would return their wallet if they found it in a shopping mall. There was even more mistrust of Singaporean Indians among the Chinese; some 61.5 per cent of Chinese respondents had similar sentiments towards Indians. In contrast, just under half of Chinese respondents (46.1 per cent) felt that either none, almost none or less than half of fellow Singaporean Chinese would return their wallet.

4.1.1 Analysis by socio-economic status (SES), age, ethnic group, interracial interactions, and religious affiliation

There were higher proportions of those with less trust of other races, among Chinese respondents of lower socio-economic status (see Tables 7 to 9). About 87 per cent of those living in 1 to 2-room HDB flats thought that none, almost none or less than half of Indians would return their wallets, compared to 53.6 per cent of Chinese respondents in private housing, as Table 7 indicates.

Analysing respondents by their educational background provided similar conclusions. Among lower-educated Chinese respondents who had no formal education, had completed some primary school, or had finished primary school and took the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), 78 per cent had similar sentiments towards Indians. The corresponding figure for Chinese respondents who had university degrees was 49.2 per cent.

Table 7: Proportion of each ethnic group who trust Indians to return wallet (less than half, almost none, or none)

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
1-2 room	87.9	72	66.7
Private housing	53.6	53.3	43.2
Millennials	53.4	42.2	46.0
Older than 50 years old	64.9	55.5	46.9
0 Indian friends	65.7	69.8	44.4
5 Indian friends	46.2	40.9	45.5
"PSLE" & below	78	62.2	53.3
Degree & above	49.2	41.3	36.7
Overall	61.5	48.9	42.7

As Table 8 indicates, a similar pattern was found between Chinese of varying socio-economic status, towards Malays. About 84 per cent living in 1 to 2-room flats felt that none, almost none or less than half of Malays would return their wallet — much higher than the 47.7 per cent of those in private housing who displayed similar sentiments. Again, the findings were similar when we used respondents' educational background as a marker for socio-economic status.

Table 8: Proportion of each ethnic group who trust Malays to return wallet (less than half, almost none or none)

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
1-2 room	84.4	69.2	66.6
Private housing	47.7	42.8	48.7
Millennials	53.3	43.8	50
Older than 50 years old	59.4	47.7	52.3
0 Malay friends	59.2	87.5	52.3

5 Malay friends	53.5	59.3	40.9
"PSLE" & below	73.6	54.6	56.7
Degree & above	44	34.4	41.8
Overall	57.2	45.6	48.6

Table 9 indicates that this divergence between Chinese of different socio-economic status (measured either by housing type or educational background) was present even when respondents were asked if they thought a fellow Chinese would return their wallet. There is also a significant level of mistrust of other Chinese. For instance, 40.1 per cent of Chinese in private housing believed none, almost none, or less than half of the Singapore Chinese population would return their wallet. This compares with 48.1 per cent of Chinese respondents in private housing who believed similar proportions of Singapore Malays would do so, and 54.2 per cent of private-dwelling Chinese respondents in the case of Singapore Indians.

Table 9: Proportion of each ethnic group who trust Chinese to return wallet (less than half, almost none or none)

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
1-2 room	75	69.6	29.5
Private housing	40.1	46.7	42
Millennials	42.6	39.3	38.8
Older than 50 years old	46.2	45.4	45.1
0 Chinese friends	60	62.5	44.5
5 Chinese friends	45.9	37.2	33.3
"PSLE" & below	56.2	50.7	46.7
Degree & above	35.9	36.6	32.9

Overall	46.1	42.7	38.9

Tables 7 to 9 also indicate that younger Chinese respondents were less likely to display feelings of mistrust towards all races. For instance, 53.4 per cent of Chinese aged 21 to 34 felt that none, almost none or less than half of Indians would return their wallet, compared to 64.9 per cent of those aged 50 and above.

Those with more friends of a particular race also displayed greater likelihood of thinking that someone of that race would return their wallet, compared to someone with no or fewer friends of that race. For example, 50.2 per cent of respondents who had made friends with Malays in the last two years believed that less than half of Malays would return their wallets, compared to 68.1 per cent of respondents who had *not* made friends with Malays in the last two years. Similarly, 52.3 per cent of respondents who had made friends with Indians in the last two years believed that less than half of Indians would return their wallets, compared to 71.3 per cent of respondents who had *not* made friends with Indians in the last two years.

The importance of interracial interactions — even at a casual level — in building cross-racial trust was reinforced from responses to other sections of the survey. Respondents who attended weddings or celebrations of someone from a particular race, or asked someone of a particular race about cultural practices in the past two years, were more likely to display greater trust of people from

that race regarding the likelihood of having their wallet returned (see Tables 10

to 12).

Table 10: Attended event such as wedding or celebration of someone of another race (and said that less than half would return wallet)

	Non-Chinese trusting Chinese to return wallet, having attended (or not) Chinese weddings (%)	Non-Malays trusting Malays to return wallet, having attended (or not) Malay weddings (%)	Non-Indians trusting Indians to return wallet, having attended (or not) Indian weddings (%)
Yes	33.7	50.5	53.5
No	52.2	60.6	62

Table 11: Asked someone from a particular race about cultural practices the last two years (and said that less than half would return wallet)

	Non-Chinese trusting Chinese to return wallet, having asked (or not) Chinese people about cultural practices (%)	Non-Malays trusting Malay to return wallet, having asked (or not) Malay people about cultural practices (%)	Non-Indians trusting Indian to return wallet, having asked (or not) Indian people about cultural practices (%)
Yes	32.8	47.9	51
No	49.7	62.4	64.8

Table 12: Asked someone from a particular race some sensitive issue related to their race or religion in the last two years (and said that less than half would return wallet)

	Non-Chinese trusting Chinese to return wallet, having asked Chinese people sensitive issues (%)	Non-Malays trusting Malay to return wallet, having asked Malay people sensitive issues (%)	Non-Indians trusting Indian to return wallet, having asked Indian people sensitive issues (%)
Yes	33.9	48.4	51.8
No	41.6	58.2	60.6

By religious affiliation, Christians (55.4 per cent), Buddhists (59.7 per cent) and Taoists (65.7 per cent) were most likely to believe that less than half of Malays would return their wallet. This pattern was replicated in the case of whether an Indian would return their wallet.

4.2 Likelihood of attack and sufficiency of current measures

Just under half of the respondents (43.1 per cent) felt that a terror attack was either very or quite likely to happen in Singapore in the next two years.[5] The figures were similar among respondents of different religious affiliations except for Muslims, in which case only about one in four felt an attack was very or quite likely. There were no significant differences across Muslims of different educational backgrounds. This discrepancy between the Muslim community, and non-Muslims as a whole, might be due to the Muslim population being more confident of the authorities' ability to foil potential attacks. Such confidence might stem from the frequent messages that the Malay/Muslim community

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[5] The question was, "There have been several terror attacks around the world in recent years. On a scale of 1 to 4 where 1 means "not likely at all" and 4 means "very likely", how likely would a terror attack occur in Singapore in the next two years?"

receives from mosques, Malay language media, and Malay/Muslim politicians, about how the government has been actively dealing with extremist ideology and terrorist tendencies. Moreover members of the community, based on their interactions with one another might view that there is low likelihood that someone might be radicalised and subsequently plot an attack in Singapore.

Respondents were also asked if various measures by the authorities to protect Singapore were sufficient.[6] On whether the government should do more of any of the six choices presented, the highest proportion of respondents (65.9 per cent) felt that more should be done in teaching first aid and other emergency skills to citizens. This was followed by helping racial and religious communities better understand one another (55.6 per cent).

The biggest difference between non-Muslims and Muslims was in restricting entry of foreign religious teachers. About 43 per cent of non-Muslims thought there should be more restrictions as compared to 28 per cent of Muslims. Also, 39.0 per cent of Buddhists and 43.4 per cent of Christians felt that there should be more restrictions, while only 28.4 per cent of Muslims felt that way. In fact, 15.2 per cent of Malays and 15.4 per cent of Muslims indicated that the government should do *less* of these kinds of measures.

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[6] The question was, "Do you think the Singapore government is doing enough or should do less or should do more of the following to safeguard against a possible terror attack?" Respondents were asked for their response on each of six choices. These included providing safety measures at public places, reminding Singaporeans to remain vigilant at all times, and restricting the entry of foreign religious teachers into Singapore.

Among Malays, 25 per cent of degree holders felt less should be done to restrict the entry of foreign religious teachers (see Table 13). This was higher than those whose highest educational qualifications were primary school (10.5 per cent), "O" levels or ITE (14.5 per cent), and "A" Levels or diploma holders (18.6 per cent).

Table 13: Proportion of respondents of each ethnic group who said the Government should do *less* to restrict entry of foreign religious teachers, by highest educational qualifications

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
"PSLE" & below	11	10.5	9.7
"O" Level/ITE	6.1	14.5	9.6
"A" Level/Diploma	7.1	18.6	14.3
Degree & above	5.5	25	7.5

When we analysed the results by respondents' religious affiliation, the findings were nearly similar. Some 23.3 per cent of Muslims who were degree holders felt that less should be done to restrict entry of foreign religious teachers, in comparison to 9.2 per cent of Muslim respondents with primary school qualifications only, 15.1 per cent of those with "O" Level or ITE qualifications, and 18.3 per cent of those with "A" Level or Diploma qualifications.

4.3 Individuals' reactions to terror attack scenario

Respondents were told that news reports had emerged of a bomb exploding at an MRT station platform one morning. Fifteen people had died and 40 were seriously wounded.

Respondents were then asked about the nature of those likely to be responsible for the attack. Respondents were most likely to feel that religious extremists (80.5 per cent) or racial group extremists (68.6 per cent) were responsible, as compared to a political or right-wing group (37.1 per cent) or a mentally unsound person (38.9 per cent). This demonstrates how most Singaporeans are quick to associate terror with race or religion. Chinese and Indian respondents were also more likely than Malay respondents to associate terror with religion. For example, 83.5 per cent of Chinese respondents and 76.1 per cent of Indian respondents felt it was likely that religious extremists were responsible for the attack, compared to 66.1 per cent of Malay respondents.

Respondents were then asked the likelihood of them responding in particular ways to people of the same religious community as the terrorists who claimed to represent a religious organisation. They answered these questions when they were presented with more information about the case, i.e., further news reports state this had been a terror attack, and the authorities have confirmed the identity of the attackers. There were four scenarios — that an extremist Buddhist, Muslim, Christian or Hindu overseas organisation was the one that had caused the attack.

While we acknowledge that religions in general disavow any association with terror groups (i.e., a truly religious person cannot be a terrorist), the empirical reality is that some extremist groups misappropriate religious labels and symbols. As such we presented the terrorists in the different scenarios as religious extremists.

Broadly, the results indicate that Singaporeans in general would display stronger negative reactions (such as heightened levels of suspicion or anxiety) after an attack by overseas Muslims, compared to scenarios in which overseas Buddhists, Christians or Hindus were the ones behind the incident. For instance, while between 35.5 and 40.4 per cent of all respondents were likely to be suspicious of Buddhists, Hindus and Christians walking around their neighbourhood after a Buddhist, Hindu or Christians attack, respectively. In addition, 48.1 per cent of respondents were likely to be suspicious of Muslims in their neighbourhood after an attack by Muslims (see Table 14).

Table 14: Proportion of respondents who are quite or very likely to have negative reactions towards those of a particular religion, after an attack by terrorists claiming to be affiliated to the religious group

	In the case of an attack by an extremist overseas Muslim organisation (%)	In the case of an attack by an extremist overseas Buddhist organisation (%)	In the case of an attack by an extremist overseas Christian organisation (%)	In the case of an attack by an extremist overseas Hindu organisation (%)
Likely to be suspicious of stranger walking around your	48.1	40.0	35.5	40.4

neighbourhood, who is of that particular religion				
Likely to feel anxious when introduced to someone unfamiliar to you and who is of that particular religion	28.6	26.1	24.1	26.8
Likely to work closely with a person of that particular religion, who is a stranger in workplace	67.6	76.2	73.6	64.8
Likely to be angry with people who are of that particular religion	16.9	11.9	14.2	15.9

The results also show that about seven in 10 of all respondents said it was quite or very likely they would continue to work closely with a Buddhist (76.2 per cent), Muslim (67.6 per cent), Christian (73.6 per cent), Hindu (64.8 per cent) stranger at their workplace, after that particular religion had been implicated. About 17 per cent of all respondents said they are likely to be angry with Muslims if an extremist Muslim organisation was implicated in the terror attack. This proportion was not too different from those who reported that they would be angry with Hindus (15.9 per cent), Buddhists (11.9 per cent) and Christians (14.2 per cent).

Across all four scenarios, between 24.1 per cent and 28.6 per cent (highest for the scenario of an attack by overseas extremist Muslims) said they were quite or very likely to feel anxious when introduced to someone of the same religion

associated with the terrorists. Even in the case of an attack by Muslims, 25 per cent of Malay respondents said they would display such feelings, and this may be indicative of some internalised fear and discrimination. 25.8 per cent of Muslims felt this way.

The results in Table 14 also shows some differences in terms of what respondents projected as their responses after an attack; while a small minority would be angry with those associated with the implicated religion, a much higher proportion would have heightened levels of suspicion. In the case of an attack by overseas extremist Muslims, while 16.9 per cent of all respondents would be angry with Muslims, nearly half (48.1 per cent) said they would be suspicious of a Muslim stranger in their neighbourhood.

4.3.1 Analysis excluding respondents from same religion as terrorists

We also analysed the results by removing respondents who were of the same religion as claimed by the terrorists, based on the assumption that those of the same religious affiliation might be more likely to trust or forgive those behind the attack. For example, in the case of an attack by overseas Christian extremists, we did not include respondents whose religious affiliation was listed as Christian. These findings are displayed in Table 15.

The strongest negative reactions were again generally in the scenario where Muslims were behind the attack, and the findings are similar to Table 14. For example, 49.6 per cent of non-Muslims said they were either quite or very likely to be suspicious of a Muslim stranger in their neighbourhood if Muslims had

carried out the attack. This proportion was at least 9 percentage points higher than in those for the other three scenarios. Non-Muslims were also most likely to feel anxious when introduced to a Muslim, or be angry with Muslims after an attack, compared to non-Buddhists, non-Christians and non-Hindus in the event that the attack was carried out by people from those religions. However, the differences in these two instances were marginal.

Table 15: Proportion of respondents (excluding those with same religion as the terrorists) who are quite or very likely to have negative reactions towards those of a particular religion, after a terror attack claiming to represent the religion

	Non-Muslims in the case of an attack by an extremist overseas Muslim organisation (%)	Non-Buddhists in the case of an attack by an extremist overseas Buddhist organisation (%)	Non-Christians in the case of an attack by an extremist overseas Christian organisation (%)	Non-Hindus in the case of an attack by an extremist overseas Hindu organisation (%)
Likely to be suspicious of a stranger of that particular religion who is walking around your neighbourhood	49.6	39.2	36	40.3
Likely to feel anxious when are introduced to a stranger of that particular religion	29.1	26.2	25.5	27.2
Likely to work closely with a stranger in workplace of that particular religion	65.3	77.5	71.3	63.9

Likely to be angry with people who are of that particular religion	17.1	10.8	15.1	16.2

The least negative reactions came in the scenarios of an attack by overseas extremist Buddhists or Christians. For instance, just 10.8 per cent of non-Buddhists said they were likely to be angry with Buddhists after an attack by those of that religion, the lowest across all four scenarios.

4.3.2 Analysis by ethnic group and religious affiliation, for attack by overseas extremist Muslim organisation

When the responses were analysed by ethnic group, the broad findings were again that Chinese and Indian Singaporeans were more likely to display a stronger reaction if the attack was carried out by an extremist Muslim organisation, compared to it being perpetrated by extremists of another religion. About 50 per cent of Chinese said they would either quite or very likely be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking around their neighbourhood (compared to 41 per cent if a Hindu organisation was involved, 40 per cent for a Buddhist scenario, and 35 per cent for Christian). Similarly, 49 per cent of Indians would be suspicious of Muslim strangers in their neighbourhood (compared to 43 per cent for a Hindu or Buddhist scenario and 38 per cent for a Christian one).

This pattern was repeated in three other questions: the likelihood of Chinese and Indian respondents feeling anxious if someone unfamiliar and from the same religion as the terrorist organisation was introduced to them; them being

angry with people who are Muslims; and them warning others about the potential threat Muslims pose to safety in general.

Interestingly, more Malays indicated they would display stronger reactions if an extremist Muslim organisation were behind the attack, compared to one from another religion. This was the case for being suspicious of someone in the neighbourhood, being angry with other Muslims, and warning others about the potential threat of Muslims.

Breaking down the responses by religious affiliation also showed that non-Muslim respondents were generally more likely to display a stronger negative reaction to Muslims in the event of an attack by overseas extremist Muslims, compared to Buddhists, Christians or Hindus in the event of an attack by a terrorist group associating themselves with that particular religion. When it came to feeling anxious if they were introduced to someone from a religion associated with the terrorists, the highest proportions for the likelihood of such behaviour among Buddhists, Christians, Hindus and those with no religion were in the scenario of an attack by overseas extremist Muslims (see Table 16). For example, 31.3 per cent of Buddhists were likely to feel anxious when introduced to a Muslim stranger if an attack had been carried out by Muslim extremists, compared to between 26.1 and 30.6 per cent in the other three scenarios.

Table 16: Reaction of respondents of various religions, on how likely (quite or very likely) they are to feel anxious when introduced to someone from a particular religion, after a terror attack claiming to represent the religion

	Buddhists (%)	Taoists (%)	Catholics (%)	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	Hindus (%)	No religion (%)
To feel anxious when you are introduced to a Buddhist who is unfamiliar to you	26.1	31.3	23.6	24.4	25.8	25	27.0
To feel anxious when you are introduced to a Muslim who is unfamiliar to you	31.3	22.2	29.8	28.4	25.8	26.6	28.8
To feel anxious when you are introduced to a Christian who is unfamiliar to you	28.8	25.2	22.3	16.4	26.1	21.9	22.0

To feel anxious when you are introduced to a Hindu who is unfamiliar to you	30.6	22.2	33.0	26.2	25.5	19.6	23.4

In terms of being suspicious of a stranger in their neighbourhood, 39 per cent, 34 per cent and 40.4 per cent of Taoists were likely feel so if the attack was carried out by Buddhists, Christians or Hindus, respectively. The corresponding statistic of Taoists who expressed such sentiments if Muslims were behind it was much higher, at 55.3 per cent.

This pattern was also present in the responses of Catholics and Hindus, on whether they would allow a Buddhist, Muslim, Christian or Hindu stranger to take care of their children (see Table 17). Among the Catholics, 46.2 per cent, 54.3 per cent and 30.9 per cent said they were likely or very likely to allow a Buddhist, Christian or Hindu stranger to look after their children, respectively. But just 28.2 per cent expressed similar sentiments for the Muslim scenario. Among Hindus, 34.6 to 39.1 per cent said they would have similar feelings if the attack were carried out by Buddhists, Christians or fellow Hindus. If Muslims were behind the attack however, just 26.2 per cent said they were likely to allow a Muslim stranger to look after their children.

Table 17: Reaction of respondents of various religions, on how likely (quite or very likely) they are to allow a stranger from a particular religion to look after their children, after a terror attack claiming to represent the religion

	Buddhists (%)	Taoists (%)	Catholics (%)	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	Hindus (%)	No religion (%)
To allow a Buddhist stranger to look after your children	30.2	31.4	46.2	34.8	30.4	34.8	46.2
To allow a Muslim stranger to look after your children	13.1	12.0	28.2	19.6	46.5	26.2	27.0
To allow a Christian stranger to look after your children	22.9	28.2	54.3	41.0	32.2	34.6	40.1
To allow a Hindu stranger to look after your children	11.5	13.1	30.9	18.8	28.3	39.1	24.3

In some instances, a *slightly* stronger negative reaction was indicated in the event of an attack by Hindus. This surfaced among respondents of various religious affiliations — Buddhists, Christians, and those with no religion. For instance, in Table 17, a slightly lower proportion of Buddhists, Christians and

those with no religion would allow a Hindu stranger to look after their children, compared to a Muslim stranger.

When it came to Buddhists saying they were likely to warn others about the potential threat of others from the same community as the terrorists, 25.6 per cent, 19.1 per cent, and 21.6 per cent said they were likely to do so in the case of an attack by Buddhists, Christians and Hindus, respectively. The corresponding statistic if an attack was carried out by Muslims was 24.1 per cent, marginally lower than if the attack had been organised by fellow-Buddhists.

Also, 42.5 per cent, 46.2 per cent and 33.7 per cent of Catholics would be suspicious of a Buddhist, Muslim or Christian stranger in their neighbourhood, respectively. The corresponding proportion in the case of an attack by overseas Hindu extremists, at 47.9 per cent, was marginally higher than for the Muslim scenario (see Table 18).

Table 18: Reaction of Catholic respondents, on being likely (quite or very likely) to be suspicious of a stranger from a particular religion walking around their neighbourhood, after a terror attack claiming to represent the religion

Quite likely or very likely	Catholics (%)
To be suspicious of a Buddhist stranger walking around their neighbourhood	42.5
To be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking around their neighbourhood	46.2
To be suspicious of a Christian stranger walking around their neighbourhood	33.7

To be suspicious of a Hindu stranger walking around their neighbourhood	47.9

Among those who professed no religion, 77 per cent, 69.6 per cent and 77.1 per cent would work closely with a Buddhist, Muslim or Christian colleague, respectively. But a smaller proportion (64.3 per cent) said they were likely to work with a Hindu colleague if the attack was by Hindus. That the levels of anxiety or suspicion generated towards Muslims and Hindus were fairly similar might reflect some level of unfamiliarity with minority groups and their religions. Muslims and Hindus are religions associated with the Malays and Indians respectively. Both religious groups are a small minority within the overall population. This unfamiliarity coupled with the fact that violence is often reported in South Asia and the Muslim world might increase levels of suspicion towards these groups.

About 34.5 per cent of non-Muslim respondents said they would let others know they do not associate Muslims with these types of terror attacks, compared to 30.9 per cent in the case of an attack by overseas extremist Hindus, 34.7 per cent for an attack by overseas extremist Buddhists, and 32.2 per cent for an attack by overseas extremist Christians. While the figures were low for what is seen as a necessary proactive behaviour to dispel a negative association, it was comforting to know that most non-Muslims who would have spoken up for those of another religion, would do so for Muslims as well.

Also, a significant proportion of respondents who were not of the same religion as the terrorists would seek clarification about the terror incident from a Muslim, Buddhist, Christian or Hindu they knew, after the attack. About 37 per cent of non-Muslims said they would do so if Muslims had perpetrated the attack. This was higher than the scenarios if Hindus (30.7 per cent of non-Hindus) or Christians (33 per cent of non-Christians) were behind it and comparable to a situation where Buddhists were involved (38.1 per cent of non-Buddhists).

4.3.3 Analysis by SES and ethnic group, for attack by overseas extremist Muslims

Further analysis by ethnic group showed some differences in reactions between those from high and low socio-economic status groups, as measured by their housing type or educational background, in the event of an attack by a Muslim organisation. Those from higher socio-economic backgrounds displayed more openness and trust after an attack.

For instance, better-off Chinese — measured by housing type — were more likely to continue working closely with a Muslim stranger in the workplace (see Table 19A), less likely to be suspicious of a Muslim in their neighbourhood (see Table 20A), and less likely to be angry with Muslims (see Table 21A). This pattern is also discernable when respondents are analysed by their educational background (see Tables 19B, 20B and 21B).

Table 19A: Proportion of each ethnic group who say they are quite or very likely to work closely with a Muslim stranger in the workplace, by housing type

Quite likely/very likely	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
1–2 room	47.8	71.8	47 (8 respondents)

3–4 room	61	78.8	76.6
5 room/executive	64.6	77.6	70.4
Private housing	72.4	100	81.1

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 19B: Proportion of each ethnic group who say they are quite or very likely to work closely with a Muslim stranger in the workplace, by educational background

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
"PSLE" & below	50.7	72.7	73.7
"O" Level'/ITE	60.4	77.9	75.8
"A" Level/Diploma	65.7	79.8	67.8
Degree & above	74.2	98	77.9

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 20A: Proportion of each ethnic group who say they are quite or very likely to be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking in their neighbourhood, by housing type

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
1–2 room	65.2	28.3	70.5
3–4 room	49.7	40.4	47.7
5 room/executive	48.4	39.8	45.6
Private housing	49.1	38.5	51.6

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 20B: Proportion of each ethnic group who say they are quite or very likely to be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking in their neighbourhood, by educational background

Quite likely/very likely	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)

"PSLE" & below	56.6	42.4	63.2
"O" Level'/ITE	52.8	42.6	50
"A" Level/Diploma	50.1	33.9	48.3
Degree & above	42.3	26.9	41.9

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 21A: Proportion of each ethnic group who say they are *not likely at all or quite unlikely* to be angry with people who are Muslim, by housing type

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
1–2 room	78.3	76.1	58.8 (10 respondents)
3–4 room	81.2	84.2	84.2
5 room/executive	85.3	83.5	83.2
Private housing	83	92.3	88.4

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 21B: Proportion of each ethnic group who say they are *not likely at all or quite unlikely* to be angry with people who are Muslim, by educational background

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
"PSLE" & below	73.5	79.1	80.3
"O" Level'/ITE	78.2	82.4	79.7
"A" Level/Diploma	88.4	89	83.9
Degree & above	87.4	90.4	88.6

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

The tables also indicate that, generally, the better educated a Chinese or Indian respondent, the higher the likelihood that they would retain some level of trust of and openness to Muslims after an attack. For instance, 56.6 per cent of Chinese whose highest education was primary school would either be quite or very likely suspicious of a Muslim stranger in their neighbourhood (Table 20B). In contrast, 42.3 per cent of Chinese with degrees or higher qualifications would display similar sentiments.

4.3.4 Analysis by SES and religious affiliation, for attack by overseas extremist Muslims

The results above were derived by grouping respondents by ethnic group and socio-economic status (SES). We next analysed how respondents from each religious community would react in the event of an attack by overseas extremist Muslims, based on their SES. The Sikh, Taoist, and Catholic communities were excluded from this analysis, as their numbers in the overall sample were very small (less than 3 per cent each). The results are displayed in Tables 22A, 22B, 23A, 23B, 24A and 24B.

Non-Muslims from higher socio-economic brackets were generally less likely to display negative reactions, if an attack was carried out by extremist overseas Muslims. If educational background was used as a measure for SES, Buddhists, Hindus, Christians and those with no religious affiliations of higher SES were generally less likely to say they would be suspicious of a Muslim stranger in their neighbourhood (see Table 23B). For example, 81.2 per cent of those with no religion and with PSLE and below qualifications were at least

quite likely to express such sentiments, more than double the proportion of those with no religion and who hold degrees and above (40 per cent).

Table 22A: Proportion of each religious community who say they are quite or very likely to work closely with a Muslim stranger in the workplace, by housing type

	Buddhists (%)	Hindus (%)	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	No religion (%)
1–2 room	#	#	#	70.6	#
3–4 room	53.9	76.8	71.6	77.9	70.6
5 room/executive	60.8	67.8	70	79.2	63.5
Private housing	76.4	79.6	69	91.7	78.5

Note: Figures from unweighted sample. # represents too small sample size for meaningful comparison (less than 10 respondents) even with unweighted sample, and we exclude these statistics.

Table 22B: Proportion of each religious community who say they are quite or very likely to work closely with a Muslim stranger in the workplace, by educational background

	Buddhists (%)	Hindus (%)	Christians (%)	Muslim (%)	No religion (%)
"PSLE" & below	50.4	72.5	48	72.1	62.5
"O" Level'/ITE	55.1	78.5	70.4	77.4	58.6
"A" Level/ Diploma	73.3	64	68.2	80.3	60.9
Degree & above	60.6	75.2	76.8	94.6	80.8

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 23A: Proportion of each religious community who say they are quite or very likely to be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking in their neighbourhood, by housing type

	Buddhists (%)	Hindus (%)	Christians (%)	Muslim (%)	No religion (%)
1–2 room	#	#	#	33.4	#
3–4 room	50.7	48.7	52.3	41.2	48
5 room/ executive	49.2	48.3	38.6	40	51.1
Private housing	52.7	59.3	53.5	37.5	37

Note: Figures from unweighted sample. # represents too small a sample size for meaningful comparison (less than 10 respondents) even with unweighted sample, and we exclude these statistics.

Table 23B: Proportion of each religious community who say they are quite or very likely to be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking in their neighbourhood, by educational background

	Buddhists (%)	Hindus (%)	Christians (%)	Muslim (%)	No religion (%)
"PSLE" & below	54.8	64.7	48	44.8	81.2
"O" Level'/ITE	55.1	53.1	55.6	42.4	46.3
"A" Level/ Diploma	50	56	47	35.6	46
Degree & above	41.5	43	47.5	29.8	40

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 24A: Proportion of each religious community who say they are <u>not likely at all or quite unlikely</u> to be angry with people who are Muslim, by housing type

	Buddhists (%)	Hindus (%)	Christians (%)	Muslim (%)	No religion (%)
1–2 room	#	#	#	76.5	#
3–4 room	76	85.6	93.1	84	80.7
5 room/ executive	84.2	82.7	84.3	84.6	83.3
Private housing	87.3	84.8	83.3	93.7	86.1

Note: Figures from unweighted sample. # represents too a small sample size for meaningful comparison (less than 10 respondents) even with unweighted sample, and we exclude these statistics.

Table 24B: Proportion of each religious community who say they are *not likely at all or quite unlikely* to be angry with people who are Muslim, by educational background

	Buddhists (%)	Hindus (%)	Christians (%)	Muslim (%)	No religion (%)
"PSLE" & below	72.2	86.3	84	77	62.5
"O" Level'/ITE	79.3	78.5	79.6	84	70.7
"A" Level/ Diploma	87.2	80	92.5	89.4	89.7
Degree & above	84	86.8	87.9	91.9	87.4

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

One other trend bears pointing out. Even among Muslims, at least three in 10 of each socio-economic bracket, be it using housing type or educational background, said they would be suspicious of another Muslim stranger walking around their neighbourhood (see Tables 23A and 23B).

4.3.5 Analysis by SES and religious affiliation for all four attack scenarios

Less educated respondents across all religious affiliations were also more likely to display a stronger negative reaction, regardless of which of the four religions was implicated in the incident. For example, Table 25 indicates that Buddhists with secondary education or lower, were more likely to be suspicious of strangers in their neighbourhood. This was true for Catholics, Christians, Hindus, Muslims, as well as respondents who professed no religion.

Table 25: Proportion of Buddhists who would quite or very likely be suspicious of a stranger across all four scenarios, by educational background

	Be suspicious of Buddhist stranger in neighbourhood (%)	Be suspicious of Muslim stranger in neighbourhood (%)	Be suspicious of Christian stranger in neighbourhood (%)	Be suspicious of Hindu stranger in neighbourhood (%)
"PSLE" & below	49.5	54.9	42.8	49.2
"O" Level'/ITE	53.9	55.5	47.6	45.3
"A" Level/ Diploma	39.8	49.6	36.3	38.6
Degree & above	21.6	41.6	22.4	37.5

Across all religious affiliations, more educated respondents were also more likely to allow a Christian, Buddhist, Hindu or Muslim stranger to look after their children, indicating greater acceptance of those from the same religion implicated in the attack. For example, Table 26 indicates that among those with no religious affiliation, those from higher educational backgrounds (diploma or

degree holders) were more likely to be open to having a stranger who was from the same religion as the terrorists look after their children.

Table 26: Proportions of respondents with no religion who _were not likely at all or quite unlikely_ to allow a stranger to look after their children across all four scenarios, by educational background

	To allow a Buddhist stranger to look after your children (%)	To allow a Muslim stranger to look after your children (%)	To allow a Christian stranger to look after your children (%)	To allow a Hindu stranger to look after your children (%)
"PSLE" & below	85.1	95.7	80.9	87.2
"O" Level'/ITE	71.5	78.9	75	71.9
"A" Level/ Diploma	45.6	71.2	53.6	78.8
Degree & above	47.4	67.9	54.2	72

Even though higher-educated respondents were more likely to continue to display trust towards someone of the same religion implicated in the attack, rather significant proportions of this segment indicated they would not. As Table 25 indicates, at least 21.6 per cent of Buddhist degree holders, and at least 36.3 per cent of Buddhist diploma holders, would be suspicious of a stranger in their neighbourhood, across all four scenarios of an attack. The highest proportions were in the case of an attack by overseas extremist Muslims, replicating the patterns highlighted earlier. For example, 41.6 per cent of Buddhist degree-holding respondents were at least quite likely to be suspicious of a Muslim stranger in their neighbourhood.

4.3.6 Analysis by age and SES for all four attack scenarios

Younger respondents, regardless of socio-economic status, were less likely to be suspicious of strangers of the same religion as the overseas extremist organisation that carried out the terror attack, in the aftermath of an attack. For example, Table 28 indicates that 37.5 per cent of millennials, or respondents aged 21–34, who had a PSLE education or lower, were at least quite likely to be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking around their neighbourhood. This compares to 49.7 per cent of degree-holding respondents aged above 50, and 55.2 per cent of respondents who had a PSLE education or lower and aged above 50.

However, similar to the patterns described in earlier sections, younger respondents displayed more negative reactions against Muslims in the aftermath of a terror attack, compared to scenarios where the attacks were organised by Hindus or Christians. For example, 35.2 per cent of degree-holding 21–34 year-old respondents were at least quite likely to be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking around the neighbourhood (Table 28), compared to 25.1 per cent for a Christian stranger (Table 29) or 29.3 per cent for a Hindu stranger (Table 30).

Table 27: Proportions of respondents who would quite or very likely be suspicious of a Buddhist stranger walking around the neighbourhood in the aftermath of a terror attack, by age and educational background

	21–34 years old (%)	35–49 years old (%)	Above 50 years old (%)
"PSLE" & below	31.3	44.4	35.7
"O" Level/ITE	32.9	41.6	48.7
"A" Level/Diploma	29.6	32.1	46.1
Degree & above	31.1	43.1	39.9

Table 28: Proportions of respondents who would quite or very likely be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking around the neighbourhood in the aftermath of a terror attack, by age and educational background

	21–34 years old (%)	35–49 years old (%)	Above 50 years old (%)
"PSLE" & below	37.5	54.6	55.2
"O" Level/ITE	50.6	52.2	50.4
"A" Level/Diploma	36	58.4	56
Degree & above	35.2	42.2	49.7

Table 29: Proportions of respondents who would quite or very likely be suspicious of a Christian stranger walking around the neighbourhood in the aftermath of a terror attack, by age and educational background

	21-34 years old (%)	35-49 years old (%)	Above 50 years old (%)
"PSLE" & below	50	46.4	44.9
"O" Level/ITE	50	35.1	45.2
"A" Level/Diploma	24	34.3	38.2
Degree & above	25.1	30.8	22.7

Table 30: Proportions of respondents who would quite or very likely be suspicious of a Hindu stranger walking around the neighbourhood in the aftermath of a terror attack, by age and educational background

	21–34 years old (%)	35–49 years old (%)	Above 50 years old (%)
"PSLE" & below	55.5	51.8	51.3
"O" Level/ITE	51.3	44	48.3
"A" Level/Diploma	27.9	39.6	40
Degree & above	29.3	37.3	26.9

In addition, younger respondents were more likely to allow Muslim strangers to look after their children in the aftermath of a terror attack. For example, 38.3 per cent of degree-holding respondents who were 21–34 years old were at least quite likely to allow Muslims strangers to look after their children, as compared to 16.3 per cent of degree-holding respondents aged above 50 (see Table 31). This was regardless of socio-economic status; 45.5 per cent of 21–34 year-old respondents with an "O" Level or ITE level education were at least quite likely to allow Muslims strangers to look after their children, as compared to 16.3 per cent of degree-holding respondents aged above 50. While education is an important moderator of prejudice, age is as important or even more so.

Table 31: Proportions of respondents who were quite or very likely to allow a Muslim stranger to look after their children in the aftermath of a terror attack, by age and educational background

	21–34 years old (%)	35–49 years old (%)	Above 50 years old (%)
"PSLE" & below	#	24.6	13.6
"O" Level/ITE	45.5	27.4	16.4
"A" Level/Diploma	37.8	18	18.2
Degree & above	38.3	24.1	16.3

When it came to expressing solidarity with Muslims, there was less of a pronounced age difference, except for respondents aged above 50 with PSLE and below education. As Table 32 indicates, except for those in this category, at least three in 10 of all other respondents, and in many instances more than four in 10 said they were likely to let others know they do not associate Muslims with these types of attacks. Of those aged 50 and above and who had PSLE and below qualifications, 26.3 per cent said they were likely to do so.

This is indicative of the importance of having programmes and interventions that reduce biases and build social cohesion target this extreme end of older individuals of a lower socio-economic status.

Table 32: Proportions of respondents who were quite or very likely to let others know they do not associate Muslims with terror attacks in the aftermath of a terror attack, by age and educational background

	21–34 years old (%)	35–49 years old (%)	Above 50 years old (%)
"PSLE" & below	44.4	39.3	26.3
"O" Level/ITE	44.9	43.6	30.4
"A" Level/Diploma	34.9	39.6	35.7
Degree & above	43.6	41.4	43.7

4.3.7 Respondents' perceptions of how their community would respond

Apart from eliciting individual reactions, the survey also asked respondents how they thought *members of their racial community* would respond. The findings are displayed in Table 33.

Table 33: Proportions of respondents who said members of their racial community were quite or very likely to perceive the following reactions of members of their own racial community towards people of a particular religious group, after a terror attack carried out by an overseas extremist organization of the same religion

	Non-Muslims in the case of an attack by an overseas Muslim extremist organisation (%)	Non-Buddhists in the case of an attack by an overseas Buddhist extremist organisation (%)	Non-Christians in the case of an attack by an overseas Christian extremist organisation (%)	Non-Hindus in the case of an attack by an overseas Hindu extremist organisation (%)
Likelihood of being suspicious of people of that	41.1	22.4	23.3	26.4

particular religion				
Likelihood of being angry with people of that particular religion	35.9	23.4	22.6	24.7
Likelihood of joining a campaign or event which recognizes that the community associated with that particular religion is not the cause of the attack	31.5	35.7	33.4	29.3

Overall, less than half of respondents were quite or very likely to believe that members of their own racial community would be suspicious or angry at people of a particular religion associated with an overseas extremist organization of the same religion in the aftermath of a terror attack. This is indicative of some level of interreligious solidarity in Singapore.

However, respondents believed that members of their own racial community were more likely to react negatively towards Muslims in the aftermath an

overseas Muslim extremist organization attack. For example, close to half of non-Muslim respondents (41.4 per cent) were at least quite likely to believe that members of their racial community would be suspicious of Muslims in the aftermath of a terror attack by an overseas Muslim extremist organization, as compared to 22.4 per cent of non-Buddhist respondents in the case of Buddhists and 23.3 per cent of non-Christian respondents in the case of Christians. The sentiments were similar for the case of members of one's racial community being angry at people of a particular religion.

Non-Buddhist respondents were also more likely to believe that members of their racial community would join a campaign or event to recognize that members of the Buddhist community were not the cause of the attack (35.7 per cent) as compared to non-Muslim respondents in the case of Muslims (31.5 per cent).

4.3.7. Positive reactions

While the previous sections studied respondents' negative reactions towards people from certain religious groups, this section provides statistics on the proportion of respondents who stand in solidarity with people from the same religion as the overseas terrorists, by using the same demographic variables such as educational background.

One question in the survey asked if, in the case of an attack by overseas extremist religious organisations, respondents would let others know that they do not associate people of the same religion as the terrorists with the terror

attacks. To ensure that respondents who were of the same religion as the terrorists would not influence the results, we filtered out such respondents. For example, in the case of a terror attack by overseas Buddhists extremists, we filtered out Buddhist respondents.

It is noteworthy that at least a third of non-Muslims would be proactive in expressing solidarity in such circumstances, reporting in the survey that they would be likely to let others know they do not associate Muslims with these types of terror attacks (see Table 34). However, the proportion of respondents who would take such steps is quite low for all four scenarios, and may be a function of Singaporeans being typically reticent. The lowest was 30.9 per cent (non-Hindus in the case of an attack by overseas extremist Hindus) and the highest was 34.7 per cent (non-Buddhists in the case of attack by overseas extremist Buddhists).

Table 34: Proportions of respondents (those with the same religion as that of the overseas terrorists removed) who were quite or very likely to display actions of solidarity, across all four scenarios

	Non-Muslims in the case of an attack by overseas extremist Muslim organisation (%)	Non-Buddhists in the case of an attack by overseas extremist Buddhist organisation (%)	Non-Christians in the case of an attack by overseas extremist Christian organisation (%)	Non-Hindus in the case of an attack by overseas extremist Hindu organisation (%)
Let others know that they do not associate people of that particular religion with terror attacks	34.5	34.7	32.2	30.9

Join a campaign or event that recognises that people of that particular religion are not the cause of the terror attack	25.9	33.8	30.6	26.3

The numbers were lower when respondents were asked if they would join a campaign or event that recognises that people of that particular religion are not the cause of the terror attack. Respondents were the least likely to stand in solidarity with Muslims (25.9 per cent), as compared to Buddhists (33.8 per cent), Christians (30.6 per cent) and Hindus (26.3 per cent). Still, it is encouraging that a quarter of non-Muslims would go out of their way to join such activities, to show their support for Muslim Singaporeans.

Table 35 provides a breakdown of these statistics by respondents' religious affiliation. Interestingly, despite most respondents displaying greater negative reactions towards Muslims in the aftermath of a terror attack as compared to other religious groups, a significant proportion also said they would stand in solidarity with Muslims after an attack.

For example, 36.6 per cent of Christians would let others know they do not associate Muslims with terror attacks as compared to 33.9 per cent who would

do the same for Buddhists. Similarly, 38.8 per cent of those with no religion would let others know they do not associate Muslims with these types of attacks, a higher proportion than all the other three scenarios.

Table 35: Proportions of respondents who were quite or very likely to let others know they do not associate people of a particular religion with terror attacks, across all four scenarios, by religion

	Buddhists (%)	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	Hindus (%)	No religion (%)
Let others know that they do not associate Buddhists with terror attacks	34.4	33.9	32.4	37.4	35.4
Let others know that they do not associate Muslims with terror attacks	30.4	36.6	47.6	33.3	38.8
Let others know that they do not associate Christians with terror attacks	28.6	36.9	37.3	28.3	32.4
Let others know that they do not associate Hindus with terror attacks	25.7	31.4	35.8	34.7	32.8

However, Table 35 also shows that Muslims ranked the highest when it came to letting others know they do not associate Muslims with attacks (47.6 per cent), much more than participants of other religious backgrounds (which ranged from 30.4 to 38.8 per cent). Overall, it is arguable that for a multicultural country like Singapore, rates of solidarity with other religions in the aftermath of an attack are still quite low. These trends were also mirrored when ethnicity of respondents was controlled (see Table 36).

Table 36: Proportions of respondents who were quite or very likely to let others know they do not associate people of a particular religion with terror attacks, across all four scenarios, by ethnic group

	Chinese (%)	Malays (%)	Indians (%)
Let others know that they do not associate Buddhists with terror attacks	35.1	33.5	34.6
Let others know that they do not associate Muslims with terror attacks	35	47.8	35.2
Let others know that they do not associate Christians with terror attacks	32.5	36.3	33.3
Let others know that they do not associate Hindus with terror attacks	30.1	34.6	35.9

Higher-educated respondents, across all religious backgrounds, were more likely to express solidarity with Muslims. For example, Table 37 indicates that 40 per cent of degree-holding Christian respondents are at least quite likely to

let others know they do not associate Muslims with terror attacks, as compared to 26.6 per cent of Christian respondents with a PSLE-level educational background. This trend was evident in Buddhist respondents as well (30.5 per cent of PSLE-level educated respondents against 39.8 per cent of degree-holding respondents).

Table 37: Proportions of respondents who were quite or very likely to let others know they do not associate Muslims with terror attacks, by religion and educational background

	Buddhists (%)	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	Hindus (%)	No religion (%)
"PSLE" & below	30.5	26.6	34.5	#	27.6
"O" Level/ITE	24.2	45.7	43.8	36.4	35.7
"A" Level/Diploma	25.1	28.2	57	35	40.3
Degree & above	39.8	40	72.1	34.7	40.7
Overall	30.4	36.6	47.6	33.3	38.8

However, the biggest educational discrepancy was amongst Muslim respondents; 34.5 per cent of Muslim respondents with PSLE-level educational background were at least quite likely to let others know they do not associate fellow Muslims with terror attacks, as compared to 72.1 per cent of degree-holding Muslim respondents. This trend was reflected in the case of controlling for the ethnicity of the respondents as well (see Table 38).

Table 38: Proportions of respondents who were quite or very likely to let others know they do not associate Muslims with terror attacks, by race and educational background

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
"PSLE" & below	27.4	34.6	20
"O" Level/ITE	33.4	44.6	35.3
"A" Level/Diploma	33.5	57.6	37.1
Degree	41.8	77.7	40.3
Overall	35	47.8	35.2

4.4 Post-attack: Community responses, and sentiments towards likelihood of violence

4.4.1 Analysis by ethnic group

The survey next asked if respondents would take various conciliatory steps (such as apologising to others, or helping those affected by the attack), if the terrorists were from the same religion as them. Assuming an extremist Muslim organisation was behind the attack, the vast majority (72.8 per cent) of Malays reported that they would be very or quite likely to help people of other religions who had been affected. The corresponding figures for Chinese and Indians were 65.7 per cent and 77.8 per cent, respectively, if the attack was carried out by a group that was of the same religion as them. About 41.5 per cent of Malays would also apologise to those of other religions for the attack, compared to 40.6 per cent of Indians and 25.6 per cent of Chinese if the attack was by a group of the same religion as them.

The trends were similar when we classified respondents by their religious affiliation as well (see Table 39). Around 45 per cent of Muslim respondents were more likely to apologise for the terrorist attack (the highest across all the major religious groups), as compared to 23.4 per cent of Buddhist and 29.5 per cent of Christian respondents.

Table 39: Proportion of respondents who are quite or very likely to respond to the following scenarios in the aftermath of a terror attack, by religion

	Buddhists (%)	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	Hindus (%)	No religion (%)
Speak to people of other religions to clarify that the terrorist does not represent your own community	34.2	43.6	50.1	42.7	40.9
Help people of other religions who have been affected by the terror attack	59.5	77.4	75.3	76.6	64.5
Apologise to people of other religions for the terrorist attack	23.4	29.5	45.5	36.3	22.7
Take precautions when you are physically near people of other religions, because of the potential risk of verbal abuse or actual acts of violence against you	42.6	48.5	48.1	44.3	40.5

Also, Table 39 indicates that 75.3 per cent of Muslim respondents were likely to help people of other religions after an attack, compared to 59.5 per cent of

Buddhist and 77.4 per cent of Christian respondents. Muslim respondents were also more likely to speak to people of other religions to clarify that the terrorist did not represent their own community (50.1 per cent), as compared to Buddhist (34.2 per cent) or Christian respondents (43.6 per cent). Again, this was the highest proportion across all the major religious groups.

It can be inferred that Muslim respondents are more likely to take proactive steps to respond, as a community, if and when a terror attack occurs. A possible reason for this could be the international media's dominant narrative of associating terror with Islam, and the mainstream Muslim community's resulting desire to disassociate themselves from extremist sub-groups or individuals within their religion. Such a need to disassociate will probably be acutely felt by those in the community who are more successful and whose social interactions are likely to be with those of other communities.

Given the heightened levels of suspicion and chaos after an attack, respondents were also asked if they would take precautions against possible acts of violence, assuming they were of the same religion as those responsible.[7] About 47.3 per cent of Malays said they were quite or very likely to do so, compared to 43.3 per cent of Chinese and 47.1 per cent of Indians.

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[7] The question was, "How likely are you to take precautions when you are physically near people of other religions, because of the potential risk of verbal abuse, or actual acts of violence against you?" Respondents were told to assume they were of the same religion/belief as the people responsible for the attack.

However, the vast majority of respondents felt that there would be little or no backlash against them by people of other religions. In a separate question[8], around 80 per cent of Muslims and non-Muslims felt that there would be either no abuse, or very few and isolated incidents of verbal abuse (see Table 40).

Table 40: Proportion of respondents who think that there will be *no or very few/isolated* verbal abuse or actual acts of violence against them by people of other religions, by religious affiliation

	Buddhists (%)	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	Hindus (%)	No religion (%)
No or very few and isolated incidents of verbal abuse or actual acts of violence	83.8	83	79.4	79.8	79.7

4.5 Post-attack: Societal recovery

To get a sense of how long it would take for Singaporeans to recover as a society, respondents were asked how long each of four scenarios would take to happen:

(i)   For most Singaporeans to feel united as one people

(ii)   For Singaporeans to remain suspicious of those from the same religion as the terrorists

(iii)   For incidents of abuse and violence against those from the same religion as the terrorists to continue

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[8] The question was, "How severe do you think the verbal abuse, or actual acts of violence against you and your community might be, by people of other religions." Respondents were then asked to choose between "no form of abuse at all", "very few and isolated incidents of verbal abuse", "several incidents of verbal abuse and physical confrontations taking place across some parts of Singapore", and "frequent incidents of physical violence across many parts of Singapore".

(iv)   For most Singaporeans to stand together to denounce hate against the religion associated with the terrorists

Across all four scenarios, at least half of respondents felt it would take a year or less for each to occur. The overall mean for the first scenario was 3.29 years, 3.22 years for the second scenario, 2.36 years for the third scenario and 2.62 years for the fourth scenario.

Among those who professed a mainline religion, Muslim respondents had the highest mean when it came to number of years taken for most Singaporeans to feel that we are united as one people (3.62 years), as compared to Buddhist respondents (3.51 years), Christian respondents (2.88 years) and Hindu respondents (3.13 years).

Muslims felt that Singaporeans would take the longest time to be less suspicious of those from the religion associated with terrorists (3.38 years, compared to 3.22 years for Buddhists, 3.32 years for Christians, and 3.37 years for Hindus) and for incidences of verbal abuse and violence against those from the religion to subside (2.55 years, compared to 2.21 years for Buddhists, 2.36 years for Christians, and 2.47 years for Hindus). In the case of Singaporeans standing together to denounce any hate against the religion associated with terrorists, Buddhists ranked the highest (2.89 years, compared to 2.81 years for Muslims, 2.52 years for Christians, 2.51 years for Hindus).

The findings suggest that Muslims may be more conscious of the potential backlash and suspicions that would inevitably arise within Singapore, as a result of a terror attack.

4.5.1 Analysis by SES and ethnic group

Further analysis to check whether Malays from higher or lower socio-economic brackets were the ones driving the results described earlier showed that better-educated respondents tended to be less optimistic of Singaporean unity in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Using educational background as a proxy for SES, we found that a just over a third of Malay "A" Level and diploma-holders, or degree holders, felt that it would at least a year or less for most Singaporeans to feel united again as one people. This compares to 52.6 per cent of Malay respondents with PSLE qualifications, and 54 per cent of Malays with "O" Level or ITE qualifications (see Table 41A).

Table 41A: Respondents who said Singaporeans would take "less than a year" or "one year" after a terror attack to feel that they are united as one people again,, by ethnic group and educational background

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
"PSLE" & below	52.8	52.6	68.9
"O" Level/ITE	51.8	54	66.2
"A" Level/Diploma	50.2	37.1	45.4
Degree & above	48	35.3	54.6

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

When we analysed the results by religious affiliation, lower proportions of better-educated Muslims were also likely to say that it would take a year or less

than a year for Singaporeans to feel united (see Table 41B). For example, 37.5 per cent of Muslim "A" Level or diploma holders had such sentiments, compared to just over half of Muslim respondents who had primary school qualifications and below, or Muslims with "O" Level and ITE qualifications.

Table 41B: Respondents who said Singaporeans would take "less than a year" or "one year" after a terror attack to feel that they are united as one people again, by religious affiliation and educational background

	Muslims (%)	Buddhists (%)	Christians (%)	Hindus (%)	No religion (%)
"PSLE" & below	54.6	52.5	52	70.6	51.7
"O" Level/ITE	54.8	48.8	65.4	61.5	56.4
"A" Level/Diploma	37.5	49.4	57.8	42	50.5
Degree & above	46.5	46.8	52.5	53.3	45.5

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

These trends for Malays and Muslims was mirrored in the scenario of how long it would take for most Singaporeans to stop being suspicious of religions associated with terrorists (see Table 42A and 42B). The patterns were also generally evident in the responses of the other main racial and religious communities.

Table 42A: Respondents who said Singaporeans would take "less than a year" or "one year" after a terror attack to stop being suspicious of those from religion associated with terrorists, by ethnic group and educational background

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
"PSLE" & below	57.2	55	63.5
"O" Level/ITE	51.3	55.8	70.1
"A" Level/Diploma	47.9	47.7	45.3
Degree & above	48.3	47.1	51.2

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 42B: Respondents who said Singaporeans would take "less than a year" or "one year" after a terror attack to stop being suspicious of those from religion associated with terrorists, by religious affiliation and educational background

	Muslims (%)	Buddhists (%)	Christians (%)	Hindus (%)	No religion (%)
"PSLE" & below	54.9	57.6	52	68	48.4
"O" Level/ITE	55.7	44.8	64.1	68.4	59
"A" Level/Diploma	48.4	48.9	50.7	38.7	47.7
Degree & above	53.4	47.9	47.5	50.4	49.2

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

The results in this section suggest that better-educated Malays and Muslims may be particularly vulnerable to a loss of confidence in society if an attack occurs. Across various measures, sizeable proportions feel that it would take a significant amount of time for the social fabric and cohesion in Singapore to be restored. This may be due to their more racially diverse social circles, exposing them to discriminatory attitudes held by people of other races.

4.6 Sense of victimisation among Malays/Muslims

The study also sought to establish if certain communities in Singapore felt victimised or sensed that they were viewed with suspicion, as a result of the spate of terrorist attacks around the world. The findings broadly indicate that compared to other ethnic/religious groups, Malays and Muslims experience higher levels of suspicion and feel targeted when terrorism is discussed in the public sphere.

Nearly half of all respondents acknowledge that there is suspicion about some religious communities. Interestingly, as Table 43 indicates, lower proportions of Muslims (39 per cent) agreed with this statement, in comparison to Buddhists (43.3 per cent) and Christians (47.8 per cent), despite Islam experiencing the greatest amount of association with terror.

Table 43: Proportion of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the following statements, by religion

	Buddhists (%)	Christians (%)	Muslims (%)	Hindus (%)	No religion (%)
There is suspicion about some religious communities	43.3	47.8	39	37.9	45
There is concern that some religious communities are not doing enough to stand up against terror attacks	44.5	44.2	33.3	40.7	48
Some religious communities are mocked at because of their association with terrorists	44.2	44.8	47.7	45.2	47.9

In addition, almost half of respondents across all religious backgrounds except for Muslims agreed that some religious communities are mocked at because of their association with terrorists. This is a sign that a substantial number of non-Muslim respondents (especially Buddhists, Christians, and those with no religion as Table 43 shows), acknowledge the prejudices to which certain religious communities are subject.

The survey also asked respondents if messages against terror attacks might lead to some racial groups feeling targeted. About 55.7 per cent of Muslims and 55.8 per cent of Malays agreed with this statement. Higher-educated Malays were more likely to agree, compared to those with lower levels of education (see Table 44). This was similar to the patterns among the Chinese and Indians.

Table 44: Proportion who tend to agree or strongly agree that messages against terror attacks may lead to some racial groups feeling targeted, by educational background

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
"PSLE" & below	48	39.6	34.2
"O" Level/ITE	52.3	57.9	49.2
"A" Level/Diploma	65.7	61.4	62.1
Degree & above	64	78.8	62.3

Further, across four situations, Malays reported the highest frequencies among the ethnic groups (usually around twice as high as the Chinese or Indians) of experiencing:

(i) People linking their community with terror activities

(ii) People thinking their community was not doing enough to stand up against such threats

(iii) People thinking of them suspiciously when an attack happened elsewhere in the world

(iv) Their racial community being targeted when people speak about being vigilant about terrorists

About 28 per cent of Malays said they either sometimes or often experience people linking their racial community with terror activities, compared to 11.2 per cent of Chinese and 12.5 per cent of Indians (see Table 45).

Table 45: Proportion of respondents who experience the following sometimes or often, by race

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
People link my racial community with terror activities	11.2	27.9	12.5
People think my racial community is not doing enough to stand up against terror threats	12.4	23.5	13.6
People think of me suspiciously whenever they hear about a terror attack somewhere in the world	9.8	14.7	7.6
People are targeting my racial community when they speak about being vigilant about terrorists	9.5	23.6	11.3

One in four Malays also reported that they sometimes or often felt that people were thinking that their racial community was not doing enough to stand up

against terror threats, about double the proportions for Chinese and Indians. A similar proportion of Malays also said they sometimes or often felt that their racial community was being targeted when people speak about being vigilant about terrorists. The corresponding proportion of Chinese and Indians reporting such sentiments was much lower, at 9.5 and 11.3 per cent, respectively.

4.6.1 Analysis by SES, age and ethnic group

As the survey questions on this issue asked respondents on issues related to their racial community, we conducted further analysis based on respondents' ethnic group. We found that Malays from higher socio-economic brackets, measured both by housing type and educational background, were more likely to agree that messages against terror attacks may lead to some communities feeling targeted (see Tables 46A and 46B). More than six in 10 of Malay degree-holders and "A" Level/diploma holders had such sentiments, much higher than the proportion of Malays who had only completed primary school, had some years in primary school, or had no formal education. There were similar patterns among the Chinese and Indians, when respondents were analysed by educational background. Highly educated respondents, it can be inferred, were more likely to pick up on prejudices and biases.

Table 46A: Proportion who tend to agree or strongly agree that messages against terror attacks may lead to some racial groups feeling targeted, by housing type

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
1–2 room	52.1	54.3	64.7

3–4 room	54.9	54.1	45.5
5 room/executive	64.3	59.2	66.4
Private housing	59.7	65.4	54.7

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 46B: Proportion who tend to agree or strongly agree that messages against terror attacks may lead to some racial groups feeling targeted, by educational background

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
"PSLE" & below	48	39.6	34.2
"O" Level/ITE	52.3	57.9	49.2
"A" Level/Diploma	65.7	61.4	62.1
Degree & above	64	78.8	62.3

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Malays from higher socio-economic status, measured by housing type and educational background, were also *less* likely to report that they never or seldom experience instances of people linking their community with terrorism, or that they were thought of suspiciously whenever there was news of a terror attack somewhere in the world (see Tables 46A, 46B, 47A and 47B). For example, while 57.7 per cent of Malays in private housing either never or seldom experienced people linking their community with terrorism, a far greater proportion (84.7 per cent) of those living in 1–2 room flats reported similar levels of experience.

Table 47A: Proportion who *never or seldom* experience people linking their racial community with terror activities, by housing type

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
1–2 room	91.3	84.7	82.4
3-4 room	87.4	71.7	89.2
5 room/executive	91.4	71.9	84
Private housing	87.7	57.7	89.5

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 47B: Proportion who *never or seldom* experience people linking their racial community with terror activities, by educational background

	Chinese	Malay	Indian
'PSLE' & below	86.3	83.5	93.5
'O level'/ITE	87.8	72.6	86.7
'A level'/Diploma	88.3	69.7	88.5
Degree & above	91.6	46.1	85.1

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 48A: Proportion who *never or seldom* experience thinking of them suspiciously whenever they hear about a terror attack somewhere in the world, by housing type

	Chinese	Malay	Indian
1-2 room	82.6	95.6	88.2
3-4 room	90.2	84.8	94.1

5 room/executive	92.1	84.5	89.6
Private housing	88.1	77	91.5

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

Table 48B: Proportion who *never or seldom* experience people thinking of them suspiciously whenever they hear about a terror attack somewhere in the world, by educational background

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
"PSLE" & below	85.4	87	96
"O" Level/ITE	90.4	88.2	88.3
"A" Level/Diploma	89.5	78.9	93.1
Degree & above	93.9	82.7	92.8

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

This may be due to Malays from higher socio-economic brackets having larger social networks that cut across class and income lines, as well as them being more attuned to local and global developments through regular consumption of media and news, compared to Malays from lower-socio-economic brackets. This may result in better-off Malays having greater exposure to conversations, interactions and news reports that position Islam in a negative light because of terrorism.

Younger Malays aged 21 to 34 are also more likely to experience instances of their community being linked with terrorism (see Table 49). Around three in five Malay millennials reported that they never or seldom experience such sentiments, compared with four in five Malays aged 50 and above. This pattern was also present among Indians, but not among the Chinese millennials. This may be attributable to millennials from minority groups being more sensitive to discrimination. For example, despite objectively experiencing less discrimination than older people, African American millennials were more likely to perceive discrimination than older African Americans (Sigelman & Welch, 1991).

Table 49: Proportion who *never or seldom* experience people linking their racial community with terror activities, by ethnic and age group

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
21–34 years old	88.8	61.1	82.9
35–49 years old	92.1	73.9	88.9
50 and above	86.6	80.3	89.6

Note: Figures from unweighted sample

4.7 Interactions with other races

The survey also sought to establish the level of intra and interracial cultural interactions among respondents, through activities such as attending weddings of a person from a particular race or asking someone from a particular race

about sensitive racial or religious issues. Respondents were given five scenarios and had to indicate if they had participated in that activity for each race (Chinese, Malay, Indian, Others or None).[9]

The results for Chinese, Malay and Indian respondents are displayed in Tables 50, 51 and 52, respectively. The broad findings indicate a healthy level of intercultural interactions among Singaporeans. For example, around four to eight in 10 Chinese, Malay and Indian respondents reported attending an event such as a wedding or celebration of someone from another race in the past two years, as well as asked someone from another race about their cultural practices. Greater proportions of minority race Malay and Indian respondents reported attending celebrations of someone from another race, compared to Chinese respondents.

Table 50: Proportion of *Chinese* respondents who said "yes" to having had the following interactions with someone of that race in the last two years

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
Taken an interest in understanding the culture of those who are this race	55.3	47.2	37.4
Make friends with those of this race	80.1	70.2	63.6
Attended an event such as a wedding or celebration of someone of this race	81.4	49.3	35.4

[9] The question was, "We want to know about your interactions with people of your and other races in the last two years. For each statement please select the appropriate answer/s if you have interacted with people of that race. You can select more than one answer for each statement."

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
Asked someone from this race about their cultural practices	50.3	48.2	41.4
Asked someone from this race about some sensitive issue related to their race or religion	30.4	29.1	20.9

Table 51: Proportion of *Malay* respondents who said "yes" to having had the following interactions with someone of that race in the last two years

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
Taken an interest in understanding the culture of those who are this race	63.3	51.2	56.3
Made friends with those of this race	85.5	76.6	77.4
Attended an event such as a wedding or celebration of someone of this race	68.3	79.6	58.3
Asked someone from this race about their cultural practices	65.9	49	59.7
Asked someone from this race about some sensitive issue related to their race or religion	38.9	32.1	32.7

Table 52: Proportion of *Indian* respondents who said "yes" to having had the following interactions with someone of that race in the last two years

	Chinese (%)	Malay (%)	Indian (%)
Taken an interest in understanding the	62.5	54.7	50.5

culture of those who are this race			
Make friends with those of this race	80	72.3	72.8
Attended an event such as a wedding or celebration of someone of this race	68.6	66.2	80.8
Asked someone from this race about their cultural practices	60.1	53.8	48.8
Asked someone from this race about some sensitive issue related to their race or religion	26.8	26.8	24.0

In the area of asking someone from another race about sensitive racial or religious issues, however, lower proportions of respondents reporting having done so compared to the four other activities. Between two to four in 10 Chinese, Malay and Indian respondents said they had probed friends of another race on such topics. The highest proportion was for Malay respondents and their Chinese friends (38.9 per cent had asked their Chinese friends in the last two years about such issues). These figures show that more may need to be done to encourage Singaporeans to broach sensitive racial and religious issues with people of other backgrounds, to further strengthen intercultural understanding and social harmony.

5. CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-MUSLIM RESPONDENTS LIKELY TO EXHIBIT ISLAMOPHOBIA

There have been recent instances of Islamophobia and intolerance towards Muslims by non-Muslims in Singapore. In 2015, a Malay woman was walking towards a bus stop when she was approached by a man of another race, who uttered the words "suicide bomber" to her. Also, about a week after the Paris attacks that same year, the words "Islam murderers" were found scribbled at a bus stop in Bukit Panjang and on a toilet seat at Jurong Point mall (Shanmugam, 2016). In 2017, the word "terrorist" appeared on an illustration of a Muslim woman wearing a hijab, which was part of the artwork decorating a hoarding at the site of the upcoming Marine Parade MRT station (*The Straits Times*, 2017).

Topline figures showed that around one in five of all respondents were likely to be angry with Muslims, or warn others about the potential threat of Muslims, after an attack.

We then excluded Muslims from our analysis, to check the relationships between the level of cross-cultural interactions of non-Muslims and how they would react in the event of a terror attack by a group claiming to be a Muslim organisation (see Table 53). Non-Muslim respondents who had made friends with Malays in the last two years or attended a Malay wedding or celebration displayed lower likelihood of being angry at Muslims after an attack.

In some instances however, the presence of cross-cultural interaction still resulted in a higher likelihood of being angry at Muslims or warning others about

the potential threat of Muslims. For instance, 26.9 per cent of those who had taken an interest in understanding Malays would warn others about the potential threat of Muslims, slightly more than the 20.4 per cent of those who had not taken an interest in understanding Malays.

Table 53: Cross-tabulation of non-Muslim respondents who are likely to be angry at Muslims, or warn about potential threat of Muslims, given that they had some form of interaction with Malays

	Quite likely or very likely to be angry at Muslims (%)	Quite likely or very likely to warn about potential threat of Muslims (%)
Given that respondent had taken an interest in understanding Malays (Not taken an interest in understanding Malays)	18 (16.2)	26.9 (20.4)
Given that respondent had made friends with Malays (Did not make friends with Malays)	15.5 (20.9)	22.6 (25.9)
Given that respondent had attended a Malay event (Did not attend a Malay event)	16.2 (17.9)	25.8 (21.2)
Given that respondent had asked Malay person about cultural practices (Did not ask Malay person about cultural practices)	18.4 (15.9)	26.8 (20.5)
Given that respondent had asked Malay person about sensitive issues (Did not ask Malay person about sensitive issues)	21.6 (15.2)	32.2 (20.2)

Given that respondent had no interracial close friends	18.1	20.3
Given that respondent had 1–3 interracial close friends	16.6	24.8
Given that respondent had 4-6 interracial close friends	17.3	21.7
Given that respondent had more than 6 interracial friends	16.3	27.2
"PSLE" & below	25.5	24.3
"O" Level/ITE	22.0	26.5
"A" Level/Diploma	12.0	22.1
Degree & above	12.5	22.2

Table 53 also shows that, curiously, those with more interracial friends were also more likely to warn others about the potential threat of Muslims (20.3 per

cent of those with no interracial close friends would do so, compared to higher proportions for those with at least some interracial close friends). This may be due to the fact that those with more interracial friends have larger social networks and are generally more outgoing, and hence they are more likely to want to dispense advice or news to these networks especially if a major incident like a terror attack had just occurred.

In terms of educational background, Table 53 also indicates that higher-educated respondents were less likely to be angry at Muslims. Around a quarter of those with only primary school education had such sentiments, about double the proportion of degree-holders who felt the same way.

5.1 Groups displaying extreme Islamophobia

A scale variable was also constructed, by averaging the responses across five questions:

(i) How likely a respondent was to work closely with a Muslim stranger at the workplace

(ii) How likely they were to be suspicious of a Muslim stranger in the neighbourhood

(iii) How likely they were to feel anxious when introduced to a Muslim

(iv) How likely they were to be angry with Muslims

(v) How likely they were to warn others about the potential threat Muslims pose to safety

Respondents had given their answers to each question on a four-point scale ranging from "not likely at all" to "very likely". We defined an average score of 1.0 to 1.99 as "not Islamophobic", while scores of 2.0 to 2.99 and 3.0 to 4.0 were defined as "moderately Islamophobic" and "very Islamophobic" respectively (see Table 38). The Cronbach's Alpha for this scale was 0.7.

We then categorised *non-Muslim respondents* into three categories according to their level of Islamophobia (see Tables 54 to 59). The highest number of respondents fell into the "moderately Islamophobic" category (1,068), followed by "not Islamophobic" (488) and finally, "very Islamophobic" (133). Tables 54 to 59 show the proportions of "not Islamophobic", "moderately Islamophobic" and "very Islamophobic" *non-Muslim* respondents, sorted into their level of interactions with Malays, their number of interracial friendships, housing type, age, race, and education level. Table 54 indicates, for instance, that 49.8 per cent of "not Islamaphobic" respondents took an interest in understanding Malay culture.

Table 54: Cross-tabulation of non-Muslim respondents' levels of Islamophobia and their frequency of interaction with Malays

Likely/Very likely	Taken interest in understanding Malay culture (not taken an interest)	Make friends with Malay (not made friends)	Attended Malay event (have not attended event)	Asked Malays about cultural practices (have not asked Malays)	Asked Malays sensitive issue about race of religion (have not asked Malays)
Not Islamophobic (%) (1–1.99), n=488	49.8 (50.2)	73.8 (26.2)	51.5 (48.5)	53.1 (46.9)	29.9 (70.1)

| Moderately Islamophobic (%) (2–2.99), n=1,068 | 48.3 (51.7) | 70.8 (29.2) | 51.2 (48.8) | 47.7 (52.3) | 27.8 (72.2) |
| Very Islamophobic (%) (3–4), n=133 | 36.6 (63.4) | 52.6 (47.4) | 41.4 (58.6) | 39.1 (60.9) | 29.1 (70.9) |

Table 55: Cross-tabulation of non-Muslim respondents' levels of Islamophobia and their number of interracial close friendships

	No close interracial friends	1–3 close interracial friends	4–6 close interracial friends	More than 6 interracial friends
Not Islamophobic (%) (1–1.99), n=488	26.2	26.0	17.2	30.7
Moderately Islamophobic (%) (2–2.99), n=1,068	33.6	26.0	16.1	24.3
Very Islamophobic (%) (3–4), n=133	27.8	27.1	15.0	30.1

Table 56: Cross-tabulation of non-Muslim respondents' levels of Islamophobia and their housing type

	HDB 1–2 room	HDB 3–4 room	HDB 5 room/executive	Private housing
Not Islamophobic (%) (1–1.99), n=488	1.4	48.2	32.0	18.4

Moderately Islamophobic (%) (2–2.99), n=1,068	2.4	44.4	29.5	23.7
Very Islamophobic (%) (3–4), n=133	4.5	45.9	32.3	17.3

Table 57: Cross-tabulation of non-Muslim respondents' levels of Islamophobia and their age

	21–34 year olds	35–49 year olds	Above 50
Not Islamophobic (%) (1–1.99), n=488	31.6	27.0	41.4
Moderately Islamophobic (%) (2–2.99), n=1,068	23.4	30.8	45.8
Very Islamophobic (%) (3–4), n=133	12.0	31.6	56.4

Table 58: Cross-tabulation of non-Muslim respondents' levels of Islamophobia and their race

	Chinese	Indians
Not Islamophobic (%) (1–1.99), n=488	87.3	9.8
Moderately Islamophobic (%)	89.5	8.4

(2–2.99), n=1,068		
Very Islamophobic (%) (3–4), n=133	85.0	9.8

Table 59: Cross-tabulation of non-Muslim respondents' levels of Islamophobia and their education level

	"PSLE" & below	"O" Level/ITE	"A" Level/Diploma	Degree & above
Not Islamophobic (%) (1–1.99), n=488	20.1	17.9	24.4	37.6
Moderately Islamophobic (%) (2–2.99), n=1,068	19.9	20.6	26.2	33.3
Very Islamophobic (%) (3–4), n=133	32.6	21.2	15.2	31.1

To check if the differences between these three profiles of respondents were significant, a Kruskall-Wallis H Test was conducted. Instead of comparing means akin to an ANOVA test, this test examined differences in median values. The test revealed statistically significant differences across all three groups in levels of solidarity with other non-Muslim religions, negative reactions to other non-Muslim religions, interracial trust, interracial close friendships, interracial interaction and perception of unity and discrimination after a terrorist attack.

For example, in the case of negative reactions towards Hindus in the aftermath of a terrorist attack carried out by Hindu extremists, the test revealed these statistically significant figures: (Gp1, n = [300]: not Islamophobic, Gp2, n = [662]: moderately Islamophobic, Gp3, n = [83]: very Islamophobic, x^2 [2, n = total] = 206.72, p = .000). The very Islamophobic group recorded a higher median score (Md = 2.8) than the other two groups. The "not Islamophobic" group recorded a median value of 1.6 and the "moderately Islamophobic" group recorded a median value of 2.2. This indicates the "very Islamophobic" group are as likely to have negative reactions towards other religious groups in the aftermath of a religiously motivated attack.

In the case of interracial trust levels, the test revealed these statistically significant figures: (Gp1, n = [300]: not Islamophobic, Gp2, n = [662]: moderately Islamophobic, Gp3, n = [83]: very Islamophobic, x^2 [2, n = total] = 14.636, p = .001). The "very Islamophobic" group recorded a lower median score (Md = 4) than the other two groups which both recorded median values of 6. This shows that the "very Islamophobic" group has less interracial interaction, which both produces and is caused by Islamophobia and discriminatory attitudes towards particular religious groups.

We found that people in the "very Islamophobic" category demonstrated increased distrust, anger and paranoia towards Muslims. Lower proportions of "very Islamophobic" respondents had interactions with Malays, based on another question in the survey. For instance, Table 54 shows that 73.8 per cent

of "not Islamophobic" respondents were likely to have made friends with someone Malay, compared to 70.8 per cent of those who were "moderately Islamophobic" and 52.6 per cent of those who were "not Islamophobic". These "very Islamophobic" respondents were also less likely to have taken an interest in Malay culture, attended a Malay wedding or celebration, or asked Malays about cultural practices. They were also more likely to live in 1 to 2-room flats, have only primary school education, and be above the age of 50.

Analysis of another study IPS conducted, the Race, Religion and Language Survey in 2012 (Mathew, 2015), showed that in comparison to those who lived in better housing types, those in smaller flats displayed less positive attitudes and practices related to multiracialism. This might stem from lower interracial ties which those who live in more prosperous homes have greater access to, perhaps because of their better educational backgrounds and social networks. Lower-income persons, especially those who live in rental flats, may also be more likely to find employment in contexts where there are larger proportions of co-ethnics and where vernacular language use might be more common. Among lower-income persons, many also do not have sufficient opportunities for longer tenures in the Singaporean education system where many of the values and norms of multiracialism are emphasised. Hence, they may also be more likely to display Islamophobic tendencies after an attack by an overseas Muslim organisation.

Results also point to certain religious communities that are more likely to display intolerance or Islamophobia if an attack was carried out by an overseas Muslim organisation (see Table 60). Among the major religious communities, Buddhists would most likely to not allow a Muslim stranger to look after their children and were least likely to say they would work closely with a Muslim who is a stranger at their workplace. After the Hindus, Buddhist respondents were also more likely to say they would be suspicious of a Muslim stranger in their neighbourhood.

Table 60: Proportion of respondents who are likely or very likely to [X] after a Muslim terror attack, by religious affiliation

	Allow a Muslim to look after children (%)	Work closely with a Muslim stranger at workplace (%)	Be suspicious of a Muslim stranger in neighbourhood (%)
Buddhist	13	58.7	50.9
Christian (Protestant)	19.5	68.9	48.4
Hindu	26.6	74.8	51.2
Muslim	46.9	78.6	40.4
No religion	26.7	69.9	47.9

These differences may be due to the demographic profile of Buddhists; many are slightly older in age or have lower levels of education compared to, for instance, Protestant Christians. Tables 61A and 61B display the proportion of Buddhist respondents likely to display negative reactions to Muslims, sorted by education background and age group. Buddhists who are older, and have lower

educational qualifications, are generally more likely to display negative reactions, confirming our hypothesis. For instance, about one in 10 of those with PSLE or "O" Level/ITE qualifications would allow a Muslim to look after their children. The proportion of those with degrees who would do so is nearly double.

Table 61A: Proportion of *Buddhist* respondents who are quite likely or very likely to display negative reactions to Muslims after a Muslim terror attack, by educational background

	Allow Muslim to look after children (%)	Be suspicious of Muslim stranger in neighbourhood (%)	Work closely with Muslim stranger at workplace (%)
"PSLE" & below	8.9	54.9	50.2
"O" Level/ITE	10.2	55.5	55.5
"A" Level/Diploma	15.0	49.6	73.5
Degree & above	19.4	41.6	60.2

Table 61B: Proportion of *Buddhist* respondents who are quite likely or very likely to display negative reactions to Muslims after a Muslim terror attack, by age

	Allow Muslim to look after children (%)	Be suspicious of Muslim stranger in neighbourhood (%)	Work closely with Muslim stranger at workplace (%)
21–34 years old	26.6	38.3	78.1
35-49 years old	9.9	57.7	56.8

Above 50 years old	8.9	52.2	52.3

We conducted similar analysis for Christians, and the results are displayed in Tables 62A and 62B. Reinforcing our hypothesis, older Christians were more likely to react negatively to Muslims than younger Christians.

However, these older Christians were less likely to display a negative reaction compared to older Buddhists. For example, 13.8 per cent of Christians aged above 50 would allow a Muslim who is a stranger to look after their children, as opposed to 8.9 per cent of Buddhists aged above 50. This trend was mirrored in the case of socio-economic status as well. For example, 41.9 per cent of Christians with only PSLE qualifications would be suspicious of a Muslim stranger walking around their neighbourhood as compared to 54.9 per cent of Buddhists with only PSLE qualifications.

Table 62A: Proportion of *Christian* respondents who are quite likely or very likely to display negative reactions to Muslims after a terror attack by extremists claiming to be Muslim, by educational background

	Allow Muslim to look after children (%)	Be suspicious of Muslim stranger in neighbourhood (%)	Work closely with Muslim stranger at workplace (%)
"PSLE" & below	#	41.9	41.9
"O" Level/ITE	17.2	54.3	68.6

"A" Level/Diploma	23.7	48.4	66.3
Degree & above	19.2	46.6	77.6

Table 62B: Proportion of *Christian* respondents who are quite likely or very likely to display negative reactions to Muslims after a terror attack by extremists claiming to be Muslim, by age group

	Allow Muslim to look after children (%)	Be suspicious of Muslim stranger in neighbourhood (%)	Work closely with Muslim stranger at workplace (%)
21–34 years old	25.0	26.6	83.1
35–49 years old	25.4	45.9	76.2
Above 50 years old	13.8	58.3	58.5

5.2 Regression analysis

Regression analysis (ordinary least squares) was also conducted, using "negative reaction to Muslims" after an attack by overseas extremist Muslims as the dependent variable. This was constructed similarly to how the scale variable was constructed in Section 5.1. The regression analysis aimed to further uncover the characteristics of people who would react more negatively towards Muslims in the aftermath of a terrorist attack carried out by Muslim extremists.

A multiple regression analysis was used to test if a range of demographic and scale variables significantly predicted whether respondents had negative reactions towards the Muslim community in the aftermath of a terrorist attack carried out by an extremist Muslim organisation.

The results are displayed in Table 63. In Model 1, only demographic variables were included as independent variables. In Model 2, both demographic and scale variables such as respondents' interracial interactions were included. This analysis excluded Muslim and Malay respondents.

Table 63: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression modelling the effect of demographic and scale variables on "negative reaction to Muslims" as dependent variable

Predictors	Model 1 (demographic variables only)	Model 2 (demographic and scale variables)
"PSLE" & below	.033	-.012
"O" Level/ITE	.050	.032
"A" Level/Diploma	.056	.049
Male	-.078**	-.068**
21–34 years	-.165***	-.158***
35–49 years	.008	.006
Indian	-.028	-.010
Others	.002	.047
HDB 1–2 room	.049	.069
HDB 3–5 room	-.056	-.049
Income	-.005*	-.005

Predictors	Model 1 (demographic variables only)	Model 2 (demographic and scale variables)
Interracial interaction		-.010**
Interracial trust		-.010*
Close interracial friendships		-.001
R-square	.185	.215
Degrees of freedom	11	14
N	1,650	1,650

Note: * denotes variable is significant at 5 per cent level, ** denotes significant at 1 per cent, and *** denotes significant at 0.1 per cent.
Omitted categories: Degree holders, Chinese, male, full-time employment.

The results of model 1 found that significant predictors were being in the 21 to 34 age bracket (B = -.165, p ≤ .001), being male (B = -.078, p ≤ .01) and income (B = -.005, p ≤. .005). Thus, respondents who were young, male and earned higher income were significantly likely to ***not*** display negative reactions to Muslims.

In Model 2, interracial interactions such as attending a wedding or celebration (B = -.010, p ≤ .001) and interracial trust (B = -.010, p ≤ .05) were significant predictors of a respondent *not* displaying negative reactions. Interracial trust was determined by respondents' perceptions of the likelihood of people of other races returning the respondents' wallets if they got lost (as described in Section 4.1). But the size of the coefficients for these scale variables was much smaller compared to the coefficient for the 21 to 34 age bracket (B -.158, p ≤. 001), indicating a much stronger effect from the respondent's age compared to one's

interaction with other races. The demographic variables that were significant in Model 1 remained significant in Model 2, except for income.

To account for the possible skewing effect of outliers, we also checked the Mahalanobis distance. We used a cut-off critical distance of 26.13. This resulted in 201 outliers but with little change in the predictors that were significant. In the regressions we ran without the outliers, the variables that were significant were the same as in Models 1 and 2 in Table 63.

Taking the results of Section 5.1 and 5.2 together, we observe that those likely to display negative or Islamophobic reactions to Muslims were more likely to live in 1 to 2-room flats, have only primary school education, and be above the age of 50. Males, those aged between 21 and 34, and those who had recent interracial interactions were more likely to *not* be Islamophobic after an attack by extremist overseas Muslims.

6. CHARACTERISTICS OF MALAYS MORE LIKELY TO BE APOLOGETIC OR FEEL VICTIMISED

The survey also asked respondents how they would react if they were of the same religion as the terrorists, including apologising to others, clarifying to others that the terrorists did not represent their community, and helping others affected by the attack (as described in Section 4.4).

We found that Malays of higher socio-economic status as measured by housing type, as well as younger Malays, displayed higher levels of likelihood of taking

conciliatory steps after an attack (see first two columns in Table 64). Those living in private property were less unlikely to say they would *not* speak to people of other religions to clarify that the terrorist did not represent their community, views or beliefs, compared to those living in public housing. They were also more likely to apologise for the attack to people of other religions.

Table 64: Proportion of Malays who would take conciliatory steps after an attack, or feel victimised, by housing type

	Not likely at all/quite unlikely:		Never experience/seldom experience:	
	To speak to people of other religions to clarify that the terrorist did not represent their community, views or beliefs (%)	To apologise to people of other religions who have been affected by the attack (%)	People link my racial community with terror activities (%)	People think of me suspiciously whenever they hear about a terror attack somewhere in the world (%)
HDB 1–2 room flats	68.0	75.0	84.0	96.0
HDB 3–4 room flats	55.1	57.7	71.7	84.8
HDB 5 room/ executive flats	40.0	56.4	71.5	83.9
Private housing	50.0	46.6	57.1	71.4

The reason for this may be that Malays from higher socio-economic status brackets are more likely to feel that their community is being targeted or looked at suspiciously when the topic of terrorism is discussed in the public sphere, and as a consequence may feel more obliged to take steps to rectify their

community's standing, as well as distance their community from extremist Islamic views, following an attack. Table 64 shows that higher proportions of Malays in the lower socio-economic brackets report that they never or seldom experience people linking their community with terror activities, or being thought of suspiciously when there was news of a terror attack somewhere in the world.

Younger Malays, as seen from Table 65, were also more likely to make clarifications or apologise. Nearly twice as many aged above 50 (67.0 per cent) would *not* clarify with people of other religions that the terrorist did not represent mainstream Islamic views, compared to 38.9 per cent of those aged 21 to 34. Again, this may be a consequence of younger Malays experiencing more instances of being linked with terrorism. Nearly two in five of those aged 21 to 34 report that they sometimes or often experienced people linking their racial community with terrorism, compared to one in five of those aged 50 and above.

Table 65: Proportion of Malays who would take conciliatory steps after an attack, by age

	Not likely at all/quite unlikely:		Never experience/seldom experience:	
	To speak to people of other religions to clarify that the terrorist did not represent their community, views or beliefs (%)	To apologise to people of other religions who have been affected by the attack (%)	People link my racial community with terror activities (%)	People think of me suspiciously whenever they hear about a terror attack somewhere in the world (%)

21–34 years old	38.9	52.2	61.1	84.2
35–49 years old	47.9	60.3	75.0	86.5
Above 50 years old	67.0	61.8	80.0	84.7

6.1 Logistic regression on likelihood of Malay respondents making clarifications

A logistic regression was carried out to investigate which segments of the Malay community were more likely to speak to people of other religions to clarify that the terrorists did not represent their community, views and beliefs. Demographic and scale variables were included in the regression models, as Table 66 indicates.

Table 66: Binary logistic regression modelling the likelihood of Malays speaking to people of other religions to clarify that the terrorists did not represent their community

Predictors	Model 1 (demographic variables only)	Model 2 (demographic and scale variables)
"PSLE" & below	-1.688**	-1.379*
"O" Level/ITE	-1.100*	-.861
"A" Level/Diploma	-.772	-.721
Male	.147	.111
21-34 years	.692	.652
35-49 years	.377	.309
HDB 1–2 room	-.182	-.099
HDB 3–5 room	.354	.327
Income	.011	.001
Interracial interaction		.113***
Interracial trust		.052
Interracial close friendships		.001
Number of observations	504	504
Nagelkerke R Square	.148	.219

Predictors	Model 1 (demographic variables only)	Model 2 (demographic and scale variables)
Degrees of freedom	4	7
Chi-square	31.533***	48.021***

Notes: Odds ratio of the response reported in parentheses.
* Denotes variable is significant at 5 per cent level, ** denotes significant at 1 per cent, and *** denotes significant at 0.1 per cent.
Omitted categories: Degree-holders, Malay, female, private housing, 50 years of age and above.

According to Model 1, the lower-educated ("O" Level/ITE respondents, B = -1.1, $p \le .05$; and PSLE and below respondents, B = -1.688, $p \le .01$) were significantly less likely to clarify, possibly a result of their racially homogenous social networks.

In Model 2, when scales for interracial interaction, trust and close friendships were included as control variables, interracial interaction (B = .113, $p \le .001$) was found to be a significant predictor. Malay respondents who engaged in more interracial interaction such as attending weddings of another race, or asking someone of another race about their cultural practices, were more likely to clarify that the terrorists do not represent the views of their community. This is to be expected, given their larger social networks that cut across racial lines.

6.2 Logistic regression on likelihood of Malay respondents apologising after attack

A logistic regression was used to test if a range of demographic and scale variables significantly predicted whether Malay respondents were more likely to apologise to people of other religions for a terrorist attack (see Table 67). The results of the regression (Model 2) found that recent interracial interactions

significantly predicted if a respondent would be likely to apologise (B = .100, p ≤ .001).

Table 67: Binary logistic regression modelling the likelihood of apologising to people of other religions for the terrorist attack

Predictors	Model 1 (demographic variables only)	Model 2 (demographic and scale variables)
"PSLE" & below	-.546	-.254
"O" Level/ITE	-.349	-.134
"A" Level/Diploma	-.071	-.028
Male	.387	.366
21-34 years	.233	.227
35–49 years	-.073	-.153
HDB 1–2 room	-1.206	-1.266
HDB 3–5 room	-.439	-.551
Income	-.029	-.041
Interracial interaction		.100***
Interracial trust		.022
Interracial close friendships		.004
Number of observations	504	504
Nagelkerke R Square	.050	.115
Degrees of freedom	4	7
Chi-square	10.078	23.898*

Notes: * Denotes variable is significant at 5 per cent level, ** denotes significant at 1 per cent, and *** denotes significant at 0.1 per cent.
Omitted categories: Degree holders, Malay, female, private housing, 50 years of age and above.

Taking the results of Section 6.1 and 6.2 together, we find that Malay respondents with more interracial interactions in the past two years, such as attending a wedding celebration of another race, are more likely to apologise after an attack, or speak to people of other religions to clarify that the terrorists do not represent their community, its beliefs, and views.

6.3 Logistic regression on frequency of Malays experiencing being linked to terrorism

A logistic regression analysis was used to test if a range of demographic and scale variables significantly predicted whether Malays the frequency of them experiencing people linking their community with terrorism[10] (see Table 68).

Table 68: Binary logistic regression modelling the frequency of Malay respondents experiencing people linking their community with terrorism

Predictors	Model 1 (demographic variables only)	Model 2 (demographic and scale variables)
"PSLE" & below	-1.568**	-1.225
"O" Level/ITE	-1.132*	-.930
"A" Level/Diploma	-1.121*	-1.141*
Male	-.569	-.675*
21–34 years	.711	.682
35–49 years	.047	-.026
HDB 1–2 room	-1.250	-1.270
HDB 3–5 room	-.402	-.521
Income	-.026	-.034
Interracial interaction		.085*
Interracial trust		.093
Interracial close friendships		.001
Number of observations	504	504
Nagelkerke R Square	.126	.180
Degrees of freedom	4	7
Chi-square	24.59**	35.946***

Notes: * Denotes variable is significant at 5 per cent level, ** denotes significant at 1 per cent, and ***
denotes significant at 0.1 per cent.
Omitted categories: Degree-holders, Malay, female, private housing, 50 years of age and above.

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[10] The question was, "On a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 means 'never experience' and 4 means 'often experience', can you please tell me how frequently do you experience people linking your racial community with terror activities." A response of 2 indicated "seldom experience" and 3 indicated "sometimes experience".

The results of the regression (Model 1) found that educational background significantly predicted their likelihood of Malays experiencing people linking their racial community with terrorism. The lower a Malay respondent's educational qualifications, the more likely it was that he or she did *not* experience people linking their community with terrorism. Respondents who had PSLE and below qualifications (B = -1.568, p ≤ .01), those with "O" Level/ITE qualifications (B = -1.132, p ≤ .05), and those with "A" Level/diploma qualifications (B = -1.121, p ≤ .05) were significantly not likely to have such negative experiences. Again, this might be due to their comparatively smaller social networks compared to better-educated respondents.

In Model 2, controlling for interracial interaction, trust and close friendships, the results of the regression found that recent interracial interactions in the past two years (B=.085, p ≤ .01) significantly predicted such negative experiences. Malay respondents who engaged in more interracial interactions were more likely to experience people linking their community with terrorism. In Model 2, the effect of education is reduced compared to Model 1. Only "A" Level/diploma holders are significantly less likely to experience people linking their community with terrorism. Males (B=-.675, p ≤ .05) were also significantly less likely to have such experiences.

7. CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-MUSLIMS (LESS) LIKELY TO EXPRESS SOLIDARITY WITH MUSLIMS

Regressions (ordinary least squares, or OLS) were conducted to determine the demographics of those more or less likely to express solidarity with Muslims

after an attack. The dependent variable was a scale variable, from the average of the responses to two four-point scale questions: "How likely are you to let others know you they do not associate Muslims with these types of terror attacks" and "How likely are you to join a campaign/event which recognises that the Muslim community is not the cause of the attack". The Cronbach's alpha for this scale was 0.694. The results are displayed in Table 69. This analysis excluded respondents who were Muslims.

Table 69: OLS regression modelling the likelihood of non-Muslim respondents expressing solidarity with Muslims after attack by overseas Muslim extremists

Predictors	Model 1 (demographic variables only)	Model 2 (demographic and scale variables)
"PSLE" & below	-3.47***	-.244***
"O" Level/ITE	-.176**	-.126*
"A" Level/Diploma	-.157**	-.131**
Male	.011	-.007
21–34 years	.018	-.007
35–49 years	.027	.029
Indian	-.031	-.077
Others	-.303**	-.392***
HDB 1–2 room	.026	-.002
HDB 3–5 room	.031	.020
Income	-.003	-.004
Interracial interaction		.025***
Interracial trust		.023***

Predictors	Model 1 (demographic variables only)	Model 2 (demographic and scale variables)
Close interracial friendships		-.001
R-square	.177	.248
Degrees of freedom	11	14
N	1,650	1,650

Notes: * Denotes variable is significant at 5 per cent level, ** denotes significant at 1 per cent, and ***
denotes significant at 0.1 per cent.
Omitted categories: Degree-holders, Chinese, female, private housing, 50 years of age and above

The results of the regression (model 1) found that educational background and the race of respondents significantly predicted one's potential to express solidarity with Muslims. The likelihood of such actions was significantly less, the lower one's educational qualifications. Respondents who had PSLE and below qualifications (B = -3.47, p ≤ .001), those with "O" Level/ITE qualifications (B = -.176, p ≤ .01), and those with "A" Level/diploma qualifications (B = -.157, p ≤ .01) were significantly *not* likely to express their solidarity compared to degree holders. Respondents whose racial classification was "Others" (B = -.303, p ≤ .01) were also significantly less likely to do so compared to Chinese peers.

In Model 2, controlling for interracial interaction, trust and close friendships, we found that interracial interaction (B=.025, p ≤ .001) and interracial trust (B = .023, p ≤ .001) significantly predicted solidarity. Respondents who engaged in more interracial interaction and trusted those of other races more were more likely to be supportive of Muslims in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Respondents' educational background and race (respondents classified as

"Others", compared to the Chinese sample) continued to remain highly significant predictors of one's potential to *not* express solidarity with Muslims, even after the scale variables were included.

To account for the possible skewing effect of outliers, we again checked the Mahalanobis distance. We used a cut-off critical distance of 26.13. This resulted in 201 outliers again but with no change in the predictors that were significant.

8. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Our findings suggest several possible avenues to strengthen Singaporeans' response to a terror attack. First, our findings in Section 4.1 showed that Chinese respondents who were from the lower socio-economic bracket and aged 50 and above were already more likely to be mistrustful of other races (as well as fellow Chinese) before any attack. This may suggest that they are a particularly vulnerable group in any attempts to influence Singaporeans through deliberate falsehoods about other racial or religious communities, so as to sway their attitudes and disrupt social harmony. These falsehoods could take the form of online or WhatsApp messages, and could be one way for extremist groups to destabilise Singapore society before any attack, so that social cohesion is affected to an even larger extent after a terror incident. To mitigate this, there could be increased efforts to engage this segment of the population, by ensuring they are well informed of the dangers of "fake news" or deliberate falsehoods, and providing them with avenues to check the veracity of messages they receive before or during any terror attack.

Second, greater efforts to reach out to lower-income and lower-educated non-Muslims, for instance through regular grassroots or sports programmes in housing estates, which seek to build understanding and ties with neighbours of different races, religions and backgrounds, may be useful. These are characteristics of the groups we found most statistically likely to exhibit Islamophobia after any terror attack by overseas extremist Muslims. Across most of the survey findings, those residing in 1–2 room HDB flats fared differently from those residing in HDB 3–5 room flats, executive apartments and private housing. This is indicative of the exclusion those at the extreme end of the socio-economic status may be experiencing, which fuels their prejudices and biases. In addition, this minority group may not be receiving full access to programmes that promote multiculturalism and interracial interaction, which perpetuates existence in racial silos. Hence programmes promoting interracial interaction can be tailored for this minority. In addition, as our survey found many young respondents to be less Islamophobic and prejudiced, aspects of national education that encompass the teaching of multicultural values and assigns mandatory spaces for interracial interaction can be applied to programmes tailored for the older, low-income segment of society.

While there may be some scepticism over the usefulness of such grassroots programmes, findings elsewhere in our study suggest that even casual cross-racial ties, such as attending a wedding or celebration of someone of a different race in the past two years, are sufficient to enhance one's trust of people from

that race. We found that such interracial interactions were a significant determinant of interreligious harmony and support, thus emphasising the importance of providing ample avenues for interracial mingling. Our study also found that younger Singaporeans (that is, aged between 21 and 34) are more likely to express support for Muslims after an attack. They could thus be utilised as one of the key demographic groups to help in the outreach efforts to older and lower socio-economic status non-Muslims.

Linked to this, our study found that while most Singaporeans were measured in their responses to groups implicated by the attack, only around a third from other communities (for instance, non-Muslims in the case of an attack by overseas extremist Muslims) would demonstrate solidarity with these groups — such as letting others know that they do not associate people of that particular religion with such attacks. Even less — across all four attack scenarios — said they would join a campaign or event that recognises that people of that particular religion are not the cause of the terror attack. This may be a sign of suspicion of "the other" or apathy. It is worthwhile considering how Singaporeans can be nudged to be proactive on this matter.

Third, Malay respondents who were more educated and interracially interacted more, were more likely to experience people linking their community with terrorism. A potential reason for this could be greater exposure to public sentiments of Islam-motivated terrorist attacks, through the media, interracial acquaintances and friendships, or by virtue of having spent a longer time in

educational institutions. These Malays could be engaged further through grassroots and other organisations, with the message that the Singapore population at large is well aware that terror attacks are generally carried out by those adhering to a warped version of religion, and that the terrorists do not represent the majority of the Malay/Muslim community's beliefs and ideology. Care should also be taken to ensure that media coverage and security-related announcements do not link specific communities with terrorism.

Fourth, we also found that Muslims had the highest average when it came to number of years taken for most Singaporeans to feel that we are united as one people, among those who professed a mainline religion (though those with no religion had an even higher average). Further studies (such as focus group discussions or other qualitative research) to uncover the reasons behind why Muslims responded differently may be of benefit, to provide policymakers with greater information as they seek to strengthen the resilience of all Singaporeans before a terror attack.

To address the slew of aforementioned issues, greater innovation has to be incorporated into crafting programmes. While current initiatives such as Racial Harmony Day in schools promote the celebration of differences and are factually informative, they do not promote discourse on sensitive issues regarding race and ethnicity, such as the everyday discrimination ethnic minorities undergo. Policies can be tweaked to facilitate the growth of empathy between different ethnic groups. One way of doing this could be through art. Art

is renowned for its empathetic qualities, and it can be incorporated in existing programmes to tackle issues of race and ethnicity. For example, forum theatre[11] can be introduced to primary and secondary schools as part of the curriculum, to encourage open dialogues about the sensitive issues of race and ethnicity. Art would provide more avenues for the exploration and tackling of implicit biases, which often remain latent when one answers survey questions.

An emerging area of consideration in studies related to religion has been to study differences between strands within the same religion. For instance, people from the more liberal strands may hold different practices, beliefs and worldviews compared to those from more conservative branches. While our study did not tackle this issue, it is an area for future research to build on the findings here.

Also, our measure of Islamophobia was based generally on conventional variables such as housing type, age and educational background. Future research could incorporate other variables such as the number of confidants from other racial communities that a respondent has, or how long the respondent has known someone from another race/religion, to get a picture of the strength and depth of one's cross-cultural ties.

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[11] Forum Theatre is an applied drama technique and participatory theatre practice created to empower audience individuals to determine social change.

9. CONCLUSION

This paper analyses data from a survey funded by Channel NewsAsia (CNA) at MediaCorp in 2017, examining the views of 2,031 respondents on issues related to race and religious relations in the context of terrorism. To our knowledge, this is the first public study of its kind internationally that examines perceptions of how people would react following a terror attack perpetrated by religious extremists, in a context where such incidents have not actually taken place.

In a multicultural setting like Singapore, managing racial and religious relations is of utmost priority. This has taken on even more importance in the wake of the spate of terror attacks globally, with Singapore considered a high-value target. There have been instances where plans to attack Singapore, such as launching a rocket from Batam towards the Marina Bay Sands integrated resort, have been foiled.

This CNA-IPS survey aimed to study how Singaporeans would react following a terror attack (by either a Christian, Muslim, Buddhist or Hindu overseas extremist group) in the nation-state. But even before any attack, we found that there already exist substantial levels of mistrust between races, especially by the majority Chinese community of the minority Malays and Indians. There was more mistrust of all races among Chinese from lower socio-economic status backgrounds and those aged 50 and above.

This may suggest that they are a particularly vulnerable group in any attempts to influence them through deliberate falsehoods about other racial or religious communities. This could be one way for extremist groups to affect social cohesion both before and after a terror incident. There could be increased efforts to engage this segment of the population, by providing them with avenues to check the veracity of messages they receive before, during and after any terror attack.

Our results also indicate that Singaporeans in general would display stronger negative reactions (such as heightened levels of suspicion or anxiety) towards Singaporean Muslims after an attack, compared to Singaporeans of the same religion as the terrorists in scenarios where overseas Buddhists, Christians or Hindus were the ones behind the incident. Analysing the responses by ethnic group and religious affiliation also showed that in both cases, non-Malay and non-Muslim respondents were more likely to display a stronger negative reaction to Muslims in the event of an attack by overseas extremist Muslims, compared to Buddhists, Christians or Hindus in the event that an attack was carried out by that particular religion.

From various regression analyses, we found that non-Muslim respondents who were of a lower socio-economic status tend to be more likely to have negative reactions towards and be less supportive of Muslims, after a terrorist attack by Muslim extremists. These respondents are likely to live in 1 to 2-room flats, and have lower levels of education. Those with only primary school education, especially, are most likely to not express solidarity with Singaporean Muslims.

Clearly from the above discussion, socio-economic status and education have some bearing on inter-communal relationships. A potential reason for this effect could be that those of a lower socio-economic status possess more racially homogenous social networks that drastically reduce opportunities for interracial interaction. This also limits the potential for avenues to encourage a sense of empathy for people of other races and/or religions. This suggests that social economic status is not only a consideration for social mobility but also social harmony. Efforts to deepen understanding and integration among different communities in Singapore, through events in the grassroots, schools and other such organisations, should continue as the country seeks to build up social ballast before any terror attack.

In addition, Malay respondents who were more educated and interracially interacted more, were more likely to be apologetic for terrorist events, or experience people linking their community with terrorism. A potential reason for this could be greater exposure to public sentiments of Islam-motivated terrorist attacks, through the media, interracial acquaintances and friendships, or by virtue of having spent a longer time in educational institutions. The government as well as ground-up or grassroots organisations could intensify engagement efforts with this group. One key message that could be emphasised to these Malays is that the Singapore population at large is well aware that religiously motivated terrorists have so far been shown to generally adhere to a warped version of religion, and that Singapore citizens are generally cognizant of the fact that the terrorists do not represent the majority of the Singaporean Malay or Muslim community's beliefs and ideology.

Recent research by psychologists suggest another area policymakers can consider as they seek to minimise Singaporeans' negative reactions in the workplace, heartland neighbourhoods and their daily interactions, after an attack. Through a series of eight studies, Schumann, McGregor, Nash and Ross (2014) consistently showed that people who have been primed with their religious belief system act in accordance with their magnanimous religious ideals by becoming less hostile after a threat. The primes they used included asking the question "Which religious belief system do you most identify with" and showing participants the message "turn the other cheek" (to indicate forgiveness).

One study found that participants who had been reminded of their religious beliefs and experienced a "threat" (they had to describe the emotions that thinking of their own death aroused, and their thoughts about what would happen to their bodies as they physically die) recalled fewer words associated with revenge, compared to those who had not been reminded of their beliefs. Another study found that those who had been primed were less likely to endorse "hostile revenge" against bankers whose financial institutions had been bailed out by the US government in 2008, yet paid themselves high bonuses. The researchers argued that their series of findings demonstrated that a mere reminder of people's religious belief system can promote more magnanimous, less hostile reactions in threatening contexts.

This suggests that reminding Singaporeans of their religious affiliations or teachings could be one way of reducing the inevitable tensions, mutual

suspicion and anger that will arise after a terror attack in Singapore. The help of religious and community leaders will be crucial in this regard. Before any terror attack, policymakers could consider raising this point in their regular meetings and engagements with leaders across the different faiths, so that these leaders help to disseminate religiously themed messages of forgiveness, reconciliation, tolerance and calm in the immediate aftermath of an attack.

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