IPS Working Papers

PREJUDICE, ATTITUDES AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RACE IN SINGAPORE

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Singapore's multicultural compact, historically anchored in principles of equality and harmony, faces renewed scrutiny amid global debates on racial justice, prejudice, and identity politics. As international discourses on Critical Race Theory (CRT) and structural inequality increasingly permeate local conversations, it is imperative to assess how these global trends intersect with local understandings of race and prejudice. Motivated by this context, this report presents findings from the 2024 Institute of Policy Studies' Survey on Race, Religion and Language (RRL), which canvassed responses from a nationally representative sample of 4,000 Singapore residents, and compares these findings with prior surveys from 2013 and 2018. The goal is to illuminate evolving perspectives on prejudice, attitudes, identity, lived experiences, and CRT within Singapore's distinct multicultural framework.

The findings carry significant implications for policy and community engagement. Policymakers must remain attentive to demographic and generational divides, ensuring that cohesion-building initiatives meaningfully address the concerns of those perceiving heightened prejudice, especially younger and minority populations. Educational programmes and public

conversations about race must navigate global concepts carefully, thoughtfully adapting frameworks to resonate with local realities and sensitivities.

Ultimately, ongoing efforts to reconcile multicultural ideals with lived multicultural experiences must move beyond symbolic gestures toward addressing deeper, structural inequalities in everyday interactions. This working paper thus aims to catalyse nuanced discussions about prejudice, lived multicultural realities, and frameworks of racial equality tailored specifically to Singapore's distinct social context. It is presented not merely as a static snapshot of evolving public attitudes, but as a strategic guide for stakeholders seeking to sustain social cohesion within an ever-changing local and global racial landscape.

A summary of key findings across the substantive chapters of this paper follows.

General Perceptions of Prejudice

Across seven identity domains (race, religion, age, gender, nationality, language, and sexual orientation) the dominant perception in 2024 is that prejudice levels remain largely unchanged from five years ago. In every domain, a clear majority, ranging from over half (53.1 per cent for sexuality-related prejudice) to nearly six in 10 (59.1 per cent for nationality-related prejudice) felt that levels of prejudice have held steady.

Perceptions of racial and religious prejudice show consistency over time, with 57.4 per cent and 59.0 per cent of respondents indicating no change to levels

of prejudice compared to five years ago. However, racial minorities were more likely to perceive levels of racial prejudice to have risen (around 18 per cent) compared to Chinese respondents (9.5 per cent). Meanwhile, age-based prejudice emerged as the greatest perceived concern, with 17.6 per cent of all respondents perceiving higher levels. Younger respondents (18–35 years old) consistently perceived rising prejudice more acutely than older cohorts across most identity domains.

Attitudes, Identity, and Lived Experiences Pertaining to Race

Endorsement of integration remains robust, with around eight in ten respondents (81.6 per cent) agreeing that different racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore; a proportion that has remained unchanged since 2018. Support for adaptation is particularly pronounced among Malays, Indians, Muslims, and Hindus, with close to nine in 10 (87 to 89 per cent across these groups) expressing agreement.

There is equally strong backing for cultural maintenance, as 84.6 per cent affirm that each racial and religious group should be allowed retain its own customs and traditions, a viewpoint consistently held since 2018. This sentiment is especially strong among racial minorities, as well as Taoists, Hindus, and Muslims; agreement levels of these groups are between 89 and 91 per cent. Conversely, two-thirds of respondents (66.3 per cent) reject the idea of promoting a single dominant culture in Singapore, with opposition particularly pronounced among minorities, degree-holders, and younger adults.

Importantly, Singaporeans continue to actively engage with their racial identities. Over seven in 10 respondents (73.9 per cent) have tried to find out more about their own ethnic group. Additionally, more than eight in 10 respondents (81.9 per cent) expressed a strong sense of belonging to their racial group, with belonging strongest among Malay respondents and older adults. Participation in cultural practices is similarly high, with nearly seven in 10 respondents (68.1 per cent) actively engaging in traditions associated with their racial group, particularly among Malays, Indians, and older residents.

Understanding and engaging with other racial and religious groups is largely perceived as manageable, as seven in ten respondents (70.9 per cent) disagreed that such interactions were troublesome. This is an attitude most commonly found among higher-educated and higher-income segments.

Despite these broadly positive attitudes, everyday racism persists. Approximately one-third of Malays, Indians, Muslims, and Hindus report experiencing racial or religious jokes, exclusion, or negative remarks “sometimes” or more often, while fewer than 10 per cent of Chinese report similar experiences. Young adults are notably more likely to report that they encounter such instances of discrimination.

Critical Race Theory: Singapore Perspectives

The survey reveals notable openness among respondents toward some tenets of CRT. About 57.1 per cent agree with the statement that race is a social construct, and a similar proportion (56.2 per cent) concur that racism is a

common experience for minorities; these levels of agreement rise significantly among youth (more than seven in 10) and degree-holders (approximately six in 10). Six in ten residents (59.6 per cent) believe it is easier to be Chinese in Singapore, a perspective even more pronounced among younger respondents aged 18 to 35 (75.5 per cent) as well as among minority respondents (about 63 per cent of Malays and Indians), who consistently express higher agreement than their Chinese counterparts.

Acknowledgement of "Chinese privilege" is more contested, with 44.7 per cent agreeing to varying extents that there was such privilege in Singapore. However, acceptance sharply diverges across demographic lines: over seven in ten youth 18-35 years old (71.2 per cent) recognise this privilege, compared to under three in 10 seniors over 65 years old (28.9 per cent). Ethnic differences also emerge, with approximately six in 10 Malays and Indians acknowledging "Chinese privilege," contrasted with just four in 10 Chinese respondents.

Perceptions of racial equality advocacy also reflect divisions: more than half of minority respondents and about six in 10 youth perceive that Chinese support racial equality primarily when it aligns with their self-interest; fewer than half of Chinese respondents agree with this interpretation. Similarly, when considering who is qualified to speak about racism, significant generational and ethnic differences appear. Over four in 10 youth (41.8 per cent) accept that only minorities have the legitimacy to speak on racial issues, as compared to three in 10 or less for respondents in older age cohorts and who were Chinese.

Lastly, there is widespread discomfort with the wholesale importation of foreign concepts such as CRT or “white privilege,” as 73.0 per cent express unease. This discomfort, however, is less pronounced among younger adults (61.3 per cent) and Indian respondents (66.0 per cent), while peaking among older and more affluent respondents (under or approximately 80 per cent).

1. INTRODUCTION

Singapore's multicultural compact has long rested on the twin aspirations of equality and harmony. Yet, recent global debates around "wokeness", Critical Race Theory (CRT) and identity politics have spilled into local conversations, prompting searching questions about whether old assumptions still hold. Against this backdrop, *Prejudice, Attitudes and Critical Perspectives on Race in Singapore* draws on fresh data from the 2024 IPS Survey on Race, Religion and Language (RRL) to take stock of Singaporeans' evolving views. The nationally representative survey of 4,000 residents, preceded by earlier waves in 2013 and 2018, offers a distinct lens on prejudice, attitudes towards race and religion-related issues, and the tenets of CRT.

The paper proceeds in three substantive chapters, each addressing a different layer of the prejudice-wokeness puzzle. Chapter 2 maps general perceptions of prejudice across seven identity domains: race, religion, age, gender, nationality, language and sexual orientation. By documenting where Singaporeans feel prejudice has worsened, improved or remained the same, the chapter sets a broad temperature check for social cohesion.

Chapter 3 examines attitudes, identity, and lived experiences relating especially to race. With extant literature on multiculturalism and prejudice reduction in the backdrop, the chapter presents survey findings on how Singaporeans endorse both adaptation to broader society and the preservation of racial and religious

customs, while rejecting the notion of a single dominant culture. It further assesses the strength of cultural identity through knowledge of, belonging to, and participation in one's racial group. While interracial and interreligious understanding is generally seen as unproblematic, the chapter also surfaces persistent lived experiences of discrimination among minorities, highlighting the gap between multicultural ideals and lived realities.

Chapter 4 breaks new ground by fielding — for the first time in the RRL series — a dedicated battery of items on CRT and other "woke" concepts. These questions probe Singapore residents' familiarity with and reactions to core CRT ideas, such as the social construction of race, the notion of Chinese privilege, and whether only minorities hold legitimate authority to speak on racism. As these items were introduced only in the 2024 wave, the chapter provides a benchmark against which future shifts can be tracked. Its findings can help policymakers, educators and community leaders gauge how global racial-justice discourse is filtering into local consciousness, where points of resistance or receptivity lie; and how best to frame conversations on privilege and structural inequality in a manner attuned to Singapore's multicultural context.

Read together, the chapters reveal three cross-cutting themes. First, stability masks divergence: while most respondents perceive prejudice levels to be "about the same," minorities, younger cohorts and the less affluent register sharper concerns. Second, multiculturalism remains widely endorsed but unevenly felt: strong support for intercultural adaptation and tradition-keeping co-exists with sizeable pockets reporting discrimination. Third, conceptual

importation divides opinion: many Singaporeans feel uneasy when overseas frameworks such as CRT are applied wholesale, while younger and better-educated groups show greater openness.

These insights carry practical implications. Policymakers and community leaders must recognise that demographic cleavages, especially age and majority–minority status, shape how prejudice is perceived and discussed. Efforts to foster cohesion should therefore couple broad-based messaging with targeted interventions for groups that feel left behind. Likewise, educators and media practitioners engaging with global concepts of privilege and oppression would do well to localise terminology and ground discussions in Singapore's institutional realities.

The authors proffer this working paper not as the final word on prejudice or "wokeness" in Singapore; rather, it is a snapshot intended to spark constructive dialogue and to inform future research that blends quantitative trends with qualitative nuance. By tracing where perceptions align and where they diverge, we hope to contribute to a more empathetic, and ultimately more cohesive, city-state.

1.1 Survey Methodology

The findings presented in this paper are primarily derived from an approximately 45-minute Computer-Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) administered from April 2024 to August 2024. The IPS Survey on RRL

comprised approximately 350 question items examining a range of topics, including

- Identity Markers Pertaining to Self;
- Interactions;
- Daily Experiences in a Multiracial Society;
- Prejudice and Discrimination; and
- Various Policy Issues and Public Opinion

Fieldwork and data collection was conducted by IPS Social Lab. In total, the full survey sample comprises 4,000 unique respondents after quality checks. At the outset, a sampling frame comprising a list of 6,000 randomly generated residential household addresses was obtained from the Department of Statistics (DoS). Two weeks prior to surveyors from IPS Social Lab physically visiting the addresses, invitation letters with details of the RRL survey were sent to the residential addresses in the sampling frame.

Surveyors briefed potential respondents about the study using a pre-set Participant Information Sheet, invited the individuals to participate in the study and obtained their consent. A booster sample of approximately 1,000 Malay and Indian minority-race respondents (obtained to ensure representation and enable fine-grain comparisons across responses) was also apportioned within the target of 4,000 respondents. This booster sample was obtained by surveyors knocking on the doors of Malay and Indian households, following a prescribed process where they searched for such households after locating a pre-assigned address provided from the sampling frame.

Surveyors then administrated the survey via CAPI, whereby the respondent was provided with a tablet (e.g., iPad, Galaxy Tab) on which to answer or self-complete the survey questions. If the respondent was uncomfortable using the tablet or had difficulty reading, the option for surveyors to read out the questions and record their answers was made available. The survey was conducted in all four official languages — English, Mandarin Chinese, Malay and Tamil.

If respondents had difficulty reading or writing, the option for surveyors to read out the questions and record their answers was made available. If participants were uncomfortable using the tablet, the surveyor would hand them a paper copy of the survey for completion instead. Respondents were given $20 as a token of participation upon survey completion.

Responses were then weighted to mirror the prevailing demographics of Singapore's resident population. As such, the findings are generally representative of the Singapore adult resident population. However, the RRL survey data is not exempt from the typical biases prevalent in face-to-face survey methods, including:

- Underrepresentation of certain profiles who have less opportunity to respond to the survey at the door during survey administration hours (e.g., individuals with certain occupations / extenuating circumstances); this was partly dealt with by fieldworkers visiting an

address at different time slots and on weekdays and weekends, so that such respondents could be included in the study.

- Social desirability bias arising from respondents answering the survey in a manner ostensibly viewed more favourably as compared to more “impersonal” or “removed” methods such as an online survey. This is, however, partially resolved with a CAPI method with surveyors according respondents’ privacy to answer the questions.

1.2 Demographics and Representation

The overall responses for survey questions reported in the ensuing chapters were weighted across age, race and gender with reference to prevailing Singapore resident demographics, and this enabled IPS Social Lab to effectively peruse results to provide a robust gauge of the overall Singapore resident population's perceptions and views. In the following subsections, we explore some key demographic breakdowns of the samples in relation to the Singapore resident population.

1.2.1 Race and age profiles in the 2024 RRL sample mirrored the Singapore resident population after weighting

The proportions of respondents in the 2024 RRL sample were identical to the prevailing Singapore resident population[1] in terms of race and age cohorts after weighting. Only respondents 18 years old and above at the time of administration were eligible to complete the survey (see Figure 1.2.1).

Figure 1.2.1: Survey sample vs. resident population by race / age



1.2.2 Gender breakdown for the 2024 RRL sample were also identical to the resident population after weighting; there was a slightly higher proportion of Singapore Citizens surveyed relative to prevailing demographics

The proportions of respondents in the 2024 RRL sample by gender were also identical with the prevailing Singapore resident population after weighting.

[1] Using publicly available information from Singapore Department of Statistics (DoS); accurate as of June 2024 (M810011 - Singapore Residents by Age Group, Ethnic Group and Sex, End June, Annual).

There was a slightly higher representation of Singapore Citizens (SCs) compared to Permanent Residents (PRs) (see Figure 1.2.2).

Figure 1.2.2: Survey sample vs. resident population by gender / citizenship status



1.2.3 The RRL sample was underrepresented for individuals with secondary or lower qualifications; and overrepresented for individuals with ITE, polytechnic and professional qualifications relative to the resident population; it was overrepresented for HDB 1–3 room dwellers relative to the resident population

There was an underrepresentation of individuals with secondary or lower educational qualifications, and a corresponding overrepresentation of individuals with ITE, polytechnic and professional qualifications in the 2024 RRL sample relative to the resident population.[2] In this regard, cross-tabulations to

[2] Numbers are for Residents aged 25 years and over, latest available in 2020 from Singapore Department of Statistics (DoS) (M850581).

ascertain whether education was a factor impacting responses were applied to all question items at the outset. Where statistically significant, cross-tabulations of responses by education levels are presented in this report, alongside other variables. To capture broader trends, analyses presented aggregate reported highest educational qualifications into three broad ordinal categories: 1) secondary or lower education; 2) ITE, polytechnic diplomas and professional qualifications not amounting to a degree; and 3) bachelor's degree or higher qualifications (see Figure 1.2.3).

1.2.4 The 2024 RRL sample was overrepresented for public housing dwellers and underweight on private property dwellers relative to the resident population

The 2024 RRL sample also has a higher proportion of HDB dwellers relative to the resident population[3]; this was in line with the increased possibilities of surveyors being able to come into contact with this population owing to the ease of access to their houses. Meanwhile, the corresponding response rates for private property dwellers were also much lower, due to additional difficulties with securing access especially in condominiums and cluster housing where surveyors are generally not allowed access. In the same vein as the education variable, housing types were aggregated into four broad ordinal categories to better capture broad trends: 1) 1–3 room HDB flats; 2) 4-room HDB flats; 3) 5+ room HDB flats including 5-room, executive, maisonette and HUDC units; and

[3] Numbers are for Resident Households by Type of Dwelling, latest available 2023 from Singapore Department of Statistics (DoS) (M810351).

4) Private housing, comprising condominiums, landed property or other types of private accommodation such as shophouse units (see Figure 1.2.3).

Figure 1.2.3: Survey sample vs resident population by highest educational qualifications attained / housing type



1.2.5 The 2024 RRL sample was proportionally representative of Buddhists, Taoists, Catholics, Muslims and Hindus; Christians were overrepresented while those with no religion were underrepresented relative to the resident population

There was some variance in the religion distribution for the 2024 RRL sample relative to the Singapore resident population.[4] While the proportions of Buddhists, Taoists or those with Traditional Chinese Beliefs (TCB), Catholics,

[4] Singapore Department of Statistics (DoS)'s General Household Survey 2020; retrieved from https://www.singstat.gov.sg/-/media/files/publications/cop2020/sr1/excel/t51-57.xlsx. Other religions omitted from full proportions for brevity.

Muslims and Hindus were relatively similar to the resident population, there was an overrepresentation of Protestant Christians and an underrepresentation of those with no religion. Hence, cross-tabulations to ascertain whether religion was a factor impacting responses were applied to all question items at the outset; this was also in line with the prevailing theoretical hypotheses guiding respondents' perceptions and views of issues associated with religion. Where statistically significant and relevant, cross-tabulations of responses by religion are presented in this report, alongside other variables (see Figure 1.2.4).

Figure 1.2.4: Survey sample vs resident population by religion



1.3 Analysis Strategy

While there was a confluence of factors impacting responses to the question items, we have condensed the myriad findings across results using a two-step approach to augment the relative accessibility of the content and ease of understanding for a non-academic, general audience:

1) Running ordinal logistic or ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions [5] with demographic responses and other salient responses as independent variables as a “filter” to identify significant findings;
2) Presenting single or dual cross-tabulations based on 1) for the most salient and significant results.

Step 1 was omitted from the report for brevity, and the cross-tabulations in step 2 are featured in subsequent chapters.

[5] Ordinal logistic regressions are used to predict an ordinal dependent variable (which comprise the bulk of the survey responses), given one or more independent variables. This enables the determination of which of the independent variables (if any) have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable.

2. GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF PREJUDICE

Prejudice has long been studied as a multifaceted phenomenon, encompassing cognitive, affective, and behavioural components. Seminal theories such as social identity theory, integrated threat theory, and stigma research have shaped our understanding of how group membership, perceived threats, and social context influence prejudice and its perception. Social identity theory posits that individuals derive self-esteem from group affiliations, often leading to in-group favouritism and out-group prejudice. Integrated threat theory highlights how both realistic (material) and symbolic (cultural) threats can fuel negative attitudes toward out-groups. Research on stigmatisation further explores how individuals perceive and respond to discrimination, with ethnic identity moderating the perception of both subtle and blatant prejudice (Effron & Knowles, 2015; Operario & Fiske, 2001).

Perceptions of prejudice are dynamic and context-dependent, influenced by who expresses the attitude, the target group, and the observer's identity. Research demonstrates that people's judgments of what constitutes prejudice can shift based on social norms, group entitativity (the perceived unity of a group), and the legitimacy of group interests (Effron & Knowles, 2015; Platow et al., 2022). High group entitativity can legitimize the expression of prejudice, especially when out-groups are seen as threatening in some way (Effron & Knowles, 2015). Furthermore, prejudice can emerge early in life, peaking in childhood and stabilising in adolescence, with factors such as social dominance

orientation, intergroup anxiety, and parental attitudes playing significant roles; intergroup friendships, conversely, can reduce prejudice (Crocetti et al., 2021).

In Singapore, a multicultural society, extant research reveals complex patterns of prejudice and its perception. Studies show that anti-immigrant prejudice is shaped by perceived threats and stereotypes, with different immigrant groups eliciting distinct attitudinal profiles. For example, Chinese immigrants are viewed most negatively, while Westerners are seen more positively, and perceived threat is a stronger predictor of prejudice than stereotypes (Ramsay & Pang, 2017). Social media use and risk perceptions during crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, can exacerbate prejudice, while diverse social networks and higher trust can mitigate these effects (Ahmed et al., 2021).

Attitudes toward mental illness, age, and biracial individuals in Singapore are also influenced by demographic factors such as age, ethnicity, and education, with older, less-educated, and majority-group individuals often expressing more negative attitudes (Lien et al., 2020; Wee & Cheng, 2023; Yuan et al., 2016). Media representation of minorities, including Malays and Indians, can perpetuate stereotypes and reinforce prejudice if not handled inclusively (Hui, 2025).

Prejudice in Singapore is not limited to race or nationality; it intersects with religion, age, gender, and sexual orientation too. For instance, homophobia has been identified as a strong predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes, and occupation-based stigma has been observed among healthcare workers during

the pandemic, often intersecting with race and nationality (Dirksmeier, 2020; Fahim et al., 2025).

Against this backdrop, this chapter peruses perceived prejudice across various domains: race, religion, age, gender, nationality, language and sexual orientation. These domains form the basis of distinct identities that shape how people experience and navigate the world, often creating societal faultlines or divisions. Measuring perceptions of prejudice provides insight into how societal cohesion might be undermined or bolstered over time, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay between individual experiences and group dynamics that collectively shape societal faultlines.

The survey findings reveal that perceptions of prejudice across various dimensions — including race and religion, age, gender, nationality, language and sexual orientation — have largely stabilised over time, where most respondents indicated similar levels of prejudice compared to five years ago. Perceptions of nationality-based prejudice improved most notably, with six in 10 stating it had remained the same in 2024 as compared to just four in 10 who had indicated likewise in 2013. Differences by demographics were of interest too; younger respondents were consistently more likely to perceive increasing prejudice, with approximately one in five aged 18–35 perceiving heightened prejudice based on race and religion, gender, nationality and sexual orientation. Meanwhile, Malays and minority religious groups like Muslims and Hindus were more likely to perceive racial and religious prejudice as worsening. These

trends underscore both progress and persistent sensitivities across different societal faultlines.

2.0 OVERALL FINDINGS ON PERCEIVED PREJUDICE

Survey respondents were asked whether seven different forms of prejudice were more, less or about the same today as they were five years ago. Across all domains, the modal response was “about the same”, signalling a broad public perception of stability rather than dramatic change. In every category, a clear majority, ranging from over half (53.1 per cent for sexuality-related prejudice) to nearly six in 10 (59.1 per cent for nationality-related prejudice) felt that levels of prejudice have held steady.

Against this backdrop, age prejudice stands out as the area of greatest perceived deterioration. More than one in eight respondents (17.6 per cent) thought age-based prejudice were “more” or “much more” common today; double the equivalent share for gender prejudice (8.8 per cent) and noticeably higher than for race (11.2 per cent) or religion (9.6 per cent). Nationality-based prejudice also registered comparatively high concern, with 13.9 per cent perceiving an increase. Nonetheless, these proportions are still significantly lower than the proportions perceiving levels of prejudice diminishing or holding steady, compared to five years ago.

Race and religion-related prejudice occupy a middle ground in public perceptions when set against other prejudice domains. A clear majority of respondents felt that levels of racial (57.4 per cent) and religious (59.0 per cent) prejudice were “about the same” as five years ago; this proportion is in tandem with language (58.6 per cent) and nationality (59.1 per cent), but is marginally higher than sexuality (53.1 per cent) and age (54.6 per cent). When combining “more” and “much more” responses, prejudice on the basis of religion registered the second-lowest perceived increase across all seven domains (9.6 per cent), while race-related prejudice was slightly higher (11.2 per cent); yet still well below age (17.6 per cent) and nationality (13.9 per cent) (see Figure 2.0). The next few sections proceed to analyse the findings associated with each form of prejudice in turn and with more detail.[6]

[6] Analyses for prejudice on the basis of language are excluded from this publication and will be incorporated into a forthcoming working paper on language.

Figure 2.0: Perceptions of various forms of prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, 2024 responses by form of prejudice



2.1 PERCEPTIONS OF RACIAL PREJUDICE

2.1.1 Less than six in 10 respondents in 2024 perceived levels of racial prejudice today to be about the same compared to five years ago; this proportion has risen from less than half of respondents that indicated likewise in 2013

Survey respondents were asked to indicate their perceived level of racial prejudice today in Singapore as compared to five years ago. We found that the proportion of respondents who indicated that there was about the same level of

racial prejudice today as compared to five years ago has increased over the three waves, from 46.6 per cent in 2013 to 52.5 per cent in 2018, and 57.4 per cent in 2024.

Correspondingly, lower proportions of respondents in 2024 thought there was less, or much less racial prejudice today compared to five years ago (7.1 per cent decline from 2013, 2.6 per cent decline from 2018). In the same vein, lower proportions of 2024 respondents thought there was more or much more racial prejudice today (3.8 per cent decline from 2013, 2.3 per cent decline from 2018) (see Figure 2.1.1).

Figure 2.1.1: Perception of racial prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by wave



2.1.2 Less than one in 10 Chinese respondents perceived more or much more racial prejudice today as compared to close to one in five minority-race respondents; Malays were also less likely to feel that there is less or much less racial prejudice today. Larger proportions across racial groups perceive racial prejudice to have remained the same over time

When looking at the 2024 results by race, we found that Chinese respondents were most likely to indicate that levels of racial prejudice today remain about the same as five years ago (58.7 per cent). They were also least likely to say that there was more or much more racial prejudice today; less than one in 10 Chinese respondents (9.5 per cent) indicated this, compared to close to one in five Malay respondents (18.0 per cent), Indian respondents (17.4 per cent) and Others respondents (16.2 per cent) (see Figure 2.1.2).

Furthermore, we observed that Malay respondents were least likely to think that there was less or much less racial prejudice today (26.6 per cent), as compared to Chinese respondents (31.8 per cent), Indian respondents (33.3 per cent) and Others respondents (33.8 per cent).

When considering responses across the three survey waves, we note that across all four racial groups, perceptions of racial prejudice converged towards a sense of stasis rather than change. Between 2013 and 2024, the share of respondents who felt that racial prejudice was “about the same”, relative to five years prior to the time of response, has climbed steadily within every racial group. This suggests that most Singaporeans no longer see the climate as either markedly improving or deteriorating. For instance, this centring is pronounced among Chinese respondents, where the “about the same” option grew 10 percentage points (from 48.3 per cent to 58.7 per cent) over the three waves; and less pronounced but still evident among Indians (from 41.4 per cent to 49.3 per cent).

At the same time, optimistic assessments vis-à-vis incidences of prejudice have receded. The combined “much less” or “less” responses fell by approximately 6 percentage points for Chinese (5.7 per cent) and Indians (5.8 per cent) from 2013 to 2024. However, the corresponding difference for Malays was 10.6 per cent, indicating that they were significantly less optimistic about prejudice relative to Chinese and Indians. Put differently, fewer Singaporeans in 2024 compared to 2013, were prepared to say that racial prejudice decreased; and this was especially true for Malays.

The pessimistic end of the spectrum further illustrates differences in perceptions of prejudice between the majority Chinese and minority races. Across all survey waves, the proportions that perceived more or much more racial prejudice were higher for minority-race respondents compared to Chinese respondents. In addition, while these proportions dropped noticeably from 2013 to 2024 for Chinese and Others respondents, the 2024 proportions of Malay and Indian respondents that perceived more or much more racial prejudice are relatively similar to 2013 proportions.

Figure 2.1.2: Perception of racial prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by race and across waves



2.1.3 Close to one in five respondents aged 18–35 perceived that there was more, or much more racial prejudice today compared to five years ago, as compared to one in 10 or less for their older counterparts

A notable trend can be discerned when analysing the data via age cohorts. Younger respondents were more likely to perceive more or much more racial prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, compared to older cohorts. Close to one in five respondents aged 18–35 in 2024 (18.7 per cent) expressed such sentiments, as compared to one in 10 or less for respondents aged 36–50 (13.7 per cent), aged 51–65 (10.4 per cent) and above 65 years old (5.5 per cent). This trend is evident across all three waves. In tandem with findings in 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, the proportions of respondents across all age cohorts perceiving much less or less prejudice at the time of the survey compared to five years ago, also declined from 2013 to 2024 (see Figure 2.1.3).

Younger generations today are more educated on social issues, including racial prejudice, due to greater exposure to conversations on social media platforms and public discussions around these topics. This awareness can heighten their sensitivity to issues of prejudice, leading them to perceive it as more prevalent.

Figure 2.1.3: Perception of racial prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by age and across waves



2.2 PERCEPTIONS OF RELIGIOUS PREJUDICE

2.2.1 About six in 10 respondents in 2024 believed that levels of religious prejudice stayed roughly the same compared to five years ago; this proportion increased from about half of respondents who indicated as such in 2013

Survey respondents were also asked about their perception of religious prejudice in Singapore. Similar to earlier trends noted in section 2.1.1, we observed an increasing proportion of respondents who perceived about the same level of religious prejudice today as compared to five years ago. This proportion increased from 49.6 per cent in 2013 to 54.7 per cent in 2018, and reached 59.0 per cent in 2024.

In parallel, the proportions of respondents that perceived less or much less religious prejudice decreased over the three waves, from 40.4 per cent in 2013 to 33.6 per cent in 2018, to 31.4 per cent in 2024. Proportions of respondents that perceived more or much more religious prejudice held steady across the three waves (10.0 per cent in 2013, 11.7 per cent in 2018 and 9.6 per cent in 2024) (see Figure 2.2.1).

Figure 2.2.1: Perception of religious prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by wave



2.2.2 Nearly one in five Muslims and over one in 10 Hindus and Catholics in 2024 perceived more or much more religious prejudice in Singapore compared to five years ago; these proportions were higher relative to those of other religions across all survey waves

When examining the 2024 responses by religion, we found that nearly one in five Muslims (17.6 per cent), and over one in 10 Hindus (14.2 per cent) and Catholics (13.3 per cent) perceived more or much more religious prejudice today as compared to five years ago. By contrast, significantly lower proportions of Taoists (3.6 per cent), non-religious respondents (7.4 per cent), Christian respondents (8.1 per cent) and Buddhists (8.3 per cent) believed that religious prejudice has risen compared to five years ago. Instead, these respondents were more likely to perceive similar levels of religious prejudice in recent times relative to five years ago. More than six in 10 Taoists (62.9 per cent), Christians (62.2 per cent) and non-religious respondents (62.8 per cent), as well as close to six in 10 Buddhists (58.3 per cent) expressed such sentiments. The elevated

proportions of Muslims, Hindus and Catholics who indicated more or much more perceived prejudice at the time of response, compared to five years ago, are noted across all three waves of the RRL survey (see Figure 2.2.2).

Figure 2.2.2: Perception of religious prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by religion and across waves



2.2.3 Younger respondents were more likely to perceive more or much more religious prejudice today; more than one in 10 of those 50 years old and younger indicated as such, as compared to less than one in 10 of their older peers. Larger proportions across age cohorts perceived religious prejudice to have remained the same over time

The 2024 responses on the prevalence of religious prejudice also reflected differences across age cohorts. In line with findings presented in section 2.1.3, 16.1 per cent of respondents aged 18–35 years old perceived more or much more religious prejudice today, compared to five years ago. This proportion decreases across older age cohorts; 12.3 per cent of respondents aged 36–50, 8.5 per cent of respondents aged 51–65, and 5.3 per cent of respondents above 65 years old shared this view. In addition, we note that proportions of respondents that perceived levels of religious prejudice at the time of response to be about the same as five years ago, has also increased across all age cohorts.

However, the rate of increase is significantly higher for older cohorts: 44.2 per cent in 2013 vs. 65.5 per cent in 2024 for respondents over 65 — or a 21.3 per cent increase — indicated religious prejudice to have remained the same. This is juxtaposed against younger cohorts (e.g., 49.4 per cent in 2013 to 55.8 per cent in 2024 for respondents 21–35 years old — or a 6.4 per cent increase —

indicating likewise) (see Figure 2.2.3). Possible explanations advanced in section 2.1.3 apply here.

Figure 2.2.3: Perception of religious prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by age and across waves



2.3 PERCEPTIONS OF AGE-RELATED PREJUDICE

2.3.1 Over half of respondents in 2024 felt that levels of age-related prejudice are about the same today as it was five years ago; less than three in 10 perceived less or much less age-related prejudice today

Compared to five years ago, the proportion of respondents who felt that age-related prejudice remained about the same increased to over half (54.6 per cent), which represented a 5.5 per cent increase from 2018, and an 8.1 per cent increase from 2013. Consequently, the proportion of respondents who perceived less or much less age-related prejudice also decreased from 35.5 per cent in 2013 to 29.6 per cent in 2018, and 27.8 per cent in 2024 (see Figure 2.3.1).

Figure 2.3.1: Perception of age-related prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by wave



2.3.2 Over one in five respondents in the 51–65 age cohort in 2024 perceived more or much more age-related prejudice today, as compared to less than one in five respondents 50 years or younger, and over 65 years old. Nonetheless, over half of every age cohort perceived that levels of age-related prejudice have remained the same

When analysing the data by age groups, we noted that over two in 10 respondents aged 51–65 (21.1 per cent) perceived more, or much more age-related prejudice today as compared to five years ago. On the other hand, less than one in five respondents aged 18–35 (17.3 per cent), respondents aged 36–50 (17.5 per cent) and respondents above 65 years of age (14.3 per cent) expressed such views. These trends differ somewhat from the 2018 instalment of the survey, where a more linear trend was observed: the oldest age cohort was also the most likely to indicate more or much more age-related prejudice (23.9 per cent) compared to their younger peers. However, half or more of respondents across all age cohorts in 2024 felt that age-related prejudice has remained the same at the time of response relative to five years ago; this proportion has increased since 2018 and 2013 (see Figure 2.3.2).

This observation could be attributed to a few factors, such as workplace discrimination and career limitations. Individuals in the 51–65 age group may face challenges in the workplace, such as limited opportunities for promotions, training and job security. They may feel overlooked for career advancements or suspect that age plays a role in hiring decisions, reinforcing perceptions of

age bias. In the same vein, the augmentation of policy and programmatic measures aimed at the oldest age cohort in recent years may have contributed to the mitigation of negative sentiments in relation to age-related prejudice.

Figure 2.3.2: Perception of age-related prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by age and across waves



2.3.3 Close to three in 10 private property dwellers perceived more or much more age-related prejudice today relative to five years ago, as compared to less than two in 10 public housing residents

Using housing type as a proxy for affluence, we observed that private property dwellers were significantly less likely to perceive similar levels of age-related prejudice today compared to five years ago, relative to their peers residing in public housing. Less than half of private property dwellers indicated as such (44.8 per cent) as compared to over half of public housing residents. Private property dwellers were correspondingly more likely to state that there is more, or much age-related prejudice today compared to five years ago. Close to three in 10 private property dwellers (28.8 per cent) indicated as such, as compared to less than two in 10 respondents residing in HDB 1–3 room flats (16.0 per cent), HDB 4-room flats (16.1 per cent) and HDB 5+ room flats (18.5 per cent) (see Figure 2.3.3). These trends were notable across all three survey waves from 2013 to 2024; for concision, earlier waves are not reflected.

This could be because more affluent people, especially those in higher-status careers, may stay active in professional roles longer, and may start to notice subtle shifts in how they are treated or valued, particularly in fields that prize youth, innovation or adaptability. This may contrast with their previous professional experiences, making them more sensitive to potential age biases.

Figure 2.3.3: Perception of age-related prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, 2024 responses by housing type



2.4 PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER PREJUDICE

2.4.1 Over half of respondents in 2024 perceived levels of gender prejudice today to be about the same compared to five years ago; this proportion has risen from less than half of respondents that indicated likewise in 2013

When perusing survey responses on perceived levels of gender prejudice, we note that proportions of respondents who felt that these had remained about the same as it was five years ago, have increased from 48.5 per cent in 2013 to 52.1 per cent in 2018, and 55.6 per cent in 2024. In the same vein,

proportions of respondents who perceived less or much less gender prejudice have fallen from 43.7 per cent in 2013, to 39.2 per cent in 2018, to 35.7 per cent in 2024 (see Figure 2.4.1).

Figure 2.4.1: Perception of gender prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by wave



2.4.2 There were no significant differences in perceptions of gender prejudice between male and female respondents

Interestingly, we did not find any notable differences in the perceptions of gender prejudice between male and female respondents. The proportions of both genders perceiving about the same level of gender prejudice today relative to five years ago were similar — 54.6 per cent for males and 54.2 per cent for females. This was also the case for the 2018 and 2013 survey responses (not reflected for concision). Furthermore, the proportions of male and female respondents who perceived more or much more gender prejudice today were also similar, with 10.1 per cent of males and 10.7 per cent of females expressing this view (see Figure 2.4.2).

This might be attributable to the increased awareness and education around gender issues in recent years, which may have resulted in both males and females recognising and acknowledging gender prejudice, in turn engendering more aligned perceptions.

Figure 2.4.2: Perception of gender prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, 2024 responses by gender



2.4.3 Nearly one in five younger respondents aged 18–35 years in 2024 perceived more gender prejudice, as compared to less than one in 10 respondents over 35 years old. These proportions have risen among younger age cohorts from 2013 to 2024, but have dropped for older age cohorts

In our analysis by age groups, we found that younger respondents in 2024 were more likely to perceive a greater degree of gender prejudice today. In line with findings presented in sections 2.1.3 and 2.2.3, 17.8 per cent of respondents aged 18–35 said that there is more or much more gender prejudice today in

Singapore compared to five years ago, as compared to just 9.6 per cent of those aged 36–50, 6.7 per cent of those aged 51–65, and 3.7 per cent of those above 65 years old (see Figure 2.4.3).

Further comparisons of the 2024 responses to the responses on gender-related prejudice in 2018 and 2013 reveal further trends. Across older age cohorts (51–65 and over 65 years old), the proportions of respondents who perceived gender-related prejudice to have remained the same, increased significantly from 2013 to 2024 (e.g., from 44.2 per cent of respondents over 65 years old in 2013, to 63.4 per cent in 2024). However, the corresponding proportion of respondents in the two younger cohorts that indicated likewise remained largely similar from 2013 to 2024 (approximately half).

In the same vein, while proportions of respondents that perceived more or much more gender-related prejudice shrank in the two older age cohorts compared to five years ago, the corresponding proportions in the two younger cohorts actually rose (e.g., from 8.8 per cent of 21–35 year-old respondents that indicated as such in 2013, to 17.8 per cent in 2024).

Younger generations often have more exposure to discussions around gender issues through education, social media and other online resources. This exposure can lead to heightened perceptions and sensitivities vis-à-vis instances of gender prejudice.

Figure 2.4.3: Perception of gender-related prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by age and across waves



2.5 PERCEPTIONS OF PREJUDICE BASED ON NATIONALITY

2.5.1 About six in 10 respondents in 2024 perceived levels of nationality-based prejudice to be similar today as it was five years ago; this proportion has increased considerably from just four in 10 in 2013

The proportion of respondents who felt that prejudice based on one's nationality has remained about the same compared to five years ago has risen considerably — from 40.2 per cent in 2013, to 48.8 per cent in 2018, to 59.1 per cent in 2024. Correspondingly, the proportion of respondents who felt that there was more or much more prejudice based on one's nationality has decreased over the years. Three in 10 respondents indicated as such in 2013 (30.8 per cent), as compared to over two in 10 in 2018 (23.1 per cent), and over one in 10 respondents in 2024 (13.9 per cent) (see Figure 2.5.1).

Figure 2.5.1: Perception of nationality-based prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by wave



2.5.2 One-third of Permanent Resident (PR) respondents perceived less or much less nationality-based prejudice today, as compared to over one-quarter of their Singapore Citizen (SC) counterparts

There were higher proportions of PRs than SCs who thought that there was less or much less nationality-based prejudice today relative to five years ago. One-third of PR respondents (33.0 per cent) expressed such sentiments, as compared to over one-quarter of SCs (26.5 per cent) (see Figure 2.5.2). This trend is also noted in the 2018 and 2013 waves of the survey (not reflected for concision).

This could be because many PRs in Singapore would have lived in other countries, and might find instances of nationality-based prejudice in Singapore relatively less common. This context could shape their perception, making them more likely to view Singapore as relatively inclusive.

Figure 2.5.2: Perception of nationality-based prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, 2024 responses by nationality



2.5.3 About one in five respondents aged 18–35 perceived more or much more nationality-based prejudice today, as compared to over one in 10 respondents aged 36–65, and less than one in 10 of those aged over 65; this underscores a persistent generational divide in perceptions that has held across all three survey waves

Similar to previous findings delineated in sections 2.1.3, 2.2.3 and 2.4.3, our age-group analysis revealed that younger respondents were more likely to perceive more or much more nationality-based prejudice today, compared to five years ago. About one in five respondents aged 18–35 in 2024 (19.2 per cent) indicated as such, as compared to slightly more than one in 10 respondents aged 36–50 (16.1 per cent), aged 51–65 (13.1 per cent), and less than one in 10 those above 65 years old (8.3 per cent). This trend additionally holds across all three waves of the survey (see Figure 2.5.3). Reasons set forth in section 2.4.3 may apply here.

Meanwhile, proportions of respondents who perceived less or much less nationality-based prejudice held relatively constant for the two younger age cohorts across the three waves (approximately a quarter). However, the corresponding proportions for the older age cohorts decreased from 2013 to 2024.

Figure 2.5.3: Perception of nationality-related prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by age and across waves



2.6 PERCEPTIONS OF PREJUDICE BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION

2.6.1 Just over one in 10 respondents in 2024 perceived more or much more prejudice based on sexual orientation today as compared to five years ago; more than half felt levels of such prejudice remained about the same

In 2024, we observed slightly lower proportions of respondents who perceived more or much more prejudice related to one's sexual orientation as compared to five years ago. This proportion decreased from 15.9 per cent in 2018 to 12.1 per cent in 2024. Correspondingly, there was an increase in proportion of respondents who thought prejudice based on one's sexual orientation remained about the same, from 48.4 per cent to 53.1 per cent (see Figure 2.6.1).

Figure 2.6.1: Perception of prejudice based on sexual orientation today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by wave*



**Item not asked in 2013.*

2.6.2 One in five respondents aged 18–35 perceived prejudice based on sexual orientation to be more prevalent today than it was five years ago, as compared to approximately one in 10 respondents who were over 35 years old

One in five respondents aged 18–35 (20.5 per cent) perceived more or much more prejudice based on one's sexual orientation today in Singapore compared to five years ago. In comparison, just over one in 10 respondents aged 36–50 (12.4 per cent), and less than one in 10 respondents aged 51–65 (9.3 per cent) and above 65 years old (6.7 per cent) expressed such sentiments (see Figure 2.6.2). This trend holds in the 2018 wave of the survey too, where younger respondents were more likely to perceive elevated levels of sexuality-related prejudice compared to their older peers. However, across all age cohorts, the proportions of respondents that indicated elevated levels of sexuality-related prejudice in 2024 have dipped, compared to 2018. This trend may at least partly be due to the repeal of Section 377A, which criminalised gay sex, in 2022.

Figure 2.6.2: Perception of sexuality-related prejudice today in Singapore compared to five years ago, responses by age and across waves



3. ATTITUDES, IDENTITY AND LIVED EXPERIENCES PERTAINING TO RACE

The results reported in the preceding chapter make clear that perceptions related to racial prejudice in Singapore have improved over the past decade. Indeed, the relatively low proportions of minorities reporting increased racial prejudice reinforce the efficacy of Singapore's multicultural model in managing societal cohesion and reducing tensions across racial lines (refer to Mathew et al., 2025a; 2025b; 2025c for associated findings). At the heart of this success is a carefully balanced system where Singaporeans across all ethnic groups are encouraged to adapt to a shared national framework, yet are simultaneously supported in maintaining their distinct racial and religious identities.

Across the globe, the literature on multicultural policies and practices have been shown to play a significant role in reducing prejudice and fostering social cohesion. When societies adopt multiculturalism (i.e., actively recognising and supporting the coexistence of diverse cultural identities), there is a consistent association with lower levels of prejudice, discrimination, and stereotyping, as well as greater support for diversity policies. This contrasts with identity-blind approaches such as assimilation or colour-blindness, which often fail to produce the same positive outcomes. Empirical and meta-analytic evidence indicates that multiculturalism, or its tenets, is particularly effective because it validates minority identities, encourages positive intergroup contact, and

promotes openness to diversity, all of which contribute to more harmonious intergroup relations (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Berry, 1997; Leslie et al., 2020; Sparkman et al., 2016).

Furthermore, the success of multiculturalism in reducing prejudice is context-dependent, with countries that have robust pro-diversity policies experiencing the most pronounced benefits (Guimond et al., 2013). This is also in line with Social Identity Theory, which posits that recognising and valuing multiple identities reduces perceived threats among majority groups, mitigating defensive attitudes and intergroup bias (Brewer, 1997; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Multicultural education and inclusive public policies are also highlighted as essential strategies for promoting cross-cultural understanding and reducing intolerance, underscoring the importance of collaboration between governments, educational institutions, and civil society (Sariyatun & Marpelina, 2024).

Given the international literature, this chapter presents survey findings exploring how Singaporeans across different ethnic groups endorse adaptation and blending into broader society (section 3.1), while simultaneously upholding the importance of maintaining distinct racial and religious customs and traditions (section 3.2), as opposed to adopting a singular dominant Singaporean culture (section 3.3). This balanced approach does not erode cultural identities; indeed, Singaporeans continue to exhibit high levels of knowledge about, belonging to, and active participation in cultural practices associated with their racial groups (sections 3.4 and 3.5). Moreover, the

necessity of interracial and interreligious understanding is broadly perceived as manageable rather than troublesome (section 3.6). Nevertheless, despite these generally positive sentiments, the lived experiences of discrimination, particularly among minority groups, highlight ongoing challenges in fully realising multicultural ideals (section 3.7).

3.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS ADAPTATION

3.1.1 Compared to five years ago, the proportion of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that different racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore remained more or less the same, with eight in 10 indicating as such

In 2024, around eight in 10 respondents (81.6 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that different racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore. This proportion is approximately the same as that in 2018, where 82.5 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed (see Figure 3.1.1).

Figure 3.1.1: Different racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore, responses by wave*



**Items asked in 2013 wave had differing Likert-scale options proffered to respondents, and are hence not directly comparable to 2018 and 2024 waves but included for completeness*

3.1.2 Malay and Indian respondents were more likely to say that different racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore; close to nine in 10 indicated as such, compared to eight in 10 Chinese respondents

Close to nine in 10 Malay (86.7 per cent) and Indian respondents (87.8 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that various racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore's society. In contrast, 80.0 per cent of Chinese respondents and 77.9 per cent of Others respondents expressed such sentiments (see Figure 3.1.2).

Figure 3.1.2: Different racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore, 2024 responses by race



3.1.3 Compared to other religions, Hindu and Muslim respondents were more likely to say that different racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore, with close to nine in 10 indicating as such

In general, the majority of respondents from all religious groups, as well as the non-religious, felt that different racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore. Nonetheless, we observed that Hindu and Muslim respondents were more likely than other religious groups to express such sentiments, with close to nine in 10 Hindu (89.1 per cent) and Muslim respondents (86.7 per cent) agreeing or strongly agreeing (see Figure 3.1.3).

Figure 3.1.3: Different racial and religious groups should adapt and blend into Singapore, 2024 responses by religion



3.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS MAINTAINING RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS

3.2.1 Compared to five years ago, the proportion of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that different racial and religious groups should be allowed to maintain their own customs and traditions remained more or less the same; over eight in 10 respondents indicated as such

In 2024, over eight in 10 respondents (84.6 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that racial and religious groups should be allowed to maintain their own customs and traditions. This proportion is approximately the same as that in 2018, where 83.6 per cent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed (see Figure 3.2.1).

Figure 3.2.1: Different racial and religious groups should be allowed to maintain their customs and traditions, responses by wave*



**Items asked in 2013 wave had differing Likert-scale options proffered to respondents, and hence not directly comparable to 2018 and 2024 waves, but included for completeness*

3.2.2 Compared to other races, Malay and Indian respondents were more likely to say that different racial and religious groups should be permitted to maintain their customs and traditions; nearly nine in 10 indicated as such

Close to nine in 10 Malay respondents (88.8 per cent) and Indian respondents (89.3 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that different racial and religious groups should be allowed to maintain their customs and traditions. These proportions were slightly higher than that of Chinese respondents (82.9 per cent)

and Others respondents (83.8 per cent) that indicated likewise (see Figure 3.2.2).

Figure 3.2.2: Different racial and religious groups should be allowed to maintain their customs and traditions, 2024 responses by race



3.2.3 Compared to other religions, Taoist, Hindu and Muslim respondents were more likely to say that different racial and religious groups should be allowed to maintain their customs and traditions; nine in 10 indicated as such

About nine in 10 Taoist respondents (89.3 per cent), Hindu respondents (90.8 per cent) and Muslim respondents (89.4 per cent) agreed or strongly agreed that different racial and religious groups should be allowed to maintain their customs and traditions, compared to over eight in 10 Buddhist respondents (81.0 per cent), Catholic respondents (82.9 per cent) and Christian respondents

(85.0 per cent). About eight in 10 non-religious respondents also agreed or strongly agreed with this view (80.3 per cent) (see Figure 3.2.3).

Figure 3.2.3: Different racial and religious groups should be allowed to maintain their customs and traditions, 2024 responses by religion



3.3 EMBRACING SINGAPOREAN CULTURE VS. DIFFERENT RACIAL CULTURES

3.3.1 Two-thirds of respondents disagreed to varying extents that it would be better for Singapore if everyone embraced a single dominant Singaporean culture

Two-thirds of respondents (66.3 per cent) disagreed, strongly disagreed or somewhat disagreed that it would be better for Singapore if everyone embraced one dominant Singapore culture. These proportions remained unchanged since the 2018 wave (66.9 per cent) (see Figure 3.3.1).

Figure 3.3.1: It is better for Singapore if everyone embraces one dominant Singaporean culture instead of different racial cultures, responses by wave*



**Items asked in 2013 wave had differing Likert-scale options proffered to respondents, and hence not directly comparable to 2018 and 2024 waves, but included for completeness*

3.3.2 Minority races were more likely to indicate emphatic disagreement with the benefits of everyone embracing one dominant Singaporean culture instead of different racial cultures

When studying responses to whether it was better for Singapore if everyone embraced a dominant national culture instead of different racial cultures, we note higher levels of emphatic disagreement with this question item among minority races. While over one in eight Chinese (16.5 per cent) strongly disagreed, a quarter or more of Malays (25.5 per cent) and Indians (28.1 per

cent) indicated likewise. In the same vein, while less than half of Chinese selected the “strongly disagree” or “disagree’’ options (45.5 per cent), half of Malays (49.9 per cent) and over half of Indians (54.5 per cent) indicated likewise.

However, when considering aggregated levels of agreement or disagreement with the benefits of everyone embracing one dominant Singaporean culture, there were no major differences across racial groups. Approximately two-thirds of Chinese (66.2 per cent), Malays (65.5 per cent), Indians (67.7 per cent) and seven in 10 Others respondents (70.6 per cent) disagreed with this statement to varying extents (see Figure 3.3.2).

Figure 3.3.2: It is better for Singapore if everyone embraces one dominant Singaporean culture instead of different racial cultures, 2024 responses by race



3.3.3 Younger respondents were more likely to strongly disagree or disagree that Singapore would benefit more if all embraced one dominant Singaporean culture instead of distinct racial cultures, as compared to their older peers

Over half of respondents aged 18–35 (53.1 per cent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that it is better for Singapore if everyone embraces one dominant Singaporean culture instead of different racial cultures. This proportion decreases slightly among respondents aged 36–50 (46.8 per cent) and 51–65 (47.6 per cent). Among those aged 65 and above, over four in 10 (43.8 per cent) disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, indicating a trend of decreasing disagreement with increasing age (see Figure 3.3.3).

Older respondents may view a single dominant culture as a practical approach to overcoming social divisions, based on their experiences with racial tensions or social integration during Singapore's earlier years, while younger respondents may see such a concept as outdated, valuing cultural diversity as a strength rather than a challenge to be managed.

Figure 3.3.3: It is better for Singapore if everyone embraces one dominant Singaporean culture instead of different racial cultures, 2024 responses by age



3.3.4 Higher-educated respondents were more likely to strongly disagree or disagree that Singapore would benefit more if all embraced one dominant Singaporean culture instead of distinct racial cultures

Similar to findings across age cohorts, over half of respondents with a degree and above (54.3 per cent) disagreed or strongly disagreed that it was better for Singapore if everyone embraced one dominant Singaporean culture instead of different racial cultures. This proportion is slightly lower among respondents with an ITE, polytechnic or professional qualification (51.0 per cent), and significantly lower among those with secondary or lower education (40.4 per cent). Individuals with higher education levels may be more exposed to discussions on multiculturalism, diversity and inclusion, leading them to value the coexistence of multiple cultural identities over a single dominant culture (see Figure 3.3.4).

Figure 3.3.4: It is better for Singapore if everyone embraces one dominant Singaporean culture instead of different racial cultures, 2024 responses by education



3.4 KNOWLEDGE OF AND SENSE OF BELONGING TO RACIAL GROUP

3.4.1 From the 2024 survey findings, over seven in 10 respondents have tried to find out more about their own ethnic group, while over eight in 10 have a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic group

Survey respondents were also asked to indicate if they had tried to find out more about their own ethnic group. The proportion of respondents who had done so has increased slightly from 68.7 per cent in 2018 to over seven in 10 (73.9 per cent) respondents in 2024 (see Figure 3.4.1a).

Figure 3.4.1a: I have tried to find out more about my own ethnic group, such as its history, traditions and customs, responses by wave



**Items asked in 2013 wave had differing Likert-scale options proffered to respondents, and hence not directly comparable to 2018 and 2024 waves, but included for completeness*

Survey respondents were also asked to indicate if they had a strong sense of belonging to their own racial group. The proportion of respondents who indicated that they at least somewhat agree with the aforementioned statement that was put to them, increased from 78.5 per cent in 2018 to 81.9 per cent in 2024 (see Figure 3.4.1b).

Figure 3.4.1b: I have a strong sense of belonging to my own racial group, responses by wave



**Items asked in 2013 wave had differing Likert-scale options proffered to respondents, and hence not directly comparable to 2018 and 2024 waves, but included for completeness*

3.4.2 Minorities were more likely to have tried to find out more about their own ethnic group; Malays in particular have a strong sense of racial belonging

When it comes to race, Chinese respondents were less likely to somewhat agree, agree, and strongly agree with the statement asking them if they have tried to find out more about their own ethnic group (70 per cent) compared to 89.4 per cent of Malays, 82.4 per cent of Indians, and 78 per cent of Others (see Figure 3.4.2a).

Figure 3.4.2a: I have tried to find out more about my own ethnic group, such as its history, traditions and customs, 2024 responses by race



Meanwhile, a bigger proportion of Malay respondents indicated that they strongly agreed or agreed with the statement asking them if they had a strong sense of belonging to their own racial group (70.6 per cent per cent) compared

to 46.6 per cent for Chinese, 59.8 per cent for Indians, and 45.6 per cent for others (see Figure 3.4.2b).

Figure 3.4.2b: I have a strong sense of belonging to my own racial group, 2024 responses by race



3.4.3 Older respondents were generally less likely to have tried to find out more about their own ethnic group, but more likely to have a stronger sense of belonging

When it comes to age, older respondents are generally less likely to have tried finding out more about their own ethnic group, with 72 per cent of those older than 65 years old indicating that they somewhat agree, agree, and strongly agree with the statement that was asked compared to 74.3 per cent for those aged between 51 and 65 years old, 78.8 per cent for those aged between 36 and 50 years old, and 79.6 per cent for those aged between 18 and 35 years old (see Figure 3.4.3a).

Figure 3.4.3a: I have tried to find out more about my own ethnic group, such as its history, traditions and customs, 2024 responses by age



Interestingly however, older respondents are generally more likely to have a strong sense of belonging to their racial group, with 63.1 per cent of those older than 65 years old indicating that they strongly agree or agree with the statement that was put to them, compared to 58.8 per cent for those aged between 51 and 65 years old, 51.5 per cent for those aged between 36 and 50 years old, and 48.2 per cent for those aged between 18 and 35 years old (see Figure 3.4.3b).

Figure 3.4.3b: I have a strong sense of belonging to my own racial group, 2024 responses by age



3.4.4 Respondents with degrees and above, who are living in private property, and who are earning more were generally more likely to have a weaker sense of belonging to their own racial group

In terms of education level, a smaller proportion of respondents with degrees and above indicated that they strongly agreed or agreed with the statement asking them if they had a strong sense of belonging to their own racial group (73.8 per cent) compared to around 84 per cent of those with ITE, polytechnic, and professional qualifications and below (see Figure 3.4.4a).

Figure 3.4.4a: I have a strong sense of belonging to my own racial group, 2024 responses by education level



In terms of housing type, a smaller proportion of respondents living in private property indicated that they strongly agreed or agreed with the statement asking them if they had a strong sense of belonging to their own racial group (47.6 per cent) compared to 52.4 per cent of those living in HDB 5-room and bigger flats, 53.6 per cent of those living in HDB 4-room flats, and 58.6 per cent of those living in HDB 1- to 3-room flats (see Figure 3.4.4b).

Figure 3.4.4b: I have a strong sense of belonging to my own racial group, 2024 responses by housing type



In terms of income, those who earned $7,000 and more represented the smallest proportion of respondents indicating that they strongly agreed or agreed with the statement asking them if they had a strong sense of belonging to their own racial group (46.5 per cent) compared to 49.1 per cent for those earning between $4,000 and $6,999, 55.9 per cent for those earning between $2,000 and $3,999, and 56.3 per cent for those earning less than $2,000 (see Figure 3.4.4c).

Figure 3.4.4c: I have a strong sense of belonging to my own racial group, 2024 responses by income



3.5 PARTICIPATION IN CULTURAL PRACTICES ASSOCIATED WITH RACIAL GROUP

3.5.1 Slightly under seven in 10 respondents in 2024 indicated that they had participated in cultural practices of their own racial group; this proportion is bigger than in 2018

Survey respondents were also asked to indicate if they had participated in cultural practices of their own racial group. The proportion of respondents who indicated that they at least somewhat agreed with the statement has increased slightly from 63.1 per cent in 2018 to 68.1 per cent in 2024 (see Figure 3.5.1).

Figure 3.5.1: I participate in cultural practices of my own racial group, such as dietary customs, music, and other customs, responses by wave



**Items asked in 2013 wave had differing Likert-scale options proffered to respondents, and hence not directly comparable to 2018 and 2024 waves, but included for completeness*

3.5.2 Malays and Indians were more likely to participate in cultural practices of their own racial group

When it comes to race, a bigger proportion of Malay and Indian respondents indicated that they agreed with the statement asking them if they participate in

cultural practices of their own racial group (84.7 per cent for Malays and 76.5 per cent for Indians) compared to 64.1 per cent for Chinese and 66.1 per cent for others (see Figure 3.5.2).

Figure 3.5.2: I participate in cultural practices of my own racial group, such as dietary customs, music, and other customs, 2024 responses by race



3.5.3 Older respondents were more likely to have participated in cultural practices of their own racial group

In terms of age, older respondents were more likely to have participated in cultural practices of their own racial group, with 47.6 per cent of those older than 65 years old indicating that they strongly agree or agree with the statement that was put to them, compared to 44.1 per cent for those aged between 51 and 65 years old, 38.9 per cent for those aged between 36 and 50 years old, and 38.8 per cent for those aged between 18 and 35 years old (see Figure 3.5.3).

Figure 3.5.3: I participate in cultural practices of my own racial group, such as dietary customs, music, and other customs, 2024 responses by age



3.5.4 Respondents with degrees and above, who are living in HDB 5 room and bigger flats, and who are earning between $4,000 and $6,999 generally more likely to have participated less in cultural practices of their own racial group

In terms of education level, a smaller proportion of respondents with degrees and above indicated that they strongly agreed or agreed with the statement asking them if they participate in cultural practices of their own racial group (33.1 per cent) compared to 42.1 per cent of those with ITE, polytechnic, and professional qualifications and compared to 49 per cent of those with secondary and below qualifications (see Figure 3.5.4a).

Figure 3.5.4a: I participate in cultural practices of my own racial group, such as dietary customs, music, and other customs, 2024 responses by education level



In terms of housing type, a smaller proportion of respondents living in private property indicated that they strongly agreed or agreed with the statement asking them if they participate in cultural practices of their own racial group (34.3 per cent) compared to 37.1 per cent of those living in HDB 5-room or bigger flats, 41.7 per cent of those living in HDB 4-room flats, and 47.3 per cent of those living in HDB 1- to 3-room flats (see Figure 3.5.4b).

Figure 3.5.4b: I participate in cultural practices of my own racial group, such as dietary customs, music, and other customs, 2024 responses by housing type



In terms of income, those who are earning $7,000 or more represented the smallest proportion of respondents indicating that they strongly agreed or agreed with the statement asking them I they participate in cultural practices of their own racial group (33.8 per cent) compared to 35.3 per cent of those earning between $4,000 and $6,999, 41.7 per cent of those earning between $2,000 and $3,999, and 47.1 per cent of those earning less than $2,000 (see Figure 3.5.4c).

Figure 3.5.4c: I participate in cultural practices of my own racial group, such as dietary customs, music, and other customs, 2024 responses by income



3.6 UNDERSTANDING OTHER RACES AND RELIGIONS AS "TROUBLESOME"

3.6.1 Seven in 10 respondents disagreed to varying extents that it was troublesome to understand people from another racial group across both 2024 and 2018 waves

Seven in 10 respondents (70.9 per cent) in 2024 disagreed, strongly disagreed or somewhat disagreed that it was troublesome to understand people from another racial group. These proportions are identical to the 2018 wave, where 70.9 per cent of respondents also expressed similar sentiments (see Figure 3.6.1).

Figure 3.6.1: It is troublesome to understand people from another racial group, responses by wave*



**Item not asked in 2013.*

3.6.2 Majority across all racial groups disagreed that it was troublesome to understand individuals of other races; with over seven in 10 Chinese respondents who indicated as such, the highest level of disagreement

More than seven in 10 Chinese respondents (72.2 per cent) disagreed, strongly disagreed or somewhat disagreed that it was troublesome to understand people from another racial group. Among Malay (64.5 per cent), Indian (67.3 per cent) and Others (66.1 per cent) respondents, similar sentiments were expressed, though at slightly lower levels (see Figure 3.6.2).

Figure 3.6.2: It is troublesome to understand people from another racial group, 2024 responses by race



3.6.3 More than seven in 10 respondents expressed varying levels of disagreement that understanding people from another religious group was troublesome, across both 2024 and 2018 waves

More than seven in 10 respondents in 2018 (71.5 per cent) and 2024 waves (73.8 per cent) disagreed that understanding people from another religious group was troublesome. This proportion has held relatively constant across

both waves, suggesting a strong baseline ease expressed by most in terms of inter-religious understanding (see Figure 3.6.3).

Figure 3.6.3: It is troublesome to understand people from another religious group, responses by wave*



**Item not asked in 2013.*

3.6.4 There is broad consensus across religious groups in terms of rejecting the notion that understanding people from other religions was troublesome, with no significant differences in responses across religious groups

Across all religious groups, more than seven in 10 respondents disagreed to some extent, with Hindu respondents showing the highest level of disagreement (77.0 per cent), followed closely by those with no religion (74.9 per cent) and Christians (74.6 per cent). This indicates broad consensus across religions in rejecting the notion that understanding people from another religious group was troublesome (see Figure 3.6.4).

Figure 3.6.4: It is troublesome to understand people from another religious group, 2024 responses by religion



3.6.5 Higher-educated respondents were less likely to agree that it was troublesome to understand people of other religions; over one in five degree holders indicated as such, as compared to more than three in 10 respondents with secondary or lower levels of education

While agreement levels remain relatively low across all education groups, degree holders are the least likely to agree that understanding people from another religious group was troublesome. Over one in five respondents (21.4 per cent) voiced varying degrees of agreement that it is challenging to comprehend individuals from a different religious group. In comparison, more than three in 10 respondents with secondary or lower education (31.8 per cent)

and slightly more than two in 10 respondents with ITE, polytechnic or professional qualifications (25.8 per cent) expressed such sentiments. This may suggest that higher education may be related to greater ease or acceptance in inter-religious interactions (see Figure 3.6.5).

Figure 3.6.5: It is troublesome to understand people from another religious group, 2024 responses by education level



3.6.6 Less affluent respondents were more likely to agree that it was troublesome to understand people of other religions; over one-third of respondents in the bottom income bracket indicated as such, compared to over one in five respondents in the top two income brackets

Across all income groups, more than half of respondents disagreed to some extent with the notion that it was troublesome to understand people from other religious groups. This indicates a broad consensus that understanding people from other religious groups is not troublesome, though the intensity of

disagreement varies slightly by income. Respondents who earn less than $2,000 a month were most likely to agree that it was troublesome to understand people from another religious group (35.4 per cent), while respondents who earn more than $7,000 a month (22.5 per cent) and respondents who earn $4,000 to $6,999 a month (22.2 per cent) were less likely to agree that it was troublesome to understand people from another religious group (see Figure 3.6.6).

Figure 3.6.6: It is troublesome to understand people from another religious group, 2024 responses by income



3.7 LIVED EXPERIENCES VIS-À-VIS RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

3.7.1 In general, over eight in 10 respondents have never or rarely experienced discrimination pertaining to race and religion

In the 2024 run of the survey, we asked respondents how often they experienced various forms of racial and/or religious discrimination. Majority of respondents never or rarely experienced being made fun of because of their race and/or religion (88.0 per cent); received remarks that people of their race and/or religion typically have negative qualities (83.7 per cent); received comments that their positive behaviour is an exception which other members of their race and/or religion do not exhibit (82.9 per cent); heard jokes about their race and/or religion (78.9 per cent); and experienced being left out of conversations because of their race and/or religion (86.3 per cent) (see Figure 3.7.1).

Figure 3.7.1: How often do you experience the following, 2024 responses*



**Item not asked in 2018 and 2013.*

3.7.2 Minority-race respondents were more likely to experience various forms of discrimination pertaining to race and religion, with approximately one-third of Malay and Indian respondents indicating they had experienced such incidents sometimes, often or very often

While the majority of respondents across the different racial groups never or rarely experienced various discrimination incidents pertaining to their race or religion, we found that Malay and Indian respondents were less likely to say so (see Figures 3.7.2a to Figure 3.7.2e). For instance, while over nine in 10 Chinese respondents (91.6 per cent) reported never or rarely being made fun of because of their race and/or religion, over three-quarters of Malay respondents (76.9 per cent) and seven in 10 Indian respondents (69.9 per cent) felt the same way (see Figure 3.7.2a). In the same vein, across the five items polled:

- 23.1 per cent of Malays and 30.2 per cent of Indians indicated being made fun of because of their race and/or religion sometimes, often or very often, or always (see Figure 3.7.2a);
- 32.8 per cent of Malays and 34.4 per cent of Indians indicated receiving remarks that people of their race and/or religion typically have negative qualities sometimes, often or very often, or always (see Figure 3.7.2b);
- 34.7 per cent of Malays and 35.7 per cent of Indians indicated receiving comments sometimes, often or very often, or always, that their positive behaviour were exceptions that other members of their race and/or religion do not exhibit (see Figure 3.7.2c);

- 37.2 per cent of Malays and 39.3 per cent of Indians indicated hearing jokes about their race and/or religion sometimes, often or very often, or always (see Figure 3.7.2d);
- 27.1 per cent of Malays and 31.7 per cent of Indians indicated being left out of conversations because of their race and/or religion sometimes, often or very often, or always (see Figure 3.7.2e)

Figure 3.7.2a: Being made fun of because of your race and/or religion, 2024 responses by race



Figure 3.7.2b: Receive remarks that people of your race and/or religion typically have negative qualities (e.g., bigoted, money-minded), 2024 responses by race



Figure 3.7.2c: Receive comments that your positive behaviour is an exception which other members of your race and/or religion do not exhibit, 2024 responses by race



Figure 3.7.2d: Hearing jokes about your race and/or religion, 2024 responses by race



Figure 3.7.2e: Being left out of conversations because of your race and/or religion, 2024 responses by race



3.7.3 Compared to other religions, Muslim and Hindu respondents were more likely to report experiencing various forms of discrimination pertaining to their race or religion sometimes, often or very often; approximately a quarter or more indicated as such

Muslim and Hindu respondents were more likely than other religions to experience various forms of discrimination incidents pertaining to their race or religion (approximately a quarter or more across all five items polled), and less likely to say they never or rarely experienced these incidents. Taoist and Buddhist respondents were least likely to report experiencing these incidents (see Figures 3.7.3a to Figure 3.7.3e).

Figure 3.7.3a: Being made fun of because of your race and/or religion, 2024 responses by religion



Figure 3.7.3b: Receive remarks that people of your race and/or religion typically have negative qualities (e.g., bigoted, money-minded), 2024 responses by religion



Figure 3.7.3c: Receive comments that your positive behaviour is an exception which other members of your race and/or religion do not exhibit, 2024 responses by religion



Figure 3.7.3d: Hearing jokes about your race and/or religion, 2024 responses by religion



Figure 3.7.3e: Being left out of conversations because of your race and/or religion, 2024 responses by religion



3.7.4 Younger respondents were more likely to report encountering discrimination pertaining to their race and/or religion; about three in 10 or more of those 18–35 years old indicated experiencing such incidents sometimes, often or very often, as compared to one in 10 or less for respondents over 65 years old

Compared to older respondents, younger respondents were notably more likely to report that they sometimes, often or very often, or always encountered incidents of discrimination related to their race and/or religion. For instance, while less than one in 10 respondents above 65 (7.5 per cent) said they sometimes, often or very often, or always experienced being left out of conversations because of their race and/or religion, close to three in 10

respondents aged 18–35 (29.4 per cent) expressed such sentiments (see Figures 3.7.4a to Figure 3.7.4e).

This could be because younger generations tend to be more aware of microaggressions and subtle forms of bias as these issues are widely discussed in schools and social platforms; therefore, they may be more attuned to behaviours or comments that are discriminatory but not overt.

Figure 3.7.4a: Being made fun of because of your race and/or religion, 2024 responses by age



Figure 3.7.4b: Receive remarks that people of your race and/or religion typically have negative qualities (e.g., bigoted, money-minded), 2024 responses by age



Figure 3.7.4c: Receive comments that your positive behaviour is an exception which other members of your race and/or religion do not exhibit, 2024 responses by age



Figure 3.7.4d: Hearing jokes about your race and/or religion, 2024 responses by age



Figure 3.7.4e: Being left out of conversations because of your race and/or religion, 2024 responses by age



4. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: SINGAPORE PERSPECTIVES

Critical Race Theory (CRT) has emerged as a foundational framework for understanding the complex interplay of race, power, and systemic inequality, particularly in the US. Originating in legal studies, CRT challenges traditional narratives by centring the lived experiences of marginalised groups and interrogating the social construction of race, the pervasiveness of racism, and the limitations of liberal approaches to racial justice (Garcia et al., 2018; Yosso, 2005). Seminal works have expanded CRT's reach into education, policy, and the marketplace, emphasising the importance of recognising community cultural wealth and the multiple forms of capital possessed by communities of colour (Ford & Airhihenbuwa, 2018; Ladson-Billings, 1998; Ledesma & Calderón, 2015; Yosso, 2005). CRT scholars argue that racism is not aberrational but rather a normalized and deeply embedded aspect of social structures, requiring both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to fully capture its impact (Garcia et al., 2018; Sablan, 2018).

Internationally, CRT has been adapted to various contexts, highlighting the need to consider local histories, power dynamics, and forms of racialisation. In education, CRT has been used to challenge deficit perspectives and advocate for the recognition of the strengths and assets within marginalised communities Sablan, 2018; Yosso, 2005). In the marketplace, CRT provides a lens to examine how race shapes consumer experiences and market dynamics, calling for a paradigm shift toward greater equity (Poole et al., 2020).

In Singapore, the discourse on race is shaped by a state-led ideology of multiracialism, which publicly promotes racial harmony and equality. However, scholars have noted that institutional and everyday racism persist beneath the surface (Velayutham, 2017). Despite policies aimed at managing diversity, experiences of racial discrimination remain a reality for many, particularly among minority groups. While CRT has not been widely adopted or explicitly invoked in local academic or policy discourse, its analytical tools (including the understanding of race as a social construct, the emphasis on lived experience, and the critique of colour-blindness) provide a distinctive lens for interpreting Singapore's racial dynamics. In this regard, this chapter explores Singaporean perspectives regarding CRT and its applicability within the local racial discourse. It examines views on race as a social construct, experiences of racism, perceived motivations behind racial equality, authority in racial dialogues and the existence of Chinese privilege.

The findings from this chapter reveal broad acknowledgment among Singaporeans that race is socially constructed, with racial minorities more likely to emphasise the societal rather than biological basis of race. This critical view aligns with heightened perceptions among minorities that racism remains a common experience, contrasting with relatively lower acknowledgment among Chinese respondents. Younger, more educated individuals and HDB dwellers also tend to perceive racism as more prevalent when compared to their older, less educated and private-property-dwelling counterparts.

There is noticeable scepticism regarding the motivations of Chinese Singaporeans in promoting racial equality; racial minorities and younger cohorts perceive stronger elements of self-interest when compared to Chinese respondents, older generations and private property residents. Younger respondents and racial minorities additionally exhibit greater openness to the idea that racial minorities may be more qualified to speak on racial issues, contrasting sharply with older generations and Chinese respondents who largely reject such exclusivity.

Perceptions of racial advantage reveal significant differences, with racial minorities, younger respondents and higher-educated individuals more likely to acknowledge the relative ease of being Chinese in Singapore. Correspondingly, these groups also demonstrate higher recognition of the existence of Chinese privilege, contrasting with older generations and Chinese respondents who show lower levels of agreement.

Importantly, the chapter highlights substantial discomfort among Singaporeans regarding the use of external frameworks such as CRT and white privilege in local racial discussions. While this discomfort spans racial groups, age cohorts and housing types, it is slightly less pronounced among younger respondents, Indian respondents and those residing in smaller HDB flats.

4.0 OVERALL FINDINGS ON CRITICAL RACE THEORY

In the 2024 wave, we asked respondents to share their views on seven statements relating to CRT and its application in Singapore. This included topics such as the social construction of race, the prevalence of racism for minorities, the concept of Chinese privilege and the relevance of using CRT concepts from overseas in the local context. We noted that nearly three-quarters of respondents expressed discomfort with the use of concepts from abroad, such as CRT or white privilege, in conversations on race in Singapore; over half agreed to varying extents with the ease of being a Chinese Singaporean, the socially constructed nature of race, and racism being a common experience for minorities here.

The majority of respondents agreed to varying extents (73.0 per cent) that they would feel uncomfortable if concepts from abroad (such as CRT and white privilege) were used in discussions pertaining to race in Singapore. In addition, our analysis also found considerable agreement with the following statements:

- The ease of being a Chinese Singaporean in Singapore (59.6 per cent)
- The socially constructed nature of race (57.1 per cent); and
- Racism as a common experience for racial minorities in Singapore (56.2 per cent)

However, the converse is the case vis-à-vis:

- Exclusivity in addressing racism (30.4 per cent agreed to varying extents that only racial minorities were qualified to speak about racism and its effects);
- Perceptions of Chinese privilege (44.7 per cent agreed to varying extents that there was such privilege in Singapore); and
- The belief that Chinese Singaporeans will only encourage racial equality if it promotes their self-interest (45.9 per cent agreed to varying extents) (see Figure 4.0).

Figure 4.0: Agreement / disagreement with statements relating to CRT, 2024 responses*



**Items not asked in 2018 and 2013.*

4.1 RACE AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT

4.1.1 Racial minorities were more likely to view race as a societal construct rather than a biological attribute; six in 10 or more indicated as such

While most Chinese respondents (56.0 per cent) agreed to varying extents that race is a social construct rather than a biological reality, Others respondents exhibited the highest level of agreement, where 70.6 per cent indicated a strong belief in the societal basis of racial categorisation. This is followed by Indian respondents (60.6 per cent) and Malay respondents (59.6 per cent) (see Figure 4.1.1).

Racial minorities may have developed a more critical perspective on the concept of race due to their lived experiences, and hence are more likely to question the rationale behind racial categorisations and how these shape social interactions, opportunities and identities.

Figure 4.1.1: I believe that in Singapore, race is a categorisation determined by society, not something we are born as, 2024 responses by race



4.2 RACISM AS COMMON EXPERIENCE FOR MINORITIES

4.2.1 Racial minorities were generally more likely to perceive racism in Singapore as a common experience for minorities rather than an exception; over six in 10 agreed with this to varying extents

When it came to perceptions of the prevalence of racism for racial minorities, Others respondents showed the highest level of agreement, where more than seven in 10 (76.5 per cent) indicated a strong perception of racism as a prevalent issue for minorities in Singapore. Malay and Indian respondents showed similar levels of agreement, with 65.7 per cent and 62.4 per cent of them expressing such sentiments respectively. Chinese respondents were

least likely to say that racism is a common experience for racial minorities rather than an exception, with 53.2 per cent agreeing to varying extents. These findings highlight differing perspectives on the prevalence of racism across racial groups in Singapore, with minorities generally perceiving it as more common (see Figure 4.2.1).

Figure 4.2.1: In Singapore, racism is a common experience for racial minorities rather than an exception, 2024 responses by race



4.2.2 Younger respondents were more likely to perceive racism as a common experience for racial minorities with over seven in 10 agreeing with this statement; older respondents showed greater scepticism or neutrality, with less than half indicating likewise

More than seven in 10 respondents in the 18–35 age cohort (71.1 per cent) agreed in varying extents that racism was a common experience for racial minorities. Agreement with the statement decreases steadily with age, where

59.3 per cent of those in the 36–50 age group, 49.3 per cent in the 51–65 age group, and 46.6 per cent in the above 65 age group expressed such sentiments. This trend suggests that younger generations may be more attuned to or critical of racial issues, potentially due to greater exposure to global discourses on race, multicultural education or different lived experiences, when compared to older generations (see Figure 4.2.2).

Figure 4.2.2: In Singapore, racism is a common experience for racial minorities rather than an exception, 2024 responses by age



4.2.3 More educated respondents were more likely to say that racism is a common experience for racial minorities; six in 10 degree holders agreed to varying extents with this statement

Agreement that racism is a common experience for racial minorities is higher among degree holders (59.5 per cent) and respondents with ITE, polytechnic or professional qualifications (60.5 per cent), as compared to those with

secondary or lower education (54.7 per cent). This trend suggests that individuals with higher education levels may be more exposed to discussions on racism and prejudice, shaping their perceptions. However, the relatively consistent agreement across education levels still highlights a shared recognition of racism as a prevalent issue in Singapore (see Figure 4.2.3).

Figure 4.2.3: In Singapore, racism is a common experience for racial minorities rather than an exception, 2024 responses by education level



4.2.4 Private property dwellers were least likely to think that racism is a common experience for racial minorities, rather than an exception; less than half agreed with this statement to varying extents as compared to about six in 10 HDB dwellers

Among private property dwellers, 46.2 per cent agreed to some extent that racism is a common experience for racial minorities in Singapore. This agreement level is noticeably lower compared to respondents living in HDB housing, where agreement ranges from 57.0 per cent to 60.9 per cent. This

suggests that private property residents may perceive racism as less prevalent compared to those living in public housing, and can be attributed to the suggestion that private housing is generally less diverse than public housing, which may result in less exposure to racial minorities and their lived experiences (see Figure 4.2.4).

Figure 4.2.4: In Singapore, racism is a common experience for racial minorities rather than an exception, 2024 responses by housing type



4.3 OF SELF-INTEREST AND RACIAL EQUALITY

4.3.1 Racial minorities were more likely to agree that Chinese Singaporeans would only encourage racial equality if it promoted their self-interest; over half expressed agreement as compared to over four in 10 Chinese

While a significant proportion of all groups agreed to some extent that Chinese Singaporeans would only encourage racial equality if it promoted their self-interest, agreement was much higher among Malays, Indians and Others than among Chinese respondents themselves. Others respondents showed the highest level of agreement, with 58.9 per cent agreeing, strongly agreeing or somewhat agreeing. Among Malays and Indians, 57.0 per cent and 51.3 per cent felt the same way. Chinese respondents (43.4 per cent) were significantly less likely to agree with the statement. This reflects a potential divide in how Chinese Singaporeans perceived their motivations versus how these were perceived by minority groups, with racial minorities expressing greater scepticism (see Figure 4.3.1).

Figure 4.3.1: I believe that Chinese Singaporeans will only encourage racial equality if it promotes their self-interest, 2024 responses by race



4.3.2 Younger respondents were more likely to perceive self-interest motivations in Chinese Singaporeans' support for racial equality; six in 10 individuals in the youngest age cohort agreed with this statement, as compared to less than four in 10 of the oldest age cohort

Six in 10 respondents (60.6 per cent) in the 18–35 age cohort agreed to some extent that there were self-interest motivations in Chinese Singaporeans' support for racial equality. Agreement with this statement steadily declines across age groups, from 46.4 per cent of those aged 36–50, to 42.2 per cent of those aged 51–65, to 37.8 per cent of those above 65 years old. This trend underscores a possible generational divide in perceptions of racial equality and its motivations in Singapore (see Figure 4.3.2).

Figure 4.3.2: I believe that Chinese Singaporeans will only encourage racial equality if it promotes their self-interest, 2024 responses by age



4.3.3 As compared to nearly half of HDB dwellers, four in 10 private property dwellers agreed to varying extents that Chinese Singaporeans' support for racial equality was self-serving

Among private property dwellers, four in 10 (39.7 per cent) agreed to some extent that Chinese Singaporeans would only encourage racial equality if it aligned with their self-interest. Agreement with this statement is consistently higher among HDB dwellers compared to private property dwellers, with close of half of HDB dwellers agreeing to some extent (48.7 per cent for 1–3 room dwellers; 49.6 per cent for 4-room dwellers; and 48.4 per cent for 5-room dwellers). This analysis reflects how socio-economic and housing contexts influence perspectives on racial equality and its motivations in Singapore for private property dwellers; being more affluent on average, they may have less exposure to racial inequality or systemic barriers, influencing their lower agreement levels (see Figure 4.3.3).

Figure 4.3.3: I believe that Chinese Singaporeans will only encourage racial equality if it promotes their self-interest, 2024 responses by housing type



4.4 ON WHO IS QUALIFIED TO SPEAK ABOUT RACISM

4.4.1 Chinese respondents were more likely to disagree with the idea that only racial minorities were qualified to speak about racism compared to all other groups; over seven in 10 indicated as such, as compared to over six in 10 minority-race respondents

More than seven in 10 (71.9 per cent) of Chinese respondents disagreed to some extent that only racial minorities were qualified to speak about racism, indicating a strong rejection of this statement. In contrast, 60.4 per cent of Malay respondents, 62.5 per cent of Indian respondents and 63.3 per cent of Others respondents felt the same. This suggests a greater level of rejection of

exclusivity in discussing racism among the Chinese majority, while racial minorities are more open to the notion, reflecting differing perspectives on who holds legitimacy in discussing racial issues (see Figure 4.4.1).

Figure 4.4.1: Only racial minorities are qualified to speak about racism and its effects, 2024 responses by race



4.4.2 Over four in 10 respondents in the 18–35 age cohort agreed to varying extents that only racial minorities were qualified to speak about racism, as compared to three in 10 or less for respondents in older age cohorts

Over four in 10 respondents in the 18–35 age cohort (41.8 per cent) agreed to some extent that only racial minorities were qualified to speak about racism, showing notable openness to the idea. In comparison, older respondents overwhelmingly rejected this notion, with close to seven in 10 respondents aged 36–50 (68.8 per cent), and more than seven in 10 respondents aged 51–65

(73.6 per cent) and above 65 years old (73.0 per cent) indicating as such. This generational divide suggests younger individuals may be more influenced by contemporary discourses on race and representation, while older individuals may prioritise broader inclusivity in conversations about racism (see Figure 4.4.2).

Figure 4.4.2: Only racial minorities are qualified to speak about racism and its effects, 2024 responses by age



4.4.3 Close to eight in 10 private property dwellers disagreed to varying extents that only racial minorities were qualified to speak about racism and its effects, as compared to approximately two-thirds of HDB dwellers

Private property dwellers showed the highest level of disagreement with the idea that only racial minorities were uniquely qualified to discuss racism and its impact, with close to eight in 10 disagreeing to varying extents (78.5 per cent).

In contrast, approximately two-thirds of HDB dwellers (1–3 room: 64.6 per cent; 4-room: 66.1 per cent; 5+ room: 69.3 per cent) felt the same way. This trend may reflect some differences in socio-economic experiences and exposure to diverse perspectives on race between public and private housing residents (see Figure 4.4.3).

Figure 4.4.3: Only racial minorities are qualified to speak about racism and its effects, 2024 responses by housing type



4.5 BELIEF THAT IT IS EASIER TO BE CHINESE IN SINGAPORE

4.5.1 Racial minorities were more likely to agree to varying extents that it was easier to be a Chinese Singaporean in Singapore; more than six in 10 Malays and Indians indicated as such, as compared to less than six in 10 Chinese

While less than six in 10 Chinese respondents (58.8 per cent) acknowledged that it was easier to be a Chinese Singaporean, more than six in 10 Malays (62.8 per cent) and Indians (63.0 per cent) and nearly seven in 10 Others respondents (69.2 per cent) expressed similar sentiments. Moreover, Chinese respondents, while agreeing to a considerable extent, were less likely to strongly agree compared to racial minorities, with only 8.0 per cent strongly agreeing compared to Malays (13.0 per cent) and Indians (16.2 per cent). This trend highlights a greater awareness of perceived advantages among minorities compared to the Chinese majority, who show relatively more ambivalence (see Figure 4.5.1).

Figure 4.5.1: I believe that it is easier to be a Chinese Singaporean in Singapore, 2024 responses by race



4.5.2 Respondents in the 18–35 age cohort were significantly more likely to believe that Chinese Singaporeans had an easier experience in Singapore, with three-quarters indicating as such, as compared to over four in 10 respondents over 65 years old

Younger respondents in the 18–35 age cohort were overwhelmingly more likely to agree that it was easier to be a Chinese Singaporean in Singapore, with three-quarters (75.5 per cent) expressing agreement in varying degrees, compared to over four in 10 (43.8 per cent) of those aged 65 and above. This trend highlights a generational divide, with younger individuals potentially more aware or critical of perceived racial advantages (see Figure 4.5.2).

Figure 4.5.2: I believe that it is easier to be a Chinese Singaporean in Singapore, 2024 responses by age



4.5.3 Degree holders were significantly more likely to agree that being a Chinese Singaporean was easier, with two-thirds indicating as such, compared just half of those with secondary education or lower qualifications

Two-thirds of degree-holding respondents (67.8 per cent) agreed to varying extents that it was easier to be a Chinese Singaporean, as compared to just half of those with secondary education or lower qualifications (51.9 per cent). This trend suggests that higher educational attainment may affect recognition of perceived racial advantages, possibly reflecting differences in exposure to discussions about privilege or societal dynamics (see Figure 4.5.3).

Figure 4.5.3: I believe that it is easier to be a Chinese Singaporean in Singapore, 2024 responses by education level



4.6 VIEWS ON EXISTENCE OF CHINESE PRIVILEGE

4.6.1 Four in 10 Chinese respondents agreed to varying extents with the existence of Chinese privilege in Singapore, as compared to approximately six in 10 Malays and Indians

Although nearly six in 10 Chinese respondents felt that it was easier to be a Chinese Singaporean in Singapore, only four in 10 Chinese respondents (40.2 per cent) agreed to some extent that Chinese privilege exists in Singapore. In comparison, about six in 10 Malay respondents (62.7 per cent) and Indian respondents (57.8 per cent) agreed to some extent, showing higher recognition of Chinese privilege compared to Chinese respondents. Strong agreement was also highest among Malays (14.2 per cent) and Indians (15.7 per cent), compared to only 6.5 per cent of Chinese respondents. This trend suggests that racial minorities were more likely to perceive and acknowledge Chinese privilege, while Chinese respondents are more divided, with a majority expressing disagreement (see Figure 4.6.1).

Figure 4.6.1: I believe that there is Chinese privilege in Singapore, 2024 responses by race



4.6.2 Younger respondents were far more likely to acknowledge the existence of Chinese privilege, with over seven in 10 aged 18–35 expressing varying levels of agreement as compared to just under three in 10 respondents over 65 years old

When analysing the results by age groups, we found that younger respondents overwhelmingly acknowledged Chinese privilege, with more than seven in 10 respondents aged 18–35 (71.2 per cent) expressing agreement. In contrast, about four in 10 respondents aged 36–50 (46.2 per cent) and respondents aged 51–65 (38.5 per cent) felt the same way. Less than three in 10 respondents above 65 (28.9 per cent) expressed such sentiments. This may reflect a generational divide in recognising or accepting the concept of Chinese privilege, possibly due to differences in exposure to contemporary discourses on privilege or differing societal perspectives (see Figure 4.6.2).

Figure 4.6.2: I believe that there is Chinese privilege in Singapore, 2024 responses by age



4.7 VIEWS ON CONCEPTUAL IMPORTATION

4.7.1 Across the different racial groups, majority expressed discomfort with the use of concepts from overseas to talk about issues pertaining to race in Singapore; Indian respondents were slightly less likely to indicate as such

About seven in 10 Chinese respondents (73.6 per cent), Malay respondents (71.9 per cent) and Others respondents (70.6 per cent) agreed to varying extents that they would be uncomfortable if people used concepts from abroad

to talk about issues pertaining to race in Singapore, while two-thirds of Indian respondents (66.0 per cent) felt this way (see Figure 4.7.1).

Figure 4.7.1: I feel uncomfortable if people use concepts from overseas (such as CRT, white privilege) to talk about issues pertaining to race in Singapore, 2024 responses by race



4.7.2 Younger respondents aged 18–35 were less likely to indicate discomfort with the use of concepts from abroad in race-based discussions as compared to older peers; over six in 10 of those aged 18–35 indicated as such, compared to three-quarters of those over 65 years old

Across the various age cohorts, respondents aged 18–35 were less likely to indicate discomfort with the use of concepts from abroad to address racial issues in Singapore (61.3 per cent agreement to varying degrees). By contrast, close to eight in 10 respondents aged 51–65 (80.0 per cent) and respondents above 65 (75.5 per cent) felt the same way, reflecting slightly greater discomfort

among older individuals. This trend suggests that older respondents may have stronger reservations about incorporating external frameworks into local racial discussions compared to younger respondents, who showed slightly more openness (see Figure 4.7.2).

Figure 4.7.2: I feel uncomfortable if people use concepts from overseas (such as CRT, white privilege) to talk about issues pertaining to race in Singapore, 2024 responses by age



4.7.3 Compared to HDB dwellers, private property dwellers were more likely to agree that they would feel uneasy when concepts from overseas (such as CRT and white privilege) were applied to discussions about race in Singapore

Private property dwellers exhibited the highest levels of discomfort with using overseas concepts to discuss racial issues, with over three-quarters (76.8 per cent) expressing agreement to some extent with the statement. Among HDB dwellers, agreement varied; but HDB 1–3 room residents were the least likely

to feel uncomfortable (69.4 per cent). This suggests that housing type, which is linked to socio-economic factors, influences perceptions of external frameworks (see Figure 4.7.3).

Figure 4.7.3: I feel uncomfortable if people use concepts from overseas (such as CRT, white privilege) to talk about issues pertaining to race in Singapore, 2024 responses by housing type



5. THE WAY FORWARD

This working paper has explored the nuanced landscape of prejudice, attitudes, identity, lived experiences, and critical race perspectives within Singapore's multicultural context, drawing upon rich data from the 2024 IPS Survey on RRL and its previous waves. Collectively, the findings underscore Singapore's continued success in managing racial and religious diversity amid a global climate marked by heightened racial tensions and ideological polarisation.

Despite global concerns about rising racial prejudice and deteriorating intergroup relations, the survey findings paint an optimistic picture for Singapore. Across all identity domains examined (race, religion, nationality, age, gender, language, and sexual orientation), respondents consistently perceive levels of prejudice to be stable or improving. Notably, lower proportions of individuals, including minorities, report increased racial prejudice compared to past years. This affirms the effectiveness of Singapore's multicultural approach anchored in policies of integration, social harmony, and mutual respect for cultural traditions.

Singaporeans strongly endorse the dual approach of cultural adaptation and identity maintenance. The robust support for allowing racial and religious groups to retain their own customs and traditions, alongside an equally robust consensus that groups should adapt and blend into broader Singaporean society, indicates a balanced multicultural ethos. This balanced approach has

not diluted racial identities; instead, Singaporeans across all groups demonstrate high levels of cultural knowledge, strong senses of racial belonging, and active engagement in traditional cultural practices. Such cultural vibrancy, rather than being divisive, contributes positively to social cohesion in the city-state.

The openness towards critical race perspectives, especially among youth and minority populations, presents both opportunities and challenges. Younger Singaporeans, in particular, are attuned to structural inequalities and demonstrate greater receptivity to global racial justice discourses, including the acknowledgment of “Chinese privilege”. However, caution is needed. Wholesale adoption of foreign terminologies and frameworks, as evidenced by widespread discomfort with terms like CRT or "white privilege", may generate unnecessary polarisation. It remains critical to contextualise global racial discourses within Singapore’s distinctive multicultural framework, harnessing these ideas constructively without undermining local social cohesion.

Experiences of discrimination persist, particularly among minority groups and younger Singaporeans, highlighting the gap that still exists between normative multicultural ideals and everyday realities. Recognising and addressing this gap is essential for sustaining Singapore’s social compact. It is crucial that policy and programming seek to continue educating individuals about implicit biases and structural disadvantages, without resorting to divisive blame or framing any particular group as inherently problematic.

Moving forward, there is a need for sustained investment in structured programming and interventions aimed at fostering greater intergroup understanding. Our own experiences and evaluation programming via the IPS Race, Religion and Intergroup Cohesion[7] gives us confidence that experiential workshops do provide considerable benefits, insofar that they help reduce biases and augment skills to navigate differences sensitively. Extending such programmes into workplaces, educational institutions and community settings can help mitigate existing discrimination and further reduce prejudice. Special emphasis should perhaps be placed on engaging younger cohorts and minority groups, whose heightened sensitivity to discrimination calls for targeted support and inclusion.

Singapore's policies respecting and upholding diverse ethnic traditions and identities must be steadfastly maintained and carefully calibrated as global ideological trends evolve. Policymakers, educators, and community leaders should remain discerning about international methodologies and ideologies, adopting those elements that align with Singapore's proven multicultural strategy, while refining or rejecting those that may disrupt local harmony.

In conclusion, Singapore has distinguished herself through successful multicultural management. Yet, complacency is unwarranted; ongoing vigilance and adaptation, as well as interventions informed by rigorous research and proactive community engagement, are essential to sustaining this harmony.

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[7] For more information on what the IPS Programme on Race, Religion and Intergroup Cohesion (RRIC) entails, refer to https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips/rric/.

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APPENDIX 2: ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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