

Forum on Economic Policymaking in Conditions of Uncertainty

Tuesday, 14 July 2020 2.00 pm - 4.00 pm



National University of Singapore



Competitive Advantage and Factor Shocks: The Role of Discretion in Asset-Based Strategies

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Resource-based view (RBV)

- A dominant theory in strategy that informs how companies develop competitive advantage (Barney 1991)
 - Counterpoint to economists (firm = profit maximizing function) and to Industrial organization thinkers (profitability ~industry structure)
- Firms that have valuable, rare, hard-to-imitate, and non-substitutable resources are able to create a sustainable competitive advantage

Own & Control

RBV has "a very simple view about how resources are connected to the strategies that the firm pursues" (Barney & Arikan 2001: 174)

Static worldview

- Differences in heterogeneously distributed resources are stable over time (Barney 1991)

- RBV "assumed stability in product markets" (Priem & Butler 2001: 22)

Focal issues

Although resources in the RBV are "tied semi-permanently to the firm" (Wernerfelt, 1984: 172), they can nonetheless reside in loci outside of firm boundaries (e.g. reputation, brand value, trust, supply and political networks)

→ Limited *structural discretion* over 'external' resources

The value of firm resources often hinges on the continued availability of external factors (Ellram et al 2013, Harris et al 2015)

→What is the direction of expected *shocks* (positive or negative)?

→Do firms have the *technical discretion* to deal with factor shocks (specific or generic complementarity)?



RBV: Configurational equifinality

- Resource heterogeneity is the de facto economic reality ← → "environmental models of competitive advantage" (Barney 1991: 100)
- Firms follow idiosyncratic pathways to acquire, accumulate, and integrate their resource configurations (Costa et al 2013: Maritan & Peteraf 2011)
- Diverse resource configurations can lead to equifinal competitive advantage (Lippman & Rumelt 2003; Meyer et al 1993) BUT not every resource configuration has the same environmental exposure
 - E.g. firms "develop specialized assets to enhance profits at the price of reduced flexibility in the face of Schumpeterian shocks" (Amit & Schoemaker 1993: 39).

Distinct resources and resource configurations can underpin competitive advantage

1. Structural Discretion



| Managerial Discretion | Internal Resources | External Resources | Sources |
|--|--|---|---|
| Residual rights to exercise control, including monitoring and sanctioning | High IRs are subject to rules and routines and respond elastically to fiat power and inelastically to the environment <u>Source:</u> ownership and employment contracts IRs can appropriate control rights (e.g. employee shirking) but monitoring is feasible | Low ERs respond inelastically to firm fiat power but elastically to the environment. ER is +/- autonomous <u>Source:</u> Perceptions and attributions of stakeholders ERs can easily appropriate control rights as monitoring and measuring is hard | Foss & Foss, 1999; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Zander & Kogut, 1995 |
| Rights to residual income | Typically belong to the firm but can be bargained away in the case of employees | Undetermined | Foss Foss 1999, Jensen Meckling 1976, Coff 1999 |
| Value Pattern | Despite Principal-Agent problems and possible mutiny, generally aligned with firm objectives | Aligned with individual objectives or objectives of partner firm | Parsons, 1956 |
| Transaction costs | Reduced (which is why firms exist) | Higher ~ opportunism risk and monitoring difficulties | Williamson, 1975, 1985 |



2. Shock sensitivity & uncertainty

- Two types of sensitivity
 - <u>Positive</u>: a factor shock leads to more abundance and lower prices
 - <u>Negative</u>: a factor shock leads to more scarcity and higher prices
- For simplicity, we presume firms in the same industry have the same sensitivity direction (I.e. a shock is objectively positive or negative from an industry perspective)
- Counterexample
 - Tightening of CO2 emission regulation for car manufacturers has different effects for Tesla or Range Rover

3. Technical Discretion

Superior complementarity drives competitive advantage (Adegbesan 2009)

V(F U RB) = V(F) + V(RB) + V(S) and S > 0

F = Factor, RB = Resource Base, S = complementarity

- Two types
 - Specific: requires factor-specific investment (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), increases bilateral dependency, facilitates returns to scale & scope → low technical discretion
 - *Generic:* utilization of a 'general purpose technology' enables greater rent extraction from any resource → high technical discretion because can be "redeployed to alternative uses" (Williamson, 1991: 281)

Competitive advantage can be rooted in specific and/or generic complementarity with an external factor 7



Congruent insights

- SINGAPORE MANAGEMENT
- 1) Distinct resource configurations can underpin competitive advantage
- 2) A resource's ability to create competitive advantage is susceptible to changes in the availability of external factors
 - 1) Positive or negative supply shocks
- 3) Resources differ in *technical discretion*
 - 1) Complementarity to factors
 - 2) Sensitivity to factors (presumed to be homogenous in industry)
- 4) Firm resources can be located in external and in internal loci creating differences in *structural discretion*

RQ: is it possible for firms to be equally well equipped to handle positive as well as negative shocks (i.e. uncertainty)?




| Embedded Environmental Uncertainty | | d | Structural Discretion | | |
|--|------|--|--|---|--|
| | | | High | Low | |
| | | inty | Internal Resources | External Resources | |
| | Low | Specific factor comple- mentarity | <u>Specialization</u> Assets: Expertise, specialized equipment and tools, absorptive capacity, routines | <u>Connectivity</u> Assets: Rich, dense, and diverse tight-knit networks to resource providers | |
| | High | Generic factor comple- mentarity | <u>Flexibility</u> Assets: Creativity, TQM, judgement, entrepreneurial mindset, slack, marketing | <u>Amplification</u> Assets: Brand, goodwill, legitimacy, reputation | |


Technical Discretion

Specialization strategy






Flexibility strategy




Amplification strategy





Connectivity strategy



A country perspective



| Emboddod | | dad | Structural Discretion | | |
|---------------------------|------|--|---|--|--|
| Embedded Environmental | | | High | Low | |
| Uncertainty | | inty | Internal Resources | External Resources | |
| Technical Discretion | Low | Specific factor comple- mentarity | <u>Specialization</u> Tourism-dependent countries and Covid-19 (e.g. Thailand) oil-importing countries under oil price slump (e.g. Japan) | <u>Connectivity</u> Relaxation of rare earth export quota by China (e.g. USA, Japan, South Korea) | |
| Technica | High | Generic factor comple- mentarity | <u>Flexibility</u> Innovative economies (and those with slack resources) under Covid-19 | <u>Amplification</u> Constraints on Free speech (e.g. Hong Kong) | |

Thank you

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