MORAL ATTITUDES IN FLUX: COMPARING TRENDS ACROSS RELIGIONS IN SINGAPORE

MATHEW MATHEWS
HANNIEL ASHER LIM
TEO KAY KEY
and
MELVIN TAY

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Moral Attitudes in Flux: Comparing Trends across Religions in Singapore

Mathew Mathews

Principal Research Fellow
Head, Social Lab
Institute of Policy Studies
mathew.mathews@nus.edu.sg

Hanniel Asher Lim

Former Research Assistant Institute of Policy Studies

Teo Kay Key

Senior Research Fellow Institute of Policy Studies kaykey.teo@nus.edu.sg

and

Melvin Tay

Research Fellow
Institute of Policy Studies
melvin.tay@nus.edu.sg

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MORAL ATTITUDES IN FLUX:

COMPARING TRENDS ACROSS RELIGIONS IN SINGAPORE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Singapore's multireligious compact — built on freedom of belief and a shared

civic space — has to reckon with debates on family, sexuality, and individual

choice. Against this backdrop, this paper draws on the 2024 IPS Survey on

Race, Religion and Language (RRL), a nationally representative study of 4,000

residents. Where relevant, these responses are compared with results from the

2013 and 2018 RRL waves. Our aim is to chart how Singaporeans evaluate

everyday moral questions (from gambling and fidelity to cohabitation, premarital

sex, divorce and same-sex issues); how these views differ by age and religious

tradition and how they have shifted over the past decade within Singapore's

distinctive multicultural framework.

The big picture

Extramarital sex and gambling remain "bedrock consensus" items.

Gambling disapproval stays high and steady (about three-quarters

across all waves), with only one in 10 having permissive views in 2024.

Stances on extramarital sex soften modestly (down roughly 6

percentage points in disapproval, from over eight in 10 in 2013 to three-

quarters in 2024); permissive views remain comparatively low.

Pregnancy out of wedlock (OOW) shows a clear liberalising trend:

disapproval falls by about 15 percentage points (from less than three-

quarters in 2013 to less than six in 10 in 2024), while permissive views

nearly double (to over one in five).

Views on premarital sex versus cohabitation both liberalise over the

decade, with similar proportions having prohibitive and permissive views

for premarital sex (less than four in 10 each), and less than half indicating

permissive views in relation to cohabitation.

Views on same-sex issues liberalise the most. Disapproval of gay sex

fell by about 27 percentage points from 2013 to 2024; eight in 10 held

prohibitive views of gay sex in 2013, and this proportion fell to just over

half in 2024. Proportions with prohibitive views on gay marriage similarly

fell by approximately 23 percentage points over the past decade, with

about three-quarters indicating as such in 2013 as compared to half in

2024. Across all same-sex items, permissive responses rise, and a

hierarchy of acceptance persists (sex < marriage < surrogacy / assisted

reproductive technologies or ART < adoption), though gaps narrow over

time.

Divorce consistently stands apart as the most context-dependent

judgement across all waves, with the largest and relatively stable "only

wrong sometimes" share (at one-third of respondents); younger cohorts

trend more permissive by 2024, while older cohorts remain more

prohibitive.

Moral cleavages by age and religion

Age gradients are pronounced: younger cohorts are consistently more

permissive than older cohorts, especially on sexuality and family-

formation items (premarital sex, cohabitation, pregnancy OOW) and on

all four same-sex items (sex, marriage, surrogacy/ART, adoption).

Religion matters: Muslims and (to a lesser extent) Christians remain

most prohibitive across ages; Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists show

larger liberalising shifts since 2013, led by youth; Taoists and the non-

religious are now the most permissive overall.

Premarital sex versus cohabitation

A clear gap persists: cohabitation attracts a higher permissive share than

premarital sex, and premarital sex attracts a higher prohibitive share.

By age, the gap widens among the young: youths normalise cohabitation

far more readily than premarital sex, indicating a sharper moral

distinction at younger ages.

• By religion, Catholics are more likely than average to judge cohabitation

as more permissible than premarital sex, while Muslims are more likely

to treat the two as morally equivalent (both unacceptable).

Gambling, adultery, pregnancy out of wedlock (OOW)

• Gambling and adultery show high, stable disapproval across waves, with

permissive shares remaining comparatively small.

Views on pregnancy OOW have liberalised substantially: disapproval

falls across every age group, led by the young; permissive views have

risen sharply since 2013.

Homosexuality (sex, marriage, surrogacy/ART, adoption)

Attitudes liberalised across all four items from 2013 to 2024; the biggest

swings are among younger cohorts.

• A stable hierarchy holds in every wave: gay sex attracts the most

disapproval, followed by gay marriage, with surrogacy/ART and adoption

by gay couples drawing less disapproval — although the gaps are

narrowing over time.

Muslims and older Christians continue to register strong majorities

prohibitive on gay sex and marriage; Catholic, Hindu and Buddhist youth,

as well as Taoists and the non-religious, constitute large permissive

majorities.

Within-religion highlights

• Catholics: among the young (18–35), views shifted most on premarital

sex, cohabitation, pregnancy OOW and same-sex items; adultery and

gambling remain unacceptable across ages. Regular weekly-plus

attenders (especially young Catholics) are far more prohibitive than their

less-frequent peers on gambling, adultery, pregnancy OOW, premarital

sex and divorce.

 Muslims: overall stances remain highly prohibitive, but youth show some easing on prohibitive views on premarital sex, cohabitation, pregnancy OOW and the same-sex items. Divorce is the exception where disapproval dropped across all ages, with a sizeable and enduring

conditional middle.

- Hindus: attitudes have softened across most issues, led by youth. By 2024, youths show pluralities (largest single share among options but below 50 per cent) or outright majorities (50 per cent or more) taking permissive positions on premarital sex, cohabitation and same-sex items. Older Hindus also eased but remain more prohibitive on gay sex and gay marriage.
- Taoists and non-religious: broad-based liberalisation; the non-religious are now most permissive on gay marriage and adoption (with majority permissive shares).

Taking the above together, Singapore's moral map is shifting along two axes: a stable consensus against adultery and gambling, and a broad easing, led by younger cohorts, on family-formation and same-sex issues (with cohabitation most accepted and premarital sex still more contested), while divorce draws the most contingent judgements. Sustaining harmony in a multi-religious society means managing and valuing, not erasing, pluralism: the state will need to have in place the mechanism to facilitate dialogue between parties with very different viewpoints to ensure "dialogue before division" on flashpoints; religious leaders can hold doctrinal convictions while affirming civic friendship, and the public can practise everyday accommodation and avoid zero-sum framings.

1. INTRODUCTION

Singapore's compact as a multi-religious city-state rests on a careful balance: it protects the freedom to profess and practise one's faith, while sustaining a shared civic space where people with different convictions can live well together. That balance is periodically tested as moral debates (about family, sexuality, gambling, fidelity and the bounds of individual choice) surface in public life and private conversation. Generational change, the diffusion of global norms and evolving religious expression have all shaped how Singaporeans reason about such questions. This working paper takes stock of those changes. It draws on the 2024 IPS Survey on Race, Religion and Language (RRL) and, where appropriate, compares results with earlier waves in 2013 and 2018 to trace how attitudes have shifted across time, faith traditions and age cohorts (Mathew, 2015; Mathew et al., 2019a; 2019b).

Our focus is the intersection of faith and morality. The survey asked residents to evaluate 10 issues: gambling, premarital sex, cohabitation, pregnancy out of wedlock (OOW), extramarital sex, divorce, and four items related to same-sex relations (sexual relations, marriage, adoption by gay couples and surrogacy/assisted reproductive technologies [ART] by gay couples). Respondents answered on a five-point scale ranging from "always wrong" to "not wrong at all." For clarity, the report groups responses into three analytic stances: prohibitive ("always" or "almost always wrong"), conditional ("only wrong sometimes") and permissive ("not wrong most of the time" or "not wrong

at all"). We use these categories descriptively rather than normatively,

recognising that people may hold principled views at each point on the scale.

The analysis proceeds with three aims. First, we map areas of broad moral

consensus versus domains of contestation in 2024. Second, we examine the

cleavages that matter most: age, religion and (within traditions) differences by

cohort and religious practice. This enables an understanding of where views

are converging and where they are pulling apart. Third, we compare 2024 with

2013 and 2018 to identify the direction and magnitude of change over the

decade, highlighting patterns such as "bedrock consensus" (e.g., gambling and

extramarital sex), "family-formation softening" (e.g., cohabitation and

pregnancy OOW) and the pronounced liberalisation on same-sex issues

among younger cohorts.

The report is organised as follows. Chapter 2 situates the findings within wider

shifts in Singapore's religious landscape and moral discourse. Chapter 3

presents the empirical results. These include the overall contours of morality;

generational and religious cleavages; and four deep dives on cohabitation

versus premarital sex, gambling-adultery-pregnancy OOW, same-sex affairs,

and notable intra-religion shifts. Chapter 4 concludes by distilling practical

implications for a multi-faith society: how the state, religious leaders, community

organisations and the public can manage difference with civility while

safeguarding common ground. Throughout, our goal is to inform dialogue by

describing what Singaporeans think today and how those views have moved,

rather than to prescribe what they ought to think.

1.1 Survey Methodology

The findings presented in this paper are primarily derived from an

approximately 45-minute Computer-Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI)

administered from April 2024 to August 2024. The IPS Survey on RRL

comprised approximately 350 question items examining a range of topics,

including issues pertaining to religion and morality.

Fieldwork and data collection was conducted by IPS Social Lab. In total, the full

survey sample comprises 4,000 unique respondents after quality checks. At the

outset, a sampling frame comprising a list of 6,000 randomly generated

residential household addresses was obtained from the Department of

Statistics (DoS). Two weeks prior to surveyors from IPS Social Lab physically

visiting the addresses, invitation letters with details of the RRL survey were sent

to the residential addresses in the sampling frame.

Surveyors briefed potential respondents about the study using a pre-set

Participant Information Sheet, invited the individuals to participate in the study

and obtained their consent. A booster sample of approximately 1,000 Malay

and Indian minority-race respondents (obtained to ensure representation and

enable fine-grain comparisons across responses) was also apportioned within

the target of 4,000 respondents.

Surveyors then administrated the survey via CAPI, whereby the respondent

was provided with a tablet (e.g., iPad, Galaxy Tab) on which to answer or self-

complete the survey questions. If the respondent was uncomfortable using the

tablet or had difficulty reading, the option for surveyors to read out the questions

and record their answers was made available. The survey was conducted in all

four official languages — English, Mandarin Chinese, Malay and Tamil.

If respondents had difficulty reading or writing, the option for surveyors to read

out the questions and record their answers was made available. If participants

were uncomfortable using the tablet, the surveyor would hand them a paper

copy of the survey for completion instead. Respondents were given \$20 as a

token of participation upon survey completion.

Responses were then weighted to mirror the prevailing demographics of

Singapore's resident population. As such, the findings are generally

representative of the Singapore adult resident population. However, the RRL

survey data is not exempt from the typical biases prevalent in face-to-face

survey methods, including:

> Underrepresentation of certain profiles who have less opportunity to

respond to the survey at the door during survey administration hours

(e.g., individuals with certain occupations / extenuating

circumstances); this was partly dealt with by fieldworkers visiting an

address at different times and on weekdays and weekends, so that

such respondents could be included in the study.

Social desirability bias arising from respondents answering the

survey in a manner ostensibly viewed more favourably as compared

to more "impersonal" or "removed" methods such as an online

survey. This is, however, partially resolved with a CAPI method with

surveyors according respondents' privacy to answer the questions.

1.2 Demographics and Representation

The overall responses for survey questions reported in the ensuing chapters

were weighted across age, race and gender with reference to prevailing

Singapore resident demographics, and this enabled IPS Social Lab to

effectively peruse results to provide a robust gauge of the overall Singapore

resident population's perceptions and views. In the following subsections, we

explore some key demographic breakdowns of the samples in relation to the

Singapore resident population.

1.2.1 Race and age profiles in the 2024 RRL sample mirrored the

Singapore resident population after weighting

The proportions of respondents in the 2024 RRL sample were identical to the

prevailing Singapore resident population¹ in terms of race and age cohorts after

weighting. Only respondents 18 years old and above at the time of

administration were eligible to complete the survey (see Figure 1.2.1).

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¹ Using publicly available information from Singapore Department of Statistics (DoS); accurate as of June 2024 (M810011 - Singapore Residents by Age Group, Ethnic Group and Sex, End June, Annual).




Figure 1.2.1: Survey sample vs. resident population by race / age

1.2.2 Gender breakdown for the 2024 RRL sample were also identical to the resident population after weighting; there was a slightly higher proportion of Singapore Citizens surveyed relative to prevailing demographics

The proportions of respondents in the 2024 RRL sample by gender were also identical with the prevailing Singapore resident population after weighting. There was a slightly higher representation of Singapore Citizens (SCs) compared to Permanent Residents (PRs) (see Figure 1.2.2).




Figure 1.2.2: Survey sample vs. resident population by gender / citizenship status

1.2.3 The RRL sample was underrepresented for individuals with secondary or lower qualifications; and overrepresented for individuals with ITE, polytechnic and professional qualifications relative to the resident population; it was overrepresented for HDB 1–3 room dwellers relative to the resident population

There was an underrepresentation of individuals with secondary or lower educational qualifications, and a corresponding overrepresentation of individuals with ITE, polytechnic and professional qualifications in the 2024 RRL sample relative to the resident population.² In this regard, cross-tabulations to ascertain whether education was a factor impacting responses were applied to all question items at the outset. Where statistically significant, cross-tabulations of responses by education levels are presented in this report, alongside other

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² Numbers are for Residents aged 25 years and over, latest available in 2020 from Singapore Department of Statistics (DoS) (M850581).

variables. To capture broader trends, analyses presented aggregate reported highest educational qualifications into three broad ordinal categories: 1) secondary or lower education; 2) ITE, polytechnic diplomas and professional qualifications not amounting to a degree; and 3) bachelor's degree or higher qualifications (see Figure 1.2.3).

1.2.4 The 2024 RRL sample was overrepresented for public housing dwellers and underrepresented for private property dwellers relative to the resident population

The 2024 RRL sample also has a higher proportion of HDB dwellers relative to the resident population; ³ this was in line with the increased possibilities of surveyors being able to engage this population segment owing to the ease of access to their houses. Meanwhile, the corresponding response rates for private property dwellers were also much lower, due to additional difficulties with securing access especially in condominiums and cluster housing where surveyors are generally not allowed access. In the same vein as the education variable, housing types were aggregated into four broad ordinal categories to better capture broad trends: 1) 1–3 room HDB flats; 2) 4-room HDB flats; 3) 5+room HDB flats including 5-room, executive, maisonette and HUDC units; and 4) private housing, comprising condominiums, landed property or other types of private accommodation such as shophouse units (see Figure 1.2.3).

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³ Numbers are for Resident Households by Type of Dwelling, latest available 2023 from Singapore Department of Statistics (DoS) (M810351).




Figure 1.2.3: Survey sample vs resident population by highest educational qualifications attained / housing type

1.2.5 The 2024 RRL sample was proportionally representative of Buddhists, Taoists, Catholics, Muslims and Hindus; Christians were overrepresented while those with no religion were underrepresented relative to the resident population

There was some variance in the religion distribution for the 2024 RRL sample relative to the Singapore resident population. ⁴ While the proportions of Buddhists, Taoists or those with Traditional Chinese Beliefs (TCB), Catholics, ⁵ Muslims and Hindus were relatively similar to the resident population, there was

⁴ Singapore Department of Statistics (DoS)'s General Household Survey 2020; retrieved from https://www.singstat.gov.sg/-/media/files/publications/cop2020/sr1/excel/t51-57.xlsx. Other religions

omitted from full proportions for brevity.

⁵ While Roman Catholics and Protestant Christians are normally categorised as Christians, in this study we have separated their responses as their views sometimes differ. While it would be most appropriate for us to categorise and present the two groups as Protestant Christians and Roman Catholic Christians, it is difficult for stylistic and presentation reasons to do so. As such we have separated the two groups as Christians and Catholics, and refer to these groups in-text and in our figures as such. In no way are we alleging that Roman Catholics are not Christians.

a slight overrepresentation of Christians and an underrepresentation of those with no religion (see Figure 1.2.4).

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 15.6 6.9 15.0 17.0 2024 RRL Sample 30.7 9.3 5.5 Resident 7.1 31.2 8.8 12.0 15.7 5.0 20.1 Population (2020) Buddhism ■ Taoism / TCB ■ Christianity ■ Catholicism ■ Islam ■ Hinduism ■ No Religion

Figure 1.2.4: Survey sample vs resident population by religion

1.3 Analysis Strategy

While there was a confluence of factors impacting responses to the question items, we have focused our paper on religion and age differences among respondents, leaving an examination of other variables to subsequent analysis.

2. CONTEXTUAL SHIFTS IN RELIGION AND MORAL DISCOURSE

Since the close of the 2018 wave of the RRL survey, religious demographics in

Singapore have remained stable, with modest changes in the composition of

the religious groups (Department of Statistics, 2021). However, as the Pew

Research Center notes, this stability masks underlying dynamics of religious

conversions; significant percentages of the population have converted from one

religion to another, disaffiliated to no religion, or affiliated with a religion after

not identifying with any (Evans et al., 2023). Religion thus continues to be a

salient aspect of people's lives despite the increase in secularism.

Against this backdrop, concerns about moral panic and the erosion of traditional

values have been spotlighted on occasion in Singapore's public discourse,

especially as the country navigates rapid social change and generational shifts.

The interplay between religion, morality, and the attitudes of liberal young

people is a key context for understanding debates on issues pertaining to

morals including sexuality, family, and social norms.

The classic formulation of moral panic describes moments when a condition,

group, or practice is constructed as a threat to societal values, often amplified

by media and moral entrepreneurs (Cohen, 1972; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994).

Moral panics typically feature concern, disproportionality, consensus, hostility,

and volatility (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994). In plural societies, religious

authorities and civic actors may both trigger and temper such episodes,

especially on sexuality and family norms. In Asia, moral-claim making often

intertwines with state projects of social order and "harmonious" multiculturalism

(George, 2016), meaning panics can surface as values debates framed in terms

of cohesion rather than open culture war. This literature alerts us to read public

controversy (especially around same-sex issues or family change) not merely

as opinion shifts, but as cycles of boundary-drawing where religion provides

powerful symbolic resources (Cohen, 1972; George, 2016).

In Singapore, moral panic often arises when perceived threats to social

cohesion or traditional values are spotlighted. These panics are not

spontaneous but are shaped by the socio-political context and the ability of

certain issues to trigger public concern. For instance, the state has historically

amplified moral panics (such as those around music subcultures or sexuality in

the past) to reinforce national identity and delineate acceptable moral

boundaries, often framing "Western" influences as sources of moral decay

(Kong, 2006, p. 125). Religious organizations have played a prominent role in

policing morality, focusing on issues like family, sexuality, and gambling, and

positioning themselves as the moral conscience of the nation (Mathew, 2010).

These efforts are often mediated by the state, which seeks to balance religious

influence with secular governance.

Comparative research finds long-run value change from survival/traditional to

self-expression/liberal orientations accompanying development and rising

education (Inglehart, 2018). These shifts are carried disproportionately by

younger cohorts ("cohort replacement"), producing age gradients on moral

questions—from premarital sex to same-sex relations—even in religious

societies (Voas & Chaves, 2016; Adamczyk & Hayes, 2012). However, its

strength varies by cultural context; where self-expression values are stronger,

personal religiosity more sharply predicts conservative sexual attitudes

(Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009), or self-reports of premarital or extramarital sexual

behaviour (Adamczyk & Hayes, 2012).

Singapore combines high religious salience with strong state stewardship of

social order. Surveys consistently shows that younger residents are more

permissive on sexuality and family practices than older cohorts (Wong et al.,

2009; Mathew et al., 2019), even while religion continues to shape attitudes.

This pattern—religion's continuing importance alongside cohort-led

liberalisation—sets the stage for debates over "eroding values" and the

management of plural moral orders. In such contexts, same-sex issues often

become emblematic flashpoints (though not the only ones), because they sit at

the intersection of theology, family policy, and rights language that readily

mobilises both religious and secular publics.

In Singapore, gambling adds another morally salient domain where religious

injunctions and cultural norms diverge by community (Winslow et al., 2015). Our

paper therefore treats moral attitudes within a broader moral landscape marked

by cohort change, religious authority, and institutional gate-keeping.

The past half-decade also saw religious groups making significant public

statements over the morality of various social issues, both in Singapore and

across the world. These issues have mainly been about the family and sexuality,

with an emphasis on the autonomy to engage in mutually consensual activities,

especially the permissibility of same-sex relations.

Notably, despite discourse over the permissibility of divorce and single

motherhood, a significant portion of prohibitive views remain. These

reservations appear to centre largely around children who are typically

perceived as the most innocent and vulnerable parties in family relations. Even

in the US, where more than three in four adults find it acceptable for a single

parent to a raise a child on their own, almost half of them believe that fewer

children being raised by two married parents will have a negative impact on

their country (Parker & Minkin, 2023). There has also been a growing share of

US adults who see single motherhood as being negative to society (Hurst,

2022).

Recent developments in Singapore reflect similarly nuanced views. Although

policy in Singapore remains prohibitive towards such issues, the concern for

children has led to flexible responses to divorce. Notably, in 2024, when mutual

agreement was introduced as grounds for divorce, the Government

communicated that the decision was made in the interest of children and not as

a move towards a more permissive stance on divorce (Shafeeg, 2024). Divorce

by mutual agreement maintains the status quo of barriers for divorce, whereby

married couples wishing to divorce on such grounds must demonstrate efforts

at reconciliation, and the courts able to reject divorce applications for marriages

with a reasonable possibility for reconciliation.

For same-sex relations, the discourse has been more conspicuous both locally

and internationally, with a wide range of views and significant polarisation

observed. These have accompanied notable developments on same-sex

relations observed in the religious, governmental, and judicial contexts across

the world. In Singapore, many key religious bodies made public statements in

the 2022 lead-up to the repeal of Section 377A, a section of the Penal Code

that made it a crime for consenting male adults to have sex with each other in

private.

Religious Views on Moral Issues: Global and Local

Given how important religious views have been to the debates related to same-

sex relationships, both globally and locally, we provide a quick overview of how

the main religions represented in Singapore, have provided guidance to their

adherents locally and internationally on this issue. This will also serve to situate

some of the findings in this study related to religion and homosexuality.

In the case of Hinduism, notable opinions can be found in the discourse

surrounding the 2018 repeal of Section 377 by the Supreme Court of India. The

repeal was ultimately a judicial and non-political one. Within the ruling Hindutva

BJP party, even conservative voices opposing the decriminalisation of Section

377 in legislation committed to respecting the Supreme Court's decision

(Tewari, 2018; The Indian Express, 2023). This reflected nuances among the

diverse views of the Hindu-majority country, with the country notably respecting

the process of judicial review to uphold its constitution despite differing views.

In Singapore, the Hindu Advisory Board stated its belief that the traditional

definition of marriage should be protected, it nonetheless recognised the rights

of individuals to engage in gay sex since it is private conduct (Ishak & Lean,

2022; Lim, 2022).

Diverse views have also been observed in Buddhist regions. Notably, the

Buddhist-majority Thailand has historically been identified as friendly towards

diverse sexual orientations and gender expressions. It became the first

Southeast Asian country to legalise same-sex marriage in January 2025

(Government Public Relations Department, 2025). Meanwhile, a survey

conducted in neighbouring Myanmar, which has a population that is also mostly

Theravada Buddhist, found that over eight in 10 believe that LGBT people

deserve equal treatment and over seven in 10 believe that it should be legal to

be LGBT (McGrath, 2020). Closer to home, the Singapore Buddhist Federation

issued a statement citing inclusion and cohesiveness in reaction to the repeal

of 377A in Singapore, with the writing of the definition of marriage in the

Constitution being welcomed to avoid court challenges which was perceived to

be divisive, with intergroup dialogues encouraged (Choo et al., 2022; CNA,

2022).

Taoist public discourse has notably been absent across the world. Taiwan is

the first Asian country to legalise same-sex marriage, and it is also the country

with the highest concentration of Taoists. Reflecting the quiet international

public discourse, the Singapore Taoist Federation expressed neutrality towards

the repeal of 377A (Tham, 2022).

In contrast to these religious dynamics, attitudes towards these issues have

remained effectively the same for Muslim-majority countries. In the lead-up to

the repeal of 377A in Singapore, Muslim associations such as MUIS and

Pergas stood firm on the prohibitions of same-sex relations and upholding the

traditional definition of marriage (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, 2022; Pergas,

2022). Nonetheless, these affirmations were made along with calls for

harmonious living with those of different views.

The bulk of changes in attitudes towards the family and sexuality has been seen

in the Western world, which has a more entrenched Christian presence. It is

thus expected that more of the conversation surrounding religion and sexuality

has been situated in the Christian context. With Protestantism being more

decentralised than Catholicism, the changes in practices and attitudes towards

the family and sexuality has been more variegated than that in Catholicism.

The Catholic Church, under the leadership of Pope Francis, adjusted its

messaging to be more welcoming to groups such as LGBT individuals and

divorcees, but it has not changed its doctrines. In 2016, Pope Francis' apostolic

exhortation, Amoris Laetitia, allowed certain divorced or remarried individuals

to be included in Communion (Francis, 2016). In 2023, the declaration by the

Dicastery for the Doctrine of Faith, Fiducia Supplicans, permitted the blessing

of individuals in same-sex unions (Fernández, 2023). Nonetheless, Pope

Francis and the Vatican under his leadership have affirmed the traditional

definition of marriage and its indissolubility, denounced surrogacy, and

condemned gender ideology and gender-affirming surgeries (Fernández,

2024a, 2024b; Francis, 2024a, 2024b).

In Singapore, the Archdiocese of Singapore has taken a stance similar to that

of the Catholic Church's leadership. The Archbishop of Singapore, William

Cardinal Goh was ultimately "neutral" to the repeal of 377A in the lead-up to the

repeal in 2022, affirming the non-criminalisation of homosexual acts (The

Archbishop's Communications Office, 2022; Tham, 2022). Nonetheless, he

also expressed his desire for protection of the rights for the Catholic Church to

affirm its definition of marriage as that between a man and a woman.

Mainline Protestantism, especially in Europe and the US has seen more

institutional changes than the Catholic Church. For instance, the Church of

England voted to bless same-sex relationships such as civil marriages or

partnerships although clergy are still not allowed to conduct same-sex

marriages (The Church of England, 2023). Similarly, in 2024, the United

Methodist Church in the US voted to allow the officiation of same-sex marriages

and the ordination of openly practicing homosexuals (ResourceUMC, n.d.).

Evangelical Christianity however has remained conservative, with many

Evangelical Christians strongly advocating against same-sex practices.

In contrast, Protestant attitudes in Singapore remain uniformly more

conservative. The Anglican Diocese of Singapore has voiced its opposition to

the Church of England's aforementioned blessings of same-sex unions, holding

marriage to remain as that between one man and one woman (Liew, 2023).

A similar response was made by the Methodist Church in Singapore, in

response to the United Methodist Church's vote to allow the officiation of gay

marriages and the ordination of individuals openly engaged in homosexual acts.

The Methodist Church in Singapore, which was part of the UMC until 1968,

reaffirmed its definition of marriage as between a man and a woman. It also

reaffirmed its commitment to the belief that those openly engaging in

homosexual behaviours are not eligible to be clerical candidates, as such

behaviours are "incompatible with Christian teaching" (Methodist Message,

2024).

The responses by the National Council of Churches of Singapore (NCCS) and

the Alliance of Pentecostal and Charismatic Churches of Singapore (APCCS)

show that this trend is consistent across Protestant churches in Singapore. The

NCCS — representing not just the Anglican and Methodist churches in

Singapore, but also the Lutheran and Presbyterian churches along with non-

denominational churches — has opposed the repeal of 377A on the grounds of

public morality even as it accepted its non-enforcement (NCCS, 2022). Similarly,

the APCCS, which represents churches that have been established relatively

more recently, opposed the repeal of 377A (APCCS, 2022).

3. MAPPING OUR MORAL CONTOURS AND CLEAVAGES

The latest wave of the survey is the third wave of the survey, conducted in 2024, with the previous two waves conducted in 2013 and 2018. The surveys are cross-sectional and not longitudinal, with respondents sampled independently for each wave. Across all waves of the survey, respondents were asked for their views on 10 moral issues. They were invited to provide one out of five Likert-scale responses, namely, "always wrong", "almost always wrong", "only wrong sometimes", "not wrong most of the time" and "not wrong at all".6

Responses that an issue is "always wrong" and "almost always wrong" are interpreted to reflect disapproving, or prohibitive views. Responses that an issue is "not wrong at all" or "not wrong most of the time" are considered to reflect permissive views. Those who respond that an issue is "only wrong sometimes" are considered to have contingent, or context-dependent views.

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⁶ The phrasing of the question asked respondents to determine how wrong a particular behaviour (e.g. gambling) was. The options provided were between a continuum of "always wrong" to "not wrong at all". Some have argued that such phrasing invites respondents to prejudge these behaviours as morally reprehensible from the onset and predisposes them to respond in a more conservative manner – i.e. the behaviour is always wrong. While we acknowledge that such bias is possible, we also note that the behaviours in these questions have all been subject in more recent history to prohibitions, social sanctions and certainly debates. We expect that respondents who believe that these behaviours are morally acceptable will choose the available options of "not wrong at all", or if they have reservations "not wrong most of the time". In the same manner we expect those who believe that the behaviour is unequivocally wrong to choose the option of "always wrong" or "almost always wrong" (in case they make some concessions to the behaviour). Furthermore, this phrasing has been used in many well-established surveys such as the well-cited American General Social Survey and the International Social Survey Programme Study of Religion over several decades. The questions have allowed researchers internationally to understand changes in their societies on various moral issues; replicating the phrasing of these questions in the IPS RRL Survey also enables cross-comparisons to be made.

The 10 issues respondents were surveyed on include gambling, premarital sex,

cohabitation, pregnancy OOW, gay sex, gay marriage, gay adoption, gay

couples having children via surrogacy or assisted reproductive technologies

(ART), adultery and divorce. This was also the case for the two previous waves

of the RRL survey.⁷

Where relevant, this report focuses on the proportions of respondents who

perceive an issue to be "not wrong at all" or "not wrong most of the time". Given

the increase in the prevalence of contingent or permissive views on moral

issues among Singaporeans over the past decade, where there is no majority

of those who were either disapproving or permissive of an issue, the proportion

of permissive views will be highlighted. We find this to be the more meaningful

approach since there is an interest in knowing whether a majority within certain

demographic groups has already begun to view certain matters in a more

permissible light. The presence of such a majority is often viewed as a source

of legitimation of societal readiness towards changes on a moral issue.

-

⁷ The question item on gay couples having children via surrogacy was not included in the 2013 RRL survey wave.

3.1 OVERALL CONTOURS OF MORALITY

3.1.1 Three-quarters of respondents held prohibitive views on

extramarital sex and gambling, while less than six in 10 indicated

likewise for pregnancy OOW. Approximately half viewed gay sex,

gay marriage and gay couples pursuing surrogacy or ART in the

same vein. Four in 10 had prohibitive views on premarital sex, while

about three in 10 indicated likewise for cohabitation and divorce

Based on the findings from the latest 2024 wave of the RRL survey, the majority

of Singapore residents disapproved of, or held prohibitive views in relation to

extramarital sex, gambling, pregnancy OOW, gay sex and gay marriage. About

three in four indicated that extramarital sex (75.1 per cent) and gambling (74.0

per cent) was "always wrong" or "almost always wrong", while half or more of

respondents indicated likewise for pregnancy OOW (58.0 per cent), gay sex

(52.9 per cent) and gay marriage (50.8 per cent). Less than half also held

prohibitive views in relation to gay couples pursuing surrogacy or ART and

adoption (48.9 per cent and 46.3 per cent, respectively).

Notably, none of the 10 issues-of-interest had an outright majority who held

permissive views (i.e., indicating that it was "not wrong most of the time" or "not

wrong at all"), or conditional views of it (i.e., indicating that it was "only wrong

sometimes"). For premarital sex, approximately equal proportions of

respondents held disapproving views (39.4 per cent) as respondents with

permissive views (38.1 per cent). The disapproving views were nonetheless

more emphatic than the permissive ones; about three quarters of those with

disapproving views of premarital sex saw it as "always wrong", while only about

half of those with permissive views saw it as "not wrong at all".

However, a plurality had permissive views of cohabitation and divorce (48.4 per

cent and 38.3 per cent, respectively). Meanwhile, approximately three in 10

held disapproving views of cohabitation (32.0 per cent) and divorce (27.9 per

cent). Cohabitation was the issue with the highest proportion of respondents


holding permissive views. Moreover, unlike premarital sex, permissive views

were held more emphatically vis-à-vis cohabitation, with close to three in 10

respondents indicating that this was "not wrong at all" (28.6 per cent) (see

Figure 3.1.1).

Figure 3.1.1: How do you feel about these social issues?, 2024 responses across ten different issues (%)



3.1.2 One-third of respondents had contingent or context-dependent

views on whether divorce was wrong; the corresponding

proportions were significantly lower for all other issues-of-interest.

Proportions of respondents with contingent views fell from 2013 to

2024 for divorce, cohabitation and gambling; but rose for gay sex

and gay marriage

For the purposes of this report, we treat the middle of the Likert-5 options (i.e.,

"only wrong sometimes") as conditional judgment rather than a simple midpoint

between prohibition and permissiveness. In many moral domains, and

especially with regard to divorce, respondents may weigh case-by-case

contingencies (e.g., whether children are involved, the presence of harm, the

availability of alternatives, or good-faith efforts to reconcile in the case of

divorce). Hence, the answer "only wrong sometimes" signals contingent

permissibility rather than categorical approval or disapproval. It can also

capture moral ambivalence where competing norms (religious injunctions

versus compassion, individual liberty versus social order) are held in tension.

At the same time, the middle option can function as a pragmatic shelter for

respondents who are uncertain, conflicted, or wary of signalling a strong stance

on sensitive topics. For some, it is a procedural humility response (i.e., that they

do not know enough or that it depends on circumstances); for others, it may be

a social desirability or satisficing choice to avoid appearing judgmental or

permissive. Consequently, the "only wrong sometimes" category mixes (1)

genuine conditional views and (2) indecision or strategic neutrality.

It is against this backdrop that we compare the conditional judgment responses,

and note that divorce is the only moral issue which had "only wrong sometimes"

as the most common response. For 2024, one-third viewed divorce as "wrong

only sometimes" (33.8 per cent). However, for the other issues, this ranged from

around 12.4 per cent to 22.5 per cent for the other moral issues-of-interest,

making divorce an outlier in this respect. Likewise, for the 2018 instalment of

the survey, 41.1 per cent found divorce to be "wrong only sometimes"; but the

proportions of respondents indicating likewise for the other issues-of-interest

ranged from 12.7 per cent to 27.5 per cent. In 2013, 34.1 per cent of

respondents found divorce to be "only wrong sometimes", but this ranged from

9.8 per cent to 22.4 per cent for the other issues.

Across the issues-of-interest, we note that proportions of respondents

indicating conditional, or context-dependent views in 2024 dropped for divorce.

cohabitation and gambling relative to previous waves. This can be interpreted

as evidence of norm crystallisation (i.e., that fewer respondents are sitting on

the fence and more are taking a clear stance on these issues). In contrast,

proportions of respondents indicating conditional, or context-dependent views


in 2024 increased for gay sex and gay marriage relative to previous waves. This

indicates a shift from categorical disapproval toward contingent evaluation, with

more respondents appear willing to accept private adult conduct while retaining

reservations about public recognition (e.g., marriage) (see Figure 3.1.2).

Figure 3.1.2: How do you feel about these social issues?, "Only wrong sometimes" % responses across waves, and across ten different issues



*Item not asked in 2013 wave.

3.2 MORAL CLEAVAGE ACROSS GENERATIONS AND FAITHS

3.2.1 Younger cohorts are consistently less prohibitive across all issues,

with the sharpest moral cleavages for sexuality and family items.

By contrast, extramarital sex and gambling remain the only

domains where a majority in every age group is prohibitive. Divorce

shows the least age variation, retaining a large "conditional middle"

Significant differences in responses were observed across the responses of

respondents classified by age cohorts. Across all 10 issues, lower proportions

of respondents in younger age cohorts held prohibitive views compared to their

older peers. For instance, while over four in five respondents over 65 years old

felt that extramarital sex was "always wrong" or "almost always wrong" (81.9

per cent), seven in 10 of respondents aged 18–35 years indicated likewise (70.4)

per cent). In the same vein, while less than nine in 10 respondents over 65

years old held such prohibitive views on gambling (85.9 per cent), two-thirds of

respondents aged 18–35 years indicated likewise (65.7 per cent). Extramarital

sex and gambling were also the only two issues-of-interest that saw a majority

of respondents (i.e., over 50 per cent) across all age cohorts holding prohibitive

views.

Meanwhile, pregnancy OOW, gay sex, gay marriage, gay couples pursuing

surrogacy or ART, gay couples pursuing adoption, premarital sex and

cohabitation had much greater divergence in proportions of respondents

holding prohibitive views. While the majority of respondents over 35 years of

age saw pregnancy OOW, gay sex and gay marriage as "always wrong" or

"almost always wrong", less than half of 18–35-year-old respondents concurred

in relation to pregnancy OOW (47.6 per cent); and less than four in 10 of 18-

35-year-old respondents indicated likewise for gay sex (37.3 per cent) and gay

marriage (35.3 per cent).

Cleavages in perceptions of morality in relation to surrogacy or ART for gay

couples, adoption for gay couples and premarital sex were further observed

between those 50 years of age and younger, and those over 50 years old. While

a majority of respondents over 50 years old perceived these three issues as

"always wrong" or "almost always wrong", less than half of those in the younger

two age cohorts indicated likewise. In addition, a majority of respondents 18-

35 years old held permissive views in relation to surrogacy or ART for gay

couples (52.9 per cent), adoption for gay couples (55.6 per cent) and premarital

sex (50.4 per cent).

Cohabitation was the only issue that had a majority of respondents over 65

years old seeing it as "always wrong" or "almost always wrong" (54.2 per cent),

and less than half of the three younger age cohorts taking this stance. In

contrast, nearly two-thirds of 18-35-year-old respondents held permissive


views on cohabitation (64.1 per cent).

Divorce was the issue that saw the least significant variations in stances across

all age cohorts. While over four in 10 respondents 65 years old and above held

prohibitive views on divorce (44.0 per cent), over half of the youngest age cohort had permissive views (50.6 per cent). Across all age cohorts, approximately one-third of respondents indicated contingent or context-dependent views of divorce as explicated in the earlier section.

Figure 3.2.1: How do you feel about these social issues?, 2024 responses across ten different issues and across age cohorts



IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

3.2.2 Adultery and gambling remain widely disapproved for every age

cohort; family-formation norms soften most among younger adults,

with cohabitation broadly accepted by youth while premarital sex

and pregnancy OOW are more contested, especially among older

cohorts. Views on same-sex issues liberalise fastest and most

unevenly; youth move permissive while older groups remain more

prohibitive. Divorce stands apart from other issues as one

incurring the most context-dependent judgement and with less

age-associated differences in views

Looking at the past decade, three broad patterns emerge when we consider

responses across age cohorts. First, "bedrock consensus" items (extramarital

sex and gambling) remain widely disapproved across all ages in every wave,

with only small oscillations. The age gradient here is modest: older cohorts are

a little more prohibitive, but majorities in every cohort continue to disapprove,

and permissive shares stay comparatively low (about one in eight respondents

indicating as such in 2024).

Second, "family-formation" items show broad easing, and this easing is

strongest among younger adults. Proportions with prohibitive views of

pregnancy OOW decline in each wave for all age groups, with the steepest

drops among those under 35. In 2024, fewer than half of the youngest cohort

disapprove of pregnancy OOW (47.6 per cent), whereas the majority of their

older peers still do. Trends pertaining to views on extramarital sex, gambling

and pregnancy OOW are further laid out in section 3.4.

A similar cohort pattern appears for premarital sex and cohabitation, but with a

notable split between the two: cohabitation attracts the highest permissive

shares of any non-divorce item (especially among the young), while premarital

sex remains more contested. The difference in views that each age cohort holds

towards cohabitation and premarital sex is visible in every cohort, and widens

for younger age groups. Comparisons between these two items are further set

forth in section 3.3.

Third, the same-sex cluster of items (gay sex, gay marriage, adoption by a gay

couple and surrogacy/ART for a gay couple) experiences the sharpest

liberalisation from 2013 to 2024, with the strongest age-group contrasts. In each

wave, younger respondents are markedly more permissive than older ones

across all four items; older groups also ease over time, but remain more

prohibitive, especially for gay sex and gay marriage. Within this cluster,

relationship recognition and parenting pathways (adoption, surrogacy/ART)

draw less disapproval than sexual conduct, and that hierarchy holds across

ages and waves even as gaps narrow over time. This cluster of items are

spotlighted in section 3.5.

Divorce continues to stand apart from all other issues; in every wave and age

group, it registers the highest prevalence of "only wrong sometimes," indicating


case-by-case judgment. Younger adults lean more permissive on divorce by

2024; older cohorts are more disapproving, but the dominant feature across

ages is the sizeable middle, which stays comparatively stable over time.

In *toto*, from 2013 to 2024 the moral map shifts along two axes: steady consensus on adultery and gambling; broad softening on family-formation and same-sex issues led by younger cohorts (with cohabitation most accepted and premarital sex more contested); and divorce remaining the most context-dependent judgment across all ages (see Figure 3.2.2).

Figure 3.2.2: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses acroos all 10 issues, by age group, and across waves



IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

3.2.3 Muslims and Christians have the highest proportions of adherents

with prohibitive views across all issues, while the non-religious are

the least disapproving and most permissive. Differences in views

across religious groups are modest for extramarital sex and

gambling, but widen sharply on sexuality and family issues

Across all 10 issues-of-interest, Islam and Christianity had the largest

proportions of adherents holding prohibitive views and the lowest proportions

of adherents holding permissive views. For instance, over eight in 10 Muslims

and Christians indicated that extramarital sex was "always wrong" or "almost

always wrong" (84.4 per cent and 85.6 per cent respectively), as compared to

less than eight in 10 of respondents with other religions and the non-religious.

The majority (over 50 per cent) of Muslims and Christians also held such

prohibitive views towards all issues-of-interest except divorce (38.2 per cent

and 40.6 per cent, respectively).

On the other hand, the non-religious group were the least disapproving for all

issues except extramarital sex (whereby Taoists were the least disapproving).

Nonetheless, the non-religious had the highest proportions of respondents

indicating permissive views across all issues. The majority of non-religious

respondents held prohibitive views towards extramarital sex (67.8 per cent) and

gambling (63.2 per cent), but four in 10 or less indicated likewise for all other

issues. Notably, the majority of non-religious respondents held permissive

views of cohabitation (70.5 per cent), premarital sex (61.9 per cent), divorce

(57.3 per cent), gay sex (53.2 per cent), adoption for gay couples (52.5 per

cent), gay marriage (52.3 per cent) and gay couples pursuing surrogacy or ART

(51.4 per cent). No other religious group had a majority holding permissive

views of an issue, except for Buddhists and Taoists vis-à-vis cohabitation (56.7)

per cent and 59.4 per cent, respectively). Catholics and Hindus were in general

also more disapproving and less permissive relative to Buddhists and Taoists

across all issues.

For the two issues of extramarital sex and gambling, which each received a

strong national consensus of disapproval, the various religious groups were

closely distributed for their prevalence of disapproving and permissive views

(relative to other issues). For gambling, disapproval rates ranged from 63.2 per

cent to 87.4 per cent. For extramarital sex, disapproval rates were narrower,

ranging from 67.2 per cent to 85.6 per cent.

However, for the other issues which each received weaker national consensus

against them, the differences among religious groups were starker, with

noticeable clustering among the religious groups. Response clusters which

were particularly disapproving or permissive, or on the flipside, particularly non-

disapproving or non-permissive, were evident. Such clustering can already be

observed for pregnancy OOW, which was the issue that received the third

strongest national consensus of disapproval. Muslims, Christians and Hindus

had notably higher proportions with prohibitive views compared to the other

religious groups (76.0 per cent, 72.2 per cent and 67.6 per cent, respectively).

The next cluster had lower proportions with prohibitive views, and this

comprised Catholics (55.2 per cent), Buddhists (53.6 per cent) and Taoists

(50.0 per cent). Those with no religion had the lowest proportions with

prohibitive views (39.4 per cent).

For the four same-sex issues (gay sex, gay marriage, surrogacy or ART for gay

couples and adoption for gay couples), four distinct response clusters were

noticeable. The first cluster that was observed for these issues comprised the

largely disapproving Muslims and Christians. Across these issues, Muslims and

Christians had the highest proportions noting prohibitive views (at least two-

thirds or more). The next response cluster comprised Catholics; between five

and six in 10 held prohibitive views in relation to the same-sex issues. Hindus,

Buddhists and Taoists formed the third response cluster, with more than a third

to approximately half holding prohibitive views. The last response cluster was

the non-religious which had the lowest proportions with prohibitive views in

relation to same-sex issues (three in 10 or less).

For the issues of cohabitation and premarital sex, Muslims and Christians did

not have noticeable clustering by their disapproval rates (as compared to other


issues). For both issues, Christians had a disapproval rate lower than that of

Muslims by about 10 per cent or more i.e., Muslims were significantly more

likely to have indicated a prohibitive view on cohabitation and premarital sex

relative to Christians (see Figure 3.2.3).

Figure 3.2.3: How do you feel about these social issues?, 2024 responses across ten different issues and across religions




IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

3.2.4 Proportions of respondents selecting the "only wrong sometimes" option have become more similar across religions over time, and across issues. This is seen most clearly for divorce where the cross-religion spread is minimal despite its high prevalence, while most other issues display modest and shrinking gaps

Across issues, religious identification generally shows a weaker association with the likelihood of choosing "only wrong sometimes" than with outright prohibitive or permissive responses — consistent with this middle option functioning as conditional or ambivalent rather than doctrinal. This pattern is most pronounced for divorce. In 2013, divorce had the fourth-smallest range across religions (11.0 percentage points). In 2018 and 2024, responses to this question item had the smallest ranges (10.6 percentage points and 5.3 percentage points, respectively), indicating very little between-religion spread despite high overall selection of the middle option. By contrast, gambling, despite broad national disapproval, shows larger religious dispersion in the middle response: in 2024 the gap between Muslims (7.4 per cent) and the non-religious (22.5 per cent) is about 15.1 percentage points, and in 2018, about 18.5 percentage points (7.4 per cent for Muslims versus 25.9 per cent for the non-religious).

Figure 3.2.4: How do you feel about these social issues?, "Only wrong sometimes" responses across ten different issues and across religions for three waves

● Islam ● Christianity ● Catholicism ◆ Hinduism ◆ Buddhism ◆ Taoism/TCB × No Religion



IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

3.3 DEEP DIVE I: LOVIN' TOGETHER VERSUS LIVING TOGETHER


3.3.1 Cohabitation has been viewed more permissively than premarital sex across all waves of the survey

In 2013, cohabitation already drew less prohibitiveness and more permissiveness than premarital sex: prohibitive views were 46.5 per cent for cohabitation versus 58.2 per cent for premarital sex, while permissive views were 31.1 per cent versus 20.2 per cent, respectively. In 2018, cohabitation's permissive share rose to 39.3 per cent, as compared with the share for premarital sex which grew to 27.2 per cent (prohibitive: 36.1 per cent versus 45.4 per cent). By 2024, the proportions who were permissive of cohabitation stood at nearly half (48.4 per cent) as compared to less than four in 10 for premarital sex (38.1 per cent).

Two shifts underpin this pattern. First, the middle category "only wrong sometimes" shrank from 2018 to 2024 for both items (premarital sex: 27.5 to 22.5 per cent; cohabitation: 24.6 to 19.7 per cent), indicating fewer respondents hedging and more taking a clear stance. Second, permissive perceptions of cohabitation is led by growth in respondents indicating that this practice is "not wrong at all" (17.0 per cent in 2013, to 19.4 per cent in 2018 and 28.6 per cent in 2024), while perceptions of premarital sex has liberalised more cautiously (11.0 per cent in 2013, to 12.4 per cent in 2018 and 19.9 per cent in 2024 for

"not wrong at all" responses) with a smaller rise at the most-permissive end (see Figure 3.3.1).

Figure 3.3.1: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses to acceptability of cohabitation to acceptability of premarital sex, responses by option selected across waves



3.3.2 Two-thirds see cohabitation and premarital sex as equally acceptable (or equally unacceptable); over one-quarter view cohabitation as more permissible than premarital sex; and less than one in 10 see cohabitation as less permissible than premarital sex

There is a clear gap between how respondents judge cohabitation and premarital sex in 2024, despite cohabitation seeming to imply the practice of

IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

Moral Attitudes in Flux: Comparing Trends across Religions in Singapore by Mathew, M., Lim, H. A., Teo, K. K., and Tay, M.

premarital sex. Cohabitation attracts a higher permissive share than premarital sex (by 10.3 percentage points; see Figure 3.3.1 above for overall figures), while premarital sex draws a higher prohibitive share than cohabitation (by 7.4 percentage points; see Figure 3.1.1). When comparing responses between these two question items directly, 27.0 per cent of respondents indicated cohabitation as being more permissible relative to their responses on premarital sex; 65.7 per cent selected the same response across both issues, i.e., indicating that cohabitation is just as permissible (or unpermissible) as premarital sex; and 7.3 per cent saw cohabitation as less permissible relative to their responses on premarital sex (see Figure 3.3.2a).

Figure 3.3.2a: How do you feel about these social issues?, comparisons of responses to acceptability of cohabitation to acceptability of premarital sex, respondents and respondents who found

Just as acceptable cohabitation ... 65.7


More acceptable 7.3

Breakdowns by one's view of premarital sex confirm the trends described above. Among those who say premarital sex is always wrong, 26.5 per cent of this group still view cohabitation more permissibly, while 73.5 per cent see them as equally impermissible (a "less permissible" option is logically unavailable at this end of the scale). For the premarital sex as "almost always wrong" group, nearly half (47.9 per cent) rate cohabitation as more permissible; for those indicating premarital sex as "only wrong sometimes", it is 39.0 per cent; and for "not wrong

most of the time", 29.4 per cent. At the other extreme, those who say premarital sex is not wrong at all overwhelmingly judge cohabitation equally permissible (90.3 per cent), with a "more permissible" option unavailable due to the ceiling of the scale (see Figure 3.3.2b).

These end-point constraints (floor or ceiling effects) matter for interpretation: respondents at the prohibitive extreme can only move upwards when comparing cohabitation, and those at the permissive extreme cannot move beyond "not wrong at all." Despite that mechanical nudge, only 26.5 per cent of the "always wrong" group rate cohabitation as more permissible; most (73.5 per cent) treat cohabitation as morally equivalent to premarital sex. Conversely, among respondents with moderate views of premarital sex, sizable shares still find cohabitation more permissible, consistent with cohabitation being socially normalised ahead of sexual permissiveness per se.

Figure 3.3.2b: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses to acceptability of cohabitation to acceptability of premarital sex, overall responses in 2024 by selected response option



IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

Moral Attitudes in Flux: Comparing Trends across Religions in Singapore
by Mathew, M., Lim, H. A., Teo, K. K., and Tay, M.

3.3.3 Younger cohorts draw a sharper moral distinction between

cohabitation and premarital sex, with over three in 10 of those aged

18–35 seeing cohabitation as more permissible than premarital sex

compared to one in five respondents over 65 years old

Age was a salient factor correlating with the likelihood of an individual finding

cohabitation more permissible than, or just as permissible as, premarital sex.

Among those aged 18–35, 31.9 per cent saw cohabitation as more permissible

than premarital sex (versus 27.1 per cent, 22.9 per cent and 20.9 per cent for

those in the 36-50, 51-65 and >65 cohorts, respectively). The share of

respondents indicating the two are "just as permissible" also rises with age:

62.0 per cent, 66.9 per cent, 69.3 per cent and 69.5 per cent. Thus, younger

adults are about 7–8 percentage points less likely than older cohorts to perceive

cohabitation to be "just as permissible / unpermissible" compared to premarital

sex. The youngest age cohort is also about 11 percentage points more likely

than those over 65 (and about 9 percentage points more than ages 51-65) to

indicate that cohabitation is "more permissible" than premarital sex. The "less

permissible" response also edges up with age (6.1 to 9.6 per cent) (see Figure

3.3.3).

Taken together, this suggests younger cohorts draw a sharper moral distinction

between cohabitation and premarital sex, i.e., more readily normalising


cohabitation while remaining comparatively cautious about sexual

permissiveness; whereas older cohorts are more likely to treat the two as

morally equivalent (either both being acceptable or both being unacceptable).

Figure 3.3.3: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses to acceptability of cohabitation to acceptability of premarital sex, overall responses in 2024 by age cohort

Compared to premarital sex, % who view cohabitation as ...




3.3.4 About one-third of Catholics and Buddhists view cohabitation to be more permissible than premarital sex, compared with roughly a quarter among most other religious groups and about one-fifth of Muslims

Religion was also a salient correlate of how cohabitation is judged relative to premarital sex. Catholics and Buddhists were most likely to see cohabitation as more permissible than premarital sex (32.9 and 30.4 per cent, respectively). This share was slightly lower among Hindus (28.2 per cent) and Christians (28.0 per cent), and declined further among Taoists (27.0 per cent), the non-religious (24.3 per cent) and Muslims (21.4 per cent). Conversely, the proportion saying the two are "just as permissible" rises along that sequence: from 58.6 per cent (Catholics) and 61.8 per cent (Buddhists) to about two-thirds of Hindus, Christians and Taoists, peaking among the non-religious (68.5 per

cent) and Muslims (71.1 per cent). In *toto*, Catholics and Buddhists are somewhat more inclined than other groups to differentiate in favour of cohabitation, whereas Muslims and the non-religious most often treat cohabitation and premarital sex as morally equivalent (see Figure 3.3.4).

Figure 3.3.4: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses to acceptability of cohabitation to acceptability of premarital sex, overall responses in 2024 by religion

Compared to premarital sex, % who view cohabitation as ...



3.3.5 Disapproval of premarital sex and cohabitation has eased from 2013 to 2024 but this trend differs across age and religion; in monotheistic religions and Hinduism, declines in prohibitive views are particularly stark among younger adults relative to older peers; among Buddhists, Taoists and the non-religious, declines in prohibitive views are broad-based across ages

Across religions and age cohorts, disapproval of premarital sex and

cohabitation generally declines from 2013 to 2024, but the size of that decline

varies (Figures 3.3.5a-b). In the more disapproving religions (e.g., Islam and

Christianity), older cohorts show smaller reductions in disapproval and smaller

gains in permissiveness than their younger peers, indicating greater attitudinal

stability at older ages. For instance, while less than nine in 10 18-35-year-old

Muslims held prohibitive views towards premarital sex in 2013 (86.0 per cent),

this proportion dropped substantially to just over half in 2024 (51.6 per cent).

Meanwhile, over nine in 10 Muslims over 65 years of age held similar views in

2013 (93.2 per cent), and this proportion dipped marginally (in relative terms)

to less than nine in 10 in 2024 (85.2 per cent). This trend was also seen in

Christians, Catholics and Hindus, albeit with a less stark difference in variation

between younger and older age cohorts.

Among the less disapproving groups (e.g., Buddhism, Taoism and those with

no religion), the youngest cohorts began the series with relatively lower

disapproval in 2013; subsequent decreases are therefore smaller (a floor effect).

Unlike Muslims, Christians, Catholics and Hindus, the age gradient of

differences from 2013-2024 is weaker or absent for Buddhists, Taoists and the

non-religious. In these groups, younger and older cohorts move in the same

direction and by roughly similar magnitudes, suggesting a broad-based

liberalisation rather than one driven mainly by youth.

For instance, while under three in 10 non-religious youth 18-35 years of age

held prohibitive views towards premarital sex (27.6 per cent) in 2013, this

proportion fell to under one in 20 in 2024 (4.0 per cent). The oldest age cohort

for the non-religious also experienced a similar dip in proportions wielding

prohibitive views, from over six in 10 (62.8 per cent) in 2013, to one-third in

2024 (33.7 per cent).

For cohabitation, the drop in disapproval is more modest (consistent with

already lower baseline disapproval) while gains accrue chiefly at the "not wrong"

end of the scale. Overall, the pattern in these traditions is uniform easing across

ages, not the sharper cohort contrast seen in Islam and Christianity.

In the direct comparison between the two behaviours (premarital sex and

cohabitation), Muslims most often treat them as equally permissible (or

impermissible) and are less likely than average to judge cohabitation more

permissibly. Catholics meanwhile show the opposite pattern; they are more

inclined than average to differentiate in favour of cohabitation and less likely to

say the two are equivalent. Taken together, these patterns suggest that

religion's constraining effect on these moral domains remains strongest among

older cohorts, while younger cohorts across traditions are converging toward

greater permissiveness, especially for cohabitation.


All these likely indicate that monotheistic religions and Hinduism may have

taken a circumscribed role for young people. While the levels of disapproval

remain elevated for these groups in general, the views of younger adherents


have experienced greater shifts in perceptions compared to older peers.

Figure 3.3.5a: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses on premarital sex, by age group, religion, and across waves



IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

Figure 3.3.5b: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses on cohabitation, by age group, religion, and across waves



IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

3.4 DEEP DIVE II: BETTING, BETRAYAL AND BABIES BEFORE VOWS

3.4.1 Moral consensus against gambling and extramarital sex has

remained strong from 2013 to 2024 with three-quarters of

respondents wielding prohibitive views, but consensus against

pregnancy OOW has dipped, with less than six in 10 holding

prohibitive views on this now compared to three-quarters in 2013

Disapproval rates of gambling and extramarital sex have remained high and

largely stable throughout all three waves of the survey. For gambling,

disapproving views hover at about three-quarters throughout (70.1 per cent in

2013, to 74.4 per cent in 2018 and 74.0 per cent in 2024). The permissive share

meanwhile fell from 12.7 per cent in 2013 to 6.6 per cent in 2018, before

increasing to 10.0 per cent in 2024. For extramarital sex, over four in five held

prohibitive views in 2013 and 2018 (both at around 81 per cent); this proportion

softens to 75.1 per cent in 2024, mirrored by a rise in permissive views to 12.5

per cent (from 6-8 per cent in previous waves). For both issues, the strength of

disapproval is held relatively resolutely: roughly three in four disapprovers

select the "always wrong" option rather than the "almost always wrong" option.

In contrast, attitudes towards pregnancy OOW have liberalised across every

wave: disapproval falls from 73.5 per cent (2013) to 64.9 per cent (2018) and


58.0 per cent (2024), a total drop of 15.5 percentage points. Over the same

period, permissive views climb sharply from 11.2 per cent in 2013, to 13.8 per

cent in 2018 and to 21.2 per cent in 2024 (over one in five). The middle category,

i.e., proportions indicating that pregnancy OOW was "only wrong sometimes" rises in 2018, and then settles in 2024 (15.2 per cent in 2013; 21.4 per cent in 2018; 20.8 per cent in 2024). As with the other two issues, the composition of disapproval is stable: around seven in 10 disapprovers choose "always wrong" (see Figure 3.4.1).

Figure 3.4.1: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses for acceptability of gambling, extramarital sex, and pregnancy OOW, responses by option selected across waves



3.4.2 Disapproval of extramarital sex remains, though disapproval has

eased in several traditions, most notably among Hindus and

Taoists with double-digit declines since 2013, driven largely by

younger cohorts. Older Christians and Catholics grew more

prohibitive, while permissive views rose most among mid-life

Catholics, younger Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists and the non-

religious

Extramarital sex (which can be taken as a visceral manifestation of adultery)

has a generally consistent national consensus of prohibitive views, and

proportions with permissive views remain relatively low across the past decade.

However, this trend differs across religious affiliations and ages. For Hindus

and Taoists, these groups saw proportions wielding prohibitive views towards

extramarital sex falling by more than 10 percentage points from 2013-2024.

Less than nine in 10 Hindus indicated that this act was "always wrong" or

"almost always wrong" in 2013 (88.1 per cent), with the corresponding

proportion in 2024 dipping to three-quarters (75.6 per cent). In the same vein,

four in five Taoists indicated likewise in 2013 (80.2 per cent), as compared to

two-thirds in 2024 (67.2 per cent).

Many religious groups also saw differing paces of change in proportions

wielding prohibitive views towards extramarital sex across age cohorts.

Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists and the non-religious in the

youngest 18-35 age cohort saw proportions expressing such views dipping at

a faster pace than, or declining compared to their older peers. For instance,

while 86.2 per cent of Christians aged 18-35 years held prohibitive views in

2013 as compared to 79.8 per cent in 2024; the corresponding proportions of

Christians over 65 years old actually rose from 76.2 per cent in 2013, to 91.3

per cent in 2024.

In tandem with the above trends, certain age cohorts within some religious

groups also saw a corresponding increase in proportions indicating conditional,

or context-dependent views of extramarital sex. While the overall proportions

for all religious groups and the non-religious indicating that extramarital sex was

"only wrong sometimes" experienced less than a 5 percentage point change

from 2013 to 2024, Christians and Catholics in the oldest cohort were much

less likely to select this option; while 19.0 per cent of Christians and 17.4 per

cent of Catholics over 65 years of age had conditional views of extramarital sex

in 2013, these proportions fell by over 10 percentage points in 2024, signalling

a solidifying of views towards a more prohibitive stance.

Meanwhile, proportions adopting permissive views towards extramarital sex

also rose significantly for certain groups. Catholics 36–50 years of age, Hindus

aged 18-35 years, Taoists, those with no religion, and Buddhists 50 years or


younger experienced increases of over 10 percentage points for proportions

wielding permissive views towards extramarital sex. For instance, while just 2.3

per cent of Catholics 36-50 years old held permissive views in 2013, this

proportion rose to 17.6 per cent in 2024 (see Figure 3.4.2).

Figure 3.4.2: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses on extramarital sex, by age group, religion, and across waves



IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

3.4.3 Compared with extramarital sex, views on pregnancy OOW have

softened more broadly and deeply: proportions with prohibitive

views fall in nearly every religion—age sub-group from 2013 to 2024.

The largest drops tend to occur among younger Muslims,

Christians, and Hindus, while shifts among Catholics, Buddhists

and Taoists are broad-based or mid-life-led, notably among

Catholics

Compared with adultery, views on pregnancy OOW have experienced broader

and deeper change across religious affiliations and age cohorts. Disapproval

falls in almost every age group within each religion from 2013 to 2024, with the

largest shifts typically among the younger cohorts within the Muslim, Christian,

and Hindu communities. Older cohorts in these groups remain more stable and

more prohibitive, though they, too, generally move in a liberalising direction. For

instance, while less than nine in 10 Muslims 18-35 years old held prohibitive

views towards pregnancy OOW in 2013 (88.9 per cent), this proportion drops

precipitously to six in 10 in 2024 (60.4 per cent). This is in contrast to 94.5 per

cent of Muslims over 65 years old indicating likewise in 2013, and 88.5 per cent

indicating as such in 2024.

However, among Catholics, Buddhists and Taoists, declines in proportions

holding prohibitive views towards pregnancy OOW are driven by middle-aged


cohorts or broader-based across ages rather than youth-led; in some cases

older groups shift as much as, or more than, younger groups. A standout

change occurs among Catholics aged 36–50, where disapproval drops sharply

between 2013 (81.2 per cent) and 2024 (42.1 per cent), accompanied by clear gains in both conditional and permissive responses. Across many religion-age subgroups, increases at the permissive end ("not wrong most of the time / not wrong at all") are more pronounced than growth in the conditional middle (with the exception of middle-aged Catholics) signalling movement from hesitation to acceptance (see Figure 3.4.3).

Figure 3.4.3: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses on pregnancy OOW, by age group, religion, and across waves



IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

3.5 DEEP DIVE III: HOMOSEXUALITY

3.5.1 Views on gay sex, gay marriage, gay couples pursuing adoption,

and gay couples pursuing surrogacy or ART have markedly

liberalised over the past decade; proportions of prohibitive views

fell from around four in five for gay sex and three-quarters for gay

marriage in 2013, to just over half in 2024 for both issues

Attitudes liberalised across all four items pertaining to gay issues from 2013 to

2024. Disapproval of gay sex fell by about 27 percentage points from 2013 to

2024; eight in 10 held prohibitive views of gay sex in 2013 (80 per cent), and

this proportion fell to just over half in 2024 (52.9 per cent). Proportions with

prohibitive views on gay marriage similarly fell by approximately 23 percentage

points over the past decade, with about three-quarters indicating as such in

2013 (74.2 per cent) as compared to half in 2024 (50.8 per cent).

Meanwhile, proportions with prohibitive views on gay couples pursuing

adoption fell by about 16 percentage points; over six in 10 felt this way in 2013

(61.8 per cent) as compared to less than half in 2024 (46.3 per cent). In the

same vein, proportions with prohibitive view on gay couples pursuing surrogacy

or ART (measured from 2018) fell from 56.6 per cent in 2018 to less than half

in 2024 (48.9 per cent). A stable hierarchy persists in every wave: gay sexual

relations attract the most disapproval, followed by gay marriage, with adoption

and surrogacy or ART by gay couples drawing the least disapproval.

Those gaps have narrowed over time, most notably between adoption and

marriage: approximately a 12 percentage-point difference in 2013 to about a 5-

point difference in 2024. This indicates growing alignment in how respondents

evaluate relationship recognition versus parenting pathways. In line with the

aforementioned findings, permissive responses also rose across all items, with

the largest gains at the "not wrong at all" end of the spectrum (see Figure 3.5.1).

Across the gay issues, responses follow an inverse logic relative to the

behaviours' preconditions. Although marriage typically presupposes same-sex

intimacy, it draws less disapproval (and more permissiveness) than gay sex.

Likewise, family-formation pathways (adoption and surrogacy or ART) tend to

be judged more leniently than both sex and marriage; with the exception that

surrogacy or ART is viewed more negatively than adoption by gay couples. This


pattern indicates that respondents assessed each item on its own terms rather

than as a bundled sequence. Substantively, it suggests that moral reservations

are concentrated on same-sex conjugal acts more than on same-sex

relationship recognition or same-sex parenting.

Figure 3.5.1: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses for gay sex, marriage, adoption and surrogacy/ART for gay couples, responses by option selected across waves



3.5.2 Liberalising views on gay sex are led by younger cohorts across religions. Muslims and Christians remain the most prohibitive, especially among older adults, while Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists show sharp youth-driven softening. Declines in prohibitive views are more uniform across ages for Taoists and the non-religious

IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

Moral Attitudes in Flux: Comparing Trends across Religions in Singapore by Mathew, M., Lim, H. A., Teo, K. K., and Tay, M.

Views on gay sex have liberalised across the decade, but not uniformly. Across

all religions and the non-religious, younger cohorts are more permissive than

older cohorts; and most religious traditions show a substantial liberalising of

views on gay sex from 2013 to 2024. However, Muslims and Christians remain

the most likely to hold prohibitive views on gay sex across ages, with strong

majorities in the older cohorts continuing to judge gay sex as "always" or

"almost always" wrong, and only small shares selecting the permissive options.

For instance, nearly all Muslims over 65 years old held prohibitive views

towards gay sex in 2013 (97.3 per cent), and this proportion has dipped

marginally (in relative terms) to over nine in 10 in 2024 (91 per cent); the

corresponding proportions for Christians over 65 years old were nine in 10 in

2013 (90.4 per cent) and close to eight in 10 (78.7 per cent) in 2024.

Muslim and Christian youth were less likely to display prohibitive views of gay

sex over the past decade and adopt permissive views; while over nine in 10

Muslims 18-35 years old (92.3 per cent) and less than three-quarters of

Christians 18-35 years old (73.3 per cent) held prohibitive views in 2013, the

corresponding proportions in 2024 were approximately six in 10 Muslims (62.0

per cent) and Christians (57.1 per cent).

The Catholic, Hindu and Buddhist communities also experienced significant

shifts in views towards gay sex. Proportions of Catholics holding prohibitive

views falling from about eight in 10 in 2013 (79.0 per cent) to less than six in 10

(57.6 per cent); with similar trends seen for Hindus and Buddhists. However,

changes in views of younger cohorts versus older peers are particularly stark

for Catholics (and similar for Hindus and Buddhists), as compared to Christians

and Muslims. While proportions of Catholics over 65 with prohibitive views of

gay sex dipped from nine in 10 in 2013 (90 per cent) to over eight in 10 (82.6

per cent) in 2024, the corresponding proportions for Catholics 18-35 years old

were over seven in 10 in 2013 (72.2 per cent) and just under one-quarter in

2024 (22.9 per cent).

Taoists and those with no religion also experienced diminishing proportions of

those holding prohibitive views towards gay sex. While eight in 10 Taoists (79.7

per cent) and over two-thirds of the non-religious (68.0 per cent) indicated as

such in 2013, these proportions fell to over four in 10 Taoists (41.6 per cent)

and over one-quarter of the non-religious (28.4 per cent) in 2024. However, for

these two communities, the fall in proportions with prohibitive views of gay sex

was more uniform across the age cohorts, as compared to other religious

communities.

Across traditions, the changes in proportions selecting the "only wrong

sometimes" option relatively muted, implying that changes in professed views

on gay sex are coming chiefly from shifts between prohibitive and permissive

positions rather than from growth in conditional hedging. In sum, attitudes


toward gay sex are diverging by religion and generation: strong and persistent

disapproval among older Muslim and Christian cohorts, versus rapid

liberalisation among Catholic, Hindu and Buddhist youth, as well as Taoists and

the non-religious as a whole (Figure 3.5.2).

Figure 3.5.2: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses on gay sex, by age group, religion, and across waves



3.5.3 Views on gay marriage largely mirror views on gay sex, with

liberalisation led by younger cohorts in every tradition. Older

Muslims and Christians remain the most prohibitive, while

Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists and Taoists register some of the

steepest declines; the non-religious now show majority

permissiveness

Similar to views on gay sex, views on gay marriage also liberalised significantly

from 2013 to 2024 across all religious traditions and age cohorts, though not

evenly. A clear age gradient persists: younger cohorts are less prohibitive and

more permissive than their older peers in every religion and among the non-

religious.

Among Muslims, disapproval remains very high but has eased among the

young. Muslim youth (18–35 years old) who judged gay marriage as "always"

or "almost always wrong" fell from 87.4 per cent in 2013 to 60.7 per cent in 2024,

with the permissive share rising from 7.7 per cent to 26.9 per cent. In contrast,

older Muslims stayed largely unchanged and strongly prohibitive:

approximately nine in 10 of those aged 51-65 still hold prohibitive views of gay

marriage today (88.9 per cent in 2013; 90.8 per cent in 2024), and the same is

the case for Muslims over 65 (93.3 per cent in 2013; 91.6 per cent in 2024).

Christians likewise became less prohibitive across ages, though levels remain

comparatively high in the older cohorts. Disapproval among Christians 18–35

fell from 68.7 per cent in 2013 to 53.7 per cent in 2024, and among those over

65, from 89.3 per cent in 2018 to 75.0 per cent in 2024; with permissive

responses increasing in tandem (e.g., 20.6 per cent in 2013 to 32.8 per cent in

2024 for 18-35).

Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists and Taoists exhibit some of the largest declines.

Overall Catholic disapproval dropped from 73.7 per cent in 2013 to 49.1 per

cent in 2024; among Catholics over 65, those holding prohibitive views fell from

92.2 per cent in 2018 to 73.0 per cent in 2024, and among those 18-35 from

56.7 per cent in 2013 to just 16.6 per cent in 2024. In the same vein, Hindu,

Buddhist and Taoist disapproval of gay marriage fell steeply overall, driven

especially by youth.

The non-religious have the most permissive views on gay marriage; among this

group, disapproval fell from 63.4 per cent in 2013 to 32.1 per cent in 2024

overall; with permissive responses now the majority (from 24.1 per cent in 2013

to 51.8 per cent in 2024) in line with findings on gay sex.

Across traditions, selections of "only wrong sometimes" changed little relative


to the shifts at the poles; this is similar to trends observed for responses on gay

sex. This indicates that movement on views pertaining to gay marriage over the

decade primarily reflects transitions from prohibitive to permissive positions,

rather than growth in conditional hedging (Figure 3.5.3).

Figure 3.5.3: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses on gay marriage, by age group, religion, and across waves



3.5.4 Disapproval of adoption by gay couples has eased, from roughly

six in 10 a decade ago to less than half today; permissive views

have grown, with the "only wrong sometimes" middle staying fairly

steady. The sharpest softening comes from younger and mid-life

cohorts across most religious traditions, though Muslims

(especially older adults) remain the most prohibitive and Christians

also stay comparatively disapproving at older ages

Views on adoption by gay couples have eased over the decade, though

unevenly across religions and ages. At the national level, the proportion holding

prohibitive views falls from about six in 10 in 2013 (61.8 per cent) to less than

half in 2024 (46.3 per cent), while permissive responses rise (2013: 23.7 per

cent; 2024: 37.4 per cent), with the middle "only wrong sometimes" option

remaining broadly stable (\approx 15–16 per cent) (see Figure 3.5.1).

Muslims remain the most disapproving, especially at older ages, but youth have

softened. In 2024, about half of Muslim youths (18-35) hold prohibitive views

towards adoption by gay couples (51.6 per cent), compared with seven in 10

among those aged 36-50 (70.3 per cent) and over eight in 10 51-65-year-old

and over-65-year-old Muslims (85.9 and 84.4 per cent, respectively).

Permissive shares among Muslim youths are markedly higher than a decade

ago (16.4 per cent in 2013 to 33.3 per cent in 2024), but still trail other groups.

Christians also continue to register comparatively high disapproval in older age

cohorts, alongside sizeable easing among younger adults. In 2024, over four in

10 Christians 18–35 years old indicated prohibitive views towards adoption by

gay couples (45.4 per cent), as compared to seven in 10 of those over 65 (70.3

per cent). Permissive responses among Christian youths have risen

correspondingly.

Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists show larger declines in proportions with

prohibitive views of adoption by gay couples from 2013 to 2024, driven by

younger and mid-life cohorts. Overall Catholic disapproval is now just less than

half (49.3 per cent), with around one in five Catholic youths (18.7 per cent) but

nearly seven in 10 Catholics over 65 years old indicating as such (68.8 per cent).

This trend is also observed for Buddhists. Meanwhile, Hindus and Taoists

exhibit broader-based liberalisation of views on adoption by gay couples across

ages.

Similar to findings on gay sex and gay marriage, the non-religious have the


most permissive views on adoption by gay couples; among this group,

disapproval fell from 50.9 per cent in 2013 to 27.3 per cent in 2024 overall; with

permissive responses now the majority (from 34.7 per cent in 2013 to 51.9 per

cent in 2024) (see Figure 3.5.4).

Figure 3.5.4: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of responses on adoption by gay couples, by age group, religion, and across waves



3.6 DEEP DIVE IV: NOTABLE SHIFTS WITHIN RELIGIOUS GROUPS

3.6.1 For Catholics in 2024, disapproval of gambling and extramarital sex

is high and intensifies with age; on family-formation items,

generational splits are stark: youths are largely permissive on

premarital sex, seniors largely prohibitive; divorce shows a

sizeable conditional middle, especially among 36-50s; and

disapproval of pregnancy OOW rises steadily with age

Among Catholics, age gradients differ by issue. The views of younger Catholics

(18–35 years old) are similar to those aged 36–50 on several "consensus" items

(gambling, adultery), rather than uniformly more permissive. In contrast,

premarital sex and divorce show strong cohort splits, with youths markedly

more permissive and older Catholics far more prohibitive. Mid-life Catholics

(36–50) most often select the conditional "only wrong sometimes" option on

family-formation items, signalling situational judgement.

When it comes to views of gambling among Catholics, we note that proportions

indicating prohibitive views rises steadily with age: 62.5 per cent (18–35), 66.6

per cent (36–50), 75.5 per cent (51–65) and 83.3 per cent (>65). The permissive

share falls correspondingly (18.8 per cent, 10.6 per cent, 10.5 per cent and 2.1

per cent) across the age cohorts.

Prohibitive views on extramarital sex, meanwhile, are high in every cohort and

climb sharply with age: 72.9 per cent (18-35), 68.4 per cent (36-50), 75.4 per

cent (51–65) and 95.9 per cent (>65). Permissive responses are low among the

young (14.6 per cent) and virtually absent among seniors; conditional

responses sit around one in eight for the working-age cohorts and fall to 4.2 per

cent among those over 65. Notably, Catholics aged 18-35 are more

disapproving than those 36–50 of adultery (72.9 per cent versus 68.4 per cent).

When it comes to pregnancy OOW, steep age gradients are noted. Disapproval

climbs from 37.5 per cent (18–35) to 42.1 per cent (36–50), 59.6 per cent (51–

65) and 83.3 per cent (>65). Youth are evenly split between permissive and

prohibitive positions (both 37.5 per cent), with one quarter choosing "only wrong

sometimes". Conditional responses peak at 36.8 per cent among those 36–50

years old, suggesting strong context-dependence in mid-life, while

permissiveness drops sharply with age (37.5 per cent for Catholics 18–35 years

old to just 6.3 per cent for their over-65 peers).

Catholics show one of the sharpest cohort cleavages on premarital sex. A clear

majority of youths 18-35 years old are permissive (64.6 per cent indicating

permissive views), with only 22.9 per cent indicating prohibitive views and 12.5

per cent conditional viewpoints. Shares of viewpoints then flip with age:


Catholics 36-50 are more mixed (31.6 per cent prohibitive; 38.6 per cent

permissive; 29.8 per cent conditional); those 51-65 lean prohibitive (49.1 per

cent) with fewer permissive (31.5 per cent), and seniors are largely prohibitive

(79.1 per cent) with very small permissive shares (8.4 per cent). Similar trends are noted for divorce (see Figure 3.6.1).

Figure 3.6.1: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of Catholics' 2024 responses on gambling, extramarital sex, pregnancy OOW, premarital sex, and divorce across age cohorts



3.6.2 Catholic opinion shows rapid liberalisation among the young on

same-sex and some family-formation issues, persistence of strong

prohibitions among seniors on extramarital sex, gambling and

same-sex issues, and a case-by-case stance on divorce

concentrated in mid-life from 2013 to 2024

Among Catholics, the sharpest shifts since 2013 are on the same-sex issues,

premarital sex and pregnancy OOW. These changes are led chiefly by younger

cohorts, while prohibitive views on extramarital sex and gambling remain strong,

especially among seniors. Disapproval of gay sex among Catholics aged 18-

35 fell from over seven in 10 in 2013 to less than one in four in 2024 (72.2 per

cent to 22.9 per cent). Views of gay marriage for this group moved similarly

(56.7 per cent to 16.6 per cent), and the same pattern extends to parenting

pathways: disapproval of adoption by a gay couple dropped from half to around

one in five (50.0 per cent to 18.7 per cent). Older Catholics had more muted

liberalisation of views; among those over 65, disapproval in 2024 remains high

for gay sex (87.5 per cent), gay marriage (73.0 per cent) and adoption (68.8 per

cent).

Views on premarital sex and pregnancy OOW have also shifted significantly in

the Catholic community. Among 18-35-year-olds, the prohibitive share vis-à-

vis premarital sex fell to 22.9 per cent by 2024 while permissive views rose to

64.6 per cent; mid-life Catholics (36-50) moved more moderately and older

cohorts eased least, with prohibitive views still near half for ages 51-65 (49.1

per cent) and about eight in 10 among seniors (79.1 per cent). Second, views

on pregnancy OOW liberalised across the board with the exception of the oldest

age group: disapproval is now less than four in 10 among 18-35 (37.5 per cent),

around two in five at 36-50 (42.1 per cent), rising to about three in five at 51-

65 (59.6 per cent) and more than eight in 10 for those over 65 (83.3 per cent).

Notably, conditional responses ("only wrong sometimes") concentrated in mid-

life by 2024 (36.8 per cent), signalling a shift from outright rejection in 2013

toward situational judgement.

By contrast, the "bedrock" items changed little in direction: extramarital sex and

gambling remain widely disapproved of and have become more age-stratified.

On adultery, prohibitive views stayed high in every wave and climbed among

seniors to 95.9 per cent in 2024, while younger Catholics remained firmly


disapproving (72.9 per cent at 18–35). Gambling shows a similar monotonic

rise in disapproval with age by 2024 — about five in eight among 18–35 (62.5

per cent) versus more than eight in 10 among seniors (83.3 per cent) — with

only modest shifts across the decade at the aggregate level (see Figure 3.6.2).

Figure 3.6.2: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of Catholic responses on all 10 issues, by age group and across waves



3.6.3 Overall, regular religious practice among Catholics, especially the young, is associated with firmer, more prohibitive stances across

family- and sexuality-related issues

Among Catholics, regular religious practice is a powerful differentiator of views

on morality-related issues, especially for younger adults. Among 18-35-year-

olds who attend services regularly (i.e., weekly or more often), prohibitive views

on the following five issues are markedly higher than among peers who attend

religious services less frequently: gambling (76.9 per cent versus 57.1 per cent),

extramarital sex (92.3 per cent versus 65.7 per cent), pregnancy OOW (61.6

versus 28.6 per cent), premarital sex (46.2 per cent versus 14.3 per cent) and

divorce (46.2 per cent versus 11.5 per cent). Permissive shares

correspondingly shrink (e.g., divorce: 23.1 per cent versus 65.7 per cent), and

for pregnancy OOW the "only wrong sometimes" middle collapses (7.7 per cent

versus 31.4 per cent).

Similar, though smaller patterns are also observed among Catholics aged 51–

65 for gambling (74.1 per cent versus 60.0 per cent), pregnancy OOW (63.0

per cent versus 23.4 per cent) and divorce (29.6 per cent versus 13.3 per cent).

However, for extramarital sex, regular attenders 51–65 are less prohibitive than

their less-frequent peers (63.0 per cent versus 73.3 per cent, with permissive


views 22.2 per cent versus 13.4 per cent). Overall, regular religious practice

among Catholics, especially the young, is associated with firmer, more

prohibitive stances across these family- and sexuality-related issues (see

Figure 3.6.3).

Figure 3.6.3: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of Catholics' 2024 responses on gambling, extramarital sex, pregnancy OOW, premarital sex, and divorce across age cohorts and religious practice



*N.B.: < About weekly refers to less frequent attendance of religious services (i.e., less than once weekly); ≥ About weekly refers to more frequent attendance of religious services (i.e., once weekly or more frequently).

3.6.4 Muslim views remain broadly prohibitive in relation to morality

issues, but some liberalisation of views is noted among youths:

those under 35 have become markedly less disapproving of

premarital sex, cohabitation, pregnancy OOW, and same-sex

issues, while older cohorts stay strongly prohibitive. Divorce is

however the outlier, with disapproval easing across all ages

Among Muslims, views are broadly stable at high levels of disapproval, with

most movement concentrated among the young. From 2013 to 2024, Muslims

aged 18-35 became markedly less prohibitive on several items, including

premarital sex (86.0 per cent in 2013 falling to 51.6 per cent in 2024 indicating

that this is "always wrong" or "almost always wrong"). Similar trends were also

noted for cohabitation (74.6 per cent in 2013; 42.4 per cent in 2024) and

pregnancy OOW (88.9 per cent in 2013; 60.4 per cent in 2024).

The same pattern holds for the same-sex cluster of issues: disapproval of gay

sex fell among young Muslims 18–35 years old, from 92.3 per cent in 2013 to

62.0 per cent in 2024, with similar trends noted for gay marriage. In contrast,

older cohorts were as prohibitive in 2013 as their younger peers vis-à-vis gay

sex and gay marriage, but continued remaining so in 2024, with over nine in 10

still expressing disapproval on these issues.

Divorce is the notable exception where proportions holding prohibitive views


dropped more uniformly across Muslim age cohorts: among 18-35-year-olds,

from 49.5 per cent in 2013 to 29.0 per cent in 2024, and among those over 65

from 74.3 per cent to 43.9 per cent, though a sizeable proportion indicated that this was "only wrong sometimes" persists in 2024 (approximately one-third across age cohorts) compared to other items. Taken together, Muslim trends over the decade reflect continuity at older ages and noteworthy liberalisation among youths on premarital sex, cohabitation, pregnancy OOW and same-sex issues, with divorce also shifting toward greater permissive sentiment (see

Figure 3.6.4).

Figure 3.6.4: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of Muslim responses on all 10 issues, by age group and across waves



3.6.5 Hindus' views generally liberalised from 2013 to 2024, but with

strong age splits. Premarital sex and gambling remain widely

disapproved of across all ages, especially among older Hindus; in

contrast, younger Hindus are far more open to premarital sex,

cohabitation and same-sex issues (with permissive majorities

among youth in 2024), while older cohorts remain largely

prohibitive

Across the decade, Hindu views have softened on most issues; but the pace

differs across age cohorts. Two "bedrock consensus" items, extramarital sex

and gambling, remain widely disapproved of in every cohort in 2024, with

roughly two-thirds to nine in 10 expressing prohibitive views depending on age.

Disapproval rises steadily with age on both issues, and permissive shares stay

comparatively low among middle-aged and older Hindus.

By contrast, views on premarital sex and cohabitation show clear cohort splits.

Hindus aged 18–35 are far less disapproving on these issues than their elders,

with permissive responses climbing to pluralities among youth (57.1 per cent

permissive of premarital sex and 75.6 per cent permissive of cohabitation),

while larger proportions of older Hindus still judge these actions as "always" or

"almost always wrong". Views on pregnancy OOW move in the same direction:

disapproval among younger Hindus has fallen markedly since 2013, while older

cohorts remain substantially more prohibitive.

Sharp age gradients are also noted on views pertaining to same-sex issues.

From 2013 to 2024, prohibitive views among Hindus aged 18-35 drop to one-


fifth or lower for gay sex, gay marriage and adoption or surrogacy/ART by gay

couples; permissive responses are now in the large majority (two-thirds or

higher). Older Hindus have also become more liberal, but a majority of those

over 50 years old still disapprove of gay sex and marriage (see Figure 3.6.5).

Figure 3.6.5: How do you feel about these social issues?, Comparisons of Hindu responses on all 10 issues, by age group and across waves



4. THE WAY FORWARD

This working paper has illustrated how Singapore's moral landscape is neither flat nor fractious; but textured. Across 10 issues (from gambling and extramarital sex, to cohabitation, pregnancy OOW, divorce and the same-sex cluster of issues), Singapore residents continue to sort their judgments into three broad stances: prohibitive ("always"/"almost always wrong"), conditional ("only wrong sometimes") and permissive ("not wrong most of the time"/"not wrong at all"). This shared vocabulary matters. It is a common frame within which to recognise both stable majorities (e.g., on adultery and gambling) and fast-moving edges (e.g., younger cohorts on cohabitation and same-sex issues), while also acknowledging areas, most notably divorce, where case-by-case reasoning predominates.

Three implications follow for a multireligious city-state that seeks unity without demanding uniformity. First, the role of the state to strengthen processes of engagement on divisive issues. Our findings show that views can change meaningfully within a decade, especially among the young, while other convictions remain deeply held across time and tradition. This argues for a steady emphasis on proportionate regulation, clear guardrails against harm, and predictable, consultative pathways for policy development on morally-charged questions. The state's role is to keep the playing field legitimate for disagreement: to ensure that strongly held religious or secular convictions may be expressed within the law, that minority consciences are not coerced, and

that the rights and safety of all are protected. To do this credibly, engagement

should be routine rather than episodic: widen upstream consultations with faith

bodies and civic groups; and continue building digital literacy so imported

culture-war framings do not drown out Singapore's own norms of

accommodation.

Second, religious leadership is pivotal. Our data suggests that religion and age

often shape moral outlooks. That creates both responsibility and opportunity.

Clergy and lay leaders can model pastoral clarity with civic charity: teach

doctrines faithfully while emphasising the dignity of every person; equip

followers to participate in public debate with care for social cohesion; and invest

in youth engagement that pairs moral formation with empathy across difference.

Third, the public at large — religious and non-religious — has a role that cannot

be outsourced. A diverse society is lived, not merely legislated. The everyday

disciplines that sustain trust are simple but demanding: argue the issue, not the

identity; distinguish personal conviction from public coercion; listen for the

"conditional middle" where many neighbours locate their judgments; and

practise the etiquette of disagreement. The latter is especially important in the

online sphere, where foreign narratives and outrage incentives can distort local

realities. Schools, workplaces, and community organisations can help by

normalising contact and cooperation across difference, highlighting shared

duties (e.g., caring for children and seniors, supporting those in crisis) even as

values differ.

Finally, the research agenda should continue. Longitudinal tracking has proven

its value by revealing where consensus is steady, where generational change

is rapid, and where "only wrong sometimes" marks morally complex terrain.

Future waves can deepen analysis by examining intensity of religious practice,

digital information diets and life-course transitions (e.g., marriage, caregiving)

as mechanisms of change. Keeping this evidence base current helps

stakeholders intervene earlier and more proportionately when debates heat up.

In sum, the way forward is confident pluralism with Singaporean characteristics:

a rules-based public square that safeguards space for conviction and

conscience; religious leadership that pairs fidelity with neighbourliness; and a

civic culture that prizes empathy, restraint and practical solidarity. Singapore

should remain a place where people of many faiths (and of none) live together

peacefully, contest ideas vigorously, and still choose to cohere.

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APPENDIX 1A: CONTINGENCY TABLES (OVERALL PROPORTIONS ACROSS WAVES)

How do you feel about these social issues? (% responses across three waves)						
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options	2024	2018	2013		
[PREMARITAL SEX] Sexual relations before marriage	Always wrong	28.0%	30.7%	39.7%		
	Almost always wrong	11.4%	14.7%	18.5%		
	Only wrong sometimes	22.5%	27.5%	21.6%		
	Not wrong most of the time	18.2%	14.8%	9.2%		
	Not wrong at all	19.9%	12.4%	11.0%		
[GAY SEX] Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex	Always wrong	41.4%	50.4%	61.6%		
	Almost always wrong	11.5%	13.2%	18.4%		
	Only wrong sometimes	16.1%	14.8%	9.8%		
	Not wrong most of the time	13.4%	10.2%	4.7%		
	Not wrong at all	17.6%	11.4%	5.6%		
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX] Sexual relations with someone other than marriage partner	Always wrong	58.6%	63.4%	62.2%		
	Almost always wrong	16.5%	17.8%	19.2%		
	Only wrong sometimes	12.4%	12.7%	11.1%		
	Not wrong most of the time	5.5%	3.3%	4.5%		

	Not wrong at all	7.0%	2.9%	3.0%
[DIVORCE] Divorce	Always wrong	17.8%	17.9%	24.4%
	, ,			
	Almost always wrong	10.1%	13.5%	19.7%
	Only wrong sometimes	33.8%	41.1%	34.1%
	Not wrong most of the time	15.8%	13.5%	11.9%
	Not wrong at all	22.5%	13.9%	9.9%
[COHABITATION] Living with a partner before marriage	Always wrong	23.3%	25.0%	29.6%
	Almost always wrong	8.7%	11.1%	16.9%
	Only wrong sometimes	19.7%	24.6%	22.4%
	Not wrong most of the time	19.8%	19.9%	14.1%
	Not wrong at all	28.6%	19.4%	17.0%
[PREGNANCY OOW] Having a pregnancy outside of marriage	Always wrong	41.7%	47.2%	52.6%
	Almost always wrong	16.3%	17.7%	20.9%
	Only wrong sometimes	20.8%	21.4%	15.2%
	Not wrong most of the time	10.4%	8.0%	6.8%
	Not wrong at all	10.8%	5.8%	4.4%
[ADOPTION BY GAY COUPLES] The adoption of a child by a gay couple	Always wrong	36.4%	41.2%	45.9%
	Almost always wrong	9.9%	12.2%	15.9%
	Only wrong sometimes	16.4%	16.6%	14.5%
	Not wrong most of the time	15.8%	13.2%	10.5%

	Not wrong at all	21.6%	16.8%	13.2%
[GAY MARRIAGE] Gay marriage	Always wrong	41.0%	48.5%	58.8%
	Almost always wrong	9.8%	11.5%	15.4%
	Only wrong sometimes	14.6%	13.1%	11.2%
	Not wrong most of the time	13.2%	10.5%	6.2%
	Not wrong at all	21.3%	16.4%	8.4%
[GAMBLING] Gambling	Always wrong	56.8%	55.6%	53.8%
	Almost always wrong	17.2%	18.8%	16.3%
	Only wrong sometimes	16.1%	19.1%	17.2%
	Not wrong most of the time	4.4%	3.4%	6.5%
	Not wrong at all	5.6%	3.2%	6.2%
[SURROGACY/ART BY GAY COUPLES] A gay couple having a child through surrogacy/artificial reproductive techniques	Always wrong	38.0%	44.0%	N/A (Not asked in 2013)
	Almost always wrong	10.9%	12.6%	
	Only wrong sometimes	15.5%	15.6%	
	Not wrong most of the time	14.8%	12.5%	
	Not wrong at all	20.8%	15.3%	

APPENDIX 1B: CONTINGENCY TABLES (BY AGE COHORT)

How do you	feel about these social issue	es? (2024) (% re	sponses across	age cohort)	
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options	18-35	36-50	51-65	65
	Always wrong	19.1%	31.9%	41.4%	46.0%
[PREMARITAL SEX]	Almost always wrong	9.0%	11.3%	12.9%	13.5%
Sexual relations before	Only wrong sometimes	21.4%	22.5%	20.1%	19.9%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	20.7%	17.1%	14.5%	11.3%
	Not wrong at all	29.7%	17.2%	11.2%	9.3%
	Always wrong	27.4%	43.3%	56.1%	61.1%
[GAY SEX]	Almost always wrong	9.9%	11.7%	9.9%	12.8%
Sexual relations between two	Only wrong sometimes	16.1%	16.8%	15.1%	11.5%
adults of the same sex	Not wrong most of the time	16.5%	12.5%	11.0%	7.4%
	Not wrong at all	30.2%	15.7%	7.9%	7.3%
	Always wrong	53.3%	59.2%	66.5%	67.2%
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX] Sexual relations with someone	Almost always wrong	17.1%	16.3%	13.6%	14.7%
other than marriage partner	Only wrong sometimes	11.8%	11.8%	12.0%	10.4%
	Not wrong most of the time	7.3%	5.6%	4.1%	3.0%

	Not wrong at all	10.4%	7.0%	3.8%	4.6%
	Always wrong	11.1%	17.9%	25.0%	30.2%
[DIVORCE] Divorce	Almost always wrong	8.0%	8.8%	10.4%	13.8%
	Only wrong sometimes	30.3%	35.6%	34.3%	32.9%
2.iidida	Not wrong most of the time	19.7%	15.3%	14.3%	10.0%
	Not wrong at all	30.9%	22.4%	16.1%	13.1%
	Always wrong	12.5%	25.0%	37.4%	43.5%
[COHABITATION] Living with a partner before	Almost always wrong	6.9%	10.3%	10.6%	10.7%
	Only wrong sometimes	16.6%	19.4%	19.3%	20.0%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	21.4%	19.2%	16.7%	12.5%
	Not wrong at all	42.7%	26.1%	16.1%	13.2%
	Always wrong	29.4%	44.9%	55.8%	58.3%
[PREGNANCY OOW]	Almost always wrong	18.2%	16.0%	14.0%	14.9%
Having a pregnancy outside of	Only wrong sometimes	22.6%	18.9%	17.7%	15.1%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	15.4%	8.9%	6.6%	5.4%
	Not wrong at all	14.4%	11.4%	5.9%	6.2%
IADODTION BY CAY	Always wrong	22.2%	35.0%	51.4%	55.9%
[ADOPTION BY GAY COUPLES] The adoption of a child by a gay couple	Almost always wrong	7.8%	11.2%	10.4%	10.0%
	Only wrong sometimes	14.4%	18.1%	14.6%	14.9%
	Not wrong most of the time	19.5%	16.0%	12.0%	9.1%

	Not wrong at all	36.1%	19.7%	11.8%	10.0%
	Always wrong	25.9%	39.9%	57.1%	62.4%
	Almost always wrong	9.4%	11.0%	8.5%	10.0%
[GAY MARRIAGE] Gay marriage	Only wrong sometimes	13.1%	15.8%	14.0%	11.2%
Gay mamage	Not wrong most of the time	16.3%	13.6%	9.3%	8.3%
	Not wrong at all	35.3%	19.7%	11.1%	8.1%
	Always wrong	45.0%	58.4%	69.1%	73.3%
	Almost always wrong	20.7%	17.3%	13.5%	12.6%
[GAMBLING] Gambling	Only wrong sometimes	20.8%	14.9%	11.3%	8.1%
Carrising	Not wrong most of the time	6.7%	3.7%	3.0%	2.0%
	Not wrong at all	6.9%	5.7%	3.1%	3.9%
	Always wrong	23.6%	36.6%	53.3%	57.2%
[SURROGACY/ART BY GAY COUPLES]	Almost always wrong	8.9%	12.2%	10.9%	10.6%
A gay couple having a child through surrogacy/artificial reproductive techniques	Only wrong sometimes	14.6%	16.8%	14.3%	12.0%
	Not wrong most of the time	18.3%	15.4%	10.5%	9.6%
	Not wrong at all	34.6%	19.0%	11.2%	10.6%

How do you	feel about these social issues	s? (2018) (% res	sponses across a	age cohorts)	
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options	18-35	36-50	51-65	65
	Always wrong	27.8%	37.9%	44.0%	45.7%
[PREMARITAL SEX]	Almost always wrong	12.2%	14.7%	14.5%	16.2%
Sexual relations before	Only wrong sometimes	22.9%	22.9%	27.2%	23.8%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	18.1%	14.3%	8.7%	8.1%
	Not wrong at all	19.0%	10.2%	5.6%	6.2%
ICAV SEVI	Always wrong	39.7%	55.2%	62.7%	66.1%
	Almost always wrong	10.8%	13.1%	12.5%	15.4%
[GAY SEX] Sexual relations between two	Only wrong sometimes	14.9%	13.8%	13.4%	8.3%
adults of the same sex	Not wrong most of the time	14.4%	9.3%	6.2%	6.5%
	Not wrong at all	20.2%	8.7%	5.3%	3.7%
	Always wrong	67.4%	66.6%	67.9%	65.0%
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX]	Almost always wrong	16.2%	16.1%	14.8%	17.8%
Sexual relations with someone	Only wrong sometimes	8.5%	12.5%	12.7%	11.1%
other than marriage partner	Not wrong most of the time	3.9%	2.4%	3.4%	3.2%
	Not wrong at all	4.1%	2.3%	1.2%	2.8%
[DIVORCE]	Always wrong	13.9%	17.7%	26.0%	27.5%
Divorce	Almost always wrong	12.1%	13.3%	13.2%	17.6%

	Only wrong sometimes	38.1%	42.0%	41.4%	37.2%
	Not wrong most of the time	15.8%	13.3%	11.6%	10.4%
	Not wrong at all	20.1%	13.7%	7.8%	7.4%
	Always wrong	20.8%	28.0%	38.6%	40.6%
[COHABITATION]	Almost always wrong	9.0%	12.7%	12.3%	15.9%
Living with a partner before	Only wrong sometimes	19.0%	24.9%	24.8%	22.2%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	22.1%	17.2%	15.3%	14.5%
	Not wrong at all	29.1%	17.2%	9.0%	6.7%
[PREGNANCY OOW]	Always wrong	42.6%	52.1%	59.6%	58.2%
	Almost always wrong	17.3%	16.5%	15.6%	18.4%
Having a pregnancy outside of	Only wrong sometimes	20.3%	19.6%	17.4%	14.9%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	10.9%	6.6%	4.5%	5.3%
	Not wrong at all	8.9%	5.2%	2.8%	3.2%
	Always wrong	29.7%	42.5%	53.5%	53.4%
[ADOPTION BY GAY	Almost always wrong	8.9%	12.5%	12.9%	14.8%
COUPLES] The adoption of a child by a gay	Only wrong sometimes	16.4%	16.6%	15.9%	12.8%
couple	Not wrong most of the time	16.8%	13.5%	8.6%	10.7%
	Not wrong at all	28.3%	14.8%	9.1%	8.4%
[GAY MARRIAGE]	Always wrong	37.1%	50.5%	61.0%	67.7%
Gay marriage	Almost always wrong	8.5%	11.1%	12.7%	12.6%

	Only wrong sometimes	12.6%	13.0%	11.4%	9.4%
	Not wrong most of the time	14.1%	10.6%	6.9%	4.6%
	Not wrong at all	27.7%	14.7%	7.9%	5.7%
	Always wrong	51.9%	62.4%	64.1%	64.7%
	Almost always wrong	18.2%	15.9%	15.0%	19.3%
[GAMBLING] Gambling	Only wrong sometimes	21.0%	16.4%	16.3%	11.2%
Carribining	Not wrong most of the time	3.9%	2.5%	3.4%	3.0%
	Not wrong at all	5.0%	2.7%	1.1%	1.8%
	Always wrong	33.2%	46.2%	56.5%	56.4%
[SURROGACY/ART BY GAY COUPLES]	Almost always wrong	10.4%	11.4%	13.0%	14.8%
A gay couple having a child	Only wrong sometimes	15.7%	15.5%	13.8%	11.3%
through surrogacy/artificial reproductive techniques	Not wrong most of the time	15.3%	13.0%	8.2%	10.2%
	Not wrong at all	25.4%	13.9%	8.6%	7.4%

How do you	feel about these social issues	s? (2013) (% res	sponses across a	age cohorts)	
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options	18-35	36-50	51-65	65
	Always wrong	40.3%	47.5%	50.0%	52.3%
[PREMARITAL SEX]	Almost always wrong	15.3%	17.0%	20.1%	26.1%
Sexual relations before	Only wrong sometimes	20.2%	19.5%	16.7%	13.9%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	10.5%	7.8%	6.2%	2.3%
	Not wrong at all	13.8%	8.1%	6.9%	5.5%
[GAY SEX]	Always wrong	56.9%	68.4%	67.9%	70.6%
	Almost always wrong	16.4%	15.1%	20.3%	19.7%
Sexual relations between two	Only wrong sometimes	11.1%	8.5%	6.7%	5.5%
adults of the same sex	Not wrong most of the time	5.9%	3.8%	2.9%	2.3%
	Not wrong at all	9.7%	4.1%	2.3%	1.9%
	Always wrong	64.0%	69.3%	63.0%	65.2%
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX]	Almost always wrong	16.8%	15.3%	22.1%	20.6%
Sexual relations with someone	Only wrong sometimes	10.5%	9.3%	9.0%	8.7%
other than marriage partner	Not wrong most of the time	5.7%	3.9%	2.6%	2.6%
	Not wrong at all	3.0%	2.2%	3.3%	2.9%
[DIVORCE]	Always wrong	23.2%	26.7%	32.7%	32.3%
Divorce	Almost always wrong	17.8%	18.1%	20.5%	27.4%

	Only wrong sometimes	35.6%	33.7%	32.6%	25.8%
	Not wrong most of the time	12.7%	10.9%	8.0%	9.0%
	Not wrong at all	10.6%	10.6%	6.2%	5.5%
	Always wrong	27.3%	36.1%	40.7%	45.1%
[COHABITATION]	Almost always wrong	14.6%	15.7%	20.8%	24.0%
Living with a partner before	Only wrong sometimes	19.5%	21.9%	20.1%	16.9%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	16.2%	12.4%	9.2%	7.5%
	Not wrong at all	22.5%	13.9%	9.3%	6.5%
[PREGNANCY OOW]	Always wrong	51.8%	60.5%	58.8%	59.2%
	Almost always wrong	20.3%	17.1%	21.8%	22.2%
Having a pregnancy outside of	Only wrong sometimes	14.7%	12.6%	12.3%	13.4%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	7.6%	6.3%	4.1%	2.9%
	Not wrong at all	5.5%	3.4%	3.0%	2.3%
	Always wrong	37.3%	52.0%	50.7%	55.3%
[ADOPTION BY GAY	Almost always wrong	14.3%	13.5%	17.5%	17.5%
COUPLES] The adoption of a child by a gay	Only wrong sometimes	16.1%	14.5%	12.4%	8.1%
couple	Not wrong most of the time	11.4%	9.2%	9.1%	9.4%
	Not wrong at all	20.9%	10.8%	10.2%	9.7%
[GAY MARRIAGE]	Always wrong	52.2%	64.6%	63.7%	68.3%
Gay marriage	Almost always wrong	14.4%	13.4%	17.8%	14.4%

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	Only wrong sometimes	12.1%	10.9%	8.5%	7.2%		
	Not wrong most of the time	7.6%	5.2%	3.8%	5.2%		
	Not wrong at all	13.7%	5.9%	6.2%	4.9%		
[GAMBLING] Gambling	Always wrong	53.0%	59.8%	59.7%	61.4%		
	Almost always wrong	14.0%	15.6%	18.5%	18.3%		
	Only wrong sometimes	18.2%	14.6%	14.1%	13.4%		
Carnoming	Not wrong most of the time	7.8%	4.7%	4.1%	3.9%		
	Not wrong at all	6.9%	5.3%	3.5%	2.9%		
	Always wrong						
[SURROGACY/ART BY GAY COUPLES]	Almost always wrong						
A gay couple having a child	Only wrong sometimes		N/A (Not ask	ked in 2013)			
through surrogacy/artificial reproductive techniques	Not wrong most of the time						
Toproductivo toominquoo	Not wrong at all						

APPENDIX 1C: CONTINGENCY TABLES (BY RELIGION)

Hov	How do you feel about these social issues? (2024) (% responses across religion)								
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options	Buddhism	Taoism / TCB	Christianity*	Catholicism*	Islam	Hinduism	No Religion	
[PREMARITAL SEX] Sexual relations before marriage	Always wrong	16.5%	16.5%	44.3%	32.9%	58.7%	36.0%	7.7%	
	Almost always wrong	11.4%	11.9%	16.3%	12.4%	11.7%	11.5%	6.3%	
	Only wrong sometimes	28.1%	23.7%	18.5%	19.0%	15.6%	18.0%	24.1%	
	Not wrong most of the time	22.5%	22.7%	10.8%	19.5%	6.8%	17.8%	24.3%	
	Not wrong at all	21.5%	25.2%	10.2%	16.2%	7.2%	16.7%	37.6%	
	Always wrong	32.2%	30.6%	65.0%	43.3%	67.6%	39.1%	18.6%	
[GAY SEX]	Almost always wrong	13.4%	10.4%	10.6%	13.8%	8.4%	12.3%	9.2%	
Sexual relations between two	Only wrong sometimes	19.7%	19.8%	9.3%	13.8%	12.1%	13.4%	19.0%	
adults of the same sex	Not wrong most of the time	15.0%	18.7%	7.5%	13.8%	4.4%	16.1%	20.1%	
	Not wrong at all	19.6%	20.5%	7.5%	15.2%	7.5%	19.0%	33.1%	
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX]	Always wrong	52.3%	48.9%	74.0%	64.3%	74.7%	58.2%	44.2%	
Sexual relations with someone other than marriage partner	Almost always wrong	17.7%	18.3%	11.6%	13.3%	9.7%	18.4%	23.6%	

	Only wrong sometimes	15.1%	15.8%	8.3%	11.4%	8.4%	10.3%	14.0%
	Not wrong most of the time	7.3%	6.8%	3.0%	6.7%	3.0%	5.4%	6.6%
	Not wrong at all	7.6%	10.1%	3.0%	4.3%	4.2%	7.7%	11.6%
	Always wrong	15.1%	13.3%	26.6%	24.8%	27.6%	23.6%	4.6%
[DIVORCE] Divorce	Almost always wrong	9.2%	10.4%	14.0%	10.5%	10.6%	10.0%	5.3%
	Only wrong sometimes	35.5%	33.1%	35.6%	30.5%	32.6%	30.3%	32.8%
	Not wrong most of the time	17.3%	19.4%	10.6%	14.8%	13.0%	14.4%	19.7%
	Not wrong at all	22.9%	23.7%	13.2%	19.5%	16.2%	21.5%	37.6%
	Always wrong	13.9%	12.6%	36.0%	22.9%	51.5%	28.9%	6.3%
[COHABITATION]	Almost always wrong	6.9%	7.2%	12.2%	10.5%	12.9%	10.7%	4.4%
Living with a partner before	Only wrong sometimes	22.5%	20.9%	19.7%	21.0%	14.8%	16.1%	18.8%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	24.4%	24.5%	16.3%	20.0%	8.7%	18.8%	21.9%
	Not wrong at all	32.3%	34.9%	15.9%	25.7%	12.1%	25.5%	48.6%
	Always wrong	37.8%	32.4%	55.7%	35.7%	62.4%	50.2%	22.8%
[PREGNANCY OOW]	Almost always wrong	15.8%	17.6%	16.5%	19.5%	13.6%	17.4%	16.6%
Having a pregnancy outside of	Only wrong sometimes	23.2%	22.3%	16.3%	23.8%	13.3%	14.0%	26.3%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	12.7%	14.4%	6.3%	7.6%	5.3%	9.2%	14.5%
	Not wrong at all	10.6%	13.3%	5.3%	13.3%	5.3%	9.2%	19.7%
[ADOPTION BY GAY	Always wrong	29.3%	23.4%	55.5%	37.1%	58.7%	30.3%	19.2%
COUPLES]	Almost always wrong	9.0%	11.5%	11.6%	12.4%	9.7%	9.6%	7.6%
	Allilost always wrong	9.070	11.570	11.070	12.470	9.1 /0	9.070	7.070

The adoption of a child by a gay couple	Only wrong sometimes	17.6%	20.5%	12.6%	13.8%	12.1%	14.6%	20.8%
gay couple	Not wrong most of the time	20.0%	20.9%	8.7%	14.3%	8.1%	19.2%	17.7%
	Not wrong at all	24.1%	23.7%	11.6%	22.4%	11.4%	26.2%	34.8%
[GAY MARRIAGE] Gay marriage	Always wrong	32.3%	28.1%	62.4%	42.4%	67.2%	33.3%	21.5%
	Almost always wrong	9.8%	10.1%	10.4%	8.6%	8.8%	10.9%	9.8%
	Only wrong sometimes	17.6%	17.3%	10.6%	15.7%	9.0%	13.8%	16.4%
	Not wrong most of the time	16.1%	20.9%	5.9%	11.0%	5.1%	17.8%	17.1%
	Not wrong at all	24.2%	23.7%	10.8%	22.4%	9.8%	24.3%	35.2%
	Always wrong	52.5%	46.8%	66.3%	55.7%	74.4%	61.5%	44.6%
	Almost always wrong	17.6%	23.7%	15.9%	16.2%	13.0%	16.9%	18.6%
[GAMBLING] Gambling	Only wrong sometimes	17.9%	17.3%	13.2%	17.6%	7.4%	13.2%	22.5%
- Carrier and G	Not wrong most of the time	5.6%	4.7%	2.4%	5.2%	2.4%	4.2%	5.7%
	Not wrong at all	6.4%	7.6%	2.2%	5.2%	2.7%	4.2%	8.7%
	Always wrong	30.9%	25.2%	57.1%	40.5%	60.5%	31.0%	20.1%
[SURROGACY/ART BY GAY	Almost always wrong	11.3%	10.8%	10.2%	12.9%	10.7%	10.0%	9.0%
COUPLES] A gay couple having a child through surrogacy/artificial reproductive techniques	Only wrong sometimes	17.1%	20.1%	13.6%	11.4%	10.4%	13.8%	19.5%
	Not wrong most of the time	17.8%	20.9%	7.9%	12.9%	7.5%	19.2%	17.7%
	Not wrong at all	23.0%	23.0%	11.2%	22.4%	10.9%	25.9%	33.7%

Hov	w do you feel about these soc	ial issues	? (2018) (%	responses	across reli	gion)		
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options	Buddhism	Taoism / TCB	Christianity*	Catholicism*	Islam	Hinduism	No Religion
	Always wrong	13.8%	23.9%	45.3%	36.1%	67.1%	47.2%	11.3%
[PREMARITAL SEX]	Almost always wrong	14.2%	11.8%	22.3%	17.2%	11.6%	13.6%	10.2%
Sexual relations before	Only wrong sometimes	38.2%	31.1%	16.9%	20.4%	10.6%	19.8%	35.1%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	19.0%	18.0%	9.6%	13.7%	6.1%	8.7%	22.5%
	Not wrong at all	14.8%	15.1%	5.9%	12.6%	4.6%	10.7%	21.0%
	Always wrong	35.1%	45.7%	73.0%	58.2%	75.2%	51.0%	29.8%
[GAY SEX]	Almost always wrong	16.5%	16.4%	8.0%	13.0%	8.7%	12.6%	13.9%
Sexual relations between two	Only wrong sometimes	21.5%	15.8%	6.8%	9.8%	7.0%	11.0%	20.2%
adults of the same sex	Not wrong most of the time	13.5%	11.2%	5.9%	9.1%	4.3%	11.9%	15.4%
	Not wrong at all	13.3%	10.9%	6.3%	9.8%	4.8%	13.5%	20.7%
	Always wrong	53.9%	57.5%	75.5%	64.7%	83.4%	74.7%	50.1%
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX]	Almost always wrong	21.8%	20.6%	15.3%	19.0%	7.0%	12.4%	23.3%
Sexual relations with someone other than marriage partner	Only wrong sometimes	17.0%	16.7%	5.4%	10.0%	5.4%	7.6%	17.7%
	Not wrong most of the time	4.4%	2.6%	1.7%	2.1%	2.3%	3.3%	5.4%

	Not wrong at all	2.9%	2.6%	2.1%	4.2%	1.9%	2.0%	3.5%
	Always wrong	13.0%	18.0%	20.7%	24.3%	25.4%	28.7%	9.1%
	Almost always wrong	10.3%	10.8%	23.9%	17.7%	14.9%	10.9%	8.2%
[DIVORCE] Divorce	Only wrong sometimes	45.3%	41.0%	38.7%	34.7%	37.8%	35.6%	43.8%
	Not wrong most of the time	15.6%	15.1%	7.7%	11.8%	12.9%	10.7%	16.8%
	Not wrong at all	15.9%	15.1%	8.9%	11.5%	9.0%	14.0%	22.0%
	Always wrong	9.6%	17.8%	39.3%	29.9%	55.6%	35.7%	8.0%
[COHABITATION]	Almost always wrong	8.0%	9.2%	15.8%	12.8%	14.3%	15.2%	7.1%
Living with a partner before	Only wrong sometimes	31.1%	25.7%	18.8%	24.3%	14.1%	21.2%	26.4%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	26.4%	25.3%	13.9%	15.6%	9.0%	12.9%	26.8%
	Not wrong at all	24.8%	22.0%	12.2%	17.4%	6.9%	15.0%	31.6%
	Always wrong	38.5%	36.7%	57.3%	54.3%	70.3%	63.7%	30.0%
[PREGNANCY OOW]	Almost always wrong	18.4%	19.3%	16.9%	18.0%	12.8%	14.3%	21.0%
Having a pregnancy outside of	Only wrong sometimes	27.8%	27.2%	15.7%	14.9%	10.2%	11.1%	27.2%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	9.5%	11.5%	5.9%	6.6%	4.1%	4.9%	10.8%
	Not wrong at all	5.9%	5.2%	4.2%	6.2%	2.6%	6.0%	11.0%
LABORTION BY CAY	Always wrong	28.4%	42.3%	61.7%	55.1%	58.2%	33.0%	21.0%
[ADOPTION BY GAY COUPLES]	Almost always wrong	12.9%	11.5%	11.3%	9.8%	11.3%	9.2%	14.5%
The adoption of a child by a gay couple	Only wrong sometimes	21.7%	17.7%	10.9%	8.4%	11.9%	15.7%	21.3%
gay couple	Not wrong most of the time	16.5%	14.1%	7.3%	10.1%	8.3%	17.5%	18.4%
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	Not wrong at all	20.5%	14.4%	8.7%	16.7%	10.3%	24.7%	24.7%
	Always wrong	32.3%	43.6%	72.1%	61.1%	75.2%	39.3%	26.0%
	Almost always wrong	14.0%	13.1%	6.6%	10.4%	7.1%	11.7%	14.7%
[GAY MARRIAGE] Gay marriage	Only wrong sometimes	19.2%	15.7%	7.3%	5.6%	6.4%	12.2%	16.9%
out mamage	Not wrong most of the time	14.2%	12.5%	5.2%	8.0%	4.3%	13.8%	15.6%
	Not wrong at all	20.4%	15.1%	8.9%	14.9%	7.0%	23.0%	26.8%
	Always wrong	45.8%	48.0%	65.6%	58.6%	79.4%	65.8%	42.5%
	Almost always wrong	21.6%	22.2%	19.0%	17.6%	10.0%	11.2%	21.1%
[GAMBLING] Gambling	Only wrong sometimes	24.0%	24.8%	11.2%	17.9%	7.4%	17.2%	25.9%
Carrising	Not wrong most of the time	4.5%	2.0%	2.3%	2.4%	1.8%	3.6%	5.4%
	Not wrong at all	4.2%	2.9%	1.9%	3.4%	1.3%	2.2%	5.2%
	Always wrong	30.5%	42.1%	65.9%	58.2%	64.9%	35.2%	22.6%
[SURROGACY/ART BY GAY COUPLES]	Almost always wrong	14.2%	11.8%	9.9%	9.4%	10.5%	9.2%	16.3%
A gay couple having a child	Only wrong sometimes	21.2%	17.8%	8.9%	8.7%	9.8%	13.7%	19.7%
through surrogacy/artificial reproductive techniques	Not wrong most of the time	15.7%	14.8%	7.3%	8.4%	6.1%	17.5%	18.7%
	Not wrong at all	18.4%	13.5%	8.0%	15.3%	8.7%	24.4%	22.8%

Hov	w do you feel about these soc	cial issues	? (2013) (%	responses	across reli	gion)		
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options	Buddhism	Taoism / TCB	Christianity*	Catholicism*	Islam	Hinduism	No Religion
	Always wrong	27.7%	23.2%	59.9%	41.3%	72.8%	56.2%	20.9%
[PREMARITAL SEX]	Almost always wrong	17.6%	21.4%	15.0%	23.5%	15.5%	18.2%	17.0%
Sexual relations before	Only wrong sometimes	27.6%	29.2%	13.0%	20.2%	7.7%	13.1%	26.7%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	12.7%	12.9%	4.7%	6.4%	1.8%	6.2%	14.2%
	Not wrong at all	14.5%	13.2%	7.4%	8.6%	2.1%	6.4%	21.3%
	Always wrong	54.3%	56.2%	75.7%	61.4%	81.5%	67.5%	41.2%
[GAY SEX]	Almost always wrong	20.2%	21.3%	10.1%	17.6%	11.9%	17.0%	23.4%
Sexual relations between two	Only wrong sometimes	13.9%	11.4%	5.3%	9.0%	3.9%	6.0%	13.9%
adults of the same sex	Not wrong most of the time	5.1%	7.6%	3.8%	5.6%	1.4%	3.5%	6.5%
	Not wrong at all	6.4%	3.6%	5.0%	6.5%	1.4%	6.0%	15.0%
	Always wrong	54.8%	53.0%	78.8%	67.2%	78.1%	69.9%	53.0%
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX] Sexual relations with someone	Almost always wrong	20.8%	26.0%	10.9%	19.3%	14.0%	17.4%	17.7%
other than marriage partner	Only wrong sometimes	13.7%	13.2%	4.7%	9.5%	5.3%	6.9%	15.7%
	Not wrong most of the time	5.8%	5.1%	4.1%	3.1%	1.1%	3.8%	8.6%

	Not wrong at all	5.0%	2.7%	1.5%	0.9%	1.5%	2.0%	5.0%
	Always wrong	18.4%	15.6%	35.1%	29.8%	35.0%	36.1%	18.1%
	Almost always wrong	18.2%	19.1%	24.2%	25.5%	19.5%	18.8%	12.5%
[DIVORCE] Divorce	Only wrong sometimes	37.7%	38.4%	26.0%	30.2%	34.6%	28.8%	34.7%
	Not wrong most of the time	14.6%	15.3%	8.6%	8.3%	5.6%	8.6%	16.4%
	Not wrong at all	11.1%	11.6%	6.2%	6.2%	5.3%	7.7%	18.3%
	Always wrong	19.2%	13.9%	40.7%	31.1%	61.1%	39.1%	15.3%
[COHABITATION]	Almost always wrong	13.7%	14.1%	20.9%	21.2%	17.6%	20.5%	14.6%
Living with a partner before	Only wrong sometimes	27.0%	28.0%	14.7%	22.2%	13.6%	17.4%	22.4%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	17.2%	22.4%	10.0%	11.4%	3.9%	11.2%	18.7%
	Not wrong at all	23.0%	21.7%	13.6%	14.2%	3.9%	11.9%	29.0%
	Always wrong	44.1%	43.3%	66.2%	53.4%	73.1%	65.4%	41.6%
[PREGNANCY OOW]	Almost always wrong	22.4%	22.9%	17.2%	23.3%	16.4%	18.8%	21.1%
Having a pregnancy outside of	Only wrong sometimes	17.6%	20.9%	8.9%	13.8%	7.0%	8.2%	20.7%
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	10.3%	7.4%	4.7%	6.4%	2.2%	4.4%	9.1%
	Not wrong at all	5.6%	5.6%	3.0%	3.1%	1.4%	3.3%	7.5%
	Always wrong	39.2%	40.4%	61.1%	46.9%	59.1%	40.6%	33.4%
[ADOPTION BY GAY COUPLES]	Almost always wrong	16.8%	19.9%	13.9%	15.3%	13.2%	13.7%	14.9%
The adoption of a child by a gay couple	Only wrong sometimes	17.4%	16.9%	8.0%	14.7%	13.4%	11.4%	14.4%
gay couple	Not wrong most of the time	12.1%	11.5%	6.2%	11.7%	5.2%	12.9%	13.1%
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	Not wrong at all	14.5%	11.3%	10.7%	11.3%	9.1%	21.4%	24.1%
	Always wrong	55.1%	53.7%	71.2%	56.0%	76.7%	55.1%	40.1%
	Almost always wrong	15.7%	17.8%	10.4%	12.7%	12.2%	15.0%	19.6%
[GAY MARRIAGE] Gay marriage	Only wrong sometimes	13.5%	13.5%	5.6%	14.9%	5.9%	10.9%	12.9%
Cay mamage	Not wrong most of the time	6.3%	6.8%	5.6%	7.7%	2.0%	6.8%	9.9%
	Not wrong at all	9.3%	8.1%	7.1%	8.7%	3.1%	12.2%	17.5%
	Always wrong	46.4%	40.4%	62.0%	54.9%	76.5%	60.8%	44.7%
	Almost always wrong	13.6%	18.2%	17.2%	19.3%	14.2%	17.2%	17.2%
[GAMBLING] Gambling	Only wrong sometimes	21.1%	20.7%	12.2%	17.5%	7.2%	15.4%	21.5%
o amining	Not wrong most of the time	10.0%	9.1%	6.2%	4.3%	1.1%	3.6%	7.7%
	Not wrong at all	8.9%	11.6%	2.4%	4.0%	1.1%	2.9%	8.8%
	Always wrong							
[SURROGACY/ART BY GAY COUPLES]	Almost always wrong							
A gay couple having a child	Only wrong sometimes			N/A (N	lot asked in	2013)		
through surrogacy/artificial reproductive techniques	Not wrong most of the time							
	Not wrong at all							

^{*}While Roman Catholics and Protestant Christians are normally categorised as Christians, in this study we have separated their responses as their views sometimes differ. While it would be most appropriate for us to categorise and present the two groups as Protestant Christians and Roman Catholic Christians, it is difficult for stylistic and presentation reasons to do so. As such we have separated the two groups as Christians and Catholics, and refer to these groups in-text and in our figures as such. In no way are we alleging that Roman Catholics are not Christians.

APPENDIX 1D: CONTINGENCY TABLES (THREE-LEVEL, BY WAVE, RELIGION, AND AGE COHORT)

	How do you	feel	abo	out 1	thes	e s	ocia	al is:	sue	s? (202	4) (9	% re	spo	nse	s ac	ross	s rel	igioi	n an	d a	ge c	oho	rt)					
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options		801456	Buddinsin				laoism / ICB				Cilistianity			*mojojiodeo	Catholicism			!	Islam				Minduism				No Keligion	
		18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65
	Always wrong	5.5	10.3	22.1	33.1	4.6	11.7	20.0	29.6	26.9	41.5	54.4	52.8	14.6	24.6	35.1	58.3	38.5	62.2	77.1	80.3	14.1	46.4	39.3	49.3	1.5	7.5	10.7	18.6
[PREMARITAL	Almost always wrong	7.2	9.6	14.9	14.9	1.5	13.0	10.8	21.1	16.8	17.8	18.4	11.1	8.3	7.0	14.0	20.8	13.1	14.4	9.6	4.9	7.4	12.4	13.7	13.7	2.5	4.1	8.9	15.1
SEX] Sexual relations	Only wrong sometimes	26.3	32.0	27.3	25.7	21.5	29.9	29.2	14.1	22.7	16.9	12.9	23.1	12.5	29.8	19.3	12.5	23.9	13.3	9.2	6.6	21.5	13.1	18.8	20.5	12.1	30.1	31.3	32.6
before marriage	Not wrong most of the time	26.7	25.4	19.3	17.1	32.3	23.4	20.0	15.5	16.8	12.7	10.2	2.8	31.3	24.6	17.5	4.2	11.8	4.4	2.5	4.1	23.0	15.7	17.9	12.3	26.1	21.9	26.8	20.9
	Not wrong at all	34.3	22.8	16.5	9.1	40.0	22.1	20.0	19.7	16.8	11.0	4.1	10.2	33.3	14.0	14.0	4.2	12.6	5.6	1.7	4.1	34.1	12.4	10.3	4.1	57.8	36.3	22.3	12.8
	Always wrong	11.4	23.9	43.8	56.6	15.4	20.8	38.5	47.9	48.7	61.0	81.0	65.7	12.5	40.4	49.1	70.8	49.9	72.6	81.3	87.7	14.1	50.3	41.9	57.5	5.5	18.5	28.6	36.0
[GAY SEX]	Almost always wrong	12.7	16.2	10.8	13.7	6.2	9.1	10.8	15.5	8.4	15.3	6.8	13.0	10.4	8.8	19.3	16.7	12.1	5.9	7.5	3.3	6.7	15.7	12.8	15.1	6.5	8.9	8.0	17.4
Sexual relations between two adults of the same	Only wrong sometimes	21.6	24.3	18.5	12.0	13.8	26.0	29.2	9.9	16.0	5.9	6.8	9.3	10.4	22.8	10.5	10.4	16.9	12.2	7.9	4.9	12.6	8.5	18.8	16.4	12.6	22.6	24.1	20.9
sex	Not wrong most of the time	19.1	15.8	15.3	8.0	27.7	22.1	12.3	12.7	12.6	10.2	4.8	2.8	31.3	17.5	7.0	0.0	6.8	3.7	2.1	2.5	24.4	11.8	16.2	9.6	22.6	17.1	21.4	17.4
	Not wrong at all	35.2	19.9	11.6	9.7	36.9	22.1	9.2	14.1	14.3	7.6	0.7	9.3	35.4	10.5	14.0	2.1	14.4	5.6	1.3	1.6	42.2	13.7	10.3	1.4	52.8	32.9	17.9	8.1
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX]	Always wrong	44.5	46.7	59.8	60.6	40.0	46.8	50.8	57.7	67.2	70.3	82.3	74.1	58.3	54.4	64.9	81.3	64.5	76.3	82.1	90.2	47.4	68.0	54.7	63.0	40.7	43.2	52.7	43.0

IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

Moral Attitudes in Flux: Comparing Trends across Religions in Singapore by Mathew, M., Lim, H. A., Teo, K. K., and Tay, M.

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Sexual relations with someone other than	Almost always wrong	19.9	18.8	15.3	16.6	23.1	19.5	12.3	18.3	12.6	15.3	9.5	9.3	14.6	14.0	10.5	14.6	12.6	8.9	8.3	4.9	19.3	15.7	21.4	17.8	23.1	26.7	18.8	25.6
marriage partner	Only wrong sometimes	14.4	17.6	14.1	13.7	15.4	14.3	24.6	9.9	10.9	7.6	6.1	9.3	12.5	14.0	14.0	4.2	11.3	7.4	7.1	3.3	10.4	6.5	12.8	13.7	10.1	16.4	15.2	17.4
	Not wrong most of the time	9.7	9.9	5.2	2.9	10.8	9.1	6.2	1.4	5.0	3.4	1.4	2.8	10.4	8.8	7.0	0.0	4.5	3.0	1.7	8.0	8.1	3.9	4.3	5.5	9.0	2.1	7.1	8.1
	Not wrong at all	11.4	7.0	5.6	6.3	10.8	10.4	6.2	12.7	4.2	3.4	0.7	4.6	4.2	8.8	3.5	0.0	7.1	4.4	0.8	0.8	14.8	5.9	6.8	0.0	17.1	11.6	6.3	5.8
	Always wrong	5.5	10.3	18.9	30.3	6.2	11.7	16.9	18.3	20.2	27.1	28.6	30.6	10.4	17.5	26.3	45.8	17.9	21.9	39.2	49.2	7.4	33.3	28.2	26.0	3.0	5.5	4.5	7.0
	Almost always wrong	5.9	8.8	8.8	14.9	6.2	6.5	9.2	19.7	12.6	11.0	15.0	17.6	10.4	3.5	12.3	16.7	11.1	10.7	10.0	9.8	7.4	10.5	12.0	11.0	2.5	5.5	7.1	9.3
[DIVORCE] Divorce	Only wrong sometimes	35.6	38.6	36.1	29.7	26.2	39.0	33.8	32.4	33.6	34.7	41.5	30.6	25.0	38.6	33.3	22.9	31.5	38.9	30.0	27.0	25.9	28.8	28.2	45.2	26.1	29.5	37.5	47.7
	Not wrong most of the time	22.0	18.4	16.1	10.9	27.7	19.5	20.0	11.3	16.0	10.2	6.8	10.2	22.9	17.5	12.3	6.3	14.9	13.3	12.1	8.2	23.7	9.8	15.4	5.5	21.6	19.2	20.5	15.1
	Not wrong at all	30.9	23.9	20.1	14.3	33.8	23.4	20.0	18.3	17.6	16.9	8.2	11.1	31.3	22.8	15.8	8.3	24.7	15.2	8.8	5.7	35.6	17.6	16.2	12.3	46.7	40.4	30.4	20.9
	Always wrong	1.7	6.3	20.9	32.6	3.1	5.2	18.5	23.9	16.0	30.5	45.6	50.9	2.1	19.3	21.1	50.0	28.0	52.6	75.0	79.5	6.7	37.3	35.0	42.5	2.0	4.8	6.3	18.6
[COHABITATION]	Almost always wrong	1.7	7.7	8.4	10.3	3.1	6.5	4.6	14.1	8.4	14.4	17.0	7.4	0.0	5.3	19.3	16.7	14.4	17.0	10.4	4.1	6.7	11.1	8.5	20.5	0.5	2.7	8.9	10.5
Living with a partner before	Only wrong sometimes	17.4	22.4	25.3	25.7	9.2	22.1	32.3	19.7	25.2	16.9	15.6	22.2	22.9	26.3	17.5	16.7	20.4	17.0	7.1	6.6	11.1	14.4	22.2	19.2	7.5	21.9	26.8	29.1
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	28.4	30.1	20.1	16.0	27.7	29.9	23.1	16.9	25.2	19.5	14.3	5.6	22.9	24.6	19.3	12.5	14.4	4.8	5.4	5.7	25.2	15.7	19.7	12.3	19.6	21.2	27.7	20.9
	Not wrong at all	50.8	33.5	25.3	15.4	56.9	36.4	21.5	25.4	25.2	18.6	7.5	13.9	52.1	24.6	22.8	4.2	22.9	8.5	2.1	4.1	50.4	21.6	14.5	5.5	70.4	49.3	30.4	20.9
	Always wrong	21.6	32.0	44.2	59.4	27.7	24.7	38.5	39.4	38.7	55.1	65.3	62.0	10.4	28.1	42.1	62.5	42.3	66.3	81.7	81.1	25.9	62.7	58.1	56.2	15.1	20.5	31.3	33.7
[PREGNANCY	Almost always wrong	18.6	15.1	17.3	10.9	13.8	20.8	16.9	18.3	19.3	17.8	14.3	14.8	27.1	14.0	17.5	20.8	18.1	14.8	7.9	7.4	16.3	18.3	15.4	20.5	17.6	14.4	11.6	24.4
OOW] Having a pregnancy outside	Only wrong sometimes	25.8	22.4	25.7	17.1	16.9	32.5	16.9	21.1	21.8	15.3	15.6	12.0	25.0	36.8	21.1	10.4	20.9	10.4	7.5	6.6	23.0	6.5	12.8	15.1	24.1	28.8	27.7	25.6
of marriage	Not wrong most of the time	21.6	15.8	5.6	5.7	26.2	9.1	13.8	9.9	11.8	5.1	4.1	4.6	14.6	5.3	8.8	2.1	9.6	4.1	2.1	0.8	15.6	5.9	6.8	8.2	19.1	11.6	16.1	7.0
	Not wrong at all	12.3	14.7	7.2	6.9	15.4	13.0	13.8	11.3	8.4	6.8	0.7	6.5	22.9	15.8	10.5	4.2	9.1	4.4	0.8	4.1	19.3	6.5	6.8	0.0	24.1	24.7	13.4	9.3
[ADOPTION BY GAY COUPLES]	Always wrong	8.9	24.3	37.3	53.1	12.3	10.4	32.3	39.4	35.3	52.5	69.4	62.0	8.3	36.8	47.4	54.2	40.3	59.6	77.1	80.3	12.6	30.1	38.5	50.7	7.5	13.7	31.3	39.5

IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

Moral Attitudes in Flux: Comparing Trends across Religions in Singapore by Mathew, M., Lim, H. A., Teo, K. K., and Tay, M.

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Almost always wrong	6.8	10.3	9.2	9.7	4.6	11.7	12.3	16.9	10.1	15.3	12.2	8.3	10.4	7.0	17.5	14.6	11.3	10.7	8.8	4.1	5.2	12.4	10.3	11.0	2.5	10.3	9.8	11.6
Only wrong sometimes	15.3	19.9	19.7	14.3	13.8	28.6	20.0	18.3	16.0	11.0	10.2	13.9	12.5	19.3	5.3	18.8	15.1	14.8	7.5	5.7	9.6	17.6	14.5	17.8	15.6	22.6	25.0	24.4
Not wrong most of the time	27.1	22.8	16.1	11.4	36.9	20.8	18.5	8.5	19.3	6.8	2.7	7.4	18.8	17.5	15.8	4.2	12.1	8.1	3.8	3.3	21.5	19.0	20.5	13.7	18.6	19.2	17.9	12.8
Not wrong at all	41.9	22.8	17.7	11.4	32.3	28.6	16.9	16.9	19.3	14.4	5.4	8.3	50.0	19.3	14.0	8.3	21.2	6.7	2.9	6.6	51.1	20.9	16.2	6.8	55.8	34.2	16.1	11.6
Always wrong	13.1	23.2	41.4	59.4	13.8	11.7	35.4	52.1	40.3	62.7	77.6	65.7	8.3	43.9	57.9	56.3	48.1	70.4	85.4	86.9	11.1	35.3	42.7	54.8	7.0	15.8	33.9	48.8
Almost always wrong	7.6	12.9	8.4	9.7	4.6	10.4	15.4	9.9	13.4	11.9	7.5	9.3	8.3	5.3	5.3	16.7	12.6	8.1	5.4	4.9	7.4	13.7	10.3	12.3	5.5	11.0	12.5	14.0
Only wrong sometimes	14.4	20.6	19.7	14.3	9.2	20.8	24.6	14.1	13.4	7.6	9.5	12.0	16.7	22.8	8.8	14.6	12.3	10.0	6.3	1.6	11.1	17.6	12.8	12.3	15.1	17.8	19.6	12.8
Not wrong most of the time	22.9	18.8	12.4	8.0	33.8	29.9	7.7	11.3	14.3	3.4	2.0	4.6	12.5	10.5	12.3	8.3	7.8	5.2	1.7	2.5	20.7	15.0	20.5	13.7	18.6	18.5	16.1	12.8
Not wrong at all	41.9	24.6	18.1	8.6	38.5	27.3	16.9	12.7	18.5	14.4	3.4	8.3	54.2	17.5	15.8	4.2	19.1	6.3	1.3	4.1	49.6	18.3	13.7	6.8	53.8	37.0	17.9	11.6
Always wrong	34.7	50.0	61.0	68.0	27.7	45.5	53.8	59.2	51.3	63.6	73.5	75.9	37.5	49.1	63.2	72.9	63.0	74.1	86.3	89.3	42.2	67.3	65.0	79.5	26.6	43.2	62.5	65.1
Almost always wrong	22.9	16.5	15.3	15.4	21.5	32.5	16.9	22.5	17.6	18.6	14.3	13.0	25.0	17.5	12.3	10.4	18.9	11.1	10.0	4.1	23.7	15.7	13.7	12.3	20.6	22.6	15.2	11.6
Only wrong sometimes	26.3	20.2	14.9	7.4	29.2	14.3	21.5	5.6	22.7	11.0	11.6	7.4	18.8	22.8	14.0	14.6	10.3	8.9	2.5	4.1	21.5	11.8	11.1	4.1	32.2	19.2	13.4	17.4
Not wrong most of the time	8.5	5.5	3.6	4.6	13.8	2.6	3.1	0.0	6.7	2.5	0.7	0.0	12.5	1.8	7.0	0.0	3.5	2.6	8.0	1.6	5.9	2.6	5.1	2.7	8.0	5.5	4.5	2.3
Not wrong at all	7.6	7.7	5.2	4.6	7.7	5.2	4.6	12.7	1.7	4.2	0.0	3.7	6.3	8.8	3.5	2.1	4.3	3.3	0.4	8.0	6.7	2.6	5.1	1.4	12.6	9.6	4.5	3.5
Always wrong	12.3	24.6	39.8	53.1	13.8	11.7	33.8	42.3	36.1	53.4	72.1	63.9	10.4	42.1	49.1	58.3	42.1	62.2	78.8	81.1	11.9	31.4	39.3	52.1	7.5	15.1	33.0	40.7
Almost always wrong	6.4	15.8	10.8	11.4	3.1	11.7	12.3	15.5	10.1	13.6	9.5	7.4	14.6	7.0	15.8	14.6	14.1	9.3	9.6	4.9	5.9	13.1	10.3	11.0	3.5	11.0	12.5	14.0
Only wrong sometimes	16.1	18.0	20.1	12.6	12.3	27.3	18.5	21.1	18.5	12.7	12.2	11.1	10.4	14.0	8.8	12.5	12.8	14.1	5.8	3.3	11.9	15.7	15.4	11.0	18.1	20.5	21.4	18.6
Not wrong most of the time	25.0	21.0	12.4	10.9	35.4	23.4	18.5	7.0	17.6	5.9	2.7	6.5	14.6	17.5	12.3	6.3	11.1	7.4	3.3	4.1	19.3	19.0	19.7	19.2	19.6	19.2	16.1	12.8
Not wrong at all	40.3	20.6	16.9	12.0	35.4	26.0	16.9	14.1	17.6	14.4	3.4	11.1	50.0	19.3	14.0	8.3	19.9	7.0	2.5	6.6	51.1	20.9	15.4	6.8	51.3	34.2	17.0	14.0
	only wrong sometimes of wrong most of the time of wrong at all lways wrong only wrong sometimes of wrong most of the time of wrong at all lways wrong lmost always wrong only wrong sometimes of wrong at all lways wrong only wrong sometimes of wrong most of the time of wrong at all lways wrong lmost always wrong only wrong sometimes of wrong at all of wrong at all of wrong sometimes of wrong most of the time of wrong most of the time	only wrong sometimes 15.3 of wrong most of the time 27.1 of wrong at all 41.9 Ilways wrong 13.1 Ilmost always wrong 7.6 only wrong sometimes 14.4 of wrong most of the time 22.9 of wrong at all 41.9 Ilways wrong 34.7 Ilmost always wrong 22.9 only wrong sometimes 26.3 of wrong most of the time 8.5 of wrong most of the time 8.5 of wrong at all 7.6 Ilways wrong 12.3 Ilmost always wrong 6.4 only wrong sometimes 16.1 of wrong most of the time 25.0	Inly wrong sometimes 15.3 19.9 of twrong most of the time 27.1 22.8 of twrong at all 41.9 22.8 of twrong at all 41.9 22.8 of twrong at all 41.9 23.2 of the time 20.6 of twrong most of the time 22.9 18.8 of twrong at all 41.9 24.6 of twrong at all 41.9 24.6 of twrong at all 41.9 24.6 of twrong most of the time 22.9 16.5 of twrong most of the time 26.3 20.2 of twrong most of the time 3.5 5.5 of twrong at all 7.6 7.7 of 12.3 24.6 of twrong at all 7.6 7.7 of 12.3 24.6 of twrong most of the time 3.5 of 13.8 of 13.8 of 14.8 of 15.8 of	Inly wrong sometimes 15.3 19.9 19.7 Inly wrong most of the time 27.1 22.8 16.1 Inly wrong at all 41.9 22.8 17.7 Ilways wrong 13.1 23.2 41.4 Ilmost always wrong 7.6 12.9 8.4 Inly wrong sometimes 14.4 20.6 19.7 Inly wrong most of the time 22.9 18.8 12.4 Inly wrong at all 41.9 24.6 18.1 Ilways wrong 34.7 50.0 61.0 Ilmost always wrong 22.9 16.5 15.3 Inly wrong sometimes 26.3 20.2 14.9 Inly wrong most of the time 8.5 5.5 3.6 Inly wrong at all 7.6 7.7 5.2 Ilways wrong 12.3 24.6 39.8 Ilmost always wrong 6.4 15.8 10.8 Inly wrong sometimes 16.1 18.0 20.1 Inly wrong most of the time 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lot wrong most of the time 8.5 5.5 3.6 4.6 13.8 2.6 3.1 lot wrong at all 7.6 7.7 5.2 4.6 7.7 5.2 4.6 lways wrong 12.3 24.6 39.8 53.1 13.8 11.7 33.8 lmost always wrong 12.3 24.6 39.8 53.1 13.8 11.7 33.8 lmost always wrong 12.3 24.6 39.8 53.1 13.8 11.7 33.8 lmost always wrong 14.1 18.0 20.1 12.6 12.3 27.3 18.5 lot wrong most of the time 25.0 21.0 12.4 10.9 35.4 23.4 18.5	Inly wrong sometimes 15.3 19.9 19.7 14.3 13.8 28.6 20.0 18.3 Inly wrong most of the time 27.1 22.8 16.1 11.4 36.9 20.8 18.5 Inly wrong at all 41.9 22.8 17.7 11.4 32.3 28.6 16.9 16.9 Inly wrong 13.1 23.2 41.4 59.4 13.8 11.7 35.4 52.1 Ilmost always wrong 7.6 12.9 8.4 9.7 4.6 10.4 15.4 9.9 Inly wrong sometimes 14.4 20.6 19.7 14.3 9.2 20.8 24.6 14.1 Inly wrong most of the time 22.9 18.8 12.4 8.0 33.8 29.9 7.7 11.3 Inly wrong at all 41.9 24.6 18.1 8.6 38.5 27.3 16.9 12.7 Ilmost always wrong 34.7 50.0 61.0 68.0 27.7 45.5 53.8 59.2 Inly wrong sometimes 26.3 20.2 14.9 7.4 29.2 14.3 21.5 5.6 Inly wrong most of the time 8.5 5.5 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8.6 38.5 27.3 16.9 12.7 18.5 14.4 3.4 8.3 54.2 17.5 15.8 4.2 lways wrong 34.7 50.0 61.0 68.0 27.7 45.5 53.8 59.2 51.3 63.6 73.5 75.9 37.5 49.1 63.2 72.9 lmost always wrong 22.9 16.5 15.3 15.4 21.5 32.5 16.9 22.5 17.6 18.6 14.3 13.0 25.0 17.5 12.3 10.4 lnly wrong sometimes 26.3 20.2 14.9 7.4 29.2 14.3 21.5 5.6 22.7 11.0 11.6 7.4 18.8 22.8 14.0 14.6 ot wrong most of the time 8.5 5.5 3.6 4.6 13.8 2.6 3.1 0.0 6.7 2.5 0.7 0.0 12.5 1.8 7.0 0.0 ot wrong at all 7.6 7.7 5.2 4.6 7.7 5.2 4.6 12.7 1.7 4.2 0.0 3.7 6.3 8.8 3.5 2.1 lways wrong 12.3 24.6 39.8 53.1 13.8 11.7 33.8 42.3 16.1 53.4 7.1 1.0 11.6 7.4 18.8 22.8 14.0 14.6 lot wrong at all 7.6 7.7 5.2 4.6 7.7 5.2 4.6 12.7 1.7 4.2 0.0 3.7 6.3 8.8 3.5 2.1 lways wrong 12.3 24.6 39.8 53.1 13.8 11.7 33.8 42.3 16.1 53.4 72.1 63.9 10.4 42.1 49.1 58.3 lmost always wrong 6.4 15.8 10.8 11.4 3.1 11.7 12.3 15.5 10.1 13.6 9.5 7.4 14.6 7.0 15.8 14.6 lnly wrong sometimes 16.1 18.0 20.1 12.6 12.3 27.3 18.5 10.1 13.5 12.7 12.2 11.1 10.4 14.0 8.8 12.5 lnly wrong 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	How do you	feel	abo	out 1	thes	se s	ocia	al is	sue	s? (201	8) (9	% re	espo	nse	s ac	ross	s rel	igioi	n an	d ag	ge c	oho	rt)					
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options			Биаалізт			-	I aoism / I cb				Christianity			-	camonicism"			1	Islan				Hinduism				No Keligion	
		18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65
	Always wrong	6.5	15.9	15.1	25.0	6.0	17.7	35.2	44.0	34.7	41.2	57.7	47.8	12.9	39.4	40.2	52.0	55.1	71.1	79.5	77.4	32.5	49.1	57.9	51.2	4.8	11.9	13.1	25.4
[PREMARITAL	Almost always wrong	11.2	14.3	15.8	18.8	8.3	11.4	13.2	16.0	18.8	25.0	18.5	32.6	14.5	15.5	24.5	8.0	13.4	12.4	7.9	10.7	13.7	15.4	11.6	12.2	6.0	9.6	15.2	15.3
SEX] Sexual relations	Only wrong sometimes	31.7	35.2	48.7	37.5	31.0	29.1	36.3	26.0	18.8	16.9	15.4	15.2	21.0	25.4	14.7	24.0	13.8	7.7	9.6	7.1	22.2	18.9	19.8	17.1	31.9	33.3	42.4	33.9
before marriage	Not wrong most of the time	27.0	20.0	13.2	7.3	26.2	22.8	11.0	10.0	14.9	12.2	4.6	4.3	27.4	12.7	8.8	8.0	9.5	4.7	2.1	4.8	15.4	7.1	5.0	7.3	21.7	28.9	19.2	16.9
	Not wrong at all	23.7	14.6	7.2	11.5	28.6	19.0	4.4	4.0	12.9	4.7	3.8	0.0	24.2	7.0	11.8	8.0	8.1	4.0	0.8	0.0	16.2	9.5	5.8	12.2	35.5	16.3	10.1	8.5
	Always wrong	20.6	36.0	44.2	51.0	20.2	46.2	57.1	68.0	54.5	71.6	83.7	87.2	24.6	67.1	64.4	74.0	66.2	78.1	84.9	82.1	36.5	52.7	62.8	51.2	14.4	34.1	35.1	55.9
[GAY SEX]	Almost always wrong	10.5	19.1	17.4	24.0	11.9	15.4	19.8	20.0	12.9	8.1	6.2	2.1	18.0	9.6	10.9	16.0	10.0	8.8	5.5	10.7	9.6	13.8	11.6	19.5	10.2	14.1	19.6	13.6
Sexual relations between two adults of the same	Only wrong sometimes	22.4	23.2	22.3	10.4	21.4	20.5	11.0	8.0	8.9	6.8	5.4	6.4	16.4	9.6	8.9	4.0	8.8	5.4	6.7	4.8	12.2	10.2	11.6	9.8	19.8	20.7	24.7	11.9
sex	Not wrong most of the time	20.6	11.8	9.1	9.4	21.4	10.3	5.5	4.0	12.9	6.1	1.6	2.1	18.0	8.2	6.9	4.0	6.2	3.7	2.5	2.4	20.9	9.6	8.3	7.3	16.2	19.3	10.3	13.6
	Not wrong at all	26.0	9.9	7.2	5.2	25.0	7.7	6.6	0.0	10.9	7.4	3.1	2.1	23.0	5.5	8.9	2.0	8.8	4.0	0.4	0.0	20.9	13.8	5.8	12.2	39.5	11.9	10.3	5.1
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX]	Always wrong	57.0	52.2	52.8	53.7	64.3	43.0	61.5	60.8	73.3	73.5	81.4	69.6	59.7	68.0	62.7	70.0	80.9	85.3	86.1	81.9	70.9	77.1	77.7	68.3	49.7	51.9	45.5	55.9
Sexual relations with someone	Almost always wrong	21.3	21.7	21.5	24.2	20.2	24.1	16.5	23.5	11.9	18.4	12.4	21.7	19.4	20.0	21.6	12.0	8.0	6.0	5.0	10.8	13.7	11.8	10.7	17.1	28.7	21.5	21.2	15.3
other than marriage partner	Only wrong sometimes	11.9	19.7	19.6	15.8	9.5	26.6	18.7	9.8	9.9	4.1	3.1	6.5	11.3	9.3	8.8	12.0	5.7	5.4	5.9	2.4	5.1	8.8	8.3	4.9	9.6	20.0	26.3	22.0

	Not wrong most of the time	5.4	3.2	4.5	4.2	1.2	6.3	1.1	2.0	3.0	1.4	1.6	0.0	1.6	1.3	2.9	2.0	3.1	1.0	2.5	2.4	5.1	1.2	3.3	7.3	4.8	4.4	7.1	5.1
	Not wrong at all	4.3	3.2	1.5	2.1	4.8	0.0	2.2	3.9	2.0	2.7	1.6	2.2	8.1	1.3	3.9	4.0	2.4	2.3	0.4	2.4	5.1	1.2	0.0	2.4	7.2	2.2	0.0	1.7
	Always wrong	9.0	7.6	17.7	29.2	9.5	5.1	28.9	33.3	15.0	18.9	25.4	25.5	11.3	25.7	25.5	36.0	19.3	24.0	37.9	25.6	21.4	35.5	28.1	24.4	5.4	7.4	12.1	18.6
	Almost always wrong	9.4	8.0	10.6	19.8	6.0	12.7	12.2	11.8	21.0	28.4	20.8	25.5	22.6	20.3	14.7	14.0	15.6	13.9	14.0	18.3	9.4	10.1	10.7	19.5	4.2	8.9	11.1	13.6
[DIVORCE] Divorce	Only wrong sometimes	42.2	49.4	47.9	33.3	29.8	44.3	46.7	45.1	43.0	38.5	37.7	31.9	27.4	29.7	41.2	38.0	37.5	40.2	34.9	39.0	38.5	35.5	38.0	22.0	38.3	46.7	45.5	49.2
	Not wrong most of the time	16.2	18.5	13.2	9.4	25.0	21.5	5.6	5.9	8.0	6.1	10.0	6.4	17.7	12.2	10.8	6.0	14.6	12.5	10.6	12.2	12.8	5.9	11.6	22.0	18.6	15.6	19.2	11.9
	Not wrong at all	23.1	16.6	10.6	8.3	29.8	16.5	6.7	3.9	13.0	8.1	6.2	10.6	21.0	12.2	7.8	6.0	13.0	9.5	2.6	4.9	17.9	13.0	11.6	12.2	33.5	21.5	12.1	6.8
	Always wrong	4.7	7.6	11.0	27.1	4.8	9.0	24.4	41.2	24.0	33.1	54.6	50.0	8.2	32.0	36.3	40.0	41.2	58.7	73.1	67.5	26.5	31.0	49.6	41.5	3.6	8.1	9.2	18.6
[COHABITATION]	Almost always wrong	2.2	8.0	12.5	13.5	1.2	7.7	14.4	15.7	13.0	20.3	10.8	21.7	4.9	20.0	10.8	16.0	15.9	12.8	12.6	16.9	12.0	19.6	13.2	12.2	3.6	5.2	12.2	13.6
Living with a partner before	Only wrong sometimes	21.1	34.1	38.6	29.2	13.1	29.5	32.2	29.4	14.0	22.3	19.2	17.4	26.2	18.7	27.5	24.0	17.5	16.8	7.1	7.2	23.9	22.6	19.8	12.2	18.6	27.4	33.7	33.9
marriage	Not wrong most of the time	30.5	25.8	25.0	19.8	38.1	29.5	16.7	11.8	23.0	13.5	10.8	4.3	21.3	17.3	13.7	10.0	14.0	5.7	4.6	8.4	16.2	10.1	11.6	19.5	25.7	28.9	26.5	27.1
	Not wrong at all	41.6	24.5	12.9	10.4	42.9	24.4	12.2	2.0	26.0	10.8	4.6	6.5	39.3	12.0	11.8	10.0	11.4	6.0	2.5	0.0	21.4	16.7	5.8	14.6	48.5	30.4	18.4	6.8
	Always wrong	30.2	39.3	44.0	43.8	21.4	25.3	50.0	54.9	48.5	52.4	66.4	65.2	32.8	57.3	60.8	62.7	59.9	74.1	81.2	78.6	47.0	68.8	74.2	61.0	27.5	26.7	29.3	44.1
[PREGNANCY	Almost always wrong	18.0	17.6	19.2	20.8	16.7	21.5	15.6	27.5	13.9	18.4	16.0	21.7	19.7	21.3	16.7	13.7	14.4	12.1	10.9	13.1	23.1	10.6	10.8	14.6	20.4	22.2	23.2	16.9
OOW] Having a pregnancy outside	Only wrong sometimes	28.1	28.8	27.4	25.0	29.8	32.9	28.9	11.8	19.8	17.7	12.2	10.9	21.3	14.7	14.7	7.8	14.9	8.8	5.0	6.0	16.2	11.2	9.2	2.4	20.4	30.4	31.3	32.2
of marriage	Not wrong most of the time	15.8	7.7	6.0	6.3	19.0	16.5	4.4	3.9	9.9	8.2	2.3	0.0	14.8	1.3	3.9	9.8	6.6	2.7	2.1	2.4	6.8	3.5	1.7	14.6	11.4	12.6	12.1	3.4
	Not wrong at all	7.9	6.7	3.4	4.2	13.1	3.8	1.1	2.0	7.9	3.4	3.1	2.2	11.5	5.3	3.9	5.9	4.2	2.4	0.8	0.0	6.8	5.9	4.2	7.3	20.4	8.1	4.0	3.4
[ADOPTION BY	Always wrong	16.5	25.5	39.5	42.7	19.0	43.0	53.3	60.8	45.5	58.1	72.7	77.8	22.6	67.1	61.8	64.0	47.8	62.2	70.3	63.4	21.1	30.2	47.1	36.6	10.8	23.7	25.5	37.3
GAY COUPLES] The adoption of a child by a gay	Almost always wrong	7.2	16.2	12.8	19.8	6.0	11.4	17.8	9.8	11.9	12.8	11.7	4.4	9.7	6.8	6.9	20.0	9.7	12.8	10.6	15.9	11.4	8.3	8.3	9.8	7.2	12.6	26.5	16.9
couple	Only wrong sometimes	18.7	22.3	25.2	18.8	19.0	20.3	14.4	17.6	12.9	12.8	8.6	6.7	9.7	6.8	11.8	2.0	14.7	11.5	9.3	6.1	14.9	16.0	15.7	17.1	21.7	21.5	21.4	20.3

IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

	Not wrong most of the time	19.1	19.4	11.7	10.4	19.0	17.7	6.7	11.8	16.8	5.4	3.1	4.4	27.4	6.8	4.9	4.0	10.6	7.1	5.5	8.5	21.1	17.8	15.7	12.2	19.9	20.7	12.2	18.6
	Not wrong at all	38.5	16.6	10.9	8.3	36.9	7.6	7.8	0.0	12.9	10.8	3.9	6.7	30.6	12.3	14.7	10.0	17.3	6.4	4.2	6.1	31.6	27.8	13.2	24.4	40.4	21.5	14.3	6.8
	Always wrong	15.5	29.2	44.5	58.3	20.2	44.3	53.3	64.7	52.5	70.9	82.9	87.2	31.1	66.2	65.7	80.4	65.2	78.8	84.9	84.5	23.5	37.3	55.8	43.9	13.8	27.4	28.6	54.2
	Almost always wrong	7.2	16.0	16.2	20.8	7.1	13.9	16.7	15.7	9.9	6.1	6.2	2.1	9.8	6.8	12.7	11.8	7.8	6.4	6.7	7.1	13.0	12.0	10.8	9.8	9.0	15.6	24.5	13.6
[GAY MARRIAGE] Gay marriage	Only wrong sometimes	18.4	22.1	19.2	11.5	15.5	19.0	13.3	15.7	9.9	8.8	5.4	2.1	9.8	8.1	2.0	3.9	7.8	6.1	5.0	4.8	13.0	11.4	11.7	14.6	15.6	14.1	22.4	15.3
,g-	Not wrong most of the time	20.6	15.1	9.8	4.2	21.4	13.9	6.7	3.9	12.9	4.1	1.6	2.1	14.8	6.8	7.8	2.0	7.1	3.7	1.3	1.2	17.4	13.9	11.7	9.8	15.6	19.3	13.3	10.2
	Not wrong at all	38.3	17.6	10.2	5.2	35.7	8.9	10.0	0.0	14.9	10.1	3.9	6.4	34.4	12.2	11.8	2.0	12.1	5.1	2.1	2.4	33.0	25.3	10.0	22.0	46.1	23.7	11.2	6.8
	Always wrong	35.6	47.6	49.1	59.4	36.1	43.0	54.3	62.7	51.5	66.2	76.9	63.8	40.3	68.0	64.7	54.9	73.0	82.6	85.0	84.5	57.3	68.3	69.4	68.3	35.1	50.4	39.4	50.8
	Almost always wrong	23.4	19.7	21.0	25.0	22.9	24.1	20.7	21.6	23.8	16.2	15.4	27.7	21.0	16.0	15.7	19.6	11.8	8.7	8.8	9.5	12.0	12.6	7.4	14.6	23.2	21.5	17.2	20.3
[GAMBLING] Gambling	Only wrong sometimes	28.8	25.1	22.8	9.4	34.9	24.1	22.8	13.7	14.9	14.2	6.9	4.3	27.4	13.3	12.7	23.5	10.7	6.4	4.2	3.6	23.1	15.0	18.2	7.3	25.6	20.7	36.4	20.3
	Not wrong most of the time	5.8	2.2	5.6	5.2	1.2	5.1	1.1	0.0	5.9	1.4	0.8	2.1	3.2	1.3	3.9	0.0	2.4	1.3	1.7	1.2	4.3	2.4	3.3	7.3	5.4	5.2	6.1	5.1
	Not wrong at all	6.5	5.4	1.5	1.0	4.8	3.8	1.1	2.0	4.0	2.0	0.0	2.1	8.1	1.3	2.9	2.0	2.1	1.0	0.4	1.2	3.4	1.8	1.7	2.4	10.7	2.2	1.0	3.4
(SURROGACY/	Always wrong	16.9	30.4	40.2	45.3	21.4	39.7	52.2	62.7	52.5	61.5	78.3	73.9	29.0	69.4	61.8	70.6	54.7	69.9	74.6	71.1	20.9	29.8	57.0	34.1	10.8	26.9	26.5	39.0
ART BY GAY COUPLES]	Almost always wrong	10.8	13.7	15.9	21.1	7.1	14.1	15.6	9.8	8.9	11.5	9.3	8.7	8.1	4.2	11.8	13.7	10.4	10.1	9.7	14.5	10.4	10.7	5.0	12.2	13.2	11.9	27.6	15.3
A gay couple having a child through	Only wrong sometimes	18.3	24.0	22.3	16.8	16.7	21.8	16.7	15.7	10.9	10.1	7.8	4.3	16.1	9.7	5.9	3.9	13.5	8.8	7.6	1.2	13.9	14.3	11.6	17.1	21.0	17.2	21.4	20.3
surrogacy/artificial reproductive	Not wrong most of the time	19.4	16.9	12.1	9.5	23.8	15.4	6.7	11.8	15.8	6.8	1.6	6.5	19.4	5.6	5.9	3.9	6.6	6.1	4.2	8.4	23.5	17.3	12.4	17.1	18.0	23.9	13.3	16.9
techniques	Not wrong at all	34.5	15.0	9.5	7.4	31.0	9.0	8.9	0.0	11.9	10.1	3.1	6.5	27.4	11.1	14.7	7.8	14.7	5.1	3.8	4.8	31.3	28.0	14.0	19.5	37.1	20.1	11.2	8.5

How do you feel about these social issues? (2013) (% responses across religion and age cohort)																													
[ISSUES] and Question Items	Response Options			Buddnism			-	laoism / I cB		Christianity*					Catholicism*					Sign				Hinduism		No Religion			
		18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65	18-35	36-50	51-65	>65
[PREMARITAL SEX] Sexual relations before marriage	Always wrong	17.6	24.3	37.4	53.7	12.0	21.8	32.0	48.7	53.4	70.4	59.7	42.9	26.8	43.6	55.4	43.5	71.5	77.5	69.0	68.9	51.0	62.4	59.3	43.9	15.8	18.0	30.7	37.1
	Almost always wrong	15.4	19.0	18.9	16.4	19.7	21.2	19.6	33.3	12.2	13.0	20.8	23.8	27.8	21.1	20.3	30.4	14.5	12.7	19.0	24.3	12.9	16.4	26.7	36.6	11.8	20.1	20.5	25.7
	Only wrong sometimes	24.9	34.5	23.3	22.4	31.7	32.4	27.8	10.3	14.5	8.7	13.9	23.8	25.8	19.5	13.5	21.7	10.1	5.8	7.6	4.1	18.1	10.8	9.3	7.3	28.6	28.8	21.6	20.0
	Not wrong most of the time	18.3	10.6	10.7	4.5	17.6	12.4	11.3	2.6	8.4	4.3	0.0	0.0	8.2	7.5	4.1	0.0	1.5	2.0	2.4	1.4	9.0	5.6	1.2	4.9	18.7	12.9	11.4	0.0
	Not wrong at all	23.8	11.6	9.7	3.0	19.0	12.4	9.3	5.1	11.5	3.5	5.6	9.5	11.3	8.3	6.8	4.3	2.5	2.0	1.9	1.4	9.0	4.7	3.5	7.3	25.1	20.1	15.9	17.1
	Always wrong	41.7	57.0	61.6	71.6	46.2	55.0	67.7	69.2	64.1	86.1	81.7	71.4	48.5	65.6	67.1	73.9	84.2	83.0	75.6	75.7	60.5	75.1	69.0	61.0	26.1	51.4	52.3	61.8
[GAY SEX]	Almost always wrong	22.1	20.1	20.2	13.4	21.0	21.9	17.7	28.2	9.2	6.1	15.5	19.0	23.7	14.5	17.8	8.7	8.1	10.4	18.2	21.6	16.7	12.0	26.4	24.4	23.6	21.0	26.7	23.5
Sexual relations between two adults of the same	Only wrong sometimes	17.3	14.1	9.9	11.9	11.9	14.2	9.4	2.6	11.5	1.7	0.0	4.8	12.4	7.6	6.8	8.7	3.4	4.6	4.3	1.4	7.1	6.2	3.4	4.9	18.7	10.1	11.6	5.9
sex	Not wrong most of the time	6.6	4.6	4.9	1.5	14.7	5.3	4.2	0.0	5.3	2.6	2.8	4.8	6.2	5.3	4.1	8.7	1.7	1.2	1.9	0.0	5.2	2.4	0.0	7.3	8.9	8.0	1.2	0.0
	Not wrong at all	12.2	4.2	3.4	1.5	6.3	3.6	1.0	0.0	9.9	3.5	0.0	0.0	9.3	6.9	4.1	0.0	2.5	0.9	0.0	1.4	10.5	4.3	1.1	2.4	22.7	9.4	8.1	8.8
[EXTRAMARITAL SEX]	Always wrong	50.0	56.3	54.4	68.7	46.9	56.0	49.5	71.8	76.3	85.2	77.8	61.9	57.7	72.7	70.3	65.2	80.8	78.7	72.2	77.0	70.5	77.1	62.1	46.3	47.0	60.4	56.8	48.6
SEXJ Sexual relations with someone other than marriage partner	Almost always wrong	19.5	20.4	25.0	14.9	29.4	19.6	33.0	23.1	9.9	9.6	13.9	14.3	22.7	16.7	20.3	17.4	11.8	13.3	17.7	18.9	15.7	11.2	28.7	34.1	17.8	16.5	17.0	22.9
	Only wrong sometimes	15.8	13.7	11.3	11.9	16.8	15.5	8.2	2.6	5.3	2.6	2.8	19.0	11.3	8.3	6.8	17.4	5.2	5.5	6.7	1.4	7.6	6.5	6.9	4.9	16.3	12.2	19.3	17.1

		1							1												1		1						
	Not wrong most of the time	8.5	5.3	3.9	3.0	5.6	6.0	5.2	0.0	7.6	1.7	1.4	4.8	7.2	1.5	1.4	0.0	0.5	1.7	1.4	0.0	3.8	4.2	1.1	7.3	13.9	5.8	2.3	5.7
	Not wrong at all	6.3	4.2	5.4	1.5	1.4	3.0	4.1	2.6	0.8	0.9	4.2	0.0	1.0	0.8	1.4	0.0	1.7	0.9	1.9	2.7	2.4	0.9	1.1	7.3	5.0	5.0	4.5	5.7
	Always wrong	12.5	14.8	27.8	28.4	7.0	14.7	20.4	38.5	29.0	41.7	37.5	28.6	22.4	29.2	39.2	34.8	33.5	33.9	37.1	41.9	33.2	37.3	43.7	29.3	14.8	16.5	28.7	17.1
	Almost always wrong	16.1	18.0	18.0	28.4	21.7	14.7	15.3	38.5	24.4	20.0	31.9	19.0	29.6	29.2	16.2	17.4	16.0	18.0	24.3	32.4	18.3	17.5	23.0	19.5	9.9	12.2	14.9	22.9
[DIVORCE] Divorce	Only wrong sometimes	40.7	37.8	36.6	28.4	37.1	42.4	42.9	15.4	27.5	24.3	22.2	38.1	30.6	27.7	32.4	34.8	37.7	36.5	31.9	16.2	29.3	26.9	28.7	36.6	38.9	33.8	27.6	31.4
	Not wrong most of the time	17.9	15.2	10.7	10.4	18.2	17.6	11.2	5.1	11.5	7.0	5.6	9.5	11.2	5.4	8.1	13.0	6.7	5.8	3.3	5.4	12.5	7.5	2.3	7.3	15.3	19.4	14.9	14.3
	Not wrong at all	12.8	14.1	6.8	4.5	16.1	10.6	10.2	2.6	7.6	7.0	2.8	4.8	6.1	8.5	4.1	0.0	6.2	5.8	3.3	4.1	6.7	10.8	2.3	7.3	21.2	18.0	13.8	14.3
[COHABITATION] Living with a partner before marriage	Always wrong	8.5	16.6	28.6	45.5	4.9	11.3	21.6	38.5	27.5	48.7	51.4	42.9	16.7	35.3	39.2	40.9	56.4	64.6	63.8	63.5	30.0	46.7	44.8	34.1	11.8	12.2	22.7	28.6
	Almost always wrong	8.8	13.8	18.9	16.7	9.8	11.3	19.6	28.2	21.4	19.1	25.0	14.3	19.8	16.5	29.7	27.3	18.2	16.1	15.2	27.0	19.8	15.6	28.7	31.7	6.9	20.9	19.3	22.9
	Only wrong sometimes	25.7	32.5	22.8	21.2	23.8	31.5	30.9	20.5	15.3	13.9	13.9	19.0	25.0	24.1	17.6	13.6	15.5	12.1	15.2	5.4	17.9	17.5	16.1	17.1	18.7	23.7	26.1	28.6
	Not wrong most of the time	20.2	18.0	14.6	9.1	29.4	24.4	14.4	7.7	15.3	6.1	4.2	19.0	16.7	9.8	5.4	18.2	4.9	3.7	3.3	0.0	14.5	9.9	6.9	9.8	25.6	16.5	12.5	2.9
	Not wrong at all	36.8	19.1	15.0	7.6	32.2	21.4	13.4	5.1	20.6	12.2	5.6	4.8	21.9	14.3	8.1	0.0	4.9	3.5	2.4	4.1	17.9	10.4	3.4	7.3	36.9	26.6	19.3	17.1
	Always wrong	33.8	45.1	52.2	57.6	38.0	42.6	45.8	59.0	58.8	75.7	65.3	63.2	42.7	60.9	54.1	52.2	71.6	77.2	70.7	68.5	61.7	72.6	62.1	53.7	34.0	43.9	52.9	48.6
[PREGNANCY	Almost always wrong	23.2	22.5	21.7	21.2	25.4	17.2	28.1	25.6	18.3	12.2	25.0	10.5	26.0	20.3	24.3	26.1	17.3	13.0	16.8	26.0	20.1	13.7	24.1	26.8	19.7	25.2	20.7	14.3
OOW] Having a pregnancy outside	Only wrong sometimes	20.6	16.9	14.8	16.7	21.1	25.4	16.7	10.3	10.7	7.8	4.2	21.1	18.8	10.5	13.5	13.0	6.4	7.5	9.1	1.4	8.6	6.6	8.0	14.6	25.1	12.2	20.7	28.6
of marriage	Not wrong most of the time	13.6	11.6	6.9	1.5	7.7	9.5	5.2	2.6	8.4	2.6	2.8	0.0	9.4	5.3	4.1	8.7	2.7	1.4	2.4	2.7	4.8	4.7	3.4	2.4	11.8	10.1	2.3	5.7
	Not wrong at all	8.8	3.9	4.4	3.0	7.7	5.3	4.2	2.6	3.8	1.7	2.8	5.3	3.1	3.0	4.1	0.0	2.0	0.9	1.0	1.4	4.8	2.4	2.3	2.4	9.4	8.6	3.4	2.9
[ADOPTION BY GAY COUPLES] The adoption of a child by a gay couple	Always wrong	24.5	45.9	46.1	49.3	31.7	39.8	46.9	59.0	46.6	74.8	63.4	70.0	29.6	55.7	51.4	56.5	56.4	61.9	58.7	62.2	32.7	46.9	41.4	46.3	21.2	42.4	43.7	42.9
	Almost always wrong	15.8	18.4	15.2	19.4	19.7	19.3	21.9	17.9	14.5	8.7	22.5	10.0	20.4	10.7	14.9	21.7	13.0	10.2	16.3	20.3	10.2	12.9	21.8	17.1	13.3	16.5	16.1	14.3
	Only wrong sometimes	22.0	15.9	15.2	11.9	13.4	21.7	16.7	10.3	10.7	5.2	8.5	5.0	19.4	13.7	10.8	13.0	14.2	14.8	12.5	5.4	15.1	11.0	6.9	4.9	16.3	15.1	11.5	8.6

IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

Moral Attitudes in Flux: Comparing Trends across Religions in Singapore by Mathew, M., Lim, H. A., Teo, K. K., and Tay, M.

	Not wrong most of the time	15.8	9.9	11.8	7.5	14.8	10.8	7.3	12.8	10.7	2.6	2.8	10.0	12.2	9.9	16.2	4.3	3.7	6.1	5.8	6.8	13.7	12.4	11.5	14.6	16.7	10.8	9.2	11.4
	Not wrong at all	22.0	9.9	11.8	11.9	20.4	8.4	7.3	0.0	17.6	8.7	2.8	5.0	18.4	9.9	6.8	4.3	12.7	7.0	6.7	5.4	28.3	16.7	18.4	17.1	32.5	15.1	19.5	22.9
[GAY MARRIAGE] Gay marriage	Always wrong	40.7	60.6	60.8	74.2	40.8	52.7	67.7	71.1	58.8	83.3	75.0	70.0	43.3	62.3	57.5	69.6	78.2	78.3	72.6	73.0	50.2	61.7	52.3	51.2	25.6	48.9	50.6	62.9
	Almost always wrong	17.2	15.1	17.2	7.6	19.0	18.0	17.7	13.2	9.9	5.3	18.1	15.0	13.4	10.8	12.3	21.7	9.2	11.6	16.3	20.3	14.6	13.9	22.1	7.3	21.2	15.8	21.8	20.0
	Only wrong sometimes	16.1	13.7	10.8	10.6	16.9	15.6	8.3	5.3	10.7	1.8	2.8	5.0	20.6	10.8	17.8	4.3	5.0	7.0	6.7	4.1	12.7	10.5	5.8	14.6	13.8	16.5	9.2	2.9
	Not wrong most of the time	10.6	3.9	4.4	4.5	7.0	8.4	3.1	7.9	8.4	3.5	2.8	10.0	11.3	8.5	2.7	4.3	3.0	1.7	1.4	0.0	5.9	6.2	7.0	14.6	12.8	9.4	6.9	2.9
	Not wrong at all	15.4	6.7	6.9	3.0	16.2	5.4	3.1	2.6	12.2	6.1	1.4	0.0	11.3	7.7	9.6	0.0	4.7	1.4	2.9	2.7	16.6	7.7	12.8	12.2	26.6	9.4	11.5	11.4
	Always wrong	35.5	47.0	53.4	66.7	30.8	39.6	46.5	64.1	55.4	72.2	61.1	50.0	50.0	58.3	61.6	34.8	76.4	76.3	76.6	78.1	60.5	66.8	52.9	47.5	36.5	50.0	53.9	48.6
	Almost always wrong	14.3	12.6	16.0	7.6	16.8	19.5	19.2	15.4	20.0	13.9	15.3	25.0	13.3	20.5	19.2	39.1	13.3	14.5	13.9	19.2	12.9	15.4	28.7	25.0	11.3	17.4	29.2	20.0
[GAMBLING] Gambling	Only wrong sometimes	24.5	21.8	18.0	13.6	25.2	19.5	22.2	5.1	16.2	7.8	9.7	20.0	20.4	16.7	12.3	26.1	7.4	7.8	7.2	2.7	18.1	11.2	17.2	20.0	27.1	18.8	11.2	25.7
	Not wrong most of the time	12.8	10.9	5.8	7.6	11.9	9.5	6.1	5.1	6.9	2.6	11.1	5.0	10.2	0.8	4.1	0.0	1.7	0.9	0.5	0.0	5.2	2.8	1.1	5.0	13.3	2.9	4.5	2.9
	Not wrong at all	12.8	7.7	6.8	4.5	15.4	11.8	6.1	10.3	1.5	3.5	2.8	0.0	6.1	3.8	2.7	0.0	1.2	0.6	1.9	0.0	3.3	3.7	0.0	2.5	11.8	10.9	1.1	2.9
(SURROGACY/	Always wrong																												
ART BY GAY COUPLES]	Almost always wrong																												
A gay couple having a child through	Only wrong sometimes													N/A (N	Not as	ked in	2013)												
surrogacy/artificial reproductive	Not wrong most of the time																												
techniques	Not wrong at all																												

^{*}While Roman Catholics and Protestant Christians are normally categorised as Christians, in this study we have separated their responses as their views sometimes differ. While it would be most appropriate for us to categorise and present the two groups as Protestant Christians and Roman Catholic Christians, it is difficult for stylistic and presentation reasons to do so. As such we have separated the two groups as Christians and Catholics, and refer to these groups in-text and in our figures as such. In no way are we alleging that Roman Catholics are not Christians.

APPENDIX 2: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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institutional partners who believed in the value of this work.

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As the saying goes, "great research is never a solo act," and this publication is

a testament to the collective effort of many.

IPS Working Papers No. 66 (August 2025):

APPENDIX 3: ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MATHEW MATHEWS is Head of IPS Social Lab and Principal Research Fellow

at the Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. He also leads

the IPS Programme on Race, Religion and Intergroup Cohesion. To date,

Mathews has led over 60 research projects, most of them addressing social

policy issues. These have included research using both quantitative and

qualitative methods on race, religion, immigrant integration, family, ageing and

poverty. He also studies the impact of social programmes and has been

involved in a number of evaluations on the usefulness of various government

initiatives. Mathews has taught courses on social policy and has published in a

range of outlets. He currently sits on various boards including OnePeople.sg.

Hanniel Asher LIM is a former Research Assistant at the Institute of Policy

Studies' Social Lab, where he worked on studies relating to Singapore's social

fabric through both quantitative and qualitative methods. His academic and

policy interests centre on the intersection of religion and political economy, and

he has contributed to multiple research projects spanning societal values,

development, and governance in Singapore and the region. Hanniel also holds

an affiliate appointment at the Adam Smith Center, where he has published

scholarly work on state-led development and institutional diversity in Southeast

Asia.

Hanniel holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences (Honours) in Philosophy, Politics,

and Economics (PPE) from the National University of Singapore, and has prior

experience as a research assistant, editor, and teaching assistant across

various educational institutions. He is currently studying at Harvard University.

TEO Kay Key is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies Social

Lab. Kay Key's current projects examine a myriad of issues in Singapore,

including attitudes towards the family, social norms and values and national

identity. She graduated with a PhD in Political Science from the National

University of Singapore, and holds a Master's in Political Behaviour from the

University of Essex in the United Kingdom. Her research interests are an

amalgamation of the varied experiences she has had, and include voting

behaviour, public opinion and Singapore society. Prior to joining IPS, she

worked in the Singapore Civil Service for nearly three years doing strategic

planning, training and policy work.

Melvin **TAY** is Research Fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies' Social Lab.

His research interests lie at the intersection of politics and society; with a focus

on societal faultlines, their significance and their management via policy

instruments and community platforms. He has scoped, managed and

contributed to several public sector-commissioned projects on race, religion,

immigration, class, sexuality, age and education — key faultlines in Singapore.

Melvin previously worked in the corporate strategy team at a top consulting firm

and contributed to strategy and visioning projects for key public sector agencies.

Melvin is a recipient of the University of Tokyo Graduate School of Public Policy

Doctoral Fellowship, and the NUS Graduate Teaching Fellowship, Master's and

Undergraduate Scholarships. He completed his PhD in Public Policy at the

University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Public Policy, and has a Master of

Social Sciences (Political Economy) and a Bachelor of Social Sciences (1st

Class Honours) in Political Science and Philosophy from the National University

of Singapore.

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Institute of Policy Studies
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy National University of
Singapore 1C Cluny Road House 5 Singapore 259599

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