



US – Bracing for Trump 2.0

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
Nov 2024

### Trump's policies – Broadly inflationary, uncertain growth outlook

#### **Key takeaways**



- Red sweep defied expectations.
- Republican Party won **Presidency**, **US Senate** and retained the **House**.
- Implication : Easier policy implementation.



Source: UOB Global Economics & Markets Research

+/- mild impact

++/-- moderate impact

+++/--- major impact

### Impact Assessment of Trump's policies – Lower ST yield, higher LT yield, stronger USD in short term




Rates & FX under Trump 2.0					
Segment	Impact	Rationale			
Short-term yields	▼ Lower	<ol> <li>Trump's preference - looser monetary policy &amp; lower interest rates</li> <li>He may lobby for rate cuts, during signs of slowing.</li> </ol>			
Long-term yields	▲ Higher	<ol> <li>Expansionary Fiscal Policy - higher budget deficits and government borrowing.</li> <li>Protectionist Trade Policies - higher inflation expectations &amp; long-term yields.</li> <li>Stronger Growth Expectations - Better future economic conditions, higher inflation.</li> </ol>			
Yield curve	<b>⊿</b> Steeper	<ol> <li>Reflects market expectations of looser monetary policy in the near term; higher growth/inflation expectations over longer term.</li> <li>Interpreted as improved economic growth prospects, but concern about long-term fiscal sustainability.</li> </ol>			
US Dollar	Higher relative to base case	<ol> <li>Higher yields &amp; wider US-G10 rate differentials.</li> <li>Safe haven flows to USD on risk aversion (tariffs, growth concerns); JPY may appreciate.</li> <li>Risk currencies such as AUD &amp; NZD likely to underperform within Major FX.</li> </ol>			

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### USD to strengthen if 2018-2020 trade war playbook repeated





Date of Trump tariff

implementation

UOB Economics and Markets Research, Bloomberg

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### US Fed: Recap of Fed's rate trajectory




After a strong start to the easing cycle, a dial-down to 25 bps in Nov, we expect another 25-bps in Dec, and then 100bps in 2025, the risk in 2025 is for less cuts

US: Federal Funds Target Rate Trajectory

After a 50bps cut in Sep 2024 (the first cut since 2020) to start the easing cycle, the Fed followed up with a normal 25-bps cut in Nov. We still expect one


25-bps cut in Dec, 100 bps of cuts in 2025



For further details: US Nov 2024 FOMC: Staying on rate cut path with 25-bps move and political defiance <a href="https://www.uobgroup.com/assets/web-resources/research/pdf/MN\_241108A.pdf">https://www.uobgroup.com/assets/web-resources/research/pdf/MN\_241108A.pdf</a>



## SG rates to be in lock-step with US rates but lower magnitude




For further details: Monthly FX & Rates Strategy - USD and Treasuries yield firm up heading into the US Election




Tariff – More to come?

## China – Stimulus measures insufficient for meaningful turnaround *Trump* adds downside challenges to growth







Source: Macrobond, UOB Global Economics & Markets Research

#### Stimulus measures since Sep 2024

- very little "new & actual spending"
- Looks big on quantum, **but relatively small compared to 2008** (1/3 lower than 12.5% in 2008).
- No fresh direct stimulus spending to raise consumption, long period of debt resolution over 5 years.
- > RMB10 trillion announced but 30% via monetary policy easing, bank recap & facilities for stock purchases.

#### **Risks to Outlook**

#### Downside risk

- Residential real estate likely to struggle for years due to existing large stock, high home ownership and weak growth momentum.
- Trade war with US has LT negative impact on China's growth.

#### **Upside risk**

New fiscal spending, if substantial enough, may turn situation around


## China will retaliate to US tariffs, just like in 2018 episode With or without Trump, China needs to fix weak domestic consumption



#### **US-China trade war: Tariff size and timeline 2018-2020**

Effective date	Addt'l tariff rate	Amount	Goods involved		
Implemented by US					
6-Jul-2018	25%	US\$34 bn	machinery, cars, hard disks and aircraft parts		
23-Aug-2018	25%	US\$16 bn	semiconductors, iron and steel products, electrical machinery, railway equipment, instruments and apparatus		
24-Sep-2018	10% (raised to 25% from 10 May 2019)	US\$200 bn	electronics parts, electric appliances, network equipment, metals, furniture, plastic goods, textiles and leather goods		
1-Sep-2019	15% (cut to 7.5% from 14 Feb 2020)	US\$120 bn	some consumer goods but exclude cellphones, laptops, pharmacetical & medical goods and critical minerals		
Implemented by China					
6-Jul-2018	25%	US\$34 bn (some rolled back in Sep 2019-2020)	545 goods including agricultural products, automobiles and aquatic products		
23-Aug-2018	25%	US\$16 bn (some rolled back in Dec 2019-2020)	114 goods including motorcycles, bourbon, orange juice, chemicals, medical equipment and energy products such as coal and crude oil		
24-Sep-2018	10% (raised to 10- 25% from 1 Jun 2019 )	US\$60 bn (some were rolled back in 2020)	5,207 goods including food stuff, industrial minerals and chemicals, textiles and clothing, jewellery, metal products, machinery parts, and a wide range of consumer products		
23-Aug-2019	5 -10% (halved from 14 Feb 2020)	US\$75 bn	5,078 goods ranging from agricultural products to crude oil		


## China needs household consumption to drive growth, not relying just on investments



Source: Macrobond, UOB Global Economics & Markets Research


### Did Trump Trade Tariffs help to improve US trade balance?





## US' goods trade deficits with North America, EU and ASEAN have ballooned since 2018






# US: Imports from ASEAN rose significantly while China's plunged to a 14-year low in 2023








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
# China: US exports rose significantly... Various US industries may be vulnerable to retaliation in the event of 60% tariff (ref: EU's EV tariffs)






Electronics exports cycle in both South Korea and Taiwan which serves as a bellwether for the region could have peaked in 3Q24; **Singapore:** y/y growth in trade-related sectors could top-out sometime in 1Q25, based on our estimates







— Singapore, Commodity, Domestic Export, Non-Oil Products, Electronic Products, Total, SGD...



Softening of external inflation conditions since the peak in 3Q22 should continue to filter through to domestic prices via the import channel; Singapore's core inflation momentum has softened meaningfully to around historical levels but recent pickup in food inflation momentum warrants close monitoring







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