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LIVED EXPERIENCES IN SINGAPORE: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

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LIVED EXPERIENCES IN SINGAPORE: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE WORLD VALUES SURVEY

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Preface

PREFACE

While much has been said about the values, views and attitudes of Singaporeans in the first two instalments of the Institute of Policy Studies' reports on the World Values Survey (WVS), this report, titled *Lived Experiences in Singapore*, is the last of a three-part series[1] focusing on the reported encounters and personal experiences of Singapore respondents. Presenting the salient findings arising from the latest instalment of the WVS, this report provides a useful glimpse of what motivates and sustains our attitudes and values.

WVS is the largest non-commercial, cross-national, and time-series survey of public attitudes and values globally. Spanning 80 countries and currently in its seventh iteration, WVS seeks to study individuals' changing values across polities and their impact on social and political life.

In this most recent wave, WVS continues to monitor cultural values, attitudes and beliefs towards gender, family, and religion; attitudes and experience of poverty; education, health, and security; social tolerance and trust; attitudes towards multilateral institutions; cultural differences and similarities between regions and societies. It aims to investigate public attitudes to a range of issues, including family, work, culture, diversity, the environment, subjective well-being, politics, religion, and the impact of globalisation. In addition, new topics such as issues of justice, moral principles, corruption, accountability and risk, migration, national security, and global governance are included in the survey questionnaire.

For ease of understanding, we have organised the WVS findings and analyses into three main themes: 1) personal values; 2) perceptions of institutions, politics, and policies; and 3) lived experiences, including well-being and social trust. This report explicates the third theme and spotlights aspects of well-being across broad-ranging themes such as happiness, satisfaction, health, finances, and safety, as well as trust, participation in civil society, political experiences, and national identity. Where appropriate, the analyses presented across the three reports consider results from previous and current iterations in tandem to illustrate shifts in individual and societal values. Across all sections in the reports, we use open-source data weighted to the national populations of each polity from the WVS website to make cross-country comparisons (Haerpfer et al., 2020). The reports present and discuss findings only pertaining to notable variables with significant results, due to space exigencies.

The Singapore component of the WVS survey was carried out by the Institute of Policy Studies' (IPS) Social Lab. IPS is a think-tank in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP) at the National University of Singapore. The survey implementation received additional support from LKYSPP faculty members, particularly Associate Professor Alfred Wu. Other faculty members who collaborated with funding arrangements were Dr Tan Poh Lin, Dr Joelle Fong, Dr Mehmet Akif Demircioglu, and Dr Xi Lu.

[1] The 1st and 2nd reports titled, *Our Singaporean Values* and *Attitudes towards Institutions, Politics, and Policies* were released in February 2021 and April 2021 respectively. They are available at https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-exchange-series-16.pdf and https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-exchange-series-17.pdf.

A general population sampling frame comprising randomly generated household addresses and contact details was obtained from the Singapore Department of Statistics (DOS). Surveyors subsequently visited these addresses to recruit Singaporeans and Permanent Residents (PRs) aged 21 years and above. Fieldwork in Singapore for WVS was conducted from November 2019 to March 2020, with 2,012 respondents completing the survey. The findings from this overall dataset are representative of the Singapore resident population. The refusal rate was relatively low for the study – only 24.5 per cent of households refused to participate in the study or indicated that they were too busy to complete the survey and did not subsequently agree to participate.

The duration the survey was in the field cut through two periods – prior to the middle of January 2020, when there was relatively little concern about the Covid-19 pandemic, and after this period, where concerns were steadily increasing with the first local transmissions being reported on 4 February 2020. Expectedly, the concerns over Covid-19 could have resulted in some changes in sentiments, ranging from trust in institutions to perceptions of foreigners. As such, the research team carefully examined whether there were any sentiment shifts between these two periods. In general, the changes were small with some exceptions for specific issues. Cases of the latter are elaborated upon in the analyses that follow.

In Chapter 2, we begin by perusing responses to questions on personal well-being, encompassing happiness and satisfaction, health, personal autonomy, and standard of living. In general, we find that the bulk of Singapore respondents indicated that 1) they were generally happy and satisfied; 2) in good health; 3) had some or a high degree of control over their lives; and 4) they were better-off than their parents in terms of their standard of living. These responses, however, vary sizeably across demographics such as age and affluence.

Questions on safety and security – another aspect of well-being – are analysed in Chapter 3, where we find that over nine in 10 respondents indicated feeling very secure or quite secure in general. This finding is supported by a large majority expressing that they 1) never or rarely felt unsafe from crime and were not victims of crime in the past year; 2) felt unsavoury activities such as robberies, street sales of drugs, racist behaviour, and sexual harassment rarely or never occurred; and 3) did not see the need to take precautions such as carrying less money on them or avoiding going out at night. Nonetheless, over half indicated worrying about the occurrence of a terrorist attack in the future.

Chapter 4 addresses issues of work, finances, and perceptions of class. We find that while more than nine in 10 respondents had some degree of satisfaction with their current jobs, over half were worried about losing their jobs, not finding another job, or not being able to give their children a good education. Most were at least somewhat satisfied with their household finances; approximately nine in 10 had never gone without food, shelter, or medicine in the past year. Just over half consulted financial advisors before investing, and only over a quarter stated they participated in the CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS). Vis-à-vis class, approximately three-quarters identified themselves as belonging to the working or lower middle class, and placed their households in the mid-range income group.

Respondents' lived experiences pertaining to social trust, sources of information, participation in organisations, and religion are spotlighted in Chapter 5. In terms of trust and social capital, we find that only over one-third of respondents believed that most people could be trusted, with the only group where the majority indicated trusting completely being their families. Respondents largely leverage technology-based platforms like their mobile phones, the Internet, and social media to obtain information about the world, with traditional sources such as news and radio being less popular. WVS survey responses also indicate that Singapore respondents were most likely to be part of a religious, sports, recreational, art, music, or educational organisation relative to others such as charitable, self-help, women's or environmental organisations. However, the majority were still far more likely to indicate non-affiliation with any organisation. Among those religiously affiliated, over four in 10 reported attending some form of religious services at least once a month.

Chapter 6 spotlights the experiences and encounters of respondents in the realm of politics. Singapore is among the most politically apathetic polities, with close to four in 10 indicating they never discussed politics with friends. Just over one-fifth of respondents have donated to a group or campaign and searched for information about politics, while very few have organised political activities or events. About a third felt they had little or no say in what the Government does given the political system in Singapore, while one in three Singapore respondents believed that TV news favours the ruling party fairly often. Nonetheless, most felt elections were conducted fairly.

National pride, social closeness, and governance are explored in Chapter 7. Over nine in 10 respondents were very or quite proud to be Singaporean; this proportion is among the highest globally. Respondents also indicated feeling closest to their country, followed by their neighbourhood or estate, ASEAN, Asia, and the world. Over three-quarters of respondents felt that ordinary people like themselves would never have to bribe government officials or service providers to get the services they need. This proportion is the highest when compared with other polities. However, just under four in 10 respondents felt the Singapore Government is innovative.

To conclude, this report presents a structural equation model and summarises all in-depth findings explicated in Chapter 8.

The primary intent of this series of reports is to present the findings of the WVS survey factually, with minimal value judgments attached to the statistical analyses presented. We leave it to our readers to draw more in-depth conclusions as to what these findings represent in terms of whether, or how our values shape the way we lead our lives, interact with society-at-large, and influence policymaking.

Chapter 1

Introduction

CHAPTER 1 | INTRODUCTION

In this report, we analyse the lived experiences of Singaporeans across the following themes: personal well-being (Chapter 2), safety and security (Chapter 3), work, finances, and SES (Chapter 4), trust, information and civil society (Chapter 5), politics (Chapter 6), and national identity and governance (Chapter 7).

Firstly, we examine Singaporeans' quality of life at an individual level in Chapters 2 to 4. Since the 1960s, researchers (Veenhoven, 2000; McCall, 1975) have attempted to define the term "quality of life" in different ways. For instance, McCall (1975) defines it as the satisfaction of the necessary conditions of anyone's happiness, while Campbell, Converse and Rodgers (1976) conceptualised quality of life as being about individual well-being. For a comprehensive overview of the quality of life literature, read Marans and Stimson (2011) and Sirgy et al. (2006). Researchers studying quality of life have generally distinguished the notion of quality of life as either "objective" or "subjective" (Cummins, 2000).

This distinction arose due to the observation that improvements in socio-economic conditions did not necessarily equate to an increase in quality of life or happiness in the long run. This phenomenon is also known as the happiness-income paradox (Easterlin et al., 2010). Favoured by economists, objective indicators include tangible measures such as crime statistics, income levels, health and education. However, subjective well-being researchers argue that relying on social indicators alone cannot fully encapsulate quality of life. Hence, these researchers came up with subjective indicators that include people's emotional responses, domain satisfaction, and personal judgements of life satisfaction (Diener, Suh, Lucas & Smith, 1999; Minkov, 2009). Notwithstanding the rich literature surrounding quality of life research, researchers have yet to reach a consensus on a definition of quality of life (Barofsky, 2012). Hence, the definition of quality of life still remains subject to the research fields – often spanning across many disciplines, such as science, medicine, economics and the social sciences (Cummins, 2005).

This report leans towards the subjective approach where we go beyond focusing on the objective conditions in which people live but rather, how people actually feel about those conditions. We define quality of life as the "physical, psychological, and sociological state of being of people" (Inoguchi & Fujii, 2013, p. 3). Such a definition embraces that quality of life is a comprehensive, multidimensional, multilevel concept. It enables us to analyse a myriad of indicators like happiness and specific life domain satisfactions, which in turn contributes to a fuller picture of the quality of life in Singapore.

A common approach to understanding the subjective quality of life is by breaking it down into its constituent domains. The possible number of domains is large. For instance, Cummins (1996) pointed out seven general domains: material well-being, health, productivity, intimacy, safety, community, and emotional well-being. However, in reality, domains of quality of life are non-exhaustive. In a similar vein, this section on quality of life includes people's overall levels of satisfaction, personal safety, national security, future security, and knowledge of international organisations.

In Chapter 4, we move on to the economic aspects of quality of life. This would explore levels of satisfaction of an individual's finances, job, family economic situation, as well as their perceptions on class and investment patterns. Satisfaction in these economic areas has also been found to have effects on an individual's quality of life.

Chapter 5 explores lived experiences at the societal level. Here, we explore levels of social capital and trust. According to Robert Putnam (2000), social capital can be defined as norms of reciprocity derived from networks of civic engagement (or engagement in civic associations). Much of Putnam's work stresses the role of social capital in generating trust. In other words, formal and informal social networks, as measured by membership in civic, voluntary associations, can reinforce trust. For instance, regular in-person interactions in clubs facilitate inclusive networks and contribute to the bridging of different social groups, leading to the creation of social trust.

Recent social capital research has also shed light on how membership in voluntary civic associations builds social trust, results in beneficial political outcomes (such as trust in state institutions, democracy), and drives economic performance. For example, by utilising World Value Survey results to compare within 12 countries, Herreros (2004) argues that associational participation leads to social capital and material wealth. Stolle (1998) finds that participation in more diverse, more engaged voluntary associations is conducive for generalised trust production. Conversely, the decline in social capital has been found to depress the well-being of the lower class in China (Bartolini & Sarracino, 2015). Chua *et al*. (2021) find that building social capital through social mixing – via social infrastructure such as schools, workplaces, and voluntary associations – produces collective goods of national identity and trust.

According to the Pew Research Center (2007), social trust "refers to a belief in the honesty, integrity, and reliability of others, a 'faith in people'." Within social trust, there is a distinction between generalised trust and particularised or personalised trust. Generalised trust is a trust that "goes beyond the boundaries of kindship and friendship, and even beyond the boundaries of acquaintance" (Stolle, 1998, p. 503). In other words, generalised trust implies the expectation that strangers are trustworthy, including people from different ethnic or cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, personalised trust is a trust limited to the "immediate circle of known people, whether that be family, community, or fellow members of a voluntary association" (Stolle, 1998, p. 503).

The presence of social trust has implications on society. For instance, according to Putnam (2000), individuals with higher social trust are generally better citizens, more cooperative and more engaged in community life. Social trust has also been claimed to be associated with better community governance, economic growth, social cooperation, and even democracy. Given that higher levels of social trust can build a more caring society, it can be viewed as an important aspect of individuals' lives. The types of individuals that people say they trust can also present an indication of the attitudes they hold towards various issues. Hence, in this section on trust, we analyse not just generalised trust but trust towards specific groups of people stratified according to race, religion, and nationality.

Chapter 6 brings our analysis to the sphere of an individual's political lived experience. This chapter is interested in the rate of political participation and political interest amongst the populace. Studying political participation is important as scholars generally deem such participation as an essential element of democracy (Teorell, 2006). Today, political participation is not limited to the physical sphere but has extended to the online sphere. With the Internet readily available to virtually everyone, there are now new opportunities for political participation to take place online – such as online debate or engagement in new forms of social networks online.

Hence, in this chapter, we analyse political acts that take place physically, such as voting in-person and discussing politics with friends, as well as those that take place online, such as signing online petitions. Studies examining political participation in Singapore found it to be low, indicating an indifference about politics (Rodan, 1998). However, the rise of the Internet could signal a growth in political interest and activism in Singapore, such as Singaporeans organising online petitions to protest against certain policies, such as the opening of Singapore's first casino in 2004. Skoric, Ying and Ng (2009) find that emerging social networks online opened up new spaces for online political participation and political expression.

Through the Internet, individuals are also easily able to attain political information, such as government policies and action (Bimber, 1998). Against the backdrop of Singapore's highly developed technological infrastructure and connectivity, we also explore sources from which the population attain much of their political information – be it traditional or online – in this chapter.

Lived experiences at the national level are tackled in both Chapters 6 and 7. In these chapters, the citizen's perceptions with regard to the government's innovativeness, elections and electoral politics, and national pride are explored. In democracies, elections extend legitimacy to the political system. Hence, public confidence in elections is crucial for democratic legitimacy, because when citizens believe their votes contribute to the creation of the government, they will be more likely to perceive it as legitimate (Garnett, 2019). Electoral integrity, or the legitimacy of the electoral process, fosters public confidence in elections and is thus a crucial factor for a well-functioning democracy.

Public assessments of the legitimacy and quality of the electoral system are known to affect feelings of political legitimacy. It also influences how and the extent to which citizens engage in politics, as well as their satisfaction with democracy. For instance, if voters believe the system to be fair, they will be more inclined to vote, and increase democratic participation, which in turn leads to greater regime legitimacy (Weatherford, 1992) and higher satisfaction with democracy in general (Birch, 2010; Norris 2014). However, if voters perceive electoral processes to be unfair, they are more likely to withhold support from the regime, which results in a decline in voter turnout (Birch, 2010). In extreme cases of distrust, voters challenge the system itself, through mass protests (Schedler, 2002; Norris, 2014).

Given that there are key behavioural and attitudinal consequences of perceptions of electoral integrity, it is important that we understand public opinion towards electoral conduct. Questions in this chapter cover many aspects of elections, from electoral competitiveness, or the degree to which an election is perceived as being fairly contested, to electoral malpractice, or the extent to which electoral officials can corrupt the electoral process. Additionally, while there is much literature describing the evolving electoral processes and nature of Singapore elections (Chiang, 2015; Tan, Mahizhnan & Ang, 2016; Oliver & Ostwald, 2018; Open Singapore

Centre, 2000; Zhang, 2016), there is a need for more updated analyses about the public's first-hand assessment of elections in Singapore.

Finally, we take a look at global and governance-based lived experiences of the individual in Chapter 7. We look at the level of closeness they feel not just to their country, but to the region and the world. This is timely, especially when we live in an increasingly globalised and connected world. Feelings of closeness to the world could be due to the push towards going global, not just in Singapore, but all around the world as well. Singapore is in an especially unique position, where there is a need to develop and maintain its national identity and yet retain a competitive edge in the world by building its reputation as a global city (Velayutham, 2007). This chapter seeks to augment understanding of the sense of national belonging of the Singaporean population, as well as their closeness to the region and the world, against the backdrop of rapid globalisation.

1.1 METHODOLOGY

Data for this report is primarily derived from the latest 2020 Singapore instalment of the WVS survey. The survey instrument is developed in concert with the overall global WVS survey framework used across other polities to facilitate cross-country comparisons. Data collection for this instalment took place from November 2019 to March 2020, and was conducted by IPS Social Lab. In total, 2,012 Singaporean residents participated in the survey.

At the outset, a sample frame comprising a list of 3,000 randomly generated household addresses was obtained from the Singapore Department of Statistics (DoS). There was a reasonable response rate for this iteration of the WVS survey; approximately two-thirds of those eligible to complete the study did so. As such, the findings are representative of the Singapore adult resident population, as the next section expounds in greater detail.

IPS Social Lab surveyors approached the pre-determined prospective households to recruit Singaporeans and Permanent Residents (PRs) aged 21 years and above. They identified eligible respondents using a set of criteria (including gender and age) to ensure demographic proportionality, briefed the respondent about the study, and invited the respondent to participate in the survey. If they agreed, the survey was administered in a face-to-face interview format in either of the four official languages – English, Mandarin Chinese, Malay, or Tamil. Respondents who completed the survey were given a $15 grocery shopping voucher.

Interviewer training stressed the importance of presenting questions and receiving responses without expressing any judgment. Nevertheless, given that this is a face-to-face survey where respondents provided their answers to the interviewer verbally, we cannot exclude the role of social desirability. This is, unfortunately, a bias inherent in the design of the face-to-face survey methodology.

1.2 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

Cross-country comparisons are collated with open-source data weighted to the national populations of each polity from the official WVS website (Haerpfer et al., 2020). Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia, US, UK, Switzerland, Sweden were the dozen chosen for comparison; *in toto,* they reflect a well-rounded range of polities with diverse attributes. Malaysia and Thailand are chosen for their geographical proximity to Singapore. China, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are included in comparisons as a well-documented cluster representing Asian values and East Asia; the latter four are also the Asian Tigers with comparable levels of economic development. Australia, the US, the UK, Switzerland and Sweden round up the dozen as comparative Anglo-centric or Euro-centric democratic polities.

As part of the broader three-part thematic study, we have condensed the myriad findings in this report using a three-step approach of 1) standard regressions based on pre-defined scales, 2) cluster analysis to discern collections of similar values or beliefs prevalent within the respondent pool, and 3) structural equation modelling to discern statistically significant findings with confirmatory factor analyses. For the first step, we construct scales that provide an aggregated measure of the values or principles respondents hold across various component issues.

The second step involves cluster analysis, which is a broad-based quantitative exploratory analysis attempting to identify structures or segments within the data. Based on overarching value dimensions analysed in the first report, we had mapped out a total of four logically salient clusters of WVS respondents. These value groupings were primarily driven by views across three broad dimensions: politics, economy, and society, as their names suggest (see Mathew et al., 2021a for details).

At the outset, the largest group, the Conservative Democrats, make up 45.2 per cent of the sample. This group has a very positive disposition towards democracy and neoliberal economics coupled with conservative social values. This group has a much larger proportion of older respondents and racial minorities relative to others.

The Secular Liberals, who comprise 14.2 per cent of the sample and are overwhelmingly young and Chinese, share similar views of democracy and neoliberal economics with Conservative Democrats, albeit having a lower degree of faith-based beliefs and being more open about social issues.

Meanwhile, Conservative Autocrats form the smallest group at 6.0 per cent of the sample; they score low on support for democracy, hold traditional views vis-à-vis social issues, and do not think highly of neoliberal economic values. Middle-aged and older respondents make up most of this group, with larger-than-average proportions of less affluent and racial minorities belonging to this cluster.

Middle Grounders are named thus because of their centrist stance on all value dimensions relative to the other clusters, and form 34.6 per cent of the sample population. With this cluster being the second-largest, these individuals are quite supportive of democracy and neoliberal economic practices, and do not hold particularly strong views on social issues. This group has a lower average age relative to the rest of the sample, and has a higher percentage of degree-holders relative to the rest of the clusters.

In this report we present through the use of cross-tabulations, where significant, how attitudes differ not only by respondents of different demographic backgrounds; but also based on their value positions derived through this cluster analysis.

The third and final step involves structural equation modelling, which involves the use of confirmatory factor analyses to test whether measures of a construct are consistent with a theoretical understanding of the nature of that construct. Results are presented in Section 8.2.

1.3 DEMOGRAPHICS AND REPRESENTATION

The overall responses for each question reported in the ensuing chapters are weighted to ensure that the WVS sample's demographic proportions closely approximate those of the national population in terms of age cohort, gender, and race. This enables us to effectively compare results across different iterations of the survey, and provide a general gauge of the overall population's value systems. However, further two-level breakdowns of the results are not weighted to provide a more accurate representation of separate demographic groups.

It is important to note the slight discrepancies between cross-wave comparisons presented in this report vis-à-vis the World Values Survey's official data online. This is due to variations in weighting methodologies across the two previous waves (2002 and 2012) to reflect Singapore's demographic proportions in the original WVS data. We have re-weighted this in line with updated methodologies to achieve better consistency in our comparisons, although this is not a panacea for the prevailing data collation limitations.

The sample demographics largely mirror the Singapore resident population. To keep this report more succinct, we invite the reader to refer to the first World Values Survey report for a more detailed rundown of the profile of respondents (Mathew et al., 2021a).

Chapter 2

Personal Well-being

CHAPTER 2 | PERSONAL WELL-BEING

In this chapter, we peruse responses on overall levels of happiness and satisfaction, as well as satisfaction with regards to specific domains such as health, autonomy, and security. While we report all the proportions in the tables below, we refrain from discussing the results of the category "Others", as all of them include less than 50 respondents.

Quality of life in this context references the physical, economic, and social well-being of individuals within a society. The World Health Organization (WHO) provides a salient understanding of this concept that extends beyond physical health: it is a "broad-ranging concept affected in a complex way by the person's physical health, psychological state, personal beliefs, social relationships and their relationship to salient features of their environment" (WHO, 2020).

In our study, we seek to glean insights with regards to the overall perceptions of individuals' (1) physical health; (2) mental wellbeing in terms of life satisfaction and happiness; and (3) perceptions of personal autonomy and control over choice and actions. A cursory purview of related literature yields significant findings on the Singapore general population's physical health, with objective indicators comparable across polities (see World Bank, 2019 and GovTech, 2020b for examples).

Singaporean residents generally enjoy a high level of quality of life. Most survey respondents report high levels of life satisfaction, health, perceptions of autonomy, security, wealth, trust, and social capital. This corroborates with the survey finding by Mercer, which ranks Singapore as first in Asia in terms of quality of living in 2019 (Low, 2019). Singapore is hence one of the most liveable cities in the world.

However, analyses on mental health alongside insights on personal autonomy and control are more limited in scope. Substantial research has been undertaken on different segments of the resident population, such as foreign domestic workers (Anjara et al., 2017), binge drinkers (Lee et al., 2020), pre-school children (Chia et al., 2019) amidst others apropos the mental and emotional wellbeing of these groups.

However, studies that seek generalisable insights among the broader population on life satisfaction and perceptions of personal autonomy are few and far within (for an exception, see Tan & Tambyah, 2016). In this regard, an examination of the survey results below will enable a better understanding of the resident population's perceptions on their overall quality of life pertaining to physical and mental wellbeing.

This set of questions asked respondents about their quality of life in Singapore. It included aspects like overall levels of satisfaction, their perception of security, current affairs knowledge, as well as the nature of social capital they engage in. Some of these are presented in the following sub-sections, while others are subsumed in broader categories on security, social capital, and economic wellbeing.

Several questions gave us an idea of respondents' overall levels of satisfaction. Respondents were asked how happy they were, their satisfaction with life in general, the state of their health, as well as whether they had some freedom of choice. By breaking down these responses according to demographics, we were also able to see which groups felt happier and healthier.

Overall, a majority of Singaporeans seem to have quite a positive outlook on life. Most of them also report high levels of overall life satisfaction. The largest differences seem to come from socioeconomic and employment factors, with respondents of higher socioeconomic levels reporting higher quality of life compared to those in the lowest levels.

2.1 HAPPINESS AND SATISFACTION

2.1.1 Most respondents indicated they were happy in general; over 40 per cent were highly satisfied with their lives as a whole

At the outset, respondents were asked to indicate their levels of general happiness and satisfaction with their lives. The question on happiness levels provided four options: "not at all happy", "not very happy", "rather happy", and "very happy". The question on satisfaction, meanwhile, prompted a response along a 10-point Likert scale. For ease of reference and analysis, we condense responses on satisfaction into three categories: 1 to 3 reflecting low levels of satisfaction, 4 to 7 reflecting middling levels of satisfaction, and 8 to 10 reflecting high levels of satisfaction.

When asked the question about overall happiness, nearly nine in 10 respondents chose the "very happy" or "rather happy" options. Overall satisfaction levels also appear to be rather high; 41.8 per cent indicated that they were highly satisfied with their lives as a whole, while 54.2 per cent indicating middling levels of satisfaction (see Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1: Overall happiness level ("Taking all things together, would you say you are...")



Figure 2: Overall satisfaction level (All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?")



2.1.2 Singapore ranked in the middle of the pack for overall happiness levels when compared across selected polities; overall happiness has dipped marginally over two decades

With 25.9 per cent of Singapore respondents indicating they were very happy and 63.2 per cent indicating they were rather happy, these levels of reported happiness are similar to those reported in Japan, South Korea, Mainland China, and Taiwan. The UK, Sweden, and Switzerland reported the highest levels of overall happiness, while in contrast, slightly lower proportions of respondents from Hong Kong, Thailand, and Malaysia felt very happy or rather happy (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Overall happiness level, by polity



When comparing responses across waves, we find that respondents in 2020 were slightly less likely to indicate that they were very or quite happy, as compared to the previous two WVS waves. Overall, approximately 93 per cent of respondents in 2012 and 2002 indicated that they were very or quite happy. In contrast, 89.1 per cent of respondents in 2020 did the same (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Overall happiness level, across WVS waves



2.1.3 Females, silvers, married respondents, housewives, the affluent, Christians, and Muslims were more likely to indicate higher levels of happiness relative to their peers

We next peruse responses on overall happiness by various demographics. A higher proportion of females compared to males in Singapore felt that they were either very happy or rather happy, while a larger proportion of males felt that they were not very happy (see Table 1).

Table 1: Overall happiness level, by gender

Gender *N = 2,009*	**Taking all things together, would you say you are…**			
	Not at all happy	**Not very happy**	**Rather happy**	**Very happy**
Male	1.1	12.4	63.3	23.3
Female	1.0	7.6	63.4	28.1

When divided according to age, it appears that the oldest group are the happiest, given that it had the largest proportion (34.2 per cent) reporting that they were "very happy". In contrast, only 20.7 per cent of the youngest age group (21-35 years old) reported that they were "very happy". Despite the differing proportions reporting "very happy" and "rather happy" across the different age groups, it should be noted that the level of happiness was generally quite high, as nearly 90 per cent of individuals belonging to each of the age groups replied that they were either "very happy" and "rather happy" (see Table 2).

Table 2: Overall happiness level, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,009*	Taking all things together, would you say you are…			
	Not at all happy	Not very happy	Rather happy	Very happy
21-35	1.1	8.9	69.3	20.7
36-50	0.9	10.1	62.5	26.5
51-65	1.1	11.1	62.4	25.4
Above 65	1.2	8.4	56.2	34.2

In terms of marital status, it appears that people who are married or living with partners they are in serious relationships with[2] have the highest levels of happiness. While 26.4 per cent of those divorced, separated, or widowed reported that they "very happy", there were more of them (19.9 per cent) compared to the single or married group who stated that they were not happy. Perhaps, responses at both sides of the happiness spectrum may have resulted from different outcomes of the end of a marriage. For some, this may have resulted in ongoing difficulties, while for others, a divorce or separation may have put an end to a relationship that they were unhappy with. Hence for the latter group, divorce may be perceived as a positive state of affairs. Fewer singles report being "very happy" compared to the other groups; more singles were represented in the "rather happy" group (see Table 3).

Table 3: Overall happiness level, by marital status

Marital Status *N = 2,009*	Taking all things together, would you say you are…			
	Not at all happy	Not very happy	Rather happy	Very happy
Married / Cohabiting	0.6	8.0	61.3	30.1
Divorced / Separated / Widowed	2.0	16.9	54.7	26.4
Single	1.7	10.8	70.3	17.2

When respondents were analysed by occupation status, more housewives fell in the "very happy" category, followed by retirees and part-time employees. In contrast, the lowest proportions to report "very happy" were students and unemployed. It is likely that the higher proportion of retirees who are happy is derived from both a reduction of stresses of employment, and more time to pursue leisure options.

While managing a household can be stressful, housewives may have fewer sources of unhappiness and also have time to pursue their interests. The smaller proportion of students in the "very happy" category seems to indicate some level of stress, either from their

[2] Respondents declaring that they were cohabiting accounted for a very small proportion of the sample (1.2%).

environment or stage of life. It should be noted, however, that over 70 per cent of this group indicated that they were "rather happy".

The same cannot be said about the unemployed, as they report the lowest proportion stating that they were either "very happy" or "rather happy". The difficulties associated with unemployment, including financial instability, issues that had led to the unemployment, and, if they are searching for jobs, the stress of remaining unemployed, are likely to have led to these lower levels of happiness (see Table 4).

Table 4: Overall happiness level, by employment status

Employment Status ***N = 2,009***	**Taking all things together, would you say you are…**			
	Not at all happy	**Not very happy**	**Rather happy**	**Very happy**
Full-time employee	0.7	8.7	67.8	22.8
Part-time employee	0	9.7	59.5	30.8
Self-employed	1.5	13.3	60.0	25.2
Retired / pensioned	0.4	7.4	56.8	35.4
Housewife	1.4	5.1	57.7	35.8
Student	1.1	9.0	76.4	13.5
Unemployed	6.5	25.8	51.6	17.2

Overall, more affluent respondents are less likely to indicate that they are not very happy or not at all happy compared with their less well-off peers. However, it is remarkable that respondents in the lowest two income brackets are also most likely to report being "very happy" compared to others. While the combined proportions of "very happy" and "rather happy" still indicates that people in the highest income bracket are the happiest, the happiness levels of respondents seem to temper somewhat with income (see Table 5).

Table 5: Overall happiness level, by income

Income ***N = 1,223***	**Taking all things together, would you say you are…**			
	Not at all happy	**Not very happy**	**Rather happy**	**Very happy**
Below $1,500	0.9	11.1	57.6	30.4
$1,500 - $2,999	0.3	11.6	62.3	25.8
$3,000 - $4,999	0.3	10.2	66.4	23.1
$5,000 - $6,999	1.2	6.7	73.9	18.2
Above $6,999	0.6	5.7	71.7	22.0

When analysing responses by religion, Christians and Muslims are most likely to be happy overall; approximately 92 per cent indicated being rather happy or very happy. Higher proportions of Hindus and Muslims also indicated being very happy relative to others. Meanwhile, Taoists, Buddhists, and those with no religion were marginally less likely to be happy (approximately 87 per cent) (see Table 6).

Table 6: Overall happiness level, by religion

Religion *N = 2,009*	**Taking all things together, would you say you are…**			
	Not at all happy	**Not very happy**	**Rather happy**	**Very happy**
Buddhism	1.3	11.1	65.8	21.8
Taoism / TCB	1.4	12.2	66.2	20.3
Christianity	0.6	6.7	64.1	28.7
Catholicism	0.8	10.3	61.1	27.8
Islam	0.7	7.3	54.5	37.5
Hinduism	0	9.0	47.7	43.2
No religion	1.5	11.0	68.4	19.1

2.1.4 Levels of satisfaction in Singapore were comparable to Malaysia, Thailand, and Japan; the UK and Mainland China had the greatest proportions of respondents indicating high levels of satisfaction

With regards to overall levels of satisfaction, 41.8 per cent were very satisfied while 54.2 per cent were rather satisfied with their lives. When compared to other polities, proportions of Singapore respondents indicating high levels of satisfaction were comparable to Malaysia, Thailand, and Japan. South Korea and Hong Kong had the lowest proportions of respondents indicating high levels of satisfaction, while the converse was true for the UK and Mainland China (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Overall satisfaction level, by polity



Comparing responses across the three available waves, it appears that Singapore respondents in 2002 were the most satisfied with their lives, followed by those in 2020. It is also of note that the proportions indicating low degrees of satisfaction were very similar across all three survey waves (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Overall satisfaction level, across WVS waves



2.1.5 Similar to responses on happiness, younger, single, less-educated, less-affluent, unemployed, and Buddhist respondents were less likely than their peers to be satisfied with their lives

When analysing responses by age cohort, we find that the youngest respondents aged 21-35 were less likely to indicate they are highly satisfied; with the converse true for the oldest respondents over 65. When compared across marital statuses, it appears that married or cohabiting individuals were the most satisfied with their lives. In comparison, people who said that they were single, divorced, separated, or widowed, were less likely to say they were highly satisfied (see Tables 7 and 8).

Table 7: Overall satisfaction level, by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 2,009***	**All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?**		
	Low satisfaction	**Middling satisfaction**	**High satisfaction**
21-35	3.6	60.4	36.0
36-50	4.8	52.8	42.4
51-65	3.7	54.0	42.2
Above 65	3.9	47.9	48.2

Table 8: Overall satisfaction level, by marital status

Marital Status ***N = 2,009***	**All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?**		
	Low satisfaction	**Middling satisfaction**	**High satisfaction**
Married / Cohabiting	3.5	49.5	47.0
Divorced / Separated / Widowed	7.9	55.0	37.1
Single	3.8	64.1	32.1

There were some differences in satisfaction levels when comparing responses across socioeconomic factors like education, income, and housing type. In general, higher educated and more affluent respondents were more likely to reflect that they were satisfied with their lives to some degree. The starkest difference was between the lowest and highest income levels – 38.2 per cent of those in the lowest income group were highly satisfied, much lower compared to the 58.5 per cent that reflected similar responses in the highest income group. Similar though more muted trends were noted for education and housing (see Tables 9 to 11).

Table 9: Overall satisfaction level, by education level

Education Level *N = 2,005*	**All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?**		
	Low satisfaction	**Middling satisfaction**	**High satisfaction**
Below secondary	6.7	54.2	39.1
Secondary / ITE	3.9	58.6	37.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	4.2	57.7	38.1
Bachelor's and above	2.4	49.2	48.4

Table 10: Overall satisfaction level, by income

Income *N = 1,222*	**All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?**		
	Low satisfaction	**Middling satisfaction**	**High satisfaction**
Below $1,500	6.5	55.3	38.2
$1,500 - $2,999	3.2	62.6	34.2
$3,000 - $4,999	2.4	58.2	39.4
$5,000 - $6,999	1.2	56.4	42.4
Above $6,999	2.5	39.0	58.5

Table 11: Overall satisfaction level, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,009*	**All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?**		
	Low satisfaction	**Middling satisfaction**	**High satisfaction**
1-3 room HDB	6.6	54.0	39.4
4 room HDB	3.1	56.9	40.0
5-room HDB	3.0	56.7	40.3
Private apartment/ Landed property	2.7	47.3	50.0

When perusing responses on satisfaction by employment type, we find that retirees were most likely to indicate high levels of satisfaction, in line and correlated with findings by age cohort. Perhaps, their status as retirees allows them more time to pursue interests or reflect on their lives in a more positive manner. This conjecture also seems to be supported by how only 25.0 per cent of unemployed respondents reflected high levels of satisfaction; much lower compared to the rest of the sample (see Table 12).

Table 12: Overall satisfaction level, by employment status

Employment Status *N = 2,009*	All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?		
	Low satisfaction	Middling satisfaction	High satisfaction
Full-time employee	3.2	55.8	41.0
Part-time employee	4.3	59.1	36.6
Self-employed	3.7	51.1	45.2
Retired / pensioned	1.5	44.4	54.1
Housewife	4.2	50.0	45.8
Student	5.6	62.9	31.5
Unemployed	14.1	60.9	25.0

When comparing responses by religion, we find that Buddhists have the lowest proportion (35.2 per cent) reporting high levels of satisfaction with their lives. In comparison, Roman Catholics and Protestant Christians have the highest proportions (over 50 per cent) reporting high levels of satisfaction with their lives (see Table). When a regression analysis was conducted with housing type used as a control, the relationship between different religions and life satisfaction was not statistically significant, except for Christians. Therefore, the lower satisfaction levels (for instance, observed among Buddhists) are better accounted for by their socioeconomic background rather than religious affiliation. In the case of Christians, religious features may have had a role in explaining life satisfaction (see Table 13).

Table 13: Overall satisfaction level, by religion

Religion *N = 2,009*	All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?		
	Low satisfaction	Middling satisfaction	High satisfaction
Buddhism	4.2	60.6	35.2
Taoism / TCB	4.1	55.4	40.5
Christianity	2.9	48.0	49.1
Catholicism	0.8	47.6	51.6
Islam	4.0	55.3	40.7
Hinduism	4.5	47.7	47.7
No religion	5.3	54.7	40.0

2.2 HEALTH

2.2.1 Over seven in 10 respondents indicated they were in "very good" or "good health"; a quarter stated that their health was "fair"

The WVS survey also asked respondents to rate their current state of health using a five-point Likert scale. Overall, 71.9 per cent stated that they are either in very good or good health, while another 24.1 per cent indicated that their health was "fair". Based on these responses, it appears that Singapore respondents are generally positive about the state of their own health (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Overall health condition ("All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days?)



2.2.2 Singapore respondents were among the most likely to indicate being in the pink of health; however, these proportions have declined since 2012

Compared to selected polities, Singapore respondents self-report similar states of health compared to Thais, Malaysians, and Taiwanese, and are most likely to feel they are in good or very good health after South Korea. Meanwhile, Mainland Chinese, Japanese, and Hong Kongers were less likely than others to indicate they were in the pink of health (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: Overall health condition, by polity



When comparing responses across WVS waves, we find that while 26.6 per cent of 2012 respondents indicated their health was very good, only 19.6 per cent of 2020 respondents said that their health was very good. Overall, respondents were somewhat less optimistic about their health in 2020 compared to 2012 (see Figure 9).

Figure 9: Overall health condition, across WVS waves*



** The options for 2012 were along a 4-point Likert scale: (1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Fair, and (4) Poor. Hence, the options of "poor" and "very poor" in 2020 were combined for easy comparison.*

2.2.3 Age and SES had a marked impact on self-reported health; older and less affluent respondents were less likely to indicate good health

Older people were more likely to report poor health conditions compared to the younger cohorts. However, they still appear to be in generally good health across the board, with less than 10 per cent of the oldest cohort stating that their health was poor or very poor. These age effects are expected given age-related health conditions (see Table 14).

Table 14: Overall health condition, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days?				
	Very poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Very good
21-35	0.4	1.8	17.2	58.2	22.5
36-50	0	2.5	26.7	49.3	21.6
51-65	0.5	3.4	24.1	54.9	17.1
Above 65	1.2	7.8	31.8	43.2	15.9

Examining reported health across SES presents interesting insights. Responses clustered by income brackets and housing types yielded similar results; those living in the smallest public housing (HDB 1-3 room flats) and in the lowest income bracket (<$1,500) were also the least likely to feel they were in the pink of health relative to their better-off peers. This could be due to SES being correlated with a diminished need to focus on work and making ends meet, and more time spent on personal well-being. Additionally, more affluent individuals have greater propensity and ability to spend on higher-cost healthy lifestyle and healthcare options such as relatively timelier medical consultations and specialists (see Tables 15 and 16).

Table 15: Overall health condition, by income

Income *N = 1,224*	All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days?				
	Very poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Very good
Below $1,500	0.5	3.7	26.7	46.5	22.6
$1,500 - $2,999	0.3	2.3	22.5	55.6	19.3
$3,000 - $4,999	0.6	1.8	18.3	61.8	18.5
$5,000 - $6,999	0.6	1.8	23.0	57.6	17.0
Above $6,999	0.6	1.9	18.2	54.7	24.5

Table 16: Overall health condition, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,012*	All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days?				
	Very poor	Poor	Fair	Good	Very good
1-3 room HDB	0.7	6.2	26.3	48.7	18.2
4 room HDB	0.3	2.6	23.9	52.1	21.1
5-room HDB	0.2	2.5	25.0	52.8	19.4
Private apartment/ Landed property	0.6	1.2	20.2	58.5	19.6

2.3 PERSONAL AUTONOMY

2.3.1 Over nine in 10 Singapore respondents felt they had some or high degree of control over their lives

Having agency and autonomy over one's life decisions and trajectory can improve perceptions of quality of life in individuals. Respondents in Singapore were asked to reflect on a 10-point scale the degree of control they believe they hold over their lives. The scale has been condensed into three categories for clearer and more concise reporting – with scores of 1 to 3 reflecting a low degree of control, 4 to 7 reflecting some degree of control, and 8 to 10 reflecting a high degree of control. Nearly four in 10 respondents fell into the latter category, while another 55.6 per cent felt they had some degree of control. This indicates that, in general, Singapore respondents do believe that they have agency over their lives (see Figure 10).

Figure 10: Overall control over one's life ("How much freedom and control do you feel you have over the way your life turns out?")



2.3.2 Asian polities were less likely to report high levels of autonomy in life; local proportions indicating as such have marginally declined since 2002

The majority of Singaporean respondents (55.6 per cent) indicate that they have some autonomy over the way their lives turn out, with findings mirroring those from Hong Kong. On the other hand, the majority of the respondents in Taiwan, Australia, the US, and the UK indicate that they have a high degree of control over their lives (see Figure 11).

Figure 11: Overall control over one's life, by polity



When comparing responses in 2020 to previous WVS waves, we find that respondents in 2020 and 2012 were less likely to say that they have a high degree of control when compared to those in 2002. A marginally larger proportion of 2020 respondents (5.1 per cent) indicated that they had a low amount of control over their lives compared to those in the previous two waves (see Figure 12).

Figure 12: Overall control over one's life, across WVS waves



2.3.3 Higher-educated, more affluent, and Christian respondents were significantly more likely to feel that they had a high degree of freedom and control over their lives relative to others

More educated and more affluent respondents were more likely to indicate higher levels of agency over their lives. In particular, there are significant differences between the highest and lowest groups across education levels, income brackets, and housing types – approximately 30 per cent of the lowest groups report having a high amount of control over their lives, compared to about half or more amongst the highest groups. The perception of life conditions, therefore, seems to be significantly impacted by education, and the resources at one's disposal (see Tables 17 to 19).

Table 17: Overall control over one's life, by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,999***	**How much freedom and control do you feel you have over the way your life turns out?**		
	Low degree	**Some degree**	**High degree**
Below secondary	9.5	63.2	27.3
Secondary / ITE	4.3	62.5	33.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	5.7	52.6	41.6
Bachelor's and above	3.0	47.7	49.3

Table 18: Overall control over one's life, by income

Income *N = 1,220*	**How much freedom and control do you feel you have over the way your life turns out?**		
	Low degree	**Some degree**	**High degree**
Below $1,500	5.1	60.4	34.6
$1,500 - $2,999	4.2	64.1	31.7
$3,000 - $4,999	4.0	54.6	41.4
$5,000 - $6,999	2.5	50.9	46.6
Above $6,999	3.8	40.3	56.0

Table 19: Overall control over one's life, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,003*	**How much freedom and control do you feel you have over the way your life turns out?**		
	Low degree	**Some degree**	**High degree**
1-3 room HDB	7.1	58.8	34.1
4 room HDB	4.9	56.7	38.3
5-room HDB	4.6	58.0	37.4
Private apartment/ Landed property	2.4	45.4	52.2

When perusing responses by religion, we find that Muslims were the least likely to feel they have a high degree of control over their lives, preferring to indicate responses within the middle range of the scale. In contrast, about half of Christians indicate they have a large amount of control over their lives (see Table 20).

Table 20: Overall control over one's life, by religion

Religion *N = 2,003*	**How much freedom and control do you feel you have over the way your life turns out?**		
	Low degree	**Some degree**	**High degree**
Buddhism	4.8	61.0	34.2
Taoism / TCB	8.1	56.8	35.1
Christianity	2.6	48.1	49.3
Catholicism	2.4	51.6	46.0
Islam	8.4	62.0	29.6
Hinduism	5.5	51.4	43.1
No religion	4.9	53.6	41.5

2.4 STANDARD OF LIVING

2.4.1 Over three-quarters of Singapore respondents felt they were better off than their parents in terms of standard of living; this proportion is among the highest globally

We conclude this chapter with an analysis of responses to a question on standard of living. Respondents were asked to compare their standard of living with their parents' standard of living when they were about the same age by selecting one of three options: "better off", "worse off", or "about the same". Over three-quarters of respondents felt that they were better off; only 7 per cent felt that they were worse off compared to their parents (see Figure 13).

Figure 13: Perceived changes to standard of living ("Comparing your standard of living with your parents' standard of living when they were about your age, would you say that you are better off, worse off or about the same?")



Based on the responses, the majority of Singapore respondents believe that the standards of living have improved over one generation. In fact, Singapore had the second-highest proportion of respondents who indicated that they felt they were better off compared to other selected polities; only Mainland China's proportions indicating likewise were higher. Meanwhile, Japan and the US were the only two polities where a majority of their respondents felt they were worse off or about the same in terms of standards of living as compared to their parents (see Figure 14).

Figure 14: Perceived changes to standard of living, by polity



2.4.2 PRs, naturalised citizens, higher-educated, and more affluent respondents were more likely to feel they had better standards of living compared to their parents

A higher proportion of naturalised citizens and PRs (85.1 per cent) said they were better off compared to born citizens (75.2 per cent). Given that the former comprises individuals who chose to migrate to Singapore (often in search of a better life), it is not surprising to see more of them indicating their standard of living has improved. In comparison, responses from local-born citizens are perhaps indicative of perceptions of whether progress has been equally shared amongst the population. Over nine in 10 of this group indicate their standards of living were about the same or better off, suggesting a vast majority of the respondent population has progressed together with the country to some extent (see Table 21).

Table 21: Perceived changes to standard of living, by citizenship status

Citizenship Status ***N = 2,005***	**Comparing your standard of living with your parents' standard of living when they were about your age, would you say that you are better off, worse off or about the same?**		
	Worse off	**About the same**	**Better off**
Local-born citizen	7.8	17.1	75.2
Naturalised citizen / PR	3.5	11.4	85.1

Perusing results by education, income, and housing presented very similar patterns. Over 80 per cent of the respondents who obtained the highest level of education, earned the most, or who lived in private housing said that they were better off than their parents. In comparison, less than 70 per cent of those in the lowest education, income, and smallest housing groups felt likewise. Given standards of living are directly linked to these three elements, these patterns are anticipated. While growth does seem to be uneven to some extent, it should be noted that even a large majority of lower-SES respondents report being better off than their parents, which indicates some level of growth across the population (see Tables 22 to 24).

Table 22: Perceived changes to standard of living, by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,999***	**Comparing your standard of living with your parents' standard of living when they were about your age, would you say that you are better off, worse off or about the same?**		
	Worse off	**About the same**	**Better off**
Below secondary	9.2	22.1	68.7
Secondary / ITE	6.7	18.8	74.4
Dip. / Prof. qual.	7.2	11.7	81.0
Bachelor's and above	5.7	12.8	81.5

Table 23: Perceived changes to standard of living, by income

Income ***N = 1,220***	**Comparing your standard of living with your parents' standard of living when they were about your age, would you say that you are better off, worse off or about the same?**		
	Worse off	**About the same**	**Better off**
Below $1,500	7.4	24.4	68.2
$1,500 - $2,999	10.0	16.2	73.8
$3,000 - $4,999	5.4	14.0	80.6
$5,000 - $6,999	4.2	12.1	83.6
Above $6,999	5.0	8.2	86.8

Table 24: Perceived changes to standard of living, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,003*	**Comparing your standard of living with your parents' standard of living when they were about your age, would you say that you are better off, worse off or about the same?**		
	Worse off	**About the same**	**Better off**
1-3 room HDB	11.4	21.4	67.3
4 room HDB	6.3	14.7	79.0
5-room HDB	4.6	14.8	80.6
Private apartment/ Landed property	3.3	10.4	86.3

Chapter 3

Safety and Security

CHAPTER 3 | SAFETY AND SECURITY

Another aspect of an individual's lived experience pertains to their perceptions or beliefs on security. Much like the broad scope quality of life alludes to, security is multidimensional in nature and diverse in practice; as such, its definition is dependent on applied context. For instance, food security is associated with unimpeded access to food (Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009), while information security is predicated on the ability to control access to information (Thomson & Solms, 2005). In the context of our study, we apply a broader understanding of security encompassing two aspects: personal security and national security.

The former is a key aspect featuring in Maslow's hierarchy of needs (1943), which sets forth physical safety as a basic human need after physiological needs such as air, food, and water are satiated. Physical safety is founded on the ability to reside in a safe environment, which is often defined as an individual's proximate surroundings, such as their neighbourhood or community. A safe environment assuages fears of being a victim of crime or violence, or suffering potential injury to mind and self.

Comparatively few studies have been done on perceptions of crime in Singapore due to the prevailing community context; the island-state is often perceived as one of the safest cities in the world to live in (Reynolds, 2017; Quah, 2018). Hence, it stands to reason that studying perceptions of physical safety in Singapore would not be an immediate policy need, nor would it hold much academic allure. However, it is important to examine the differences between demographic groups in their perceptions of personal security to glean insight into other underlying sociocultural issues. In addition, responses to perceived future security across various issues are included in this sub-section, given the impact security and safety has on one's outlook.

National security, on the other hand, refers to perceptions of safety within the greater polity in which one resides. It is often construed as the "safety of a nation" and refers to the ability of a state to cater for the protection and defence of its citizenry against threats such as war and terrorism (for classical explanations, see Makinda, 1998; Osisanya, 2010). Much of the prevailing scholarship in recent times have, however, acknowledged the changing definition of this concept in line with global trends; many incorporate issues of health, economics, food information and other non-military threats within frameworks of national security (Evans, 2000).

However, for clarity and ease of understanding, only questions and analyses pertaining to military threats and terrorism will be included in this sub-section, while other relevant analyses pertaining to the economy and government are subsumed in subsequent sections. In addition to beliefs on military or terrorist threats, we separately peruse responses illustrating awareness of international organisations in Chapter 6, given their interplay with global order and security (Osisanya, 2010).

In relation to the above, respondents were asked about their perceptions of security, including their perceptions of overall security as well as the frequency of crime and other less savoury activities occurring in their vicinity. In conjunction with extant literature, Singapore appears to be a safe place to live, with most respondents reflecting high levels of confidence over security as well as a low amount of unsavoury activities.

From the analyses of responses to issues about security, the most consistent factor determining differences in experiences appears to be related to socioeconomic backgrounds. While most of the questions discussed in this section related to physical security and safety, people from the lowest income group and smallest housing types are the most worried. They are the ones who have the most direct contact with criminal activities or unsavoury incidents, even though the overall frequency of these events is very low. Their worries also extend beyond actual incidents to potential negative events and thoughts of the future. Overall, these results point to a distinction in life experiences and expectations between those who have more resources and those who have less.

3.1 OVERALL PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY

3.1.1 Over nine in 10 respondents felt very secure or quite secure; however, proportions who emphatically agreed they were secure dropped from 2012

At the outset, respondents were asked how secure they felt in general, and chose one of four options: "not at all secure", "not very secure", "quite secure", and "very secure". Over nine in 10 respondents indicated high levels of security, selecting the latter two options (see Figure 15).

Figure 15: General sense of security ("Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days?")



However, when comparing responses across waves, we find that proportions of respondents who felt very secure decreased in 2020 (38.3 per cent) relative to 2012 (49.2 per cent), even though the combined proportions accounting for those selecting "quite secure" remained relatively similar (see Figure 16).

Figure 16: General sense of security, across WVS waves



3.1.2 Male and more affluent respondents were more likely to indicate feeling more secure

Respondents' reported levels of security were tempered by two main variables: gender and income. A higher proportion of males (41.9 per cent) indicated feeling "very secure" compared to females (33.9 per cent). In addition, a marginally higher percentage of females felt that they were not very secure. This may reflect perceptions of prevailing gender-based security issues even in a relatively safe country like Singapore (see Table 25).

Table 25: General sense of security, by gender

Gender *N = 2,010*	**Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days?**			
	Not at all secure	**Not very secure**	**Quite secure**	**Very secure**
Male	0.5	5.4	52.1	41.9
Female	0.4	9.4	56.3	33.9

Income also tempered perceptions of general security, although this could be due to the notion of financial health and stability also contributing to an overall sense of security. There was a clear differentiation across income brackets, with 13.0 per cent of the lowest income group indicating either feeling not very or not at all secure compared to just 5.0 per cent of those in the highest income bracket (see Table 26).

Table 26: General sense of security, by income

Income *N = 1,223*	**Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days?**			
	Not at all secure	**Not very secure**	**Quite secure**	**Very secure**
Below $1,500	0.0	13.0	55.1	31.9
$1,500 - $2,999	0.0	9.6	53.7	36.7
$3,000 - $4,999	0.3	7.3	52.7	39.8
$5,000 - $6,999	0.6	7.3	53.9	38.2
Above $6,999	0.6	4.4	51.6	43.4

3.2 CRIME

3.2.1 Over eight in 10 Singapore respondents indicated never feeling unsafe from crime in their homes

Respondents were next posed a more specific question on crime, and whether they or their families felt unsafe from crime even in their homes. In all, 85.8 per cent indicated they "never" felt this way in the past year (see Figure 17).

Figure 17: Perceived safety from crime at home ("In the last 12 months, how often have your or your family felt unsafe from crime in your home?")



3.2.2 Proportions of Singapore respondents who reported never feeling unsafe were second only to South Korea, and has risen since 2012

Compared to other selected polities, Singapore has the second-highest percentage (after South Korea) of respondents (85.8 per cent) who indicated that they have never felt unsafe from crime in their home. Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the US had over 60 per cent indicating that they have never felt unsafe from crime in their home. In contrast, less than 60 per cent of the respondents from Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia indicated the same (see Figure 18).

Figure 18: Perceived safety from crime at home, by polity



When comparing responses across WVS waves, we find that a larger proportion of respondents in 2020 (85.8 per cent) indicated that they never felt unsafe from crime in their homes relative to 2012 (79.7 per cent) (see Figure 19).

Figure 19: Perceived safety from crime at home, across WVS waves



3.2.3 Respondents residing in larger public housing or private property were more likely to indicate never feeling unsafe in their homes; support for government surveillance is correlated with feelings of safety

There were some slight differences found in the responses from those living in different housing types. Compared to over 85 per cent of those living in 4-room flats or larger housing types, 79.5 per cent of those living in 1- to 3-room flats said they never felt unsafe (see Table 27).

Table 27: Perceived safety from crime at home, by housing type

Housing Type ***N = 2,009***	**In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family felt unsafe from crime in your home?**			
	Never	**Rarely**	**Sometimes**	**Often**
1-3 room HDB	79.5	15.4	3.9	1.2
4 room HDB	86.9	10.5	2.0	0.6
5-room HDB	89.6	8.8	0.9	0.7
Private apartment/ Landed property	89.9	8.9	1.2	0

In addition, we find responses on safety from crime at home to be somewhat correlated with support for government surveillance in public. Overall, 72.2 per cent of those who indicated rarely, sometimes, or often feeling unsafe at home also felt the government should have the right to implement surveillance in public to some extent. In contrast, 65.9 per cent of those who indicated never feeling unsafe at home, felt likewise (see Table 28).

Table 28: Agreement to government surveillance, by perceived safety from crime

Perceived Safety from Crime *N = 2,009*	Do you think that the Singaporean government should or should not have the right to do the following - Keep people under video surveillance in public areas			
	Definitely should not have the right	Probably should not have the right	Probably should have the right	Definitely should have the right
Never	14.9	19.3	38.9	27.0
Rarely / Sometimes / Often	10.7	17.1	42.0	30.2

3.2.4 Just four per cent of Singapore respondents indicated being victims of crime in the past year; this proportion has held constant from 2012, and is among the lowest globally

While 14.2 per cent of respondents indicate rarely, sometimes, or often feeling unsafe from crime in their homes, just 4.0 per cent were victims of crime in the past year, while 3.3 per cent of respondents with family they were in contact with said that their immediate family members had been victims (see Figure 20).

Figure 20: Personal experience of crime ("Have you been the victim of a crime during the past year?")



No statistically significant differences were found when comparing responses across the 2012 (3.9 per cent) and 2020 (4.0 per cent) waves. In addition, when comparing these responses to selected polities, we find that the proportion of respondents in Singapore with personal experience of crime is among the lowest globally and second only to Japan. In contrast, more than 10 per cent of respondents in Malaysia, Australia, Thailand, and the US indicated they were a victim of crime in the past year (see Figure 21).

Figure 21: Personal experience of crime, by polity



3.3 UNSAVOURY ACTIVITIES

3.3.1 Very small proportions of respondents indicated the occurrence of unsavoury activity in the neighbourhood; 13 per cent indicated quite or very frequently encountering alcohol consumption, while 6 per cent indicated likewise for racism

Respondents were asked a series of questions about how frequently they see unsavoury practices in their neighbourhoods. The most frequent activity perceived was alcohol consumption in the streets (12.8 per cent indicating quite or very frequently). However, this is relatively "milder" or more trivial than the other activities posed in the question series, such as drug sales in the streets, violence, and sexual harassment. A small proportion (5.7 per cent) responded that racism occurred very frequently or quite frequently, an issue that bears further study considering Singapore's multicultural population (see Figure 22).

Figure 22: Unsavoury activities by perceived frequency of occurrence ("How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood?")



3.3.2 An overwhelming majority indicated that robberies do not occur very or quite frequently in their neighbourhoods; this proportion is among the highest globally and has marginally increased from 2012

Singapore has one of the lowest percentages of respondents who indicate that robberies occurred very or quite frequently when compared to selected polities. Japan and Taiwan report similarly low proportions, with 3.9 per cent and 2.2 per cent of their respondents respectively indicating that robberies occurred very or quite frequently. In contrast, approximately one-third of Malaysians and one quarter of Thais and Australians indicated likewise (see Figure 23).

Figure 23: Perceived frequency of occurrence (robberies), by polity



When comparing responses across WVS waves, we find that compared to 2012, the proportions of robbery frequencies remained somewhat constant. There was a marginally smaller proportion (2.3 per cent) who indicated that robberies happened very or quite frequently in 2020 compared to 2012 (5.4 per cent) (see Figure 24).

Figure 24: Perceived frequency of occurrence (robberies), across WVS waves



There are some differences in responses across housing types. While over 70 per cent of those residing in 4-room or larger public housing and private property selected the "not at all frequently" option, only 60.5 per cent of those residing in 1-3 room HDB flats indicated likewise (see Table 29).

Table 29: Perceived frequency of occurrence (robberies), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,007*	**How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Robberies**			
	Not at all frequently	**Not frequently**	**Quite frequently**	**Very frequently**
1-3 room HDB	60.5	34.9	4.1	0.5
4 room HDB	70.7	27.6	1.5	0.2
5-room HDB	77.0	22.3	0.7	0
Private apartment/ Landed property	72.1	26.1	1.8	0

3.3.3 While reported frequencies of public alcohol consumption occurring were among the lowest globally, those residing in smaller public housing units were more likely to perceive higher frequencies

We find that 12.8 per cent indicated alcohol consumption on the streets happening in their neighbourhoods either very frequently or quite frequently. Meanwhile, 31.9 per cent reported that such incidents did not happen frequently, and 55.3 per cent said that they did not happen at all frequently. Singapore had the highest proportion of respondents (87.2 per cent) who indicated that alcohol consumption on the streets was not at all frequent or not frequent. Japan and Taiwan reported similar results. In contrast, less than 70 per cent of respondents from Thailand, Hong Kong, and Malaysia indicated the same (see Figure 25).

Figure 25: Perceived frequency of occurrence (alcohol consumption on the streets), by polity



Compared to 2012 (64.9 per cent), a smaller proportion of respondents in the 2020 wave (55.3 per cent) indicated that alcohol consumption happened not at all frequently (see Figure 26).

Figure 26: Perceived frequency of occurrence (alcohol consumption on the streets), across WVS waves



In line with findings in 3.3.2, there are marked differences in responses across housing types. While only 45.2 per cent of those residing in 1-3 room HDB flats indicated public alcohol consumption was not at all frequent in their neighbourhoods, this proportion increased progressively across the housing groups to reach 65.3 per cent for those residing in private property (see Table 30).

Table 30: Perceived frequency of occurrence (alcohol consumption on the streets), by housing type

Housing Type ***N = 2,006***	**How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Alcohol consumption on the streets**			
	Not at all frequently	**Not frequently**	**Quite frequently**	**Very frequently**
1-3 room HDB	45.2	31.3	17.9	5.6
4 room HDB	55.6	34.7	7.6	2.2
5-room HDB	60.9	31.9	5.6	1.6
Private apartment/ Landed property	65.3	26.1	7.4	1.2

3.3.4 Nearly all respondents felt police or military interference in their private lives were infrequent or did not occur at all; while this proportion is among the highest globally, younger and less affluent respondents were more likely to indicate otherwise

An overwhelming majority meanwhile indicated that police or military interference in people's private lives was infrequent, or did not occur at all. Only 2.2 per cent indicated such acts occurred very frequently or quite frequently. This result complements the findings in the 2nd instalment of the IPS WVS reports on the high degree of trust in the army and police force Singapore respondents hold. The Singaporean responses on police or military interference occurrence are among the lowest globally, and mirror those of Taiwan and Japan. On the other end of the spectrum, half or more of Malaysians and Thais indicated such acts occurred very or quite frequently or infrequently. The proportions for the Singapore respondents across the options also did not vary significantly from 2012 to 2020 (see Figures 27 and 28).

Figure 27: Perceived frequency of occurrence (police or military interference), by polity



Figure 28: Perceived frequency of occurrence (police or military interference), across WVS waves



However, when dissecting responses by demographics, we find that younger respondents were more likely to feel there was some police or military interference in people's lives; 4.9 per cent of those aged between 21 and 35 years chose "very frequently" or "quite frequently".

This is in contrast with just 0.6 per cent of those aged above 65 indicating likewise (see Table 31).

Table 31: Perceived frequency of occurrence (police or military interference), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,006*	How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Police or military interference			
	Not at all frequently	Not frequently	Quite frequently	Very frequently
21-35	70.6	24.5	3.4	1.5
36-50	77.3	20.9	1.6	0.2
51-65	78.5	18.6	2.3	0.5
Above 65	88.0	11.4	0.6	0

When examining responses across income brackets and housing types, we find clear differences between the lowest income and housing levels compared to the rest of the sample population. While 6.5 per cent of the lowest income group replied "very frequently" or "quite frequently", the next highest proportion was 3.5 per cent, reported by the second-lowest income group. Similarly, while 5.3 per cent of those in the smallest housing types answered "very frequently" or "quite frequently", the next highest proportion was 2.2 per cent. This seems to indicate that the least affluent were somewhat more likely to perceive some police or military interference in their lives (see Tables 32 and 33).

Table 32: Perceived frequency of occurrence (police or military interference), by income

Income *N = 1,220*	How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Police or military interference			
	Not at all frequently	Not frequently	Quite frequently	Very frequently
Below $1,500	70.8	22.7	5.1	1.4
$1,500 - $2,999	73.9	22.6	2.9	0.6
$3,000 - $4,999	79.8	18.5	1.6	0.0
$5,000 - $6,999	80.0	19.4	0.0	0.6
Above $6,999	86.6	11.5	1.9	0.0

Table 33: Perceived frequency of occurrence (police or military interference), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,006*	How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Police or military interference			
	Not at all frequently	Not frequently	Quite frequently	Very frequently
1-3 room HDB	72.3	22.5	4.1	1.2
4 room HDB	76.2	21.6	1.4	0.8
5-room HDB	83.3	15.5	1.2	0
Private apartment/ Landed property	82.1	16.4	1.5	0

3.3.5 Two-thirds of respondents felt racist behaviour did not occur frequently at all; while this proportion is among the highest globally, it has declined substantially since 2012, with younger, Indian, and more educated respondents more likely to feel otherwise

In terms of racist behaviour in the neighbourhood, only 5.7 per cent said that these incidents occur either very frequently or quite frequently. In contrast, 28.7 per cent chose “not frequently”, and 65.7 per cent chose “not at all frequently” as their answer. Thailand, Japan, and South Korea have similar proportions of respondents who indicated that racist behaviour occurred not at all frequently. In Malaysia, Hong Kong, Australia, and the US, only about one-third of their respondents chose “not at all frequently” when asked if racist behaviour occurred in their neighbourhood. We also compare the reported frequencies for racist behaviour across other polities varying in levels of multiculturalism. This is useful in illustrating the differences between polities with diverse social fabrics (see Figure 29).

Figure 29: Perceived frequency of occurrence (racist behaviour), by polity



Respondents in 2020 also reported greater frequencies of racist behaviour compared to 2012. While 79.2 per cent in 2012 said that these incidents do not happen at all frequently, only 65.7 per cent did so in 2020. In addition, a much larger proportion of respondents (28.7 per cent) in 2020 chose the middle option compared to 2012 (15.9 per cent). This could reflect greater awareness of racism and what it constitutes (see Figure 30).

Figure 30: Perceived frequency of occurrence (racist behaviour), across WVS waves



Responses on the frequency of racist behaviour occurring also varied across racial communities, age cohorts, and education levels. Younger respondents were more likely to indicate frequent incidents of racist behaviours in their neighbourhoods. In particular, respondents aged 21 to 35 years old were more likely to indicate these occurred "very frequently" or "quite frequently" (9.8 per cent), compared with 5.3 per cent of those aged between 36 and 50, 4.7 per cent for those aged between 51 and 65, and 2.1 per cent for those aged above 65. This is likely due to augmented awareness among youth of what constitutes racism, giving rise to greater recognition and understanding of such incidents compared to older respondents (see Table 34).

Table 34: Perceived frequency of occurrence (racist behaviour), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,010*	**How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Racist behaviour**			
	Not at all frequently	**Not frequently**	**Quite frequently**	**Very frequently**
21-35	55.6	34.5	7.4	2.4
36-50	61.6	33.1	4.6	0.7
51-65	68.9	26.4	4.5	0.2
Above 65	83.8	14.1	2.1	0

When examining responses by race, we find that Chinese respondents report the lowest frequency of racist behaviour in their neighbourhoods, while Indians and Others racial groups report the highest frequencies. Given that the Chinese are the majority race, it is likely that they are usually not the targets of such behaviour (see Table 35).

Table 35: Perceived frequency of occurrence (racist behaviour), by race

Race *N = 2,010*	How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Racist behaviour			
	Not at all frequently	Not frequently	Quite frequently	Very frequently
Chinese	67.1	28.2	4.3	0.5
Malay	65.7	28.4	4.2	1.7
Indian	57.1	29.1	10.1	3.7
Others	51.4	40.5	8.1	0

Respondents with lower education qualifications also seem to notice fewer incidents of racist behaviour. For instance, 81.7 per cent of those with below secondary qualifications indicated such acts did not occur at all, compared to 59.1 per cent of degree holders. It is likely that more education engenders increasing awareness of subtle and explicit racist behaviours (see Table 36).

Table 36: Perceived frequency of occurrence (racist behaviour), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,010*	How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Racist behaviour			
	Not at all frequently	Not frequently	Quite frequently	Very frequently
Below secondary	81.7	14.5	3.0	0.8
Secondary / ITE	66.9	26.4	5.8	0.9
Dip. / Prof. qual.	60.0	34.1	5.5	0.5
Bachelor's and above	59.1	34.9	4.8	1.2

3.3.6 In line with strict anti-drug laws, an overwhelming majority indicated sales of drugs on streets did not occur at all, or did not occur frequently; however, lower-SES respondents were less likely to feel this way

In general, most respondents perceived no or low frequencies of drug sales in the streets; only 2.3 per cent noted observing such incidents occurring very frequently or quite frequently. The response proportions in Singapore mirror those in Japan and Taiwan, polities with similarly strict anti-drug laws. In contrast, approximately 40 per cent or less of Malaysian, Thai, Hong Kong, and US respondents felt drug sales on streets did not frequently occur at all (see Figure 31).

Figure 31: Perceived frequency of occurrence (drug sales on streets), by polity



In both waves, the vast majority perceived that drug sales in the streets did not frequently happen at all, with no significant changes in proportions across the waves (see Figure 32).

Figure 32: Perceived frequency of occurrence (drug sales on streets), across WVS waves



Similar to responses in previous sub-sections, we find too that less affluent respondents were more likely to perceive higher frequencies of drug sales occurring in the streets. For instance, while over nine in 10 respondents residing in private property and in the highest income bracket indicated such acts did not frequently occur at all, this proportion dropped to under eight in 10 respondents for 1-3 room HDB flat dwellers and those in the lowest income bracket (see Tables 37 and 38).

Table 37: Perceived frequency of occurrence (drug sales on streets), by income

Income *N = 1,217*	**How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Drug sales on streets**			
	Not at all frequently	**Not frequently**	**Quite frequently**	**Very frequently**
Below $1,500	79.0	15.4	2.8	2.8
$1,500 - $2,999	81.2	13.9	3.9	1.0
$3,000 - $4,999	87.9	11.6	0.5	0
$5,000 - $6,999	87.8	11.0	1.2	0
Above $6,999	92.4	7.0	0	0.6

Table 38: Perceived frequency of occurrence (drug sales on streets), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,001*	**How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Drug sales on streets**			
	Not at all frequently	**Not frequently**	**Quite frequently**	**Very frequently**
1-3 room HDB	78.6	16.7	3.1	1.7
4 room HDB	85.0	13.6	1.1	0.3
5-room HDB	86.7	11.6	1.4	0.2
Private apartment/ Landed property	91.6	7.5	0.6	0.3

3.3.7 Over seven in 10 respondents felt that street violence and fights did not frequently happen at all; this proportion was the highest globally, although less affluent respondents were more likely to think otherwise

When prompted for views on how frequent street violence and fights occurred in their neighbourhoods, over seven in 10 respondents indicated this did not frequently happen at all. Compared to other polities, this proportion (72.2 per cent) was the highest globally, followed by Taiwan (69.7 per cent). Meanwhile, just under one-third of Hong Kongers and Malaysians felt likewise (see Figure 33).

Figure 33: Perceived frequency of occurrence (street violence and fights), by polity



There were negative correlations between income levels and perceived frequency of such incidents, as well as between housing types and perceived incident frequency. Compared to 8.9 per cent of the lowest income level group, only 3.1 per cent of the highest income group felt that street violence and fights occur very frequently or quite frequently. Comparison across housing types present the same pattern – 10 per cent of those living in 1- to 3-room flats felt these incidents occurred very or quite frequently, but only 1.8 per cent of those living in private properties indicated likewise. Furthermore, none of the respondents residing in private properties chose the response "very frequently". It would thus appear that perceptions of fights and violence do vary across socioeconomic levels and housing types to some extent (see Tables 39 and 40).

Table 39: Perceived frequency of occurrence (street violence and fights), by income

Income *N = 1,219*	**How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Street violence and fights**			
	Not at all frequently	**Not frequently**	**Quite frequently**	**Very frequently**
Below $1,500	63.7	27.4	7.0	1.9
$1,500 - $2,999	68.3	26.2	4.9	0.6
$3,000 - $4,999	76.9	18.8	4.3	0
$5,000 - $6,999	75.8	21.8	1.8	0.6
Above $6,999	79.7	17.1	2.5	0.6

Table 40: Perceived frequency of occurrence (street violence and fights), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,006*	How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Street violence and fights			
	Not at all frequently	Not frequently	Quite frequently	Very frequently
1-3 room HDB	60.0	30.0	8.5	1.5
4 room HDB	73.5	23.5	2.6	0.5
5-room HDB	78.7	19.0	1.9	0.5
Private apartment/ Landed property	83.4	14.8	1.8	0

3.3.8 Over nine in 10 respondents felt that sexual harassment on the streets was infrequent; these proportions are among the highest globally, but younger and more educated respondents were more likely to feel otherwise

When asked about the perceived frequency of sexual harassment occurring in their neighbourhoods, we find that 4.1 per cent said that such incidents occur either very frequently or quite frequently, 23.4 per cent reported that they do not frequently happen, while 72.5 per cent said that they do not happen at all frequently. After Taiwan, Singapore has the second-highest proportion of respondents who reported that sexual harassment did not occur at all frequently among the polities of comparison (see Figure 34).

Figure 34: Perceived frequency of occurrence (sexual harassment), by polity



Interestingly, there were no significant differences when comparing the responses of the two genders directly. However, there were some gender differences observed when controlling for specific demographic characteristics.

The youngest age group are the most likely to report that sexual harassment occurs very frequently or quite frequently in their neighbourhoods. It could be that younger individuals are more likely to be a target of such behaviour, or that younger individuals are more likely to be aware of subtler forms of sexual harassment and to call them out as such. When responses were further separated by gender, females aged 21 to 65 were less likely than males of the same age to report that sexual harassment did not frequently occur at all (see Tables 41 and 42).

Table 41: Perceived frequency of occurrence (sexual harassment), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,001*	**How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Sexual harassment**			
	Not at all frequently	**Not frequently**	**Quite frequently**	**Very frequently**
21-35	68.5	24.4	5.1	2.0
36-50	69.8	25.9	3.6	0.7
51-65	72.3	24.6	2.9	0.2
Above 65	84.6	14.8	0.6	0

Table 42: Perceived frequency of occurrence (sexual harassment), by age cohort and gender

Age Cohort and Gender *N = 2,001*		How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Sexual harassment			
		Not at all frequently	Not frequently	Quite frequently	Very frequently
21-35	Male	72.3	21.6	4.7	1.4
	Female	64.7	27.2	5.5	2.6
36-50	Male	72.6	22.6	3.9	0.9
	Female	67.9	28.2	3.3	0.6
51-65	Male	73.0	24.7	2.3	0.0
	Female	71.7	24.6	3.4	0.3
Above 65	Male	80.4	18.3	1.3	0.0
	Female	88.3	11.7	0	0.0

Perceptions of sexual harassment occurrence also vary across education levels. In particular, people with below secondary school qualifications are significantly more likely to report that such incidents do not frequently happen at all. In contrast with 81.6 per cent of this group choosing "not at all frequently", the proportions for the other groups range between 69.2 and 72.3 per cent. For respondents with diploma or above qualifications, there was a smaller proportion of female respondents who indicated sexual harassment does not occur at all frequently. Compared to approximately 74 per cent of male respondents in these two educational categories, under two-thirds of their female counterparts felt likewise (see Tables 43 and 44).

Table 43: Perceived frequency of occurrence (sexual harassment), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,997*	How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Sexual harassment			
	Not at all frequently	Not frequently	Quite frequently	Very frequently
Below secondary	81.6	15.1	3.0	0.3
Secondary / ITE	72.3	23.9	3.2	0.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	69.2	26.1	4.0	0.7
Bachelor's and above	69.9	25.7	3.0	1.4

Table 44: Perceived frequency of occurrence (sexual harassment), by education level and gender

Education Level and Gender *N = 1,997*		How frequently do these happen in your neighbourhood? – Sexual harassment			
		Not at all frequently	Not frequently	Quite frequently	Very frequently
Below secondary	Male	76.3	18.8	5.0	0.0
	Female	85.7	12.4	1.4	0.5
Secondary / ITE	Male	72.8	24.0	2.8	0.4
	Female	72.0	23.9	3.5	0.6
Dip. / Prof. qual.	Male	74.2	23.0	2.9	0.0
	Female	63.7	29.5	5.2	1.6
Bachelor's and above	Male	73.6	22.1	2.6	1.7
	Female	66.9	28.7	3.3	1.1

3.4 MITIGATING DANGERS

3.4.1 Over four in 10 respondents avoided carrying too much money on them, and over two in 10 preferred not to go out at night for reasons of security

As a follow-up to questions posed on the frequency of unsavoury activities occurring in respondents' neighbourhoods, respondents were asked if they did any of the following for reasons of security: 1) not carrying much money, and 2) preferring not to go out at night. Over four in 10 respondents indicated they avoided carrying too much money, while over two in 10 indicated they preferred not to go out at night (see Figure 35).

Figure 35: Mitigating dangers ("Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security?")



3.4.2 Singapore had the lowest proportions globally of respondents who reported not carrying much money on them for security reasons; these proportions have held constant since 2012

Among the selected polities of comparison, Singapore had the lowest proportion of respondents who indicated not carrying much money on them for reasons of security. In contrast, approximately nine in 10 Malaysian and Japanese respondents indicated likewise. The Singaporean responses have been relatively constant since 2012. The decision made by respondents to carry little cash for reasons of security in this regard is clearly not based on high crime rates, as evident from the very muted concerns about robbery. Hence, it is most likely a reflection of the focus Singapore residents have on safety, and their ensuing choices to reduce such risks wherever possible (see Figures 36 and 37).

Figure 36: Mitigating dangers (didn't carry much money), by polity



Figure 37: Mitigating dangers (didn't carry much money), across WVS waves



3.4.3 Females, the elderly, and the least affluent were significantly more likely to exercise an abundance of caution and carry less money on them for security reasons

When perusing results by demographic cuts, we find a clear gender and age divide. Compared to 33.2 per cent of males indicating they did not carry much money on them, 49.8 per cent of females answered likewise. Meanwhile, 56.0 per cent of the oldest respondents indicated as such compared to just 33.0 per cent of the youngest cohort. Despite Singapore being generally safe, it appears that females and older individuals are still much more cautious about becoming potential targets of crime (see Tables 45 and 46).

Table 45: Mitigating dangers (didn't carry much money), by gender

Gender ***N = 1,998***	**Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security? - Didn't carry much money**	
	Yes	**No**
Male	33.2	77.8
Female	49.8	50.2

Table 46: Mitigating dangers (didn't carry much money), by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 1,998***	**Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security? - Didn't carry much money**	
	Yes	**No**
21-35	33.0	67.0
36-50	43.5	56.5
51-65	41.5	58.5
Above 65	56.0	44.0

When examining responses across income brackets, we note the three middle-income brackets did not seem to differ much in their responses; around 34 per cent indicated they did not carry much money around for reasons of security. However, there were marked differences when comparing the lowest and highest income brackets. Respondents who earned below $1,500 were much more cautious, with 54.6 per cent indicating that they did carry less money for security reasons. In contrast, only 27 per cent of those who earned above $6,999 indicated likewise (see Table 47).

Table 47: Mitigating dangers (didn't carry much money), by income

Income ***N = 1,219***	**Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security? - Didn't carry much money**	
	Yes	**No**
Below $1,500	54.6	45.4
$1,500 - $2,999	35.4	64.6
$3,000 - $4,999	34.7	65.3
$5,000 - $6,999	34.1	65.9
Above $6,999	27.0	73.0

3.4.4 Similar to 3.4.2, the proportion of Singapore respondents who indicated they preferred not to venture out at night for security reasons was the lowest globally; this proportion has decreased since 2012

In Singapore, 21.4 per cent of the overall population indicated they preferred not to venture out after dark for security reasons. This proportion was the lowest among selected polities of comparison, followed by South Korea (35.8 per cent). In stark contrast, over seven in 10 Malaysians and Japanese indicated likewise (see Figure 38).

Figure 38: Mitigating dangers (preferred not to go out at night), by polity



Respondents in 2020 were also less cautious in this regard relative to their counterparts in 2012. Compared to 27.5 per cent in 2012 indicating they preferred not to go out at night, 21.4 per cent of respondents in the 2020 wave felt likewise (see Figure 39).

Figure 39: Mitigating dangers (preferred not to go out at night), across WVS waves



3.4.5 In the same vein as findings in 3.4.3, females, the elderly, and less affluent were significantly more likely to prefer not going out at night due to security reasons

There was a clear gender and age difference across responses. Compared to 12.6 per cent of the males who answered yes, 30.2 per cent of the females preferred not to go out at night. Similarly, older respondents were less inclined to go out at night compared to younger respondents (see Tables 48 and 49).

Table 48: Mitigating dangers (preferred not to go out at night), by gender

Gender *N = 1,997*	Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security? - Preferred not to go out at night	
	Yes	**No**
Male	12.6	87.4
Female	30.2	69.8

Table 49: Mitigating dangers (preferred not to go out at night), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,997*	Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security? - Preferred not to go out at night	
	Yes	**No**
21-35	17.5	82.5
36-50	22.6	77.4
51-65	20.4	79.6
Above 65	31.6	68.4

When dissecting responses with socioeconomic factors, we find that lower-SES respondents were more likely to prefer not going out at night for reasons of security. A quarter of respondents living in 1-3 room HDB flats indicated as such, compared to 18.2 per cent of those residing in private properties. The greatest contrast was found when comparing income levels: while 25.6 per cent of people earning below $1,500 indicated as such, only 11.9 per cent of those earning above $6,999 felt the same way (see Tables 50 and 51).

Table 50: Mitigating dangers (didn't carry much money), by housing type

Housing Type ***N = 1,997***	**Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security? - Preferred not to go out at night**	
	Yes	**No**
1-3 room HDB	25.8	74.2
4 room HDB	22.0	78.0
5-room HDB	20.2	79.8
Private apartment/ Landed property	18.2	81.8

Table 51: Mitigating dangers (didn't carry much money), by income

Income ***N = 1,215***	**Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security? - Preferred not to go out at night**	
	Yes	**No**
Below $1,500	25.6	74.4
$1,500 - $2,999	19.9	80.1
$3,000 - $4,999	16.2	83.8
$5,000 - $6,999	16.0	84.0
Above $6,999	11.9	88.1

3.5 NATIONAL SECURITY

3.5.1 While over half of respondents were worried about a terrorist attack, over two-fifths were worried about a civil war or a war involving Singapore

Respondents were asked about how worried they were about various major security threats happening in their country, including war, terrorist attacks, as well as civil war. Over half of the respondents said they were worried about a terrorist attack. While civil war was not as big a concern, 27.0 per cent indicated they were very much worried, and 13.5 per cent indicated they worried a great deal about such an event happening (see Figure 40).

Figure 40: Worries about national security ("To what degree are you worried about the following situations?")



3.5.2 Singapore respondents were among the least worried about war globally; males, the affluent, and those who believed the government does not have the right to surveil the public were less likely to be worried about a war involving Singapore

Looking at overall results, over 50 per cent said that they were not very worried about Singapore going to war; 32.1 per cent said they did not worry much, and 23 per cent were not worried at all. However, 30.5 per cent said that they worried very much about a potential war. Singapore's results were similar to those reported by Thailand and Australia. In contrast, a majority of respondents in Malaysia, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and the US indicated that they were very much or a good deal worried about their country going to war (see Figure 41).

Figure 41: Worries about national security (a war involving my country), by polity



While 41.4 per cent in 2012 indicated that they worried very much or a good deal about a war involving their country, the proportion increased to 44.5 per cent in 2020. Furthermore, a much smaller proportion of respondents in 2020 (23.0 per cent) indicated that they were not at all worried about this event happening compared to 2012 (36.1 per cent) (see Figure 42).

Figure 42: Worries about national security (a war involving my country), across WVS waves



Females were much more worried compared to males about Singapore going to war. A much larger proportion (35.3 per cent) answered “very much” compared to their male counterparts (24.8 per cent). Furthermore, while 27.1 per cent of male respondents said they did not worry at all, only 18.9 per cent of females said the same. Perhaps widespread participation in the National Service by male Singaporeans have assured them that 1) Singapore is not very likely to be involved in a war, or that 2) Singapore’s defences are effective against such potential threats. Meanwhile, most of the female population are not privy to such information and may therefore feel more worried (see Table 52).

Table 52: Worries about national security (a war involving Singapore), by gender

Gender *N = 2,010*	**To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - A war involving my country**			
	Not at all	**Not much**	**A good deal**	**Very much**
Male	27.1	33.7	14.3	24.8
Female	18.9	29.6	16.2	35.3

Respondents who earned below $1,500 were the most worried about the prospects of a war – 41.7 per cent said that they worried very much, while 16.7 per cent said they worried a good deal. A similar pattern was found when comparing across housing types, with responses for “very much” being higher for those living in smaller housing types compared to their more affluent peers (see Table 53).

Table 53: Worries about national security (a war involving Singapore), by income

Income *N = 1,215*	**To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - A war involving my country**			
	Not at all	**Not much**	**A good deal**	**Very much**
Below $1,500	11.1	30.6	16.7	41.7
$1,500 - $2,999	25.8	31.9	14.5	27.7
$3,000 - $4,999	27.2	31.2	14.0	27.7
$5,000 - $6,999	24.8	35.8	10.3	29.1
Above $6,999	22.6	37.1	9.4	30.8

When the responses to this question are compared to attitudes on public surveillance, there was a divide in opinions between those who are worried and those who are not. Over half of respondents who indicated the government should have the right to public surveillance also worried a good deal or very much about a war starting, as opposed to under a third of their counterparts who indicated the government should not have the right to surveil the public (see Table 54).

Table 54: Worries about national security (a war involving Singapore), by agreement to government surveillance

Agreement to Government Surveillance *N = 1,982*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - A war involving my country			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
Definitely should have the right	19.9	26.9	17.8	35.4
Probably should have the right	14.5	34.2	17.1	34.1
Probably should not have the right	26.7	41.0	10.6	21.7
Definitely should not have the right	46.9	24.3	10.1	18.8

3.5.3 Females, silvers, the less-educated, and those who felt the government should have the right to surveil the public were likelier to worry about a terrorist attack; however overall proportions have dropped from 2012

Respondents were fairly split when it came to how much they are worried about a terrorist attack occurring. While 33.7 per cent and 21.7 per cent worried very much or a good deal respectively, 31.9 per cent did not worry very much, and 12.7 per cent were not at all worried. With the exception of Thailand, South Korea, and Hong Kong, a majority of respondents in all selected polities indicated that they worried a good deal or very much about the prospect of a terrorist attack (see Figure 43).

Figure 43: Worries about national security (a terrorist attack), by polity



Compared to 2012, respondents in 2020 were much more worried about a terrorist attack happening. While 24.9 per cent were very worried and 20.2 per cent worried a good deal in 2012, the proportions increased to 33.7 per cent and 21.7 per cent in 2020. This increase in worry could be due to 1) the higher prevalence of attacks over the world over the past eight years, and 2) the SGSecure community efforts to raise awareness among Singapore residents about the need to stay vigilant in light of possible terror attacks (see Figure 44).

Figure 44: Worries about national security (a terrorist attack), across WVS waves



When comparing across genders, females were again more worried about the possibility of a terrorist attack, with 38.7 per cent of them answering "very much". Meanwhile, only 28.6 per cent of males responded in a similar fashion (see Table 55).

Table 55: Worries about national security (a terrorist attack), by gender

Gender *N = 2,009*	**To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - A terrorist attack**			
	Not at all	**Not much**	**A good deal**	**Very much**
Male	14.9	34.4	22.1	28.6
Female	10.8	28.4	22.1	38.7

Similar to the question about a war involving Singapore, the youngest group was the least worried about a terrorist attack. While at least 34 per cent of the other three age groups responded with "very much", only 28.4 per cent of those aged between 21 and 35 did so (see Table 56).

Table 56: Worries about national security (a terrorist attack), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,009*	**To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - A terrorist attack**			
	Not at all	**Not much**	**A good deal**	**Very much**
21-35	16.5	33.2	21.9	28.4
36-50	11.5	32.0	20.2	36.3
51-65	10.0	30.6	22.2	37.2
Above 65	12.6	27.3	25.5	34.5

When the responses were divided according to education levels, it appears that respondents with at least diploma or professional qualifications were less worried about a terrorist attack happening. In total, 49.9 per cent of respondents with diploma or professional qualifications and 44.5 per cent of respondents with university degrees replied that they were either "not much" or "not at all" worried about a terrorist attack (see Table 57).

Table 57: Worries about national security (a terrorist attack), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,005*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - A terrorist attack			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
Below secondary	17.7	26.3	22.3	33.6
Secondary / ITE	8.8	29.9	23.0	38.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	14.5	35.4	19.0	31.2
Bachelor's and above	12.0	32.5	22.9	32.5

Respondents who feel that the government should have the right to public surveillance are more likely to worry more about a terrorist attack. Compared to approximately two-thirds of those who think that the government should have the right indicating significant worry, under 40 per cent of respondents who felt the government should not have the right to surveil the public indicated likewise (see Table 58).

Table 58: Worries about national security (a terrorist attack), by agreement to government surveillance

Agreement to Government Surveillance *N = 1,980*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? – A terrorist attack			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
Definitely should have the right	10.6	23.1	25.9	40.4
Probably should have the right	6.6	30.2	25.1	38.1
Probably should not have the right	12.7	49.1	14.3	23.9
Definitely should not have the right	32.1	31.4	14.3	22.3

3.5.4 Singapore ranked in the middle for worries about a civil war when compared with other polities; females, older folks, and those who felt the government has the right to surveillance were more likely to be worried

Respondents were least worried about a civil war happening, as 23.5 per cent said that they were not worried at all, and 36.1 per cent did not worry much about this prospect. There was still a portion that held worries about it occurring – 27 per cent said they worried very much, and 13.5 per cent said they worried a good deal about it. Singapore respondents were similar to respondents in Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Australia, and the US, of which more than 50 per cent indicated that they were not much or not at all worried about a civil war happening. Malaysia and Taiwan, in contrast, saw more than a majority of their respondents indicating that they were very much or a good deal worried about a civil war happening (see Figure 45).

Figure 45: Worries about national security (a civil war), by polity



Respondents in 2020 were again much more worried about the prospect of a civil war compared to those in 2012. While 38.0 per cent in 2012 said they were not at all worried, the proportion decreased to 23.5 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 46).

Figure 46: Worries about national security (a civil war), across WVS waves



Female respondents were also more worried about a possible war. The consistent sentiments displayed in these three questions suggest that females are generally more concerned about major negative events compared to males (see Table 59).

Table 59: Worries about national security (a civil war), by gender

Gender *N = 2,007*	**To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - A terrorist attack**			
	Not at all	**Not much**	**A good deal**	**Very much**
Male	28.6	37.6	12.2	21.7
Female	18.7	33.5	15.2	32.6

The youngest age group was again the least worried about this particular event happening in Singapore, with just 22.5 per cent selecting the “very much” option. The oldest group shared their sentiments, with just 26.6 per cent being very much worried. Meanwhile, the two age groups in between reported very similar response proportions for each of the options (see Table 60).

Table 60: Worries about national security (a civil war), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,007*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - A civil war			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
21-35	26.3	38.9	12.3	22.5
36-50	24.4	32.2	13.1	30.3
51-65	20.2	35.8	13.4	30.6
Above 65	21.1	34.1	18.1	26.6

Just under half of respondents who feel the government has the right to public surveillance worry to a sizeable extent about a civil war happening. In contrast, just over a quarter of those who do not feel the government should have the right to public surveillance indicate the same levels of worry (see Table 61).

Table 61: Worries about national security (a civil war), by agreement to government surveillance

Agreement to Government Surveillance *N = 1,979*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? – A civil war			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
Definitely should have the right	24.1	28.8	14.5	32.7
Probably should have the right	18.8	34.8	16.2	30.2
Probably should not have the right	21.0	50.4	8.5	20.2
Definitely should not have the right	37.6	34.8	10.8	16.7

Chapter 4

Work, Finances, and SES

CHAPTER 4 | WORK, FINANCES, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

The themes of work, finances, and SES fall within the broader ambit of economic well-being, which can be understood as one indicator of an individual's quality of life. However, in this study, it is presented as a separate section due to the fairly extensive scope it covers, including (1) job satisfaction, (2) perceived future socio-economic security, (3) household finances, (4) investment behaviour, and (5) perceptions of SES. When individuals have an assured source of income and the ability to save for a rainy day, they are more likely to report higher levels of satisfaction and happiness. Furthermore, the stress of trying to provide for oneself and one's family can be alleviated when there is some level of economic stability.

The analyses presented across the sub-sections also allude to concepts of socio-economic class. Overall, we adopt a broad definition of economic wellbeing as the ability to consistently meet basic needs (such as food, housing, utilities, health care, transportation, education, childcare, clothing, and taxes), and have control over day-to-day finances. It also includes the ability to make economic choices and feel a sense of security, satisfaction, and personal fulfilment with one's personal finances and employment pursuits.

Future socio-economic security includes the ability to absorb financial shocks, meet financial goals, build financial assets, and maintain adequate income throughout an individual's life. This definition is by and large explicated in part by much of the relevant literature (see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013 and Clearinghouse for Economic Well-Being, 2016, amongst others).

A directly related concept in perusing participants' responses is the notion of inequality, which refers to the differences in economic wellbeing between individuals within the same polity. Much has been said about inequality in Singapore, especially with regard to income (Rao et al., 2003; Mukhopadhaya, 2014; Yahya, 2015; Teo, 2018) and poverty (Smith et al., 2015). Recent market studies have shown that many Singaporeans identify issues pertaining to economic wellbeing as their top concern (Ho, 2020); although this may be due in part to the prevailing socioeconomic climate.

In general, most of the prevailing scholarships explicate how economic wellbeing may be achieved by individuals, families, and communities — thus diminishing inequality — through public policies that ensure the ability to build financial knowledge and skills, access to safe and affordable financial products as well as economic resources, and opportunities for generating income and asset-building. This occurs within a context of economic justice, where labour markets provide opportunities for secure full employment with adequate compensation and benefits for all.

4.1 JOB SATISFACTION

4.1.1 More than nine in 10 respondents had at least some degree of satisfaction with their current job

Job satisfaction is one aspect of economic wellbeing. While we do not delve into the exact reasons for satisfaction or dissatisfaction, these patterns do provide some clue about the perceptions that respondents hold towards their jobs. Respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction on a 10-point scale. For ease of reference and discussion, the answers are condensed into three categories, with 1 to 3 indicating a low degree of satisfaction, 4 to 7 indicating some degree of satisfaction, and 8 to 10 indicating a high degree of satisfaction. Across the population with some sort of employment, 47.8 per cent had some degree of satisfaction, while 45.2 per cent were highly satisfied (see Figure 47).

Figure 47: Job satisfaction ("How satisfied are you with your current job?")



4.1.2 Older, more educated, self-employed, and higher-income respondents were more likely to be highly satisfied with their jobs

Respondents aged 36 and above had very similar responses. In contrast, those aged between 21 and 35 indicated lower satisfaction with their jobs. While over 47 per cent of those above 35 were highly satisfied, 38.5 per cent of those in the youngest age group indicated likewise (see Table 62).

Table 62: Job satisfaction, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,334*	How satisfied are you with your current job?		
	Low satisfaction	Some degree of satisfaction	High satisfaction
21-35	7.5	54.0	38.5
36-50	7.0	45.1	47.9
51-65	7.1	45.0	47.9
Above 65	7.0	43.7	49.3

Respondents with university degrees appeared to be the most satisfied with their jobs, with 48 per cent indicating high satisfaction, compared to under 44 per cent in the other groups. Given how a university qualification is usually the gateway to professional employment, which often comes with higher levels of job autonomy and prestige, degree holders may hence have greater propensity to be satisfied with their jobs (see Table 63).

Table 63: Job satisfaction, by education level

Education Level *N = 1,332*	How satisfied are you with your current job?		
	Low satisfaction	Some degree of satisfaction	High satisfaction
Below secondary	7.1	50.0	42.9
Secondary / ITE	6.6	49.8	43.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	8.7	48.7	42.6
Bachelor's and above	6.6	45.5	48.0

When comparing individuals who have some form of employment, 40 per cent of part-time employees were highly satisfied with their jobs. In contrast, 46 per cent of full-time employees and self-employed respondents gave similar answers (see Table 64).

Table 64: Job satisfaction, by employment status

Employment Status *N = 1,335*	How satisfied are you with your current job?		
	Low satisfaction	Some degree of satisfaction	High satisfaction
Full-time employee	7.5	46.5	46.0
Part-time employee	6.3	53.7	40.0
Self-employed	3.7	50.0	46.3

Respondents with higher incomes were more likely to report higher satisfaction with their jobs. Compared to just 39.3 per cent of those earning below $1,500 indicating as such, 59.4 per cent of respondents earning above $6,999 felt the same way (see Table 65).

Table 65: Job satisfaction, by income

Income *N = 1,251*	**How satisfied are you with your current job?**		
	Low satisfaction	**Some degree of satisfaction**	**High satisfaction**
Below $1,500	8.7	51.9	39.3
$1,500 - $2,999	6.5	53.2	40.3
$3,000 - $4,999	7.4	48.2	44.4
$5,000 - $6,999	5.7	43.4	50.9
Above $6,999	5.9	34.7	59.4

4.2 FUTURE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SECURITY

4.2.1 While over half of respondents were worried about losing or not finding a job and not being able to give their children a good education, more were worried about their children's future than their own job prospects

The following question relates to aspects of socio-economic security. The first question about employment worries concerns economic security, while the second relates to ideas of securing the future for one's children. While the proportions of "very much" and "a great deal" for both questions exceeded 50 per cent, respondents seem to be more worried about their children's future than their own job prospects (see Figure 48).

Figure 48: Worries about socio-economic security ("To what degree are you worried about the following?")



4.2.2 Compared with other Asian polities, Singapore had one of the lowest proportions of respondents who were worried about losing or not finding a job; these proportions remained relatively constant since 2012

A majority of the respondents were worried about their jobs to some extent, with 30.2 per cent reporting that they worry very much about it, and 23.6 per cent worrying a great deal. Meanwhile, 30.9 per cent said that they did not have much worries about this issue, and 15.3 per cent were not worried at all. Similar to Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan, a majority of Singaporean respondents indicated that they were very much or a good deal worried about losing their job or not finding a job. Only less than a majority of Hong Kongers and Americans were not much or not at all worried about the same issue of jobs (see Figure 49).

Figure 49: Worries about socio-economic security (job security), by polity



Respondents in 2020 were less likely to say they were not at all worried compared to those in 2012. However, a similar proportion (around 46 per cent) in both waves indicated that they did not have much or any worry about losing their job or finding a job (see Figure 50).

Figure 50: Worries about socio-economic security (job security), across WVS waves



4.2.3 Older, employed, and more affluent respondents were less likely to be worried about losing or not finding a job

In general, younger respondents were more worried than older respondents about their employment status. Over one-third of those 50 years of age and under reported worrying very much, and over a quarter reported being worried a great deal about losing or not finding a job. Job insecurity is to be expected among these age groups since they are the most economically active. In particular, respondents aged between 36 and 50 years old are likely to have heightened worries because they face competition from younger employees, who are perceived to be more productive and possess more updated skills. Proportions of those 36 to 50 years old indicating significant worry were slightly higher compared to the youngest cohort, which had 33.2 per cent for "very much" and 25.5 per cent for "a good deal". Respondents aged 36-50 are also more likely to have children who are still in their school-going years, and have greater concerns with sufficiency of household income (see Table 66).

Table 66: Worries about socio-economic security (job security), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,895*	**To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - Losing my job or not finding a job**			
	Not at all	**Not much**	**A good deal**	**Very much**
21-35	14.8	26.5	25.5	33.2
36-50	11.2	27.2	26.8	34.9
51-65	15.2	36.2	21.7	26.9
Above 65	25.4	38.1	16.3	20.2

Not surprisingly, respondents who were currently unemployed or studying were the most worried by far – just under 70 per cent of this group worried a good deal or very much about losing or not finding a job, as compared to approximately half of other groups. This indicates some level of concern about the employment market (see Table 67).

Table 67: Worries about socio-economic security (job security), by employment status

Employment Status *N = 1,895*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - Losing my job or not finding a job			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
Full-time employee	12.4	31.3	24.3	32.0
Part-time employee	10.3	37.5	25.0	27.2
Self-employed	25.4	24.6	23.9	26.1
Retired / pensioned	27.6	37.9	11.8	22.7
Housewife	20.1	32.1	20.7	27.2
Student	10.6	20.0	37.6	31.8
Unemployed	11.5	20.5	26.2	41.8

Expected trends were found when the results were compared across socioeconomic factors, with lower-income respondents indicating being more worried about losing or not finding a job. In addition, respondents living in 1- to 3-room HDB flats were much more worried compared to the rest of the respondents – 37.9 per cent of them said they were very much worried, compared to the group who live in 4-room HDB flats, which had the second-highest proportion for “very much” at 28.3 per cent. These results point to much higher levels of job insecurity for those at the lowest end of the income spectrum (see Tables 68 and 69).

Table 68: Worries about socio-economic security (job security), by income

Income *N = 1,219*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - Losing my job or not finding a job			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
Below $1,500	5.6	28.0	30.8	35.5
$1,500 - $2,999	9.4	34.6	21.4	34.6
$3,000 - $4,999	16.4	33.1	22.3	28.2
$5,000 - $6,999	18.2	29.7	27.3	24.8
Above $6,999	19.5	32.7	19.5	28.3

Table 69: Worries about socio-economic security (job security), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,895*	**To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - Losing my job or not finding a job**			
	Not at all	**Not much**	**A good deal**	**Very much**
1-3 room HDB	11.7	29.1	21.3	37.9
4 room HDB	14.3	32.2	25.2	28.3
5-room HDB	18.1	30.6	24.5	26.7
Private apartment/ Landed property	19.5	32.4	23.3	24.8

4.2.4 Levels of worry over their children's education among Singapore respondents were comparable to those in Thailand, Japan, and South Korea; these proportions have risen since 2012

Respondents in Singapore were slightly more worried about their children's education compared to their own employment prospects; 35.1 per cent reported that they were very much worried, and 23.6 per cent worried a good deal about this issue. Meanwhile, 24.4 per cent are not very worried, while 16.9 per cent are not worried at all. Close to 60 per cent of Singaporean respondents indicated that they were very much worried or a good deal worried about not being able to give their children a good education. Other polities with similar levels of anxiety on this matter include Thailand (67 per cent), Japan (63.7 per cent), and South Korea (63.9 per cent). At the higher end of the spectrum, around 80 per cent of the Malaysian, Mainland Chinese, and Taiwanese respondents indicated very much or a good deal of worry (see Figure 51).

Figure 51: Worries: Not being able to give one´s children a good education



Compared to 2012, more respondents now worry very much about giving their children a good education. While 56 per cent in 2012 said they were worried to a large extent, this proportion increased to 58.7 per cent in 2020. In addition, the proportion with no worries at all decreased from 26.5 per cent in 2012 to 16.9 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 52).

Figure 52: Worries: Not being able to give my children a good education



4.2.5 Younger, housewives and the unemployed, and the less-affluent were more likely to be worried about their children's education prospects

Younger respondents were more worried about their children's education prospects compared to their older counterparts. Similar to the question on employment prospects, respondents aged between 36 and 50 years old were the most worried, with 43.5 per cent saying they were very much worried. The youngest group were also quite concerned, with 37.6 per cent choosing the "very much" option. Respondents in these two groups are most likely to be in the midst of starting their families or have school-going children, which may augment their levels of worry about education (see Table 70).

Table 70: Worries about socio-economic security (education), by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 1,707***	**To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - Not being able to give my children a good education**			
	Not at all	**Not much**	**A good deal**	**Very much**
21-35	15.5	22.7	24.1	37.6
36-50	13.5	21.0	22.0	43.5
51-65	18.6	26.8	24.9	29.7
Above 65	24.4	39.6	21.9	23.1

In general, over 45 per cent indicated worrying very much or a good deal about providing for their children's education regardless of employment type. Housewives and the unemployed were most likely to indicate worrying very much (see Table 71).

Table 71: Worries about socio-economic security (education), by employment status

Employment Status *N = 1,707*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - Not being able to give my children a good education			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
Full-time employee	14.0	27.0	22.6	36.4
Part-time employee	19.3	21.1	27.7	31.9
Self-employed	27.6	19.8	18.1	34.5
Retired / pensioned	25.4	27.4	21.4	25.9
Housewife	15.1	21.0	24.2	39.8
Student	13.0	22.1	28.6	36.4
Unemployed	19.2	16.2	25.3	39.4

While people with university education are more likely to choose "not much" or "not at all" as their answer, there was still 55 per cent of this group that worried very much or a good deal about their children's education. The most worried group were those with secondary school or ITE qualifications – 39 per cent of them said they worried very much, and 24.4 per cent said they worried a good deal. Other than these differences, the distribution of answers was quite similar across the different educational levels, suggesting that their children's education is a source of concern for Singaporeans from different walks of life (see Table 72).

Table 72: Worries about socio-economic security (education), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,705*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - Not being able to give my children a good education			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
Below secondary	16.6	24.0	28.0	31.4
Secondary / ITE	12.4	24.2	24.4	39.0
Dip. / Prof. qual.	18.7	24.5	20.3	36.5
Bachelor's and above	20.1	24.9	22.3	32.7

There are common trends when perusing income levels and housing types. Respondents belonging to the highest income bracket and residing in private properties were the least worried, but not by a large degree. While the lack of resources needed to help children achieve a good education weighed more on the minds of those from lower socio-economic groups, overall, the high priority bestowed on a good education in Singapore might have made this a general concern for all groups to varying degrees (see Tables 73 and 74).

Table 73: Worries about socio-economic security (education), by income

Income *N = 1,072*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - Not being able to give my children a good education			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
Below $1,500	8.9	18.9	32.6	39.5
$1,500 - $2,999	13.1	27.2	20.5	39.2
$3,000 - $4,999	17.3	26.4	23.0	33.3
$5,000 - $6,999	19.4	24.3	22.2	34.0
Above $6,999	22.9	27.9	17.1	32.1

Table 74: Worries about socio-economic security (education), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,707*	To what degree are you worried about the following situations? - Not being able to give my children a good education			
	Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much
1-3 room HDB	13.8	23.6	23.0	39.6
4 room HDB	16.0	26.7	24.6	32.7
5-room HDB	15.7	25.3	24.3	34.7
Private apartment/ Landed property	26.6	20.5	20.9	32.0

4.3 HOUSEHOLD FINANCES

4.3.1 Over one-third of respondents were highly satisfied with their household finances and this is comparable with most other polities; proportions indicating so were the highest in 2012 compared to 2002 and 2020

Respondents were asked on a 10-point scale about their level of satisfaction towards the financial situation in their household. The responses are condensed into three answer categories – where 1 to 3 indicates a low level of satisfaction, 4 to 7 indicates middling levels of satisfaction, while 8 to 10 indicates a high level of satisfaction. – for easy reference. Overall, 8.9 per cent were dissatisfied, 58.8 per cent had middling levels of satisfaction, while 32.3 per cent were highly satisfied with their household finances (see Figure 53).

Figure 53: Satisfaction with financial situation of household ("How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?")



Most selected polities had over 30 per cent indicating high levels of satisfaction with their household finances. The only exceptions were Malaysia (28.6 per cent), Thailand (27.9 per cent), South Korea (16.7 per cent), and Hong Kong (27.7 per cent). While South Koreans were not as likely to indicate high satisfaction, they were also less likely to indicate low levels of satisfaction compared to the rest of the polities. While at least 9 per cent of the other polities said they were dissatisfied, only 5.3 per cent of South Koreans indicated thus (see Figure 54).

Figure 54: Satisfaction with financial situation of household, by polity



Respondents in 2002 were the most optimistic about their household finances, with 36.1 per cent indicating high satisfaction. In contrast, 25.7 per cent of those in 2012 and 32.3 per cent of those in 2020 had similar responses. However, the proportion indicating middling satisfaction was the largest in 2012 and smallest in 2002. It, therefore, appears that the overall level of satisfaction with household finances in 2020 is somewhere in between those reflected in 2002 and 2012 (see Figure 55).

Figure 55: Satisfaction with financial situation of household, across WVS waves



4.3.2 Older, higher-educated, more affluent respondents and retirees were likelier to indicate high satisfaction levels with their household finances

There was a positive correlation between satisfaction levels and age. While 26.6 per cent of those aged between 21 and 35 said they were highly satisfied, 39.9 per cent of those aged above 65 said the same (see Table 75).

Table 75: Satisfaction with financial situation of household, by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 2,010***	**How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?**		
	Low satisfaction	**Middling satisfaction**	**High satisfaction**
21-35	6.7	66.7	26.6
36-50	11.5	57.6	30.9
51-65	7.7	57.2	35.1
Above 65	9.4	50.8	39.9

When comparing across employment types, it is unsurprising to see the unemployed being the least satisfied with their household finances. Overall, retirees were the most likely to indicate high satisfaction, with 45.2 per cent doing so. Meanwhile, housewives, full-time employees, and students also had over 30 per cent indicating high satisfaction. Therefore, it appears that individuals from different walks of life all experience some level of financial insecurity. While individuals who have regular sources of income, or are not the main breadwinners of the household are less dissatisfied, a portion of them are still quite worried about their household finances (see Table 76).

Table 76: Satisfaction with financial situation of household, by employment status

Employment Status *N = 2,010*	**How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?**		
	Low satisfaction	**Middling satisfaction**	**High satisfaction**
Full-time employee	7.4	60.6	32.0
Part-time employee	10.2	65.6	24.2
Self-employed	7.4	64.4	28.1
Retired / pensioned	6.3	48.5	45.2
Housewife	7.4	55.8	36.7
Student	5.6	60.7	33.7
Unemployed	27.3	55.5	17.2

Unsurprisingly, the level of satisfaction was higher for individuals with higher socioeconomic levels, whether measured by education, income, or housing type. The highest category for each of these characteristics was much more satisfied compared to the rest of the population. Compared to around 27 per cent of those with diploma or below qualifications, 40.7 per cent of those with university education had high satisfaction. Meanwhile, 54.1 per cent of those earning above $6,999 indicated high satisfaction, while only 22.6 to 38.2 per cent of the other categories did so. When comparing across housing types, 51.2 per cent of private property dwellers were highly satisfied with their household finances, while 25.1 to 32.9 per cent of the other categories said the same (see Tables 77 to 79).

Table 77: Satisfaction with financial situation of household, by education level

Education Level *N = 2,006*	**How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?**		
	Low satisfaction	**Some degree of satisfaction**	**High satisfaction**
Below secondary	15.3	56.0	28.7
Secondary / ITE	8.9	62.7	28.4
Dip. / Prof. qual.	9.2	63.2	27.6
Bachelor's and above	4.8	54.5	40.7

Table 78: Satisfaction with financial situation of household, by income

Income *N = 1,224*	How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?		
	Low satisfaction	Some degree of satisfaction	High satisfaction
Below $1,500	14.3	63.1	22.6
$1,500 - $2,999	9.0	69.8	21.2
$3,000 - $4,999	7.0	63.4	29.6
$5,000 - $6,999	2.4	59.4	38.2
Above $6,999	3.1	42.8	54.1

Table 79: Satisfaction with financial situation of household, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,010*	How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?		
	Low satisfaction	Some degree of satisfaction	High satisfaction
1-3 room HDB	15.8	59.1	25.1
4 room HDB	5.9	65.2	29.0
5-room HDB	7.2	59.9	32.9
Private apartment/ Landed property	3.9	44.9	51.2

4.3.3 While over nine in 10 respondents had never gone without food or shelter in the past 12 months, slightly over one in 10 had gone without medicine or cash

The next series of questions ask more specific questions about each family's financial situation, covering the availability of food, medicine, cash, and shelter. The responses reveal that the economic situation for the vast majority of respondents and their families are quite good. In general, it appears that most respondents do not need to worry much about having a safe shelter. However, slightly over 10 per cent indicate that they have gone without a cash income sometimes or often. Examinations across different demographic variables are conducted to determine which groups are more vulnerable (Figure 56).

Figure 56: Basic necessities ("In the past 12 months how often have you and your family...")



4.3.4 Singapore respondents were among the least likely to have gone without food when compared across polities; the unemployed, less-educated, and less-affluent were likelier to indicate that they have gone without enough food

The first question pertains to whether individuals and their families usually have enough food to eat. Singapore had the second-highest proportion of respondents after South Korea who indicated that they had never gone without enough food to eat (90.8 per cent). Societies with similarly high proportions of respondents indicating thus were China, Taiwan, and Australia. Other polities like Malaysia, Japan, Hong Kong, and the US had at least 70 per cent who indicated the same. Conversely, Thailand reported the highest proportion of respondents who indicated that they had either often, sometimes, or rarely gone without enough food to eat (44.8 per cent) (see Figure 57).

Figure 57: Basic necessities (gone without food), by polity



When compared to 2012 results, it appears the situation has improved. While 81.8 per cent of 2012 respondents reported never having to go without enough food to eat, 90.8 per cent of 2020 respondents indicated likewise (Figure 58).

Figure 58: Basic necessities (gone without food), by polity



With respect to employment type, the unemployed were most likely to answer "often" or "sometimes" to having gone without food. However, the proportion indicating as such is still relatively low (7.9 per cent). Just under 4 per cent of part-time employees and the self-employed also state that they sometimes have to go without food, suggesting that there are some within such employment arrangements who may have rather irregular financial situations (see Table 80).

Table 80: Basic necessities (gone without food), by employment status

Employment Status *N = 2,012*	In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without food to eat?			
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often
Full-time employee	91.5	6.2	2.1	0.3
Part-time employee	86.0	10.2	3.8	0
Self-employed	93.3	3.0	3.7	0
Retired / pensioned	93.7	3.7	2.2	0.4
Housewife	94.0	2.8	2.3	0.9
Student	92.1	5.6	1.1	1.1
Unemployed	78.9	13.3	6.3	1.6

The trends reported from a comparison of the socioeconomic factors are within expectations. Individuals with higher education levels, income levels, and who live in larger housing types are more likely to answer "never" to having gone without food. In comparison, the respondents who belong to the lowest education, income and smallest housing groups are the most likely to answer "sometimes" or "rarely" (see Tables 81 to 83).

Table 81: Basic necessities (gone without food), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,008*	In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without food to eat?			
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often
Below secondary	87.4	7.2	4.6	0.8
Secondary / ITE	89.0	7.4	3.0	0.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	90.8	7.0	2.0	0.2
Bachelor's and above	94.0	4.0	1.5	0.4

Table 82: Basic necessities (gone without food), by income

Income *N = 1,224*	In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without food to eat?			
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often
Below $1,500	81.6	12.0	6.0	0.5
$1,500 - $2,999	88.7	8.0	2.9	0.3
$3,000 - $4,999	95.2	4.0	0.5	0.3
$5,000 - $6,999	92.1	6.1	1.2	0.6
Above $6,999	94.3	3.8	1.9	0

Table 83: Basic necessities (gone without food), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,010*	In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without food to eat?			
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often
1-3 room HDB	82.5	10.8	5.7	1.0
4 room HDB	92.9	5.7	1.4	0
5-room HDB	94.9	3.0	1.2	0.9
Private apartment/ Landed property	95.8	3.0	1.2	0

4.3.5 Respondents in Singapore were also among the least likely to have gone without medicine or treatment when compared across polities, though the unemployed and less-affluent were more likely to state otherwise

With respect to the question on having to forgo medicine or treatment, 88.8 per cent of Singaporean respondents reported that they have never gone without needed medicine or treatment. This places Singapore as second-highest in terms of the proportion of respondents who indicated they had never gone without needed medical treatment, after South Korea. It is relatively higher than other Asian polities like Malaysia and Thailand, where respondents were almost equally split between having never gone without needed medicine and respondents who had often, sometimes, or rarely done so (see Figure 59).

Figure 59: Basic necessities (gone without medicine / treatment), by polity



Compared to 2012, a larger proportion of respondents in 2020 said that they never had to go without needed medicine or treatment. 88.8 per cent of 2020 respondents, in contrast to 80.9 per cent in 2012, gave this response (see Figure 60).

Figure 60: Basic necessities (gone without medicine / treatment), by polity



The unemployed were most likely to state they had to go without medicine or treatment at least sometimes (10.2 per cent), with part-time employees having the second-highest proportion of similar answers (5.3 per cent). Meanwhile, the self-employed, housewives, and retirees were the most likely to say that they never had to do so (see Table 84).

Table 84: Basic necessities (gone without medicine/treatment), by employment status

Employment Status *N = 2,012*	In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without medicine or medical treatment that you needed?			
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often
Full-time employee	89.3	7.6	2.8	0.3
Part-time employee	83.9	10.8	4.8	0.5
Self-employed	91.9	5.9	0.7	1.5
Retired / pensioned	91.1	5.2	3.3	0.4
Housewife	91.2	5.6	1.4	1.9
Student	89.9	7.9	2.2	0
Unemployed	79.7	10.2	9.4	0.8

Compared to 93.1 per cent of those in the highest income group who say they never have to go without treatment, 83.4 per cent from the lowest income group agree. A similar pattern is found across housing types – 94.1 per cent of those living in private property, compared to 82.2 per cent of those in 1- to 3-room flats, answered “never”. Meanwhile, 6.9 per cent of those in the lowest income group and 6.9 per cent of those in 1- to 3-room flats say that they had to forgo treatment at least sometimes. The need to go without medical treatment is usually related to perceived costs of medical care. While Singapore provides avenues for highly subsidised medical care, such as the Community Health Assist Scheme (CHAS), some are likely still deterred from accessing such care (see Tables 85 and 86).

Table 85: Basic necessities (gone without medicine/treatment), by income

Income *N = 1,224*	In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without medicine or medical treatment that you needed?			
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often
Below $1,500	83.4	9.7	6.0	0.9
$1,500 - $2,999	86.2	10.6	3.2	0
$3,000 - $4,999	91.9	5.9	1.9	0.3
$5,000 - $6,999	90.9	6.1	3.0	0
Above $6,999	93.1	4.4	1.3	1.3

Table 86: Basic necessities (gone without medicine/treatment), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,012*	In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without medicine or medical treatment that you needed?			
	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often
1-3 room HDB	82.2	10.9	5.7	1.2
4 room HDB	89.5	7.6	2.6	0.3
5-room HDB	92.8	5.1	1.4	0.7
Private apartment/ Landed property	94.1	3.9	2.1	0

4.3.6 Similar trends reported in 4.3.4 and 4.3.5 apply for proportions of respondents who reported going without cash incomes; divorced, unemployed, less educated, and less affluent respondents were more likely to have experienced this

Disposable income is an important aspect of economic wellbeing – without a sufficient amount, it will be difficult for an individual and their family to meet daily needs. Overall, 19.1 per cent reported that they had often, sometimes, or rarely gone without a cash income, as compared to 80.8 per cent indicating they had never gone without a cash income. Compared to other selected polities, Singapore has the highest proportion of respondents who had never gone without a cash income (see Figure 61).

Figure 61: Frequency you/family (last 12 month): Gone without a cash income, by polity



Overall, there were similar responses for the question on cash income when comparing between 2012 and 2020. However, the situation in 2020 seems to be slightly improved, with 80.8 per cent indicating they never had to go without cash income, compared to 77.4 per cent in 2012 (see Figure 62).

Figure 62: Frequency you/family (last 12 month): Gone without a cash income, across WVS waves



Compared to singles and married individuals, divorced, separated, or widowed respondents are more likely to answer “often” or “sometimes” to this question. Given that there are few differences between age cohorts, it does imply that individuals in such familial arrangements are more likely to experience difficulties in cash flow (see Table 87).

Table 87: Basic necessities (gone without cash income), by marital status

Marital Status *N = 2,009*	**In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without a cash income?**			
	Often	**Sometimes**	**Rarely**	**Never**
Married/ Living as if married	1.9	5.6	9.4	83.2
Divorced/ Separated/ Widowed	5.4	11.9	9.9	72.8
Single	1.8	6.5	13.1	78.5

Employment status also makes a difference to having ready cash income. The unemployed are by far most likely to report going without a cash income; 13.3 per cent and 17.2 per cent chose the “often” or “sometimes” responses respectively. Three other groups also present some worrying trends: 13.5 per cent of part-time employees, 10.3 per cent of the self-employed, and 8.9 per cent of retirees indicated having to go without a cash income at least sometimes. Given the nature of their employment contracts, part-time employees and the self-employed may experience less regular income. Some retirees may also have insufficient cash flow, especially if they are financially dependent on others such as their children (see Table 88).

Table 88: Basic necessities (gone without cash income), by employment type

Employment Type ***N = 2,009***	**In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without a cash income?**			
	Often	**Sometimes**	**Rarely**	**Never**
Full-time employee	0.9	4.2	10.4	84.4
Part-time employee	1.1	12.4	14.0	72.6
Self-employed	0.7	9.6	8.1	81.5
Retired/pensioned	3.7	5.2	10.0	81.2
Housewife	2.3	5.6	7.0	85.1
Student	0	4.5	11.2	84.3
Unemployed	13.3	17.2	14.8	54.7

Over 15 per cent of those in the lowest income, education, and housing brackets indicated that they have gone without a cash income at least sometimes. There is an expected disparity between socioeconomic levels, with less than 5 per cent of those in the highest income, education, and housing levels indicating “often” or “sometimes” (see Tables 89 to 91).

Table 89: Basic necessities (gone without cash income), by education level

Education Level ***N = 2,005***	**In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without a cash income?**			
	Often	**Sometimes**	**Rarely**	**Never**
Below secondary	4.6	12.3	11.8	71.3
Secondary / ITE	2.0	7.4	12.4	78.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	2.2	5.0	8.0	84.8
Bachelor’s and above	1.2	3.3	9.9	85.6

Table 90: Basic necessities (gone without cash income), by income

Income *N = 1,222*	In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without a cash income?			
	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
Below $1,500	1.8	13.8	12.9	71.4
$1,500 - $2,999	1.6	8.4	13.2	76.8
$3,000 - $4,999	0.5	3.5	8.6	87.4
$5,000 - $6,999	0	2.4	7.3	90.3
Above $6,999	0	1.9	7.6	89.9

Table 91: Basic necessities (gone without cash income), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,009*	In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without a cash income?			
	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
1- to 3-room HDB	4.4	10.8	14.5	70.3
4-room HDB	1.4	5.9	10.7	82.1
5-room HDB	1.9	3.9	7.2	87.0
Private apartment/ Landed property	0.6	3.3	7.7	88.4

4.3.7 Singapore respondents were among the least likely to have gone without safe shelter compared with other polities; divorcees, the unemployed or part-time employees, and public housing dwellers were more likely to have gone without safe shelter

Having a safe shelter appears to be the least of respondents' concerns, given that 94.8 per cent said that they never had to worry about this issue. Compared to all other selected polities, Singapore has the highest proportion of respondents who have a safe shelter over their heads. While all polities have more than a majority of their respondents indicating they have a safe shelter over their head, Malaysia, Thailand, and Australia have more than 20 per cent of its respondents who indicated they often, sometimes or rarely have gone without a safe shelter over their head (see Figure 63).

Figure 63: In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family: Gone without a safe shelter over your head, by polity



Respondents who were divorced, separated, or widowed had the lowest proportion answering "never", with 7.4 per cent indicating they rarely had to go without a safe shelter, 1.5 per cent indicating sometimes, and 0.5 per cent indicating rarely. While these percentages are very low, they are still higher compared to singles and those married. Singles appear to have the least housing issues, given that none of them selected the "often" option (see Table 92).

Table 92: Basic necessities (gone without safe shelter), by marital status

Marital Status ***N = 2,010***	**In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without a safe shelter over your head?**			
	Often	**Sometimes**	**Rarely**	**Never**
Married/ Living as if married	0.3	0.6	3.8	95.3
Divorced/ Separated/ Widowed	0.5	1.5	7.4	90.6
Single	0	0.7	4.0	95.3

Interestingly, full-time employees and housewives were the only two groups that had respondents selecting the "often" option. This may imply that some individuals under exceptional circumstances are still without safe shelters despite having a stable income. Meanwhile, 2.3 per cent of the unemployed stated that they sometimes went without safe shelter, indicating that this group may be slightly more vulnerable to housing issues (see Table 93).

Table 93: Basic necessities (gone without safe shelter), by employment status

Employment Type ***N = 2,010***	**In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without a safe shelter over your head?**			
	Often	**Sometimes**	**Rarely**	**Never**
Full-time employee	0.4	0.5	4.7	94.3
Part-time employee	0	1.1	4.8	94.1
Self-employed	0	0.7	1.5	97.8
Retired/pensioned	0	0.7	3.3	95.9
Housewife	0.5	0	3.3	96.3
Student	0	1.1	1.1	97.7
Unemployed	0	2.3	7.0	90.6

When examined across housing types, respondents who live in private housing are the most likely to say they had never gone without safe shelter in the past 12 months. Meanwhile, the other three groups have small proportions of between 0.2 to 0.5 per cent saying that they have often gone without safe shelters (see Table 94).

Table 94: Basic necessities (gone without safe shelter), by housing type

Housing Type ***N = 2,010***	**In the last 12 months, how often have you or your family gone without a safe shelter over your head?**			
	Often	**Sometimes**	**Rarely**	**Never**
1- to 3-room HDB	0.5	1.2	7.1	91.2
4-room HDB	0.2	0.2	4.2	95.5
5-room HDB	0.2	0.7	2.3	96.8
Private apartment/ Landed property	0	0.9	1.8	97.3

4.3.8 Over half of Singapore respondents managed to save money in the past year; this proportion was the highest compared with other polities and has increased over the years since 2002

Respondents were asked about their household finances – specifically about whether they were able to make ends meet with existing income flow. It appears that a majority (57.2 per cent) of respondents earned an excess of what was needed for household use, while another 28.8 per cent had just enough. However, 11.4 per cent had to spend some of their savings, while 2.6 per cent even had to borrow money from others to keep afloat (see Figure 64).

Figure 64: During the past year, did your family...



Compared to other polities, Singapore had the highest proportion of respondents who save money, as well as the lowest proportion of respondents who just get by. All other polities had less than a majority of its respondents who reported that they save money, with Thailand having only 6.0 per cent of its respondents indicating as such (see Figure 65).

Figure 65: Family savings during past year, by polity



Comparing across WVS waves, there has been an improvement in families' financial position. While 34.5 per cent in 2002 and 44.5 per cent in 2012 said that their family saved money during the past year, this proportion increased to 57.2 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 66).

Figure 66: Family savings during past year, across WVS waves



4.3.9 Younger, single, higher-educated, and more affluent respondents, as well as students, were more likely to have saved money in the past year

The family financial situation of the youngest age group appears to be in the best shape, as 66.4 per cent said they managed to save money and 23.7 per cent were able to get by. The proportion that managed to save money, however, decreased across the age groups. The oldest age group appears to have the most difficulties, as not even half of this group managed to save money. While 40.2 per cent managed just to get by, this group still has the largest proportions saying that they needed to dip into their savings or borrow money from others. This is possibly due to their older age and potential lack of regular income (see Table 95).

Table 95: Family savings during past year, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,979*	**During the past year, did your family**			
	Saved money	**Just get by**	**Spent some savings**	**Spent savings and borrowed money**
21-35	66.4	23.7	8.3	1.7
36-50	62.2	24.8	9.9	3.1
51-65	52.3	31.7	12.4	3.6
Above 65	39.3	40.2	19.3	1.2

The family finances of those who are divorced, separated, or widowed appear to be most adversely impacted, given that only 35.3 per cent of this group managed to save money as compared to 56.9 per cent of married or cohabiting respondents, and 63.9 per cent of single respondents. Divorcees and widows were also most likely to spend savings (16.9 per cent) or borrow money (7.5 per cent) (see Table 96).

Table 96: Family savings during past year, by marital status

Marital Status *N = 1,979*	During the past year, did your family			
	Saved money	Just get by	Spent some savings	Spent savings and borrowed money
Married/ Living as if married	56.9	29.1	11.6	2.4
Divorced/ Separated/ Widowed	35.3	40.3	16.9	7.5
Single	63.9	24.8	10.3	1.0

There was a large disparity across the education levels, especially with reference to the proportions that saved money or just got by. Compared to 29.2 per cent of those with below secondary school qualifications and 51.3 per cent of those with secondary school or ITE qualifications, 72.7 per cent of those with university degrees managed to save money. Furthermore, 47 per cent of those with below secondary education and 34.1 per cent of those with secondary or ITE qualifications said they just got by; much higher proportions than those for the two higher education groups (see Table 97).

Table 97: Family savings during past year, by education level

Education Level *N = 1,976*	During the past year, did your family			
	Saved money	Just get by	Spent some savings	Spent savings and borrowed money
Below secondary	29.2	47.0	17.6	6.2
Secondary / ITE	51.3	34.1	12.4	2.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	64.1	25.3	8.6	2.0
Bachelor's and above	72.7	16.5	9.6	1.1

Groups with over 60 per cent saying that they had saved money were full-time employees, students, and the self-employed. In comparison, less than 40 per cent of the retired and unemployed responded with the same answer. While those with a stable income are more likely to save money, the financial straits of the unemployed seem to be rather worrying, given that 36.3 per cent had to either spend savings or borrow money (see Table 98).

Table 98: Family savings during past year, by employment type

Employment Type *N = 1,979*	During the past year, did your family			
	Saved money	Just get by	Spent some savings	Spent savings and borrowed money
Full-time employee	66.2	23.9	8.2	1.7
Part-time employee	49.5	38.2	9.1	3.2
Self-employed	60.2	29.3	7.5	3.0
Retired/pensioned	39.4	34.8	24.6	1.1
Housewife	49.3	37.6	10.8	2.3
Student	68.6	22.1	9.3	0
Unemployed	32.3	31.5	23.4	12.9

Respondents in the lower-income groups were less likely to state that they saved money. Instead, higher proportions just got by. The difference was quite large when comparing between the highest and lowest income groups – while 47 per cent of those earning below $1,500 said they saved money and 41 per cent just got by, 85.4 per cent of those earning above $6,999 saved money and 7.6 per cent just got by (see Table 99).

Table 99: Family savings during past year, by income

Income *N = 1,220*	During the past year, did your family			
	Saved money	Just get by	Spent some savings	Spent savings and borrowed money
Below $1,500	47.0	41.0	8.8	3.2
$1,500 - $2,999	48.6	36.0	12.5	2.9
$3,000 - $4,999	65.9	24.9	7.3	1.9
$5,000 - $6,999	83.5	10.4	4.9	1.2
Above $6,999	85.4	7.6	7.0	0

The same trends remained when comparing across housing types; compared to 44.1 per cent of those in 1- to 3-room flats reporting they had saved money, 76.6 per cent of those living in private properties indicated likewise (see Table 100).

Table 100: Family savings during past year, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,979*	During the past year, did your family			
	Saved money	Just get by	Spent some savings	Spent savings and borrowed money
1- to 3-room HDB	44.1	38.1	13.7	4.1
4-room HDB	57.2	29.7	10.9	2.2
5-room HDB	58.3	27.9	11.7	2.1
Private apartment/ Landed property	76.6	12.8	9.7	0.9

4.4 INVESTMENT

4.4.1 Close to half of respondents did not consult financial advisors before investing, and those who did only took their advice sometimes

In addition to questions on financial health, respondents were also asked about their investment decisions in terms of 1) whether they consulted financial advisors before investing, and 2) if so, how often they adopted the advice after consultation. Nearly half of the respondents reported not consulting advisors, and even among those who did, most only took the proffered advice sometimes. However, given that no earlier or subsequent question asked respondents if they had actually invested, it is unclear as to whether those who reported never seeking advice from a financial advisor before investing simply indicated as such because they had not carried out any investments (see Figure 67).

Figure 67: Consulting financial advisors and adopting advice



4.4.2 Over one-quarter of respondents have participated in the CPF Investment Schemes (CPFIS); under a fifth of respondents were quite confident or extremely confident in earning higher returns than the CPF interest rate

Slightly over a quarter of respondents have invested their Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings using the CPF Investment Schemes (CPFIS). In addition, just under 17 per cent are quite confident or extremely confident that they will be able to earn higher returns compared to the CPF interest rate (see Figures 68 and 69).

Figure 68: Have you participated in the CPF Investment Schemes?



Figure 69: How confident are you in your ability to earn a higher return than the CPF interest rate?



4.4.3 Respondents aged 36-65 years old and those with higher education and wealth were likelier to have participated in CPFIS; older, less-educated, and less-affluent respondents were less likely to be confident in their ability to earn a higher return

Meanwhile, the highest take-up rates across the age groups come from those aged between 51 and 65 years old. This is not surprising given that this group is closer to retirement; hence likely to possess more motivation to grow their savings. Furthermore, CPF stipulates that users of the CPFIS are required to keep a minimum amount in their accounts. Give the number of years individuals aged between 51 and 65 years have worked and the likelihood that they have completed home purchases with their CPF savings much earlier, they are most likely to have excess savings to invest (see Table 101).

Table 101: Participation in CPFIS, by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 1,974***	**Have you ever participated in the CPF Investment Schemes?**	
	Yes	**No**
21-35	14.4	85.6
36-50	37.9	62.1
51-65	39.1	60.9
Above 65	17.2	82.8

The use of the CPFIS also increased across income levels, education levels, and housing types. Individuals who had higher education, earned higher salaries, and lived in larger housing types were more likely to have participated in the scheme. It is likely that these trends are attributable to the higher possibility that the individuals described above have a higher amount of savings in their CPF accounts, and therefore are able to make use of the scheme (see Tables 102 to 104).

Table 102: Participation in CPFIS, by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,971***	**Have you ever participated in the CPF Investment Schemes?**	
	Yes	**No**
Below secondary	12.2	87.8
Secondary / ITE	25.8	74.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	29.2	70.8
Bachelor's and above	39.2	60.8

Table 103: Participation in CPFIS, by income

Income *N = 1,208*	**Have you ever participated in the CPF Investment Schemes?**	
	Yes	**No**
Below $1,500	16.8	83.2
$1,500 - $2,999	24.6	75.4
$3,000 - $4,999	36.4	63.6
$5,000 - $6,999	42.0	58.0
Above $6,999	50.9	49.1

Table 104: Participation in CPFIS, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,974*	**Have you ever participated in the CPF Investment Schemes?**	
	Yes	**No**
1- to 3-room HDB	20.7	79.3
4-room HDB	28.8	71.2
5-room HDB	28.7	71.3
Private apartment/ Landed property	40.8	59.2

When respondents were asked how confident they were in their ability to earn higher returns than the CPF interest rates, we find that the oldest age group were the least confident about their investment abilities, as 59.3 per cent said that they were not at all confident. In contrast, the other age groups were more likely to either say they were "somewhat confident" or "a little confident" (see Table 105).

Table 105: Confidence in earning higher returns vis-à-vis CPF, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,928*	**How confident are you in your ability to earn a return higher than the CPF interest rate (currently 2.5% for OA, and 5% for SA) using your own investment strategy on your CPF savings?**				
	Extremely confident	**Quite confident**	**Somewhat confident**	**A little confident**	**Not at all confident**
21-35	2.2	14.9	33.3	27.9	21.6
36-50	3.8	17.6	29.8	24.7	24.1
51-65	3.2	11.5	26.7	22.3	36.4
Above 65	2.6	6.9	11.5	19.7	59.3

Respondents who were highly educated, earned high salaries, and living in private properties were the most confident about their own investment abilities. It is likely that these differences are related to how savvy individuals are about investment in general. In addition, more educated and affluent individuals may have greater interest and access to resources to learn about how to generate higher returns with their money (see Tables 106 to 108).

Table 106: Confidence in earning higher returns vis-à-vis CPF, by education level

Education Level *N = 1,925*	**How confident are you in your ability to earn a return higher than the CPF interest rate (currently 2.5% for OA, and 5% for SA) using your own investment strategy on your CPF savings?**				
	Extremely confident	**Quite confident**	**Somewhat confident**	**A little confident**	**Not at all confident**
Below secondary	0.9	2.3	7.9	17.8	71.1
Secondary / ITE	2.7	10.2	24.1	27.6	35.4
Dip. / Prof. qual.	2.8	17.4	35.5	24.3	19.9
Bachelor's and above	4.5	19.8	34.5	24.4	16.8

Table 107: Confidence in earning higher returns vis-à-vis CPF, by income

Income *N = 1,200*	**How confident are you in your ability to earn a return higher than the CPF interest rate (currently 2.5% for OA, and 5% for SA) using your own investment strategy on your CPF savings?**				
	Extremely confident	**Quite confident**	**Somewhat confident**	**A little confident**	**Not at all confident**
Below $1,500	2.8	6.1	17.8	25.8	47.4
$1,500 - $2,999	2.0	9.6	29.8	24.2	34.4
$3,000 - $4,999	3.0	19.4	35.5	23.0	19.1
$5,000 - $6,999	0.6	21.0	36.4	28.4	13.6
Above $6,999	8.9	25.5	35.0	21.0	9.6

Table 108: Confidence in earning higher returns vis-à-vis CPF, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,928*	How confident are you in your ability to earn a return higher than the CPF interest rate (currently 2.5% for OA, and 5% for SA) using your own investment strategy on your CPF savings?				
	Extremely confident	Quite confident	Somewhat confident	A little confident	Not at all confident
1- to 3-room HDB	3.2	8.4	17.7	23.5	47.1
4-room HDB	2.5	14.7	26.3	24.5	32.0
5-room HDB	2.8	14.9	32.1	23.8	26.4
Private apartment/ Landed property	3.8	17.8	38.2	24.8	15.3

4.4.4 Over half of respondents were not confident in generating higher rates of return compared to bank interest rates

When asked about their confidence in generating higher returns compared to bank interest rates, over half of the respondents said that they were not very confident. In fact, only 19.6 per cent said they were at least quite confident. This suggests that there might not be a lot of individuals willing to take their savings out of the bank to conduct their own investments, which may also explain the low take-up rates for financial advice from professional sources (see Figure 70).

Figure 70: Confidence in returning higher return rate than bank's interest rate



4.4.5 Older, less-educated, and less affluent respondents were less likely to express confidence in generating higher returns compared to bank interest rates

Younger individuals were slightly more confident about generating higher returns compared to bank interest rates. However, they were also more likely to choose “somewhat confident”, with the proportions of those selecting “extremely confident” under 10 per cent and “quite confident” below 20 per cent. It is likely that the younger individuals could be savvier about the different investment products or methods, and therefore have slightly more confidence than the older age groups in conducting their own investments (see Table 109).

Table 109: Confidence in earning higher returns vis-à-vis bank rates, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,953*	**How confident are you in your ability to earn a return higher than the bank’s interest rate by investing on your own with your personal savings?**				
	Extremely confident	**Quite confident**	**Somewhat confident**	**A little confident**	**Not at all confident**
21-35	5.3	17.6	32.9	23.2	21.0
36-50	6.1	15.7	32.5	23.3	22.2
51-65	4.2	14.3	23.1	21.8	36.5
Above 65	1.6	7.1	16.7	17.4	57.2

Individuals with lower education levels were more likely to say they were not at all confident in generating higher returns for their savings compared to the banks. In contrast, those with diploma qualifications and above were more likely to say they were at least somewhat confident. Similar patterns were observed for housing and income. Respondents earning above $6,999 were the most confident in their abilities to make their money work more for them, with 44 per cent being either extremely or quite confident. In addition, compared to 67.3 per cent of those living in 1- to 3-room flats saying they were a little or not at all confident, only 34 per cent of those living in private properties gave similar responses (see Tables 110 to 112).

Table 110: Confidence in earning higher returns vis-à-vis bank rates, by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,950***	**How confident are you in your ability to earn a return higher than the bank's interest rate by investing on your own with your personal savings?**				
	Extremely confident	**Quite confident**	**Somewhat confident**	**A little confident**	**Not at all confident**
Below secondary	0.9	2.6	6.3	18.8	71.5
Secondary / ITE	2.9	9.1	26.0	27.3	34.6
Dip. / Prof. qual.	5.3	17.8	35.0	21.3	20.6
Bachelor's and above	7.8	23.3	35.5	19.5	13.9

Table 111: Confidence in earning higher returns vis-à-vis bank rates, by income

Income ***N = 1,208***	**How confident are you in your ability to earn a return higher than the bank's interest rate by investing on your own with your personal savings?**				
	Extremely confident	**Quite confident**	**Somewhat confident**	**A little confident**	**Not at all confident**
Below $1,500	5.6	7.0	16.4	23.4	47.7
$1,500 - $2,999	3.0	7.9	29.7	23.4	36.0
$3,000 - $4,999	5.2	20.7	33.4	21.2	19.6
$5,000 - $6,999	1.8	22.0	38.4	25.0	12.8
Above $6,999	12.6	31.4	34.6	15.1	6.3

Table 112: Confidence in earning higher returns vis-à-vis bank rates, by housing type

Housing Type ***N = 1,953***	**How confident are you in your ability to earn a return higher than the bank's interest rate by investing on your own with your personal savings?**				
	Extremely confident	**Quite confident**	**Somewhat confident**	**A little confident**	**Not at all confident**
1- to 3-room HDB	4.1	6.9	21.7	20.5	46.8
4-room HDB	3.2	14.4	28.3	22.3	31.8
5-room HDB	5.1	17.5	28.7	24.8	23.8
Private apartment/ Landed property	8.0	23.9	34.3	19.9	14.1

4.5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

4.5.1 Over seven in 10 respondents identified themselves as belonging to the working class and the lower middle class; over three-quarters perceived their households to belong in the mid-range income group

The next questions asked individuals to rate themselves on where they belonged in terms of social class and income levels. As these questions involved self-perceptions, it may not capture where respondents stand objectively compared to other Singaporeans. However, it provides an idea of how people perceive their own financial situations.

Respondents were asked to place themselves in a social class and an income group. As the question on income group asked for responses along a scale of 1 to 10, the responses were recoded into three main categories – values of 1 to 3 indicates low income, 4 to 7 indicates mid-range income, and 8 to 10 indicates high income. The most popular categories for the social class question were lower middle class and working class, while 75.9 per cent said they earned mid-range income. The results for these two questions reveal that most place themselves in the middle of the societal strata when it comes to income and class (see Figures 71 and 72).

Figure 71: Would you describe yourself as belonging to the...



Figure 72: What group does your household belong to?



4.5.2 Proportions perceiving themselves as belonging to the middle class in Singapore were comparable to other Asian polities like Malaysia, Japan, China, and Hong Kong; these proportions increased from 2002 to 2012, though declined in 2020

Singapore had similar proportions of respondents who indicated that they were part of the middle class when compared with Malaysia, Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia, and the US. Thailand and South Korea were the only polities where a majority of its respondents indicated that they were part of the middle class (see Figures 73 and 74).

Figure 73: Perceptions of social class, by polity



Figure 74: Perceptions of social class, across WVS waves



4.5.3 Higher-educated and more affluent respondents were more likely to identify as belonging to the middle class

Nearly half of the respondents (47.8 per cent) who had below secondary school education selected “working class”, the highest proportion amongst all the education level groups. The group with secondary school or ITE qualifications was a close second, with 46.5 per cent selecting working class. In comparison, the most popular choice for those with diploma or professional qualifications was lower middle class.

Meanwhile, nearly equal proportions – more than 36 per cent – of respondents with university degrees identified themselves as upper-middle-class or lower-middle class. Similar patterns were observed when divided across housing types – 44.7 per cent of those living in private properties selected upper middle class, 37.6 per cent of those in 5-room flats selected lower middle class, while over 40 per cent of the other two groups chose working class (see Tables 113 and 114).

Table 113: Perceptions of social class, by education level

Education Level *N = 1,957*	**People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:**				
	Upper class	**Upper middle class**	**Lower middle class**	**Working class**	**Lower class**
Below secondary	0.5	4.7	24.5	47.8	22.5
Secondary / ITE	0.7	13.4	33.6	46.5	5.8
Dip. / Prof. qual.	0.5	17.0	44.2	34.0	4.3
Bachelor’s and above	0.3	36.7	38.4	22.9	1.7

Table 114: Perceptions of social class, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,960*	**People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:**				
	Upper class	**Upper middle class**	**Lower middle class**	**Working class**	**Lower class**
1- to 3-room HDB	0.7	8.1	31.7	44.0	15.4
4-room HDB	0.5	14.9	39.1	40.2	5.3
5-room HDB	0.2	25.8	37.6	32.9	3.5
Private apartment/ Landed property	0.6	44.7	33.4	20.0	1.3

The differences were clearer when divided across income lines. Over half of those who earned above $6,999 said they were part of the upper-middle class. Over 40 per cent of the two groups with the next highest income levels chose lower middle class, while over half of the two lowest income groups selected working class (see Table 115).

Table 115: Perceptions of social class, by income

Income *N = 1,214*	**People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:**				
	Upper class	**Upper middle class**	**Lower middle class**	**Working class**	**Lower class**
Below $1,500	0.9	10.3	22.9	53.7	12.1
$1,500 - $2,999	0.3	6.5	34.0	52.1	7.1
$3,000 - $4,999	0	17.0	46.2	35.7	1.1
$5,000 - $6,999	0	32.3	43.9	22.6	1.2
Above $6,999	1.9	57.3	26.8	14.0	0

4.5.4 Compared with selected polities, Singapore respondents were among the least likely to identify as part of the low-income group

Comparing across selected polities, Singaporeans were one of the least likely to indicate that they were part of the low-income group together with South Koreans and Swedish. Meanwhile, respondents from the UK were most likely to indicate that they were part of the high-income group (see Figure 75).

Figure 75: Perceptions of income, by polity



4.5.5 Higher-educated and more affluent respondents were likelier to identify with the higher half of the income spectrum

Individuals with higher education and bigger housing were more likely to state that they were part of the higher half, with 9.1 per cent of those with university degrees and 12.5 per cent of those living in private properties expressing so. The correlation is stronger when directly comparing against income levels, as 23.4 per cent of those in the highest income tier expressed that they were part of the higher half of the income spectrum (see Tables 116 to 118).

Table 116: Perceptions of income, by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,953***	**We would like to know what income group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.**		
	Low income	**Mid-range income**	**High income**
Below secondary	42.8	55.2	1.9
Secondary / ITE	20.5	76.6	2.9
Dip. / Prof. qual.	16.3	81.6	2.0
Bachelor's and above	7.9	83.0	9.1

Table 117: Perceptions of income, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,956*	**We would like to know what income group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.**		
	Low income	**Mid-range income**	**High income**
1- to 3-room HDB	33.7	64.0	2.3
4-room HDB	18.0	78.7	3.3
5-room HDB	13.2	83.0	3.8
Private apartment/ Landed property	6.0	81.5	12.5

Table 118: Perceptions of income, by income

Income *N = 1,218*	**We would like to know what income group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.**		
	Low income	**Mid-range income**	**High income**
Below $1,500	38.1	59.1	2.8
$1,500 - $2,999	22.5	75.9	1.6
$3,000 - $4,999	9.5	88.4	2.2
$5,000 - $6,999	4.9	90.9	4.3
Above $6,999	1.9	74.7	23.4

Chapter 5

Trust, Information, and Civil Society

CHAPTER 5 | TRUST, INFORMATION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The concept of social capital was birthed at the close of the 20th century as an endeavour to develop a broad-based coherent theory of social relations, and was coined in differentiation with physical and human capital (see Coleman,1988; 1994 for base references). Essentially, much like how pecuniary holdings and individual ability are currencies that are seen to be valuable, the notion of social capital ascribes value to trust and social networks. Putnam sets forth a clear definition in this regard: it means “features of social life — networks, norms, and trust — which enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared interests” (1995, p.664–65). One key conduit to increasing one’s social capital is the embedment in extensive networks of voluntary associations (Inglehart, 1997), such as with a religious institution, a professional organisation, an interest group, and more.

Studies on social capital in Singapore are often situated to address precise hypotheses interrogating the correlation between social capital and identity markers such as language (Vaish et al., 2010), gender and ethnicity (Chua et al., 2016), political participation (Tan & Tan, 2003), and age (Lane et al., 2019), amidst others. However, when attempting to understand social capital in Singapore in relation to associational membership, much less is available save for limited-scope, in-depth studies (see Lee & Low, 2009 for one on Chinese clan associations; Tan, 2008 for one on religion). Against the backdrop of extensive data and research available for other polities (e.g., Billiet & Cambre, 2008; Strømsnes, 2008), a broader-scale examination of how various associational memberships contribute to the advancement of social capital in the local context will benefit future research. A starting point is to ascertain levels of participation across various types of organisations and compare these across organisations and demographics.

Some additional focus on religion is also of value when attempting to make sense of the machinations social capital brings about in Singapore. Practically all of the world’s major religions are represented among our resident population of four million (Department of Statistics, 2019); of which 43 per cent identify as Buddhist, Taoist, or practise some form of syncretic Chinese folk religion, 19 per cent identify as Christian or Catholic, 14 per cent identify as Muslim, and 5 per cent identify as Hindu (Department of Statistics, 2016). In keeping with the highly pluralistic social fabric, there is also substantial variety vis-à-vis the denominations of the major religions in Singapore. It should hence be no surprise that Singapore is considered to be the most religiously diverse country in the world (Pew Research Center, 2014).

Against this backdrop, the below analyses are presented with an eye on how taking part in different types of activities and groups helps to increase the amount of social capital that people have, which in turn brings people together outside of family and work. The survey asked a series of questions about different organisations that people belonged to, as well as how active they were in these organisations. A separate carve-out of religious practices was also examined to shed light on the trends across the multifarious religious make-up of the population.

5.1 SOCIAL CAPITAL

5.1.1 Over one-third of respondents believed that most people can be trusted; the only group where the majority could trust completely was their family

The next set of questions directly asked about individuals' trust levels. The first question examined general trust levels, while the next six questions asked respondents to indicate their trust in specific groups of people. Outside close personal and family relationships, trust levels did not appear to be high. Two-thirds of the population felt they had to be very careful when dealing with people, as opposed to feeling most people could be trusted (see Figure 76).

Figure 76: Trust in people ("Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?")



These findings are corroborated over several questions. The only group where the majority said they trusted completely was their family. Over two-thirds somewhat trusted people with whom they interacted more frequently, such as friends and neighbours. However, most people did not trust people they met for the first time very much. When it comes to people of different cultural backgrounds, such as those of other religions or nationalities, the prevailing sentiment was also to be warier.

Overall, younger respondents, particularly those aged between 21 and 35, were the most trusting of the different groups mentioned in the questions. In addition, respondents from better socioeconomic backgrounds — higher education, higher income, or living in larger housing types — had higher levels of trust. This corroborates with studies that found that higher levels of education give rise to higher levels of social trust as education provides increased information about different cultures, decreasing misunderstandings regarding people from different backgrounds (Cetin et al., 2019).

It is also likely that those from higher socioeconomic backgrounds have had more positive interactions with others and, as shown from the section on personal well-being, higher quality of life. As these positive experiences can make individuals more trusting, it is not surprising to see higher trust levels amongst these groups (see Figure 77).

Figure 77: Trust for different groups



5.1.2 Levels of trust in people in Singapore were comparable to most other Asian polities; respondents in 2012 and 2020 were more trusting than those in 2002

With respect to generalised trust, only 34.6 per cent said that most people could be trusted. This proportion is similar to polities such as Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the US, where around 30 per cent of its respondents indicated that most people could be trusted. Malaysia had the lowest proportion of respondents who indicated that most people could be trusted. In contrast, China had the highest proportion of respondents who indicated the same (see Figure 78).

Figure 78: Most people can be trusted, by polity



Respondents in 2002 were the least trusting, with only 13.9 per cent indicating that most people can be trusted. In contrast, respondents in 2012 and 2020 were more trusting, with 37.5 per cent and 34.6 per cent respectively indicating that most people can be trusted (see Figure 79).

Figure 79: Most people can be trusted, across WVS waves



5.1.3 Younger, higher-educated, and more affluent respondents were more likely to indicate trust in other people

For the three younger age groups, similar proportions (over 32 per cent) said that most people could be trusted. In comparison, the group aged above 65 years old was less trusting, with just 25.5 per cent giving the same answer (see Table 119).

Table 119: Trust in people, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,998*	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	
	Most people can be trusted	Need to be very careful
21-35	35.5	64.5
36-50	38.8	61.2
51-65	32.7	67.3
Above 65	25.5	74.5

Positive correlations were found between levels of generalised trust and socioeconomic factors like education, income and housing type. For education levels, there was a substantial difference in trust levels between the less-educated (secondary and below secondary education) and more educated (diploma and degrees). While 26.5 per cent of those with secondary school or ITE qualifications said most people could be trusted, this proportion increased to 40.3 per cent for those with diploma or professional qualifications. A more gradual increase was found for housing type, where the proportion reporting trust rose from 25.6 per cent for those in 1- to 3-room housing to 43 per cent for those living in private properties. The starkest increase was found for income levels; compared with 18.9 per cent of those who earned below $1,500, over half (53.8 per cent) of those who earned above $6,999 said that most people could be trusted (see Tables 120 to 122).

Table 120: Trust in people, by education level

Education Level *N = 1,994*	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	
	Most people can be trusted	Need to be very careful
Below secondary	23.0	77.0
Secondary / ITE	26.5	73.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	40.3	59.7
Bachelor's and above	42.9	57.1

Table 121: Trust in people, by income

Income *N = 1,217*	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	
	Most people can be trusted	Need to be very careful
Below $1,500	18.9	81.1
$1,500 - $2,999	36.7	63.3
$3,000 - $4,999	40.1	59.9
$5,000 - $6,999	41.8	58.2
Above $6,999	53.8	46.2

Table 122: Trust in people, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,998*	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	
	Most people can be trusted	Need to be very careful
1- to 3-room HDB	25.6	74.4
4-room HDB	32.8	67.2
5-room HDB	40.4	59.6
Private apartment/ Landed property	43.0	57.0

5.1.4 Levels of trust in the family in Singapore were similar to all polities of comparison except the US; males, higher-income respondents, and Catholics, Hindus, and Muslims were more likely to trust their families completely

Family was by far the most trusted group for respondents, with 78.2 per cent saying they trusted their family completely, and another 19.9 per cent saying that they trusted their family somewhat. Such high levels of complete trust in the family amongst Singaporean respondents were similar to all polities of comparison, with the exception of the US, which had less than 60 per cent of its respondents indicating that they trust their family completely (see Figure 80).

Figure 80: Trust for different groups (your family), by polity



Trust for family decreased slightly when compared to 2012. While 82.8 per cent of 2012 respondents said that they trust their family completely, 78.2 per cent of respondents in 2020 said the same (see Figure 81).

Figure 81: Trust for different groups (your family), by across waves



A slightly larger proportion of males (80.3 per cent) than females (75.3 per cent) said that they trusted their family completely. Meanwhile, a larger proportion of female respondents (22.5 per cent) compared with male respondents (17.9 per cent) said that they trusted their family somewhat (see Table 123).

Table 123: Trust for different groups (your family), by gender

Gender *N = 2,008*	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? Your family**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
Male	80.3	17.9	1.6	0.1
Female	75.3	22.5	1.9	0.3

Individuals who earned higher income were slightly more likely to choose "trust completely". While 71.2 per cent of those who earned below $1,500 chose this answer, 84.9 per cent of those who earned above $6,999 did the same (see Table 124).

Table 124: Trust for different groups (your family), by income

Income *N = 1,222*	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? Your family**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
Below $1,500	71.2	24.2	4.7	0
$1,500 - $2,999	76.5	22.5	1.0	0
$3,000 - $4,999	81.7	16.9	1.1	0.3
$5,000 - $6,999	80.0	20.0	0	0
Above $6,999	84.9	15.1	0	0

Over 80 per cent of Roman Catholic, Hindu, and Muslim respondents said that they trusted their family completely. Fewer Protestant Christians indicated such complete trust in family, with 73.8 per cent selecting this option (see Table 125).

Table 125: Trust for different groups (your family), by religion

Religion *N = 2,008*	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? Your family**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
No religion	75.2	22.9	1.9	0
Catholicism	84.9	14.3	0.8	0
Christianity	73.8	24.2	1.7	0.3
Taoism / TCB	76.4	22.3	1.4	0
Islam	80.3	17.9	1.8	0
Hinduism	83.8	13.5	2.7	0
Buddhism	78.4	19.1	1.9	0.6

5.1.5 Singapore respondents were among the least likely to trust their neighbourhood completely; naturalised citizens/PRs, higher-income respondents and those living in 4- and 5-room flats were more likely to trust their neighbourhood

Trust for one's neighbourhood did not appear to be very high as a majority (69.6 per cent) chose the "trust somewhat" option. In comparison, only 8.3 per cent said that they trusted their neighbourhood completely. Singapore appears to be similar to Malaysia, Japan, and Hong Kong, all of which report rather low levels of complete trust (less than 10 per cent) in their neighbourhood. In contrast, Thailand, South Korea, China, and the UK exhibited slightly higher levels of complete trust in their neighbourhood, with more than 15 per cent of their respondents indicating as such (see Figure 82).

Figure 82: Trust for different groups (your neighbourhood), by polity



Compared to 2012, a lower proportion of respondents in 2020 indicated that they trust their neighbourhood completely. The overall proportion of respondents who had at least some trust in their neighbourhoods, however, remained at around 78 per cent in both survey waves (see Figure 83).

Figure 83: Trust for different groups (your neighbourhood), across WVS waves



When the response proportions for "trust completely" and "trust somewhat" are taken together, those aged between 36 and 50 were the most trusting of their neighbourhood compared with the rest of the age groups. When looking only at the proportions that answered "trust completely", however, this group had the lowest response proportions. Taking the overall proportions into account, it appears that the oldest and youngest age groups were similarly not as trusting of their neighbours compared with the other two groups (see Table 126).

Table 126: Trust for different groups (your neighbourhood), by income

Age Cohort ***N = 2,006***	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? Your neighbourhood**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
21-35	8.9	65.6	23.6	2.0
36-50	7.4	74.3	16.5	1.8
51-65	9.0	69.6	20.0	1.4
Above 65	8.1	65.5	24.3	2.1

Naturalised citizens and PRs were more trusting of their neighbourhood compared with the born citizens. While 13.2 per cent said they trusted completely, only 7.2 per cent of the born citizens did the same. Meanwhile, 22.3 per cent of born citizens, compared with 14 per cent of naturalised citizens and PRs, said they did not trust their neighbourhood very much. One possible reason for this disparity may be that born citizens have their own family and friends living in Singapore to turn to in times of need, while many of the naturalised citizens and PRs may not have as extensive networks in the same country. Hence, they may be more active within their neighbourhoods. Since more positive interactions can increase trust, this likely happened for the naturalised citizens and PRs (see Table 127).

Table 127: Trust for different groups (your neighbourhood), by citizenship status

Citizenship Status ***N = 2,006***	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? Your neighbourhood**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
Born citizen	7.2	68.5	22.3	2.0
Naturalised citizen/PR	13.2	71.8	14.0	1.0

In general, that individuals earning $3,000 and above were more trusting compared with those earning less. The proportions answering “do not trust very much” and “do not trust at all” for the three higher income groups ranged between 16 to 18 per cent. In comparison, around 23.6 per cent of those earning below $1,500 and 25.1 per cent of those earning between $1,500 and $2,999 chose either “do not trust very much” or “do not trust at all” (see Table 128).

Table 128: Trust for different groups (your neighbourhood), by income

Income ***N = 1,221***	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? Your neighbourhood**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
Below $1,500	7.4	69.0	22.2	1.4
$1,500 - $2,999	8.7	66.2	21.9	3.2
$3,000 - $4,999	10.3	71.9	16.8	1.1
$5,000 - $6,999	7.9	75.8	15.8	0.6
Above $6,999	10.7	71.1	17.0	1.3

The groups that lived in 4- and 5-room flats were more trusting than the other two groups. Around 80 per cent of these two groups said they either trusted their neighbourhood completely or somewhat. In comparison, 73 per cent of those living in 1- to 3-room flats and 75.2 per cent of those who stayed in private properties gave the same answers (see Table 129).

Table 129: Trust for different groups (your neighbourhood), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,006*	I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? Your neighbourhood			
	Trust completely	Trust somewhat	Do not trust very much	Do not trust at all
1- to 3-room HDB	8.4	64.6	23.9	3.0
4-room HDB	9.1	70.8	19.0	1.1
5-room HDB	7.9	74.1	17.6	0.5
Private apartment/ Landed property	7.5	67.7	22.2	2.7

5.1.6 Respondents from Singapore and other Asian polities exhibited low levels of complete trust in people they know personally; younger respondents and those with higher SES were likelier to trust such people

Respondents trusted people they knew personally more than their neighbourhood. However, the majority still chose the less absolute option of "trust somewhat". Overall, 21.5 per cent said that they trusted people they knew personally completely, while 68.7 per cent said they trusted this group somewhat. Respondents from Singapore and other Asian polities like Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan exhibit rather low levels of complete trust in people they know personally, with under a quarter of its respondents indicating as such. In contrast, non-Asian polities like Australia, the US, and the UK had more than 30 per cent of its respondents indicating complete trust in people they know personally (see Figure 84).

Figure 84: Trust in different groups (people you know personally), by polity



While 30.7 per cent of respondents in 2012 said that they completely trust people they know personally, this proportion dropped to 21.5 per cent in 2020. However, for both survey waves, only around 10 per cent of respondents indicated that they do not trust people they know personally (see Figure 85).

Figure 85: Trust in different groups (people you know personally), across WVS waves



Younger respondents seem to be more trusting. In particular, the youngest group were far more likely to say they trust people they knew personally completely compared with the other groups, with 31.2 per cent of them giving this answer. Meanwhile, less than 20 per cent of each of the other age groups answered in the same way. The oldest group had the smallest proportion of those who indicated that they trusted people they knew personally, completely. This group also had the highest proportion (14.7 per cent) indicating they did not trust people they knew personally at all (see Table 130).

Table 130: Trust in different groups (people you know personally), by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 2,007***	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People you know personally**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
21-35	31.2	63.6	5.3	0
36-50	19.3	72.2	8.0	0.5
51-65	18.0	69.3	11.3	1.4
Above 65	14.7	70.6	14.4	0.3

Larger proportions of respondents who earned higher income, who had higher education, or who lived in larger housing types indicated they either trusted people they knew personally completely or somewhat (see Tables 131 to 133).

Table 131: Trust in different groups (people you know personally), by education level

Education Level ***N = 2,003***	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People you know personally**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
Below secondary school	13.7	66.8	18.1	1.3
Secondary school/ITE	19.0	69.2	11.2	0.5
Diploma/Professional qualifications	23.9	70.9	5.0	0.2
Bachelor's and above	26.3	68.0	5.2	0.4

Table 132: Trust in different groups (people you know personally), by income

Income *N = 1,223*	I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People you know personally			
	Trust completely	Trust somewhat	Do not trust very much	Do not trust at all
Below $1,500	17.1	67.1	14.8	0.9
$1,500 - $2,999	19.6	70.1	10.0	0.3
$3,000 - $4,999	25.3	68.5	5.9	0.3
$5,000 - $6,999	26.1	71.5	2.4	0
Above $6,999	27.7	66.7	5.0	0.6

Table 133: Trust in different groups (people you know personally), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,007*	I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People you know personally			
	Trust completely	Trust somewhat	Do not trust very much	Do not trust at all
1- to 3-room HDB	16.2	68.2	14.2	1.4
4-room HDB	22.7	67.6	9.6	0.2
5-room HDB	21.1	72.2	6.3	0.5
Private apartment/ Landed property	28.6	67.6	3.6	0.3

5.1.7 Over seven in 10 respondents in Singapore and other Asian polities did not trust strangers; younger and higher-educated respondents were more likely to trust people they meet for the first time

Respondents do not appear very trusting of strangers, with 62.2 per cent saying that they did not trust people they met for the first time very much; 19.7 per cent said that they did not trust them at all, the highest proportion for this category across all the groups that respondents were asked about. Asian polities, including Singapore, had at least 70 per cent of its respondents indicating that they did not trust very much or do not trust strangers at all. In contrast, respondents in non-Asian polities were split rather evenly, with just less than a majority indicating that they did not trust strangers very much or at all (see Figure 86).

Figure 86: Trust in different groups (people you meet for the first time), by polity



Respondents in 2020 were much less trusting of strangers compared to those in 2012. While 32.2 per cent of those in 2012 said that they trust strangers to some extent, only 18 per cent of those responding in 2020 gave similar answers (see Figure 87).

Figure 87: Trust in different groups (people you meet for the first time), across WVS waves



Compared with the older respondents, respondents from the youngest age group were more trusting of people they met for the first time. A larger proportion of those aged between 21 and 35 (21.2 per cent) said they trusted these people somewhat when compared with the rest of the age groups, where less than 20 per cent chose this option. Furthermore, over 80 per cent of the other three age groups either did not trust people they met for the first time very much, or at all (see Table 134).

Table 134: Trust in different groups (people you meet for the first time), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,004*	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People you meet for the first time**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
21-35	0.5	21.2	62.1	16.2
36-50	0.9	17.6	60.9	20.6
51-65	0.4	15.6	63.4	20.6
Above 65	0.9	12.3	63.6	23.2

Respondents who had diploma qualifications or above seem to be slightly more trusting compared with those with lower education qualifications. Among them, 19.6 per cent of those with diploma or professional qualifications, as well as 21.5 per cent of those with university degrees, said they either trusted people they met for the first time completely or somewhat. In comparison, only 14.8 per cent of those with below secondary education and 14.2 per cent of those with secondary school or ITE qualifications said the same (see Table 135).

Table 135: Trust in different groups (people you meet for the first time), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,001*	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People you meet for the first time**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
Below secondary	0.5	14.3	60.9	24.3
Secondary / ITE	0.9	13.3	63.3	22.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	0.7	18.9	61.9	18.4
Bachelor's and above	0.5	21.0	62.6	16.0

5.1.8 Singapore respondents were split about trusting people of a different religion; Christians, Muslims, and Hindus were likelier to be more trusting of other religions

Meanwhile, respondents seem more split about trusting people of a different religion. While 48 per cent said they trusted these people somewhat, 44.9 per cent said they did not trust them very much. This split amongst Singaporean respondents was similarly found for Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Meanwhile, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, and China were the top four polities in which at least 60 per cent of respondents indicated they did not trust people of another religion very much or at all. In contrast, the non-Asian polities had less than 30 per cent of its respondents who indicated in the same way (see Figure 88).

Figure 88: Trust in different groups (people of another religion), by polity



Respondents in 2020 were also less trusting of people with other religions. 50.2 per cent indicated that they trust these people to some extent. In contrast, 58.9 per cent of respondents in 2012 gave similar answers (see Figure 89).

Figure 89: Trust in different groups (people of another religion), across WVS waves



Christians, Muslims, and Hindus appear to be the most trusting of other religions, given that they were the only groups with over 50 per cent selecting the "trust somewhat" or "trust completely" options. In contrast, Buddhists were more sceptical, where 52 per cent said that they did not trust people of another religion very much (see Table 136).

Table 136: Trust in different groups (people of another religion), by religion

Religion *N = 1,954*	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People of another religion**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
No religion	1.8	48.0	45.6	4.6
Catholicism	3.3	47.5	46.7	2.5
Christianity	1.5	57.4	36.3	4.8
Taoism / TCB	0.7	44.9	48.3	6.1
Islam	4.8	50.4	40.8	4.0
Hinduism	6.6	54.7	34.9	3.8
Buddhism	1.2	40.6	52.0	6.3

In general, the youngest group of respondents across all religious affiliations were more trusting of people of other religions (see Table 137).

Table 137: Trust in different groups (people of another religion), by religion and age cohort

Religion and Age Cohort *N = 1,954*		I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People of another religion			
		Trust completely	Trust somewhat	Do not trust very much	Do not trust at all
No religion	21-35	2.7	64.9	29.1	3.4
	36-50	1.5	40.7	51.1	6.7
	51-65	0	41.2	54.4	4.4
	Above 65	3.4	35.6	57.6	3.4
Catholicism	21-35	3.2	61.3	35.5	0
	36-50	5.6	30.6	61.1	2.8
	51-65	3.1	56.3	37.5	3.1
	Above 65	0	43.5	52.2	4.3
Christianity	21-35	1.1	67.0	30.7	1.1
	36-50	1.3	60.0	32.5	6.3
	51-65	0.9	56.5	38.0	4.6
	Above 65	3.5	40.4	47.4	8.8
Taoism / TCB	21-35	0	54.2	41.7	4.2
	36-50	2.2	5.5	39.5	4.7
	51-65	0	36.6	56.1	7.3
	Above 65	0	38.5	53.8	7.7
Islam	21-35	6.6	55.7	33.0	4.7
	36-50	6.8	47.5	42.4	3.4
	51-65	2.7	50.0	43.2	4.1
	Above 65	0	39.4	57.6	3.0
Hinduism	21-35	6.3	50.0	40.6	3.1
	36-50	10.6	66.0	21.3	2.1
	51-65	0	43.8	50.0	6.3
	Above 65	0	36.4	54.5	9.1
Buddhism	21-35	1.8	51.8	44.5	1.8
	36-50	1.4	41.4	49.7	7.6
	51-65	1.3	33.5	57.4	7.7
	Above 65	0	38.2	54.9	6.9

When comparing only the categories with at least thirty respondents, the general pattern was that those with higher education had more trust for people of other religions. The same pattern was observed when comparing across housing types, with those living in larger housing types having higher levels of trust for people of other religions (see Tables 138 and 139).

Table 138: Trust in different groups (people of another religion), by religion and education level

Religion and Education Level *N = 1,954*		**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People of another religion**			
		Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
No religion	**Below sec.**	1.4	30.0	62.9	5.7
	Secondary / ITE	0.9	44.1	49.5	5.4
	Dip. / Prof. qual.	1.0	55.2	39.6	4.2
	Bachelor's and above	2.8	54.0	39.2	4.0
Catholicism	**Below sec.**	0	50.0	40.0	10.0
	Secondary / ITE	0	48.5	48.5	3.0
	Dip. / Prof. qual.	0	33.0	66.7	0
	Bachelor's and above	6.9	51.7	39.7	1.7
Christianity	**Below sec.**	3.4	31.0	55.2	10.3
	Secondary / ITE	0	50.0	41.7	8.3
	Dip. / Prof. qual.	2.7	59.5	37.8	0
	Bachelor's and above	1.3	64.6	29.7	4.4
Taoism / TCB	**Below sec.**	0	37.5	57.1	5.4
	Secondary / ITE	0	29.4	55.9	14.7
	Dip. / Prof. qual.	0	69.6	0.4	0
	Bachelor's and above	2.9	55.9	38.2	2.9
Islam	**Below sec.**	1.5	44.1	52.9	1.5
	Secondary / ITE	7.3	43.9	44.7	4.1
	Dip. / Prof. qual.	0	68.3	25.0	6.7
	Bachelor's and above	14.3	57.1	23.8	4.8
Hinduism	**Below sec.**	0	38.5	61.5	0
	Secondary / ITE	0	40.9	54.5	4.5
	Dip. / Prof. qual.	10.0	55.0	30.0	5.0
	Bachelor's and above	9.8	64.7	21.6	3.9

Buddhism	**Below sec.**	0.8	33.9	59.3	5.9
	Secondary / ITE	1.9	37.5	51.9	8.8
	Dip. / Prof. qual.	1.0	39.8	53.4	5.8
	Bachelor's and above	0.8	50.8	44.6	3.8

Table 139: Trust in different groups (people of another religion), by religion and housing type

Religion and Housing Type *N = 1,954*		I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People of another religion			
		Trust completely	Trust somewhat	Do not trust very much	Do not trust at all
No religion	1- to 3-room HDB	0.9	47.4	46.6	5.2
	4-room HDB	1.5	42.4	50.8	5.3
	5-room HDB	1.9	49.1	44.	4.7
	Private property	2.9	54.9	39.3	2.9
Catholicism	1- to 3-room HDB	0	40.7	51.9	7.4
	4-room HDB	5.6	44.4	50.0	0
	5-room HDB	2.7	43.2	51.4	2.7
	Private property	4.5	68.2	27.3	0
Christianity	1- to 3-room HDB	3.7	48.8	40.2	7.3
	4-room HDB	2.5	53.2	40.5	3.8
	5-room HDB	0	57.6	35.6	6.8
	Private property	0	66.4	31.0	2.7
Taoism / TCB	1- to 3-room HDB	0	40.0	52.5	7.5
	4-room HDB	0	40.4	52.6	7.0
	5-room HDB	2.7	48.6	43.2	5.4
	Private property	0	69.2	30.8	0
Islam	1- to 3-room HDB	5.6	49.6	42.4	2.4
	4-room HDB	4.1	55.1	36.7	4.1
	5-room HDB	4.3	41.3	47.8	6.5
	Private property	0	66.7	0	33.3
Hinduism	1- to 3-room HDB	7.1	57.1	35.7	0
	4-room HDB	7.9	55.3	28.9	7.9
	5-room HDB	4.5	54.5	40.9	0
	Private property	0	25.0	50.0	25.0
Buddhism	1- to 3-room HDB	1.3	39.1	49.7	9.9
	4-room HDB	1.0	38.3	54.6	6.1
	5-room HDB	0	42.6	53.7	3.7
	Private property	3.5	49.1	45.6	1.8

5.1.9 Levels of trust in people of another nationality were higher in Singapore compared with most other Asian polities; younger, naturalised citizens/PRs, and the higher-educated were likelier to trust such people

Respondents also seem split with regard to how much they trust people of different nationalities. While 41.4 per cent said they trusted people of another nationality somewhat, 49.4 per cent said they did not trust them very much. Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have similar proportions of respondents who indicated that they trusted people of different nationalities somewhat. Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, and China had less than 30 per cent of its respondents who indicated the same. Meanwhile, non-Asian polities like Australia, the US, and the UK had more than 60 per cent of their respondents indicating they trusted people from different nationalities somewhat (see Figure 90).

Figure 90: Trust in different groups (people of another nationality), by polity



While 50.8 per cent of respondents in 2012 said that they trust people of other nationalities completely or somewhat, the proportion dropped to 43 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 91).

Figure 91: Trust in different groups (people of another nationality), across WVS waves



Younger respondents were more trusting compared with older respondents. The difference was most apparent when comparing between the youngest and oldest age groups, where 53.5 per cent of the youngest group said that they trusted people of a different nationality somewhat, but only 29.4 per cent of the oldest group chose the same option (see Table 140).

Table 140: Trust in different groups (people of another nationality), by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 1,962***	**I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People of another nationality**			
	Trust completely	**Trust somewhat**	**Do not trust very much**	**Do not trust at all**
21-35	2.0	53.5	39.9	4.6
36-50	2.8	41.3	46.8	9.2
51-65	0.5	35.2	55.1	9.2
Above 65	1.5	29.4	60.9	8.3

Compared with born citizens, naturalised citizens and PRs were more trusting of individuals of another nationality. Here, 40.9 per cent of born citizens compared with 50 per cent of naturalised citizens and PRs were at least somewhat trusting. There is a possibility that the experience of migrating to Singapore from another nation has made them more open to foreigners (see Table 141).

Table 141: Trust in different groups (people of another nationality), by citizenship status

Citizenship status *N = 1,962*	I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People of another nationality			
	Trust completely	Trust somewhat	Do not trust very much	Do not trust at all
Born citizen	1.2	39.7	50.5	8.6
Naturalised citizen/PR	3.9	46.6	45.6	4.4

Higher educated individuals were much more trusting of people of other nationalities compared to their less-educated peers. While less than 36 per cent of those with secondary education or lower trusted people of another nationality somewhat or completely, at least half of those with a diploma or degree gave similar answers (see Table 142).

Table 142: Trust in different groups (people of another nationality), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,958*	I'd like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? People of another nationality			
	Trust completely	Trust somewhat	Do not trust very much	Do not trust at all
Below secondary	1.1	28.1	59.9	10.9
Secondary / ITE	1.1	34.3	54.4	10.2
Dip. /Prof. qual.	1.3	48.9	43.4	6.5
Bachelor's and above	3.0	49.1	43.3	4.6

5.1.10 Singapore respondents had the greatest aversion towards drug addicts and heavy drinkers, with a large majority indicating they did not want such individuals to be their neighbours

This set of questions asked respondents who they did not want to live near. Respondents were given a list of different groups of individuals and asked to point out the ones they did not want as neighbours. It appears that respondents were the most averse to drug addicts and heavy drinkers. In light of Singapore's commitment to multiculturalism, only about 2 per cent indicated not wanting to live next to people of a different race, language, or religion. This indicates a good level of social acceptance of those who are culturally different.

Overall, respondents with higher education had comparatively lower mention rates for most of the groups on the list, indicating possibly more open attitudes towards people who were different from them (see Figure 92)[3].

Figure 92: I do not want these people as neighbours[3]



Drug addicts were the most unpopular type of neighbour, with 83.6 per cent saying that they did not want to live next to them. Respondents earning above $5,000 were more likely to mention drug addicts as a group they did not want as neighbours (see Table 143).

Table 143: Would not like to have as neighbours (drug addicts), by religion

Income *N = 1,224*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? - Drug addicts**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
Below $1,500	79.7	20.3
$1,500 - $2,999	82.6	17.4
$3,000 - $4,999	82.8	17.2
$5,000 - $6,999	87.9	12.1
Above $6,999	86.2	13.8

[3] Figure 92 includes responses on immigrants and foreign workers which have already been presented in the second instalment of the IPS three-part WVS series. For the analyses, refer to section 3.3.7 of Attitudes towards Institutions, Politics, and Policies, available at https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/ips/ips-exchange-series-17.pdf

Heavy drinkers were the second least popular group, where 70.5 per cent mentioned this group as people they did not want as neighbours. In contrast to 66.1% of male respondents, 75.2% of the female respondents mentioned that they did not want heavy drinkers as neighbours. While over 72 per cent of the three older age groups mentioned heavy drinkers, 64.1 per cent of those aged between 21 and 35 did the same (see Tables 144 and 145).

Table 144: Would not like to have as neighbours (drug addicts), by gender

Gender *N = 2,012*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? - Heavy drinkers**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
Male	66.1	33.9
Female	75.2	24.8

Table 145: Would not like to have as neighbours (heavy drinkers), by religion

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? - Heavy drinkers**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
21-35	64.1	35.9
36-50	72.1	27.9
51-65	75.2	24.8
Above 65	73.6	26.4

5.1.11 While there was strong support for multicultural tenets, certain demographic groups were more averse to AIDS patients, homosexuals, and cohabiting couples as their neighbours

There was general support for multicultural living amongst the respondents. Very few demographic differences were found for the questions asking about living next to people of different religions, races, or languages. Overall, only 2.1 per cent mentioned that they would not like people of a different race as neighbours; 2 per cent did not want people of a different religion as neighbours; and 2 per cent did not want people of a different religion as neighbours. These patterns imply that acceptance of individuals with different practices and cultural heritage are similarly high across different sectors of society.

However, we find that a significant minority – approximately a quarter of respondents – indicated aversion towards AIDS patients or homosexuals as their neighbours. Overall, 26.6 per cent said that they would not like people with AIDS to be their neighbours. Respondents who were female, older in age, less-educated, or interviewed after COVID-19 cases were first reported in Singapore had higher mention rates of this group. Compared with 22.7 per cent of male respondents, 29.8 per cent of the female respondents mentioned people with AIDS as a group they did not want as neighbours (see Table 146).

Table 146: Would not like to have as neighbours (people who have AIDS), by gender

Gender *N = 2,012*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? People who have AIDS**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
Male	22.7	77.3
Female	29.8	70.2

Older respondents were more likely to mention this group as people they would not like to have as neighbours; 38.4 per cent of the respondents above 65 years old mentioned people with AIDS, a proportion that was more than twice as high as the group aged between 21 and 35 (16.8 per cent) (see Table 147).

Table 147: Would not like to have as neighbours (people who have AIDS), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? People who have AIDS**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
21-35	16.8	83.2
36-50	23.9	76.1
51-65	31.7	68.3
Above 65	38.4	61.6

There was a negative correlation between education and the likelihood of mentioning people with AIDS as an excluded group in this question. While 36.7 per cent of respondents who had below secondary school education mentioned this group, 22 per cent of those with university education did the same (see Table 148).

Table 148: Would not like to have as neighbours (people who have AIDS), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,008*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? People who have AIDS**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
Below secondary	36.7	63.3
Secondary / ITE	27.4	72.6
Dip. / Prof. qual.	23.1	76.9
Bachelor's and above	22.0	78.0

When comparing between interview periods, respondents contacted after cases of COVID-19 infection were reported in Singapore were more likely to mention people with AIDS as a group they would not want to be neighbours with. One possibility could be that the pandemic accentuated fears of contracting illnesses, thus resulting in higher reluctance to live near people with infectious diseases (see Table 149).

Table 149: Would not like to have as neighbours (people who have AIDS), by interview date

Interview Date *N = 2,012*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? People who have AIDS**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
Before 23 Jan 2020	22.2	77.8
23 Jan 2020 and after	33.1	66.9

Overall, 25.7 per cent mentioned homosexuals as a group they would not like to live near. Respondents who were older, less educated, less affluent, Hindu, or Muslim were more likely to mention this group.

Compared with older respondents, younger respondents were less likely to mention that they did not want to live near homosexuals. While 11.8 per cent of those aged between 21 and 35 said that they did not want homosexuals as neighbours, 36 per cent of those above 65 years old mentioned this group, a much larger proportion in comparison. The age differences may point to a shifting set of attitudes towards alternative family structures across generations (see Table 150).

Table 150: Would not like to have as neighbours (homosexuals), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Homosexuals**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
21-35	11.8	88.2
36-50	23.1	76.9
51-65	37.4	62.6
Above 65	36.0	64.0

Respondents with below secondary school education were the most likely to mention homosexuals in response to the question about who they did not want as neighbours. While the larger proportion reported from this group might be partly influenced by the older average age of this group, the negative correlation between education and mention rate persists for the other three groups. Compared with 29.9 per cent of those with secondary school or ITE education, only 19.5 per cent of those with Bachelor's or above mentioned homosexuals as a group they did not want to live near (see Table 151).

Table 151: Would not like to have as neighbours (homosexuals), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,008*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Homosexuals**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
Below secondary	38.9	61.1
Secondary / ITE	29.9	70.1
Dip. /Prof. qual.	20.1	79.9
Bachelor's and above	19.5	80.5

When comparing across housing types, there was a clear disparity between those who lived in 1- to 3-room flats and the rest of the sample population, where 31.3 per cent of the first group said that they did not like to have homosexuals as neighbours, compared with around 23 per cent of the other groups (see Table 152).

Table 152: Would not like to have as neighbours (homosexuals), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,012*	On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Homosexuals	
	Mentioned	Not mentioned
1- to 3-room HDB	31.3	68.7
4-room HDB	24.8	75.2
5-room HDB	22.9	77.1
Private apartment/ Landed property	23.7	76.3

Some of the sentiments against having homosexual neighbours came from religious individuals. The lowest proportion of mentions (20.8 per cent) came from respondents who professed to have no religion. In contrast, Hindus and Muslims had the highest mention rates of 33.5 per cent and 35.1 per cent respectively (see Table 153).

Table 153: Would not like to have as neighbours (homosexuals), by religion

Religion *N = 2,012*	On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Homosexuals	
	Mentioned	Not mentioned
No religion	20.8	79.2
Catholicism	22.2	77.8
Christianity	27.1	72.9
Taoism / TCB	25.7	74.3
Islam	33.5	66.5
Hinduism	35.1	64.9
Buddhism	25.7	74.3

In general, 5.7 per cent said they did not want to have unmarried couples living together as their neighbours, indicating a high level of acceptance for this group. Respondents who were older, had lower levels of education, married or used to be married, or believed in Hinduism or Christianity were more likely to mention this group, likely indicating that they had more conservative attitudes towards family.

While very small proportions of the respondents younger than 50 years old mentioned this group, 10.3 per cent of those aged between 51 and 65, as well as 9 per cent of those above 65 years old, did so. There thus seems to be a slightly lower degree of acceptance for such living arrangements amongst the older generations (see Table 154).

Table 154: Would not like to have as neighbours (unmarried couples living together), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Unmarried couples living together**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
21-35	1.1	98.9
36-50	4.4	95.6
51-65	10.3	89.7
Above 65	9.0	91.0

It appears that respondents who were married before were more likely to mention unmarried couples as a group they did not like to have as neighbours. The mention rate by singles (2.8 per cent) was lower than the other two groups (around 7 per cent) (see Table 155).

Table 155: Would not like to have as neighbours (unmarried couples living together), by marital status

Marital Status *N = 2,012*	**On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Unmarried couples living together**	
	Mentioned	**Not mentioned**
Married/ Living as if married	7.1	92.9
Divorced/ Separated/ Widowed	7.9	92.1
Single	2.8	97.2

Less-educated respondents (secondary or lower) were more likely to mention unmarried couples as neighbours they did not want, with around 7 per cent mentioning them. In contrast, only 2.7 per cent of those with diploma or professional qualifications mentioned unmarried couples. Meanwhile, a slightly higher proportion (5.5 per cent) of those with university degrees mentioned this group (see Table 156).

Table 156: Would not like to have as neighbours (unmarried couples living together), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,008*	On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Unmarried couples living together	
	Mentioned	Not mentioned
Below secondary	7.8	92.2
Secondary / ITE	7.4	92.6
Dip. / Prof. qual.	2.7	97.3
Bachelor's and above	5.5	94.5

As unmarried couples living together contradicts the traditional family values espoused by some religious groups, the responses of those from different religious affiliations were analysed. While 1.5 per cent of those with no religion mentioned this group, 12.6 per cent of Hindus and 11.8 per cent of Protestant Christians did so. It is likely that traditional family values were more deeply rooted among these groups, which could have led them to be less comfortable living near unmarried couples (see Table 157).

Table 157: Would not like to have as neighbours (unmarried couples living together), by religion

Religion *N = 2,012*	On this list are various groups of people. Can you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours? Unmarried couples living together	
	Mentioned	Not mentioned
No religion	1.5	98.5
Catholicism	6.3	93.7
Christianity	11.8	88.2
Taoism / TCB	2.7	97.3
Islam	7.3	92.7
Hinduism	12.6	87.4
Buddhism	4.6	95.4

5.2 SOURCES OF INFORMATION

5.2.1 Respondents largely leveraged technology-based platforms like their mobile phones, the Internet, and social media to obtain information about the world

The next set of questions pertained to individuals' sources of political information. The three sources used most regularly by respondents were all technology-based: their mobile phones, the Internet, and social media. Meanwhile, the least used were radio news, email, and daily newspapers. Overall, age is a major factor determining media use, with respondents above 50 years old reporting very low usage of technology-based media, while an overwhelming majority of those below 50 years old use such media daily. Another interesting finding pertains to socioeconomic factors. While those from better socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to use the Internet, social media, and emails as news sources, respondents from less well-off circumstances depend more on sources like the TV or people around them (see Figure 93).

Figure 93: Information source ("How often do you use these sources to obtain information about the world?")



5.2.2 Over two-fifths of Singaporean respondents obtained information daily from newspapers; older, politically interested, Chinese dialect speakers, and the higher-income were more likely to do so

Approximately 40 per cent of respondents in Singapore attain information daily from newspapers. This is similar to Malaysia and Hong Kong. On the other hand, a majority of respondents in Thailand, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Australia, and the US indicated that they get their information from the newspaper either monthly, less than monthly or never (see Figure 94).

Figure 94: Information source (daily newspaper), by polity



When comparing results from 2020 and 2012, it appears that information consumption patterns have changed. While 69.6 per cent of respondents in 2012 said that they get information from daily newspapers every day, this proportion dropped to 40.3 per cent in 2020. In addition, nearly half of the 2020 respondents said that they obtain information from daily newspapers monthly or much less frequently, compared to just 13.1 per cent of the respondents in 2012 (see Figure 95).

Figure 95: Information source (daily newspaper), across WVS waves



Older respondents are much more likely to get information from daily newspapers compared to younger respondents. Over 50 per cent of the respondents aged 51 and above made use of newspapers daily, compared to under 20 per cent of those aged between 21 and 35 (see Table 158).

Table 158: Information source (daily newspaper), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,008*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Daily newspaper**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
21-35	19.4	17.6	6.0	21.4	35.6
36-50	39.5	16.6	6.4	15.0	22.5
51-65	51.2	13.6	3.6	10.2	21.5
Above 65	58.9	12.3	1.5	6.6	20.7

Compared to those with no political interest, those with political interest were more likely to read daily newspapers regularly. While 47.7 per cent of the politically interested read newspapers daily, 36.2 per cent of those who were not politically interested said the same (see Table 159).

Table 159: Information source (daily newspaper), by political interest

Political Interest *N = 2,008*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Daily newspaper				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Yes	47.7	16.8	3.8	10.8	20.9
No	36.2	14.5	5.2	15.9	28.2

The language spoken most frequently also seems to make a difference. Respondents who say that they speak Chinese dialects most often are most likely to read newspapers daily, and are also generally older. It is likely that they are not very proficient in speaking and understanding the official languages, and therefore turn to the written form instead (see Table 160).

Table 160: Information source (daily newspaper), by language spoken

Language Spoken *N = 2,008*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Daily newspaper				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
English	40.4	15.9	4.7	15.3	23.7
Mandarin	40.9	16.2	4.6	13.8	24.5
Chinese dialect	50.0	14.1	3.5	9.4	22.9
Malay	33.1	7.7	4.4	14.9	39.8
Tamil	32.6	20.9	8.1	10.5	27.9
Others	46.2	15.4	3.8	15.4	19.2

Respondents who earn over $6,999 are much more likely than the other respondents to read newspapers daily. Compared to under 40 per cent of the rest of the respondent population, 57.9 per cent of those who earn over $6,999 say they read newspapers daily (see Table 161).

Table 161: Information source (daily newspaper), by income

Income *N = 1,222*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Daily newspaper				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Below $1,500	30.6	17.1	4.2	16.2	31.9
$1,500 - $2,999	33.9	16.5	4.2	12.9	32.6
$3,000 - $4,999	38.7	12.6	6.2	19.9	22.6
$5,000 - $6,999	38.2	20.0	7.3	15.8	18.8
Above $6,999	57.9	11.9	2.5	11.3	16.4

5.2.3 Over half of Singapore respondents watched the news on TV daily; older respondents and those who speak Chinese dialects were more likely to do so

Overall, 53.5 per cent of respondents said that they watch the news on TV daily. Respondents from Singapore as well as Malaysia, China, Taiwan, Australia, and the US have similar proportions of respondents who watch the news on TV daily. In comparison, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong have relatively higher proportions of respondents who do so (see Figure 96).

Figure 96: Information source (TV news), by polity



While 71.8 per cent of respondents in 2012 said that they watch TV news daily to obtain information, only 53.5 per cent said the same in 2020. The proportion of respondents who obtain information from TV news monthly or less frequently, in contrast, increased from 11.7 per cent in 2012 to 28.4 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 97).

Figure 97: Information source (TV news), across WVS waves



Respondents above 65 years were much more likely to watch the TV news daily. In fact, there was a very large disparity across the ages, especially when compared to the youngest age group. Nearly one in four (23.6 per cent) of those aged between 21 and 35 years old said that they watched the TV news daily. In comparison, 82.6 per cent of those aged above 65 watched TV news daily, implying vastly different media consumption habits for the young and old with regards to TV (see Table 162).

Table 162: Information source (TV news), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,010*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. TV news**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
21-35	23.6	22.1	14.0	19.8	20.5
36-50	51.6	22.6	4.9	10.4	10.4
51-65	69.6	14.3	1.8	5.5	8.8
Above 65	82.6	6.9	1.2	5.4	3.9

Speakers of Chinese dialects are most likely to watch the news on TV daily, followed by Tamil-speaking respondents. Meanwhile, English-speakers were the least likely to watch TV daily, and most likely to never watch the news on TV (see Table 163).

Table 163: Information source (TV news), by language spoken

Language Spoken *N = 2,010*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. TV news**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
English	48.2	18.2	7.4	13.0	13.2
Mandarin	55.7	17.4	5.5	10.7	10.7
Chinese dialect	68.2	14.7	0.6	7.6	8.8
Malay	58.0	16.6	7.2	7.2	11.0
Tamil	62.8	18.6	3.5	4.7	10.5
Others	53.8	23.1	3.8	7.7	11.5

5.2.4 Majority of Singapore respondents alongside other polities rarely relied on the radio to get information; older, less-educated, and higher-income respondents were more likely to listen to the radio daily

Radio news was the least popular source of information, with a majority of respondents indicating that they rarely use the radio to get information. This is similar to other selected Asian polities like Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan, with the exception of Malaysia. In contrast, non-Asian polities saw a higher reliance on the radio for information (see Figure 98).

Figure 98: Information source (Radio news), by polity



Compared to 2012, respondents in 2020 were less likely to use radio news as a regular source of information. While 40.8 per cent of respondents in 2012 said that they use radio news daily as a source of information, only 34.1 per cent did the same in 2020. In addition, over half of the respondents in 2020 said they use radio news monthly or less frequently (see Figure 99).

Figure 99: Information source (Radio news), across WVS waves



The respondents aged 51 and above were the most frequent users of radio to obtain information about the world. Overall, 54.1 per cent of those aged between 51 and 65 years old and 54.9 per cent of those aged above 65 years old listened to the radio news either daily or weekly. The use of radio was drastically reduced for the youngest group, with only 32 per cent saying that they listen to the radio news daily or weekly (see Table 164).

Table 164: Information source (Radio news), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,009*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Radio news				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
21-35	16.9	15.1	8.5	24.3	35.2
36-50	38.4	17.0	6.5	15.2	22.8
51-65	43.0	11.1	6.1	11.3	28.6
Above 65	40.2	14.7	2.4	7.8	34.8

Respondents who had secondary school or ITE qualifications or below were more likely to listen to the radio news, with over 35 per cent saying that they listened to it daily. In contrast, only around 30 per cent of respondents in the two higher education groups gave the same answer (see Table 165).

Table 165: Information source (Radio news), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,005*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Radio news				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Below secondary	43.5	12.4	5.1	7.5	31.5
Secondary / ITE	35.8	12.6	4.6	14.4	32.6
Dip. / Prof. qual.	29.6	13.4	8.0	20.6	28.4
Bachelor's and above	30.1	17.8	7.3	17.5	27.1

Respondents in the lowest income group were the least likely to listen to radio news daily, while respondents in the highest income group reported the highest proportion (40.9 per cent) that listen to the radio news daily. One possibility is that the latter group listens to radio news more frequently while commuting in their cars. Meanwhile, the distribution of proportions for the income groups in between is fairly similar (see Table 166).

Table 166: Information source (Radio news), by income

Income *N = 1,222*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Radio news				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Below $1,500	30.1	13.9	6.5	14.4	35.2
$1,500 - $2,999	37.1	13.9	5.3	14.8	29.0
$3,000 - $4,999	33.3	11.0	7.0	23.1	25.5
$5,000 - $6,999	35.2	18.8	7.3	10.9	27.9
Above $6,999	40.9	11.3	8.2	17.6	22.0

5.2.5 Over seven in 10 Singaporean respondents used their phones daily as a source of information; males, younger, politically interested, and higher-educated respondents were more likely to do so

The mobile phone was the most popular source of information, with 71.1 per cent of respondents using it daily to find out information. Respondents from Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, China, and Hong Kong prefer using mobile phones daily for information. Meanwhile, lower proportions of respondents in Australia and the US use their phones daily as a source of information (see Figure 100).

Figure 100: Information source (Mobile Phone), by polity



The use of mobile phones as a source of information changed quite drastically from 2012 to 2020. While only 49.9 per cent in 2012 said they used their mobile phones as a daily source of information, 71.9 per cent said the same in 2020 (see Figure 101).

Figure 101: Information source (Mobile Phone), across WVS waves



A slightly lower proportion of females used mobile phones to glean information about current affairs, with 67.9 per cent of females indicating they did so on a daily basis as compared to 74.8 per cent of their male counterparts (see Table 167).

Table 167: Information source (Mobile phone), by gender

Gender *N = 2,008*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Mobile phone**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
Male	74.8	9.9	3.1	3.4	8.9
Female	67.9	10.9	2.5	5.5	13.2

Respondents aged 50 years old and below were heavy users of mobile phones. Over 80 per cent of these two groups used their phones daily to find out about what was happening in the world and their country. In contrast, 66.1 per cent of those aged between 51 and 65 and 44.6 per cent of those aged above 65 years old gave the same answers (see Table 168).

Table 168: Information source (Mobile phone), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,008*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Mobile phone**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
21-35	80.4	12.2	2.2	2.5	2.7
36-50	82.5	8.5	2.1	3.4	3.5
51-65	66.1	9.8	3.9	5.9	14.3
Above 65	44.6	11.7	3.0	7.5	33.1

Politically interested respondents were more likely to say they made use of their mobile phones daily; 79.4 per cent of those who were politically interested, compared to 66.2 per cent of those who were not, said that they used their mobile phones to learn about their country and the world (see Table 169).

Table 169: Information source (Mobile phone), by political interest

Political Interest *N = 2,008*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Mobile phone				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Yes	79.4	9.2	1.5	3.7	6.2
No	66.2	11.1	3.5	5.0	14.1

Respondents who had higher education levels were more likely to use their phones frequently as a source of news. In particular, the individuals who had below secondary school education were the least likely to use their mobile phones, with 34.2 per cent saying they never used it as a source of news (see Table 170).

Table 170: Information source (Mobile phone), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,004*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Mobile phone				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Below secondary	46.1	8.6	5.1	5.9	34.2
Secondary / ITE	65.6	11.9	3.5	7.8	11.2
Dip. / Prof. qual,	79.1	11.7	2.7	3.2	3.2
Bachelor's and above	84.7	9.4	0.9	1.8	3.1

5.2.6 Emails were rarely used by respondents in Singapore and other polities to obtain information; younger, politically interested, English-speaking, higher-educated, and higher-income respondents were likelier to do so

Email was not a popular option to obtain information on current affairs. Forty per cent of respondents said that they used email as a daily information source. However, this proportion is higher compared to the results from Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, and Taiwan, which had less than 20 per cent of its respondents using email to obtain information (see Figure 102).

Figure 102: Information source (Email), across polity



The use of email as an information source did not vary much when comparing 2012 and 2020 results. Around four in ten in both waves indicated that it was a daily information source, while slightly over 45 per cent in both waves said that they used it less regularly (see Figure 103).

Figure 103: Information source (Email), across WVS waves



The two younger age groups had very similar proportions for each of the answer categories. In contrast, significant proportions of the two older groups never use emails as a source of news; 39.2 per cent of those aged between 51 and 65, and 63.1 per cent of those aged above 65 said that they never did so. There thus appears to be a gap in technology use between the respondents in terms of age, with those below 50 years old being savvier (see Table 171).

Table 171: Information source (Email), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,006*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Email**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
21-35	45.9	18.0	6.7	10.9	18.5
36-50	49.9	15.6	4.8	13.5	16.3
51-65	34.9	12.9	4.3	8.8	39.2
Above 65	17.5	8.2	4.2	6.9	63.1

Compared to 34.7 per cent of those who were not politically interested, 47.2 per cent of politically interested respondents said that they made use of email as a source of information (see Table 172).

Table 172: Information source (Email), by political interest

Political Interest *N = 2,006*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Email**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
Yes	47.2	14.9	4.2	10.0	23.7
No	34.7	13.9	5.6	10.6	35.3

English speakers were the most likely to make use of emails frequently to find out news about the world, with 47.1 per cent indicating they did so daily and 16.2 per cent indicating they used it weekly. In contrast, those who spoke Chinese dialects most frequently were the least likely to use emails, with 59.8 per cent saying that they never use emails as a new source (see Table 173).

Table 173: Information source (Email), by language spoken

Language Spoken *N = 2,006*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Email				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
English	47.1	16.2	5.7	9.8	21.2
Mandarin	35.7	13.2	3.0	13.2	34.9
Chinese dialect	24.9	7.1	3.6	4.7	59.8
Malay	27.1	16.0	8.8	9.9	38.1
Tamil	38.4	10.5	11.6	7.0	32.6
Others	61.5	26.9	0	3.8	7.7

There was a large disparity in the frequency of using emails as a news source when compared across education levels. A large majority (74.3 per cent) of those with below secondary school education said that they never used emails as a new source. In comparison, around half of those with diploma or professional qualifications as well as those with university degrees said that they use emails daily. A similar but less pronounced pattern was found when comparing responses across income levels. While only 26.9 per cent of those who earned below $1,500 reported using emails daily, 56 per cent of those with incomes above $6,999 gave the same answer (see Tables 174 and 175).

Table 174: Information source (Email), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,002*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Email				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Below secondary	10.5	5.9	2.4	6.8	74.3
Secondary / ITE	36.2	11.7	6.9	12.6	32.6
Dip. / Prof. qual.	50.9	19.7	5.2	9.5	14.7
Bachelor's and above	51.0	17.8	4.9	11.1	15.1

Table 175: Information source (Email), by income

Income *N = 1,222*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Email				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Below $1,500	26.9	13.0	5.6	10.2	44.4
$1,500 - $2,999	38.1	16.5	8.4	9.4	27.7
$3,000 - $4,999	50.8	17.2	4.0	12.1	15.9
$5,000 - $6,999	64.8	12.7	1.8	8.5	12.1
Above $6,999	56.0	15.7	3.1	11.9	13.2

5.2.7 The Internet was reported as a popular source of news for respondents in Singapore and other polities; the younger, politically interested, English-speaking, higher-educated, and higher-income were likelier to indicate so

The Internet was also another popular source of news for Singaporean respondents as a whole. Overall, 61.7 per cent of respondents said they used the Internet for information. Across all polities of comparison, we see the same popularity of the Internet as an information source daily or weekly. Only Thailand and China saw less than a majority of its respondents indicating that they used the Internet daily or weekly for information (see Figure 104).

Figure 104: Information source (Internet), by polity



The use of the Internet increased from 2012 to 2020. While 52.2 per cent of respondents in 2012 said that they used it as a daily source of information, 62.8 per cent of respondents in 2020 said the same (see Figure 105).

Figure 105: Information source (Internet), across WVS waves



Eighty per cent of those aged 21 to 35 use the Internet daily, as do 75.9 per cent of those aged between 36 and 50 years old. In contrast, only 51.3 per cent of those aged between 51 and 65 years old and 24.2 per cent of those above 65 years old gave the same answer. In fact, over half (58.6 per cent) of those aged above 65 years old never used the Internet as a news source (see Table 176).

Table 176: Information source (Internet), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,006*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Internet**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
21-35	80.0	12.7	2.9	1.8	2.5
36-50	75.9	11.9	3.2	4.1	5.0
51-65	51.3	10.2	2.5	6.3	29.7
Above 65	24.2	10.0	2.7	4.5	58.6

Compared to those who were not politically interested, those who were politically interested were more likely to use the Internet as a source of information. While over 85 per cent of politically interested respondents used the Internet at least weekly, 66.8 per cent of those who were not politically interested did the same (see Table 177).

Table 177: Information source (Internet), by political interest

Political Interest ***N = 2,006***	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Internet**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
Yes	73.6	10.0	2.0	2.3	12.1
No	54.7	12.1	3.3	5.2	24.7

English speakers appear to be much more accustomed to Internet use, as 72.7 per cent say that they use it daily to learn about what is going on in the world and their country. In contrast, those who speak Chinese dialects are the least savvy, with only 39.1 per cent using the Internet as a daily news source. Besides language proficiency, it is likely that respondents who are more comfortable with Chinese dialects are older than English speakers on average. Since older individuals have been found to be less comfortable using the Internet as a news source, the lower usage by Chinese dialect speakers is thus also likely a factor of age differences (see Table 178).

Table 178: Information source (Internet), by language spoken

Language Spoken ***N = 2,006***	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Internet**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
English	72.7	12.4	2.6	3.7	8.5
Mandarin	54.6	10.7	2.3	4.9	27.4
Chinese dialect	39.1	8.9	2.4	0.6	49.1
Malay	50.8	12.7	5.5	6.1	24.9
Tamil	68.6	5.8	5.8	5.8	14.0
Others	84.6	15.4	0	0	0

There were similar patterns found when comparing across education and income. In general, individuals with higher levels of education and income depended more heavily on the Internet as a news source. The most significant difference was found when comparing across education levels. While 19.5 per cent of those with below secondary school education used the Internet daily to check for news, 82 per cent of those with university degrees indicated likewise (see Tables 179 and 180).

Table 179: Information source (Internet), by education level

Education Level ***N = 2,002***	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Internet**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
Below secondary	19.5	5.4	2.7	4.6	67.8
Secondary / ITE	53.9	12.1	4.4	7.3	22.3
Dip. / Prof. qual.	78.1	13.0	2.5	3.7	2.7
Bachelor's and above	82.0	13.0	1.8	1.5	1.6

Table 180: Information source (Internet), by income

Income ***N = 1,222***	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Internet**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
Below $1,500	44.9	12.5	3.2	6.0	33.3
$1,500 - $2,999	59.7	13.5	4.8	5.8	16.1
$3,000 - $4,999	76.1	13.2	2.4	4.3	4.0
$5,000 - $6,999	89.1	8.5	1.2	1.2	0
Above $6,999	81.8	13.8	1.3	1.3	1.9

5.2.8 Singapore respondents were among the most likely to use social media as an information source; younger, English-speaking, higher-educated, and wealthier respondents were likelier to do so

The use of social media also appears to be popular amongst Singaporean respondents as a whole. 55.8 per cent said that they used social media as an information source. This is similar to Malaysia, Thailand, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, as well as the US (see Figure 106).

Figure 106: Information source (social media), by polity



The usage rate of social media differed very widely across the ages. While 77 per cent of those aged between 21 and 35 years old use it daily to check on current affairs, only 22.7 per cent of those aged above 65 years old do so (see Table 181).

Table 181: Information source (social media), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,006*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
21-35	77.0	13.2	3.1	4.2	2.5
36-50	65.5	15.8	4.2	5.7	8.8
51-65	41.7	13.2	4.7	8.9	31.5
Above 65	22.7	9.1	2.7	6.0	59.5

When it comes to language use, English speakers are the most likely to use social media daily as a news source, with 63.2 per cent saying they do so. In contrast, Chinese dialect speakers use social media much less frequently. In fact, 50.9 per cent say that they never use social media as a source of news (see Table 182).

Table 182: Information source (social media), by language spoken

Language Spoken *N = 2,006*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
English	63.2	13.9	3.7	6.1	13.0
Mandarin	51.3	13.5	3.6	6.5	25.1
Chinese dialect	30.8	11.2	1.2	5.9	50.9
Malay	52.5	12.2	3.9	7.7	23.8
Tamil	48.8	9.3	10.5	4.7	26.7
Others	73.1	19.2	3.8	0	3.8

Respondents who have diploma or professional qualifications are the most active users of social media. Seventy per cent say that they use it to check on current affairs daily, and 13 per cent say they use it weekly. These proportions are much higher compared to those who have below secondary education, for whom only 22.2 per cent reported using social media daily, and 7.3 per cent reported using it weekly (see Table 183).

Table 183: Information source (social media), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,002*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Below secondary	22.2	7.3	2.7	6.8	61.1
Secondary / ITE	52.1	13.1	3.5	8.3	22.9
Dip. / Prof. qual.	70.3	13.0	4.5	4.7	7.5
Bachelor's and above	66.3	16.9	4.2	5.1	7.5

When compared across income levels, the majority of every group said that they use social media daily to find out what is going on in the country and the world. The group that uses social media most often are those who earn between $5,000 and $6,999. 73.3 per cent of this group use it daily as a news source, while 14.5 per cent use it weekly (see Table 184).

Table 184: Information source (social media), income

Income *N = 1,222*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.)				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
Below $1,500	47.7	14.4	1.4	7.4	29.2
$1,500 - $2,999	58.7	12.3	5.2	6.1	17.7
$3,000 - $4,999	68.3	15.6	4.3	4.6	7.3
$5,000 - $6,999	73.3	14.5	3.0	4.8	4.2
Above $6,999	64.8	18.2	5.0	6.3	5.7

5.2.9 Similar to most other polities, Singaporean respondents reported regarding their friends and colleagues as a source of daily information; younger and wealthier respondents were more likely to do so

Friends and colleagues can also be a source of news. We find that 40.5 per cent of respondents went to friends and colleagues daily for information. Respondents from Thailand, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, and the US also had similar proportions of respondents who would talk with their friends or colleagues daily to get information. Meanwhile, Japan and Taiwan had relatively lower proportions of respondents who did the same (see Figure 107).

Figure 107: Information source (talk with friends or colleagues), by polity



Conversations with friends or colleagues became a lesser-used source of information in 2020. While 48.6 per cent of respondents in 2012 said they obtain information from friends or colleagues daily, 40.5 per cent in 2020 said the same (see Figure 108).

Figure 108: Information source (talk with friends or colleagues), across WVS waves



Compared to the older respondents, younger respondents are more likely to find out news from their friends and colleagues daily. In particular, 46.3 per cent of the respondents aged between 36 and 50 find out about what is going on in the country and the world from their friends and colleagues daily (see Table 185).

Table 185: Information source (talk with friends or colleagues), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,007*	**People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Talk with friends or colleagues**				
	Daily	**Weekly**	**Monthly**	**Less than monthly**	**Never**
21-35	41.9	35.8	10.7	7.4	4.2
36-50	46.3	28.8	9.0	11.0	4.9
51-65	37.6	29.2	8.9	14.8	9.5
Above 65	33.2	20.8	11.5	16.3	18.1

With the exception of the group earning between $3,000 and $4,999, over 40 per cent of all the other income groups say that they obtain news from their friends or colleagues daily.

Meanwhile, those who earn below $1,500 were the most likely to say they never do so (see Table 186).

Table 186: Information source (talk with friends or colleagues), by income

Income *N = 1,222*	People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never. Talk with friends or colleagues				
	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Less than monthly	Never
Below $1,500	45.8	19.0	10.6	12.0	12.5
$1,500 - $2,999	43.2	24.8	11.6	13.5	6.8
$3,000 - $4,999	39.2	36.3	9.7	11.0	3.8
$5,000 - $6,999	48.5	38.8	4.8	6.7	1.2
Above $6,999	49.1	33.3	8.8	8.2	0.6

5.3 PARTICIPATION IN ORGANISATIONS

5.3.1 Participation in religious organisations were the most popular amongst Singapore respondents, followed by sports or recreational organisations and groups related to art, music, and education

With respect to organisation membership, it appears that religious organisations are the most popular amongst Singaporean respondents, followed by sports or recreational organisations and groups related to art. Other types of volunteer organisations had comparatively much lower membership. Participation in religious organisations and associated activities such as praying and attending religious services are presented separately in 5.4 to provide a more germane narrative; subsections 5.3.2 through 5.3.11 provide additional analyses pertaining to participation in other types of organisations (see Figure 109).

Figure 109: Participation in different organisations



5.3.2 Singapore respondents were among the least likely to be members of sports or recreational organisations; males, younger, higher-educated respondents, and students were likelier to belong to such organisations

A total of 21.4 per cent of the population were members of sports or recreational organisations. Of this group, 13 per cent said they were inactive members, and 8.4 per cent were active members. More than 70 per cent of Singaporean, Japanese, South Korean, Mainland Chinese, Hong Kong, and American respondents indicated they did not belong to a sport or recreational organisation. In Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan and Australia, around 50 per cent of survey respondents indicated that they did not belong to sports or recreational organisations (see Figure 110).

Figure 110: Active/Inactive membership (sport or recreational organisation), by polity



While only 10.8 per cent of 2002 respondents said that they were members of sport or recreational organisations, this proportion increased to 26.4 per cent in 2012 and 21.4 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 111).

Figure 111: Active/Inactive membership (sport or recreational organisation), across WVS waves



Note: In 2002, the survey only asks respondents if they belong to this organisation. Therefore, refer to the proportion of "don't belong" for a more accurate comparison across years.

Membership in sports or recreational organisations appears to be more common among men. Compared to only 16.8 per cent of female respondents who were either inactive or active members, 25.8 per cent of the male respondents responded likewise. In general, however, active membership was low, with less than 10 per cent for both genders indicating as such (see Table 187).

Table 187: Active/Inactive membership (sport or recreational organisation), by gender

Gender *N = 2,007*	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Sport or recreational organization, football/baseball/rugby team**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
Male	74.3	15.9	9.9
Female	83.1	10.3	6.5

Older respondents were less likely to belong to sports or recreational organisations or be active members compared to younger respondents. Given that sports require some level of physical activity and fitness, it is not surprising to see more younger individuals participating in these organisations (see Table 188).

Table 188: Active/Inactive membership (sport or recreational organisation), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,007*	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Sport or recreational organisation, football/baseball/rugby team**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
21-35	73.7	16.5	9.8
36-50	79.1	12.6	8.3
51-65	81.4	11.6	7.0
Above 65	84.0	9.3	6.6

Respondents who had secondary school or ITE qualifications or below were less likely to be members of sports or recreational organisations. Meanwhile, respondents who had higher educational qualifications were more likely to join these organisations. There was very little difference between respondents in the two highest educational groups, as around 14 per cent of both groups said they were inactive members, and 10 per cent of each group said they were active members (see Table 189).

Table 189: Active/Inactive membership (sport or recreational organisation), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,003*	For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Sport or recreational organization, football/baseball/rugby team		
	Don't belong	Inactive member	Active member
Below secondary school	87.3	7.8	4.9
Secondary school/ITE	81.4	12.1	6.6
Diploma/Professional qualifications	74.1	15.9	10.0
Bachelor's and above	75.6	14.4	10.0

When considering responses across employment types, we find that full-time employees, self-employed, and students were the most likely to be members of sports and recreational organisations. Students reported the highest proportion of active members with 15.7 per cent. Since students are likely to be part of the youngest age group, it is expected that they are more actively involved in such organisations. Similarly, the self-employed would not be as bound to fixed working hours compared to full-time employees, and are more likely to be available for events organised by these groups (see Table 190).

Table 190: Active/Inactive membership (sport or recreational organisation), by employment type

Employment Type *N = 2,007*	For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Sport or recreational organization, football/baseball/rugby team		
	Don't belong	Inactive member	Active member
Full-time employee	75.6	15.4	9.1
Part-time employee	80.6	12.4	7.0
Self-employed	75.4	14.2	10.4
Retired/pensioned	83.3	9.6	7.0
Housewife	87.9	7.4	4.7
Student	74.2	10.1	15.7
Unemployed	85.0	12.6	2.4

5.3.3 They were also among the least likely to belong to an art, music, or education organisation, though younger, single, higher-educated, and higher-income respondents were more likely to indicate otherwise

Overall, 18.3 per cent said they were members of art, music, or educational organisations. Malaysia, Thailand, and the US have the three highest membership rates for art, music, educational organisations. Singaporean respondents' membership rates in such organisations were lower compared to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Australia, but those in Japan, South Korea, and China (see Figure 112).

Figure 112: Active/Inactive membership (art, music, educational organisation), by polity



A smaller proportion of respondents in 2002 indicated they belonged to organisations with cultural activities. Meanwhile, the rates of participation in such organisations were very similar when comparing 2012 and 2020 results (see Figure 113).

Figure 113: Active/Inactive membership (art, music, educational organisation), across WVS waves



Note: In 2002, the survey only asks respondents if they belong to organisations with cultural activities. Therefore, refer to the proportion of "don't belong" for a more accurate comparison across years.

The youngest age group is more active in such organisations compared to the rest of the sample population. Overall, 24.7 per cent of those aged 21 to 35 years old indicated they were members of art, music, or educational organisations, while 10 per cent were active members (see Table 191).

Table 191: Active/Inactive membership (art, music, educational organisation), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,008*	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Art, music or educational organisation**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
21-35	75.3	14.7	10.0
36-50	81.8	10.3	8.0
51-65	85.3	10.4	4.3
Above 65	88.0	6.9	5.1

There is a substantial difference in responses of those in the lowest and highest educational brackets. While 8.6 per cent of those in the lowest income group belong to arts, music, or educational groups, the proportion for university graduates is 23.1 per cent. There seems to be a divide in the middle – the membership rate for those with secondary school, ITE (14.9 per cent), or lower qualifications (9.6 per cent) is much lower compared to respondents with diploma (22.4 per cent) or higher qualifications (23.1 per cent). University graduates also report the highest proportion of active membership (10.2 per cent) (see Table 192).

Table 192: Active/Inactive membership (art, music, educational organisation), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,004*	For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Art, music or educational organisation		
	Don't belong	Inactive member	Active member
Below secondary	91.4	5.4	3.2
Secondary / ITE	85.1	9.6	5.3
Dip. / Prof. qual.	77.6	14.7	7.7
Bachelor's and above	76.9	12.9	10.2

The highest rates of participation are found among respondents earning between $1,500 and $2,999 monthly; 12.5 per cent indicated they are inactive members, while 9.0 per cent indicated they are active members. While there is a high membership rate reported by respondents earning the highest salaries, 15.1 per cent are inactive members while only 5.0 per cent are active members (see Table 193).

Table 193: Active/Inactive membership (art, music, educational organisation), by income

Income *N = 1,222*	For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Art, music or educational organisation		
	Don't belong	Inactive member	Active member
Below $1,500	81.9	11.6	6.5
$1,500 - $2,999	78.5	12.5	9.0
$3,000 - $4,999	80.1	12.9	7.0
$5,000 - $6,999	82.4	9.1	8.5
Above $6,999	79.9	15.1	5.0

5.3.4 Singapore had the lowest proportion of respondents who reported that they are active labour union members; younger, higher-educated, and full-time and part-time employees were likelier to indicate so

Only 11.2 per cent of the population were members of labour unions. Furthermore, most of these respondents said they are inactive members. In total, only 1.7 per cent are active in labour unions. Singapore was most similar to Japan, South Korea, and China in terms of low membership in labour unions. Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan had similarly around 30 per cent indicating active or inactive membership in labour unions (see Figure 114).

Figure 114: Active/Inactive membership (labour unions), by polity



Membership in labour unions increased when comparing 2002 and 2012. Meanwhile, there was a slightly lower proportion of respondents in 2020 who had membership in labour unions compared to 2012 (see Figure 115).

Figure 115: Active/Inactive membership (labour unions), across WVS waves



Note: In 2002, the survey only asks respondents if they belong to this organisation. Therefore, refer to the proportion of "don't belong" for a more accurate comparison across years.

It appears that the respondents aged between 36 and 50 are the most active with respect to membership in labour unions. While less than 10 per cent of all the other age groups reported being inactive or active members, 16.6 per cent of respondents aged between 36 and 50 years old indicated likewise. Given that they are part of the most economically active group, higher proportions of membership are expected. However, most of these individuals said they were inactive members. As a result, the proportions of active members were quite similar across all the age groups (see Table 194).

Table 194: Active/Inactive membership (labour unions), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,007*	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Labour union**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
21-35	90.6	7.4	2.0
36-50	83.4	14.2	2.5
51-65	90.5	8.2	1.3
Above 65	93.1	6.0	0.9

Respondents with below secondary school education were the least likely to belong to a labour union. In general, higher education was correlated with union membership. However, most respondents said that they were inactive members, so the proportion of active members across education levels were fairly similar (see Table 195).

Table 195: Active/Inactive membership (labour unions), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,003*	For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Labour union		
	Don't belong	Inactive member	Active member
Below secondary	94.1	5.1	0.8
Secondary / ITE	89.7	8.0	2.3
Dip. / Prof. qual.	86.8	10.2	3.0
Bachelor's and above	86.7	12.3	1.0

Full-time (14.8 per cent) and part-time employees (12.4 per cent) were the most likely to say that they are members of a labour union. However, much lower proportions are active members – only 2.4 per cent of full-time employees and 3.8 per cent of part-time employees classified themselves in this manner (see Table 196).

Table 196: Active/Inactive membership (labour unions), by employment type

Employment Type *N = 2,007*	For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Labour union		
	Don't belong	Inactive member	Active member
Full-time employee	85.3	12.4	2.4
Part-time employee	87.6	8.6	3.8
Self-employed	89.6	9.7	0.7
Retired/pensioned	92.6	6.3	1.1
Housewife	95.3	4.7	0
Student	96.6	3.4	0
Unemployed	92.9	6.3	0.8

5.3.5 Singapore likewise had the lowest proportion of respondents who indicated being active political party members

With respect to participation in political parties, only 0.3 per cent of the population were active members, while another 2.6 per cent said they were inactive members. Across all polities of comparison, membership in political parties was low, with the exception of Malaysia, Thailand, and the US, which had more than 20 per cent indicating that they were either active or inactive members in a political party (see Figure 116).

Figure 116: Active/Inactive membership (political party), by polity



Membership in political parties was low for all three survey waves, with over 90 per cent of each wave indicating that they were not members. Respondents in 2012 were the most active, with 6.2 per cent indicating that they were inactive members and 1.7 per cent indicating that they were active members (see Figure 117).

Figure 117: Active/Inactive membership (political party), across WVS waves



Note: In 2002, the survey only asks respondents if they belong to this organisation. Therefore, refer to the proportion of "don't belong" for a more accurate comparison across years.

5.3.6 Singapore had the second to lowest proportion of respondents indicating they are active members of environmental organisations

Amongst the population, only 1.1 per cent reported that they were active members in environmental organizations. Another 3.9 per cent indicated that they were inactive members of environmental organisations. Such low levels of membership in environmental organisations were similar to Japan, South Korea, and China. In contrast, more than 10 per cent of its respondents in Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia, and the US were at least members (be it active or inactive) in environmental organisations (see Figure 118).

Figure 118: Active/Inactive membership (environmental organization), by polity



Compared to respondents in 2012, those in 2020 were less active in environmental organisations. The proportion of members dropped from 9.3 per cent to 5 per cent, while the proportion of active members dropped from 2.5 per cent to 1.1 per cent (see Figure 119).



Note: In 2002, the survey only asks respondents if they belong to this organisation. Therefore, refer to the proportion of "don't belong" for a more accurate comparison across years.

5.3.7 Similar to most other Asian polities, Singapore had low levels of active memberships in professional organisations; younger, higher-educated, self-employed, and the more affluent were likelier to be active members

Around 14 per cent said that they were members of professional associations. Of this group, 5.9 per cent said that they were active members. The low levels of active membership found in Singapore were similar to Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, with under 10 per cent holding active membership. Slightly higher levels of membership of professional associations were found in Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, and the US, where more than 10 per cent of their respondents were found to be active members (see Figure 120).

Figure 120: Active/Inactive membership (professional organisation), by polity



Membership in professional organisations increased from 5.5 per cent in 2002 to over 12 per cent in 2012 and 2020. When examining results from 2020 and 2012, the proportions indicating the different tiers of membership were very similar (see Figure 121).

Figure 121: Active/Inactive membership (professional organisation), across WVS waves



Note: In 2002, the survey only asks respondents if they belong to this organisation. Therefore, refer to the proportion of "don't belong" for a more accurate comparison across years.

Other than the group aged above 65 years old, all the other groups had relatively high participation rates. The highest rates of participation, whether based on membership numbers or active members, came from the group aged between 36 to 50 years old; 10.3 per cent of this group indicated they were inactive members, while 8.0 per cent indicated they were active members of a professional association. Respondents aged between 21 to 35 years old also had rather high rates of participation – 9.5 per cent said that they were inactive members, and 6.9 per cent said they were active members. Overall, the trends suggest that participation in these associations are likely related to economic activity, as there are higher membership rates amongst age groups younger than the official retirement age (see Table 197).

Table 197: Active/Inactive membership (professional organisation), by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 2,008***	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Professional association**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
21-35	83.6	9.5	6.9
36-50	81.7	10.3	8.0
51-65	87.9	7.0	5.2
Above 65	95.8	3.0	1.2

There are more respondents from higher educational levels who say they are part of a professional association, whether as inactive or active members. The participation rate is highest for those with university degrees – 15.6 per cent of them say they are inactive members, while 13.7 per cent say they are active members. In comparison, respondents from all the other educational groups report less than 10 per cent for each member type. While professional associations are normally established for occupations correlated with higher education, some of those with less education may be referring to tradecraft-specific associations (see Table 198).

Table 198: Active/Inactive membership (professional organisation), by education level

Education Level ***N = 2,004***	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Professional association**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
Below secondary school	97.6	2.1	0.3
Secondary school/ITE	95.6	3.2	1.2
Diploma/Professional qualifications	88.8	7.0	4.2
Bachelor's and above	70.7	15.6	13.7

The self-employed are members of professional associations in the highest proportions – 9.6 per cent say they are inactive members and 15.6 per cent say they are active members. Meanwhile, full-time and part-time employees are also quite active, with 7.7 per cent of full-time employees and 4.3 per cent of part-time employees saying they are active members (see Table 199).

Table 199: Active/Inactive membership (professional organisation), by employment type

Employment Type ***N = 2,008***	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Professional association**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
Full-time employee	82.9	9.4	7.7
Part-time employee	89.2	6.5	4.3
Self-employed	74.8	9.6	15.6
Retired/pensioned	93.7	5.5	0.7
Housewife	94.9	4.2	0.9
Student	88.8	7.9	3.4
Unemployed	86.7	9.4	3.9

Respondents with higher income levels are more likely to be members of professional associations – 20.1 per cent of those earning over $6,999 say they are active members, while a similar percentage say they are inactive members (see Table 200).

Table 200: Active/Inactive membership (professional organisation), by income

Income ***N = 1,222***	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Professional association**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
Below $1,500	95.9	2.3	1.8
$1,500 - $2,999	89.1	6.8	4.2
$3,000 - $4,999	87.6	6.2	6.2
$5,000 - $6,999	73.3	13.3	13.3
Above $6,999	57.2	22.6	20.1

Respondents who live in private properties were more likely to be members of professional associations. While between 9.3 per cent to 13.2 per cent of respondents living in other housing types said they belonged to professional associations, 26.5 per cent of those living in private properties said the same. Furthermore, 10.4 per cent said they were active members (see Table 201).

Table 201: Active/Inactive membership (professional organisation), by housing type

Housing type *N = 2,008*	For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Professional association		
	Don't belong	Inactive member	Active member
1- to 3-room HDB	90.7	6.1	3.2
4-room HDB	88.5	5.9	5.6
5-room HDB	86.8	7.2	6.0
Private apartment/ Landed property	73.5	16.1	10.4

5.3.8 Singapore respondents had low levels of active membership in charitable or humanitarian organisations; younger and higher-educated respondents were likelier to be active members

With respect to humanitarian or charitable organisations, 6.2 per cent of the population classified themselves as inactive members, while 4.8 per cent said they were active members. After Japan, South Korea, and China, Singapore had the fourth-lowest active membership in charitable or humanitarian organisations, followed by Hong Kong and Taiwan. Higher levels of active membership in charitable or humanitarian organisations were found in Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, and the US, where at least 10 per cent were active members (see Figure 122).

Figure 122: Active/Inactive membership (charitable/humanitarian organisation), by polity



When comparing the two WVS waves for which the question on charitable and humanitarian organisations was asked, no major differences were found. Around 11 per cent in each wave indicated that they were either active or inactive members of such organisations (see Figure 123).

Figure 123: Active/Inactive membership (charitable/humanitarian organisation), across WVS waves



When compared across age cohorts, younger respondents are more likely to participate, whether as an inactive or active member. Compared to the oldest group, for which 3 per cent were inactive members and 1.5 per cent were active members, 8.4 per cent and 6.9 per cent of respondents aged 21 to 35 years old were inactive and active members, respectively (see Table 202).

Table 202: Active/Inactive membership (charitable/humanitarian organisation), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,009*	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Humanitarian or charitable organisation**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
21-35	84.7	8.4	6.9
36-50	88.7	6.5	4.8
51-65	89.7	5.5	4.8
Above 65	95.5	3.0	1.5

Individuals from better socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to join humanitarian or charitable organisations; while just 3.8 per cent of those with below secondary education indicate being inactive or active members of such organisations, this proportion increases steadily to 15.5 per cent for those with a degree (see Table 203).

Table 203: Active/Inactive membership (charitable/humanitarian organisation), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,005*	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Humanitarian or charitable organisation**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
Below secondary	96.2	2.7	1.1
Secondary / ITE	91.3	4.6	4.1
Dip. /Prof. qual.	86.5	7.2	6.2
Bachelor's and above	84.4	8.8	6.7

5.3.9 Singapore had the second to lowest proportion of respondents who expressed being active members of consumer organisations

With respect to consumer organisations (e.g., CASE), only 5.2 per cent said they were members. Of this group, 0.9 per cent said they were active members. Almost all selected polities had similarly low levels of membership in consumer organisations, with the exception of Malaysia and Thailand, where 8.6 per cent and 15.1 per cent of its respondents indicated that they were active members, respectively (see Figure 124).



Membership in consumer organisations saw a very slight dip in 2020 compared to 2012. However, the overall proportions of participation were fairly similar across the two waves (see Figure 125).



5.3.10 Compared with other polities, Singaporean respondents were among the least likely to be members of self-help groups or mutual aid groups

5.6 per cent said they were inactive members of self-help or mutual aid groups, while another 3.7 per cent called themselves active members. Singapore had the third-highest proportion of respondents who indicated that they were not members of self-help or mutual-aid groups when compared to other selected polities. Meanwhile, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea had relatively higher levels of membership in such groups, with more than 20 per cent of its respondents reporting to be either inactive or active members of these groups (see Figure 126).

Figure 126: Active/Inactive membership (self-help group, mutual aid group), by polity



There was not much difference in the rate of participation for self-help or mutual aid groups when comparing the results for 2020 and 2012 (see Figure 127).

Figure 127: Active/Inactive membership (self-help group, mutual aid group), across WVS waves



5.3.11 Singapore respondents were among the least likely to be members of women's groups; females who are higher-educated and live in larger housing types were likelier to indicate so

Overall, 5.5 per cent said they were members of women's groups, 4.1 per cent were inactive, and only 1.4 per cent were active members. Across all polities of comparison, active or inactive membership in women's groups were very low, with the exception of Malaysia and Thailand, where at least 20 per cent of their respondents report being active or inactive members of women's groups (see Figure 128).

Figure 128: Active/Inactive membership (women's group), by polity



As this question was not asked in 2012, the comparison is made between the 2020 and 2002 results. Participation seems to have increased slightly across the years, given that 5.5 per cent in 2020, compared to just 1.5 per cent in 2002, indicated membership in women's organisations (see Figure 129).

Figure 129: Active/Inactive membership (women's group), across WVS waves



Note: In 2002, the survey only asks respondents if they belong to this organisation. Therefore, refer to the proportion of "don't belong" for a more accurate comparison across years.

Compared to 3.1 per cent of male respondents, 7.6 per cent of female respondents reported belonging to women's groups. In addition, 2.6 per cent of female respondents said they were active members (see Table 204).

Table 204: Active/Inactive membership (women's group), by gender

Gender ***N = 2,009***	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Women's group**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
Male	96.9	2.9	0.2
Female	92.4	5.1	2.6

While there were no pronounced educational differences amongst male respondents, female respondents with higher education were slightly more likely to be members of women's groups. University-educated female respondents were the most active, with 4.1 per cent indicating that they were active members (see Table 205).

Table 205: Active/Inactive membership (women's group), by gender and education level

Gender and Education Level ***N = 2,005***		**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Women's group**		
		Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
Male	**Below secondary**	99.4	0.6	0
	Secondary / ITE	95.1	4.9	0
	Dip. /Prof. qual.	96.2	3.3	0.5
	Bachelor's and above	97.4	2.3	0.3
Female	**Below secondary**	97.1	2.4	0.5
	Secondary / ITE	93.7	3.8	2.5
	Dip. /Prof. qual.	91.1	6.8	2.1
	Bachelor's and above	89.0	6.9	4.1

Meanwhile, female respondents living in larger housing types were more likely to be members of women's groups. However, the proportions of active members did not vary as much across educational levels (see Table 206).

Table 206: Active/Inactive membership (women's group), by gender and housing type

Gender and Housing Type *N = 2,005*		For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Women's group		
		Don't belong	Inactive member	Active member
Male	1- to 3-room HDB	96.6	3.4	0
	4-room HDB	96.6	2.7	0.7
	5-room HDB	97.2	2.8	0
	Private property	97.2	2.8	0
Female	1- to 3-room HDB	96.3	2.1	1.5
	4-room HDB	92.0	5.1	2.8
	5-room HDB	89.8	6.5	3.7
	Private property	89.1	8.3	2.6

5.4 RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION

5.4.1 Singaporean respondents were among the most likely to belong to a religious organisation; Christians were likelier to be active members compared with respondents of other religions

We find that 58 per cent of the overall sample were not members of a religious organisation. Of the remaining respondents, 21.4 per cent said that they are inactive members, and 20.6 per cent said that they are active members. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, and Australia have similar proportions of respondents who do not belong to a religious organisation. Japan, South Korea, China, and Hong Kong have at least 70 per cent of its respondents who were not members of religious organisations. The US, in contrast, have the lowest proportion of respondents who were not members of a religious organisation (see Figure 130).

Figure 130: Active/Inactive membership (church or religious organisation), by polity



Membership in religious organisations seems to have increased when comparing data between 2002 and 2012. While 79.7 per cent in 2002 indicated that they do not belong to religious organisations, only 57.1 per cent and 58 per cent reported likewise in 2012 and 2020, respectively. Active membership, however, seems to have declined somewhat when comparing 2012 and 2020 results – while 25.2 per cent said in 2012 that they are active members, the proportion dropped to 20.6 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 131).

Figure 131: Active/Inactive membership (church or religious organisation), across WVS waves



Note: In 2002, the survey only asks respondents if they belong to this organisation. Therefore, refer to the proportion of "don't belong" for a more accurate comparison across years.

Protestant Christians are most likely to describe themselves as active members of a church or religious organisation (61.6 per cent). About 41 per cent of Roman Catholics also consider themselves active members. Christians also report the lowest percentages of respondents who say they do not belong to any organisation. In comparison, Taoism had the largest proportion of non-members. These patterns are likely related to the nature of worship; while church membership is considered important for Christians, they are not as salient in Taoism or traditional Chinese religions. For the latter group, religious practices often do not need to be undertaken via an institution such as a temple (see Table 207).

Table 207: Active/Inactive membership (church or religious organisation), by religion

Religion *N = 2,008*	**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Church or religious organisation**		
	Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
No religion	89.6	9.1	1.3
Catholicism	12.7	46.8	40.5
Christianity	9.0	29.5	61.6
Taoism / TCB	81.8	14.9	3.4
Islam	50.5	26.2	23.3
Hinduism	71.2	15.3	13.5
Buddhism	67.9	21.2	10.9

There were no major gender differences for respondents with no religion, Muslim, Hindus, and Buddhists. Female Taoists were much less likely compared to their male counterparts to belong to a religious organisation. Nearly 91 per cent of female Taoists, compared to 71.8 per cent of male Taoists, did not belong to a religious organisation. In contrast, similar proportions of male and female respondents who were Protestant Christian or Roman Catholic belonged to a religious organisation. However, female Christians and Catholics were more likely than their male counterparts to indicate they were active members in the organisation (see Table 208).

Table 208: Active/Inactive membership (church or religious organisation), by religion and gender

Religion and Gender *N = 2,008*		**For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Church or religious organisation**		
		Don't belong	**Inactive member**	**Active member**
No religion	**Male**	89.5	10.5	0
	Female	89.7	7.8	2.6
Catholicism	**Male**	15.0	50.0	35.0
	Female	10.6	43.9	45.5
Christianity	**Male**	11.6	33.3	55.0
	Female	7.4	27.2	65.4
Taoism / TCB	**Male**	71.8	22.5	5.6
	Female	90.9	7.8	1.3
Islam	**Male**	51.2	24.8	24.0
	Female	50.0	27.4	22.6
Hinduism	**Male**	70.2	15.8	14.0
	Female	72.2	14.8	13.0
Buddhism	**Male**	69.3	18.6	12.1
	Female	66.8	23.3	9.9

There were no pronounced age differences for religious organisation membership amongst those with no religion and Christians. For Catholics, Muslims, and Taoists, older respondents were more likely to belong to a religious organisation and be active members (see Table 209).

Table 209: Active/Inactive membership (church or religious organisation), by religion and age cohort

Religion and Age Cohort *N = 2,008*		For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization: Church or religious organisation		
		Don't belong	Inactive member	Active member
No religion	21-35	91.0	8.4	0.6
	36-50	89.2	7.9	2.9
	51-65	87.3	11.9	0.8
	Above 65	91.5	8.5	0
Catholicism	21-35	18.8	62.5	18.8
	36-50	8.1	40.5	51.4
	51-65	12.1	45.5	42.4
	Above 65	12.5	37.5	50.0
Christianity	21-35	8.0	31.8	60.2
	36-50	11.8	30.6	57.6
	51-65	9.6	23.5	67.0
	Above 65	5.2	36.2	58.6
Taoism / TCB	21-35	70.8	25.0	4.2
	36-50	79.1	18.6	2.3
	51-65	90.2	7.3	2.4
	Above 65	85.2	12.5	5.0
Islam	21-35	46.7	35.5	17.8
	36-50	65.0	18.3	16.7
	51-65	48.6	18.9	32.4
	Above 65	41.2	26.5	32.4
Hinduism	21-35	56.3	21.9	21.9
	36-50	78.8	15.4	5.8
	51-65	93.8	0	6.3
	Above 65	45.5	18.2	36.4
Buddhism	21-35	73.6	16.4	10.0
	36-50	73.8	16.1	10.1
	51-65	67.1	21.5	11.4
	Above 65	54.7	33.0	12.3

In light of the above findings, it is worth exploring respondents' levels of participation in religious activities such as praying or attending religious services. The following subsections explore these in greater detail.

5.4.2 Over four in 10 respondents reported attending religious services at least once a month, and over six in 10 respondents indicated praying at least during religious services

In general, social capital can also be increased to some extent if individuals take part in more religious gatherings. Two questions in the survey examine the frequency with which respondents attend religious services and pray. Overall, 42.9 per cent population attend religious services at least once a month, and 60.4 per cent pray at least during religious services. Religion, therefore, appears to be quite a significant facet of many Singaporeans' lives (see Figures 131 and 132).

Figure 131: Frequency of attending religious services ("Apart from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services these days?")



Figure 132: Frequency of praying ("Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray?")



5.4.3 Singapore respondents were among the most likely to report that they attend religious services at least once a month; however, these proportions have declined since 2002

Amongst the population, 12 per cent attend religious services more than once a week, while 20.3 per cent attend once a week. In contrast, 19.8 per cent attend services less than once a year, while 17 per cent practically never attend. In contrast to other polities, Singapore has one of the lowest proportions of respondents reporting never attending religious services. This places Singapore alongside polities like Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, and the US, for which around or more than 40 per cent of its respondents attend services at least once a month. Meanwhile, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, and the UK see high levels of non-attendance of services by its respondents. Other polities like Taiwan, Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland see mid-range levels of non-attendance and rather diverse splits of attendance of services across different frequencies (see Figure 133).

Figure 133: Frequency of attending religious services, by polity



Across the years, there is a slight decline in the proportion of respondents who say they attend services at least once a month or only on special holy days. In addition, slightly larger proportions (around 17 per cent) of respondents said in 2020 and 2012 that they never or practically never attend religious services, compared to 11.1 per cent in 2002 (see Figure 134).

Figure 134: Frequency of attending religious services, across WVS waves



5.4.4 Christians were most likely to attend services more than once a week, with more female and older Christians indicating so compared to their male and younger counterparts

The religion with the highest proportion of respondents attending services more than once a week is Protestant Christianity. In fact, those from monotheistic religions – Protestant Christians, Roman Catholics, and Muslims – have higher attendance rates. Just over 76 per cent of Protestants, 63.5 per cent of Catholics, and 54.8 per cent of Muslims say that they attend religious services at least once a week. In comparison, among the religiously affiliated, Buddhists were the most likely to indicate never attending religious services (see Table 210).

Table 210: Frequency of attending religious services, by religion

Religion *N = 1,997*	Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?						
	More than once a week	Once a week	Once a month	Only on special holy days	Once a year	Less often	Never, practically never
No religion	0.9	2.0	4.1	9.8	4.6	27.8	51.0
Catholicism	20.6	42.9	4.8	11.1	4.8	12.7	3.2
Christianity	25.1	51.0	6.6	2.6	1.7	10.4	2.6
Taoism / TCB	3.4	3.4	23.0	39.2	2.7	22.3	6.1
Muslim	21.3	33.5	14.0	12.5	5.5	11.0	2.2
Hinduism	9.1	18.2	24.5	27.3	4.5	10.0	6.4
Buddhism	9.1	9.1	12.8	26.1	4.8	26.3	11.8

No significant gender differences were observed for Taoists, Buddhists, and Hindus. Female Catholics and Christians attend religious services more frequently compared to their male counterparts, while the pattern was reversed for Muslims for whom attending Friday congregational prayers are an obligation for males but not females (see Table 211).

Table 211: Frequency of attending religious services, by religion and gender

Religion and Gender *N = 1,997*		**Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?**			
		At least once a month	**Only on special holy days**	**Once a year or less**	**Never, practically never**
No religion	**Male**	6.0	8.5	33.2	52.3
	Female	8.0	11.1	31.4	49.6
Catholicism	**Male**	63.3	13.3	21.7	1.7
	Female	72.7	9.1	13.6	4.5
Christianity	**Male**	76.9	5.4	13.1	4.6
	Female	86.2	0.9	11.5	1.4
Taoism / TCB	**Male**	31.0	38.0	25.4	5.6
	Female	28.6	40.3	24.7	6.5
Islam	**Male**	77.2	10.2	11.0	1.6
	Female	61.4	14.5	21.4	2.8
Hinduism	**Male**	48.2	28.6	19.6	3.6
	Female	55.6	25.9	9.3	9.3
Buddhism	**Male**	33.0	24.5	30.0	12.4
	Female	29.5	27.4	31.8	11.3

Younger Catholics, Muslims, Taoists, and Buddhists were less likely to attend religious services regularly compared to their older counterparts, with the pattern being most pronounced amongst Catholics. Similar attendance patterns were noted for Christians of all ages, while there was no clear age pattern for Hindus (see Table 212).

Table 212: Frequency of attending religious services, by religion and age cohort

Religion and Age Cohort *N = 1,997*		Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?			
		At least once a month	Only on special holy days	Once a year or less	Never, practically never
No religion	21-35	7.3	9.9	22.5	60.3
	36-50	6.7	6.0	36.6	50.7
	51-65	7.7	10.3	38.5	43.6
	Above 65	5.1	16.9	35.6	42.4
Catholicism	21-35	37.5	25.0	31.3	11.1
	36-50	75.7	10.8	13.5	0
	51-65	81.8	3.0	12.1	3.0
	Above 65	79.2	4.2	12.5	4.2
Christianity	21-35	81.8	2.3	12.5	3.4
	36-50	76.5	3.5	18.8	1.2
	51-65	84.5	2.6	10.3	2.6
	Above 65	89.7	1.7	5.2	3.4
Taoism / TCB	21-35	25.0	29.2	33.3	12.5
	36-50	23.3	44.2	27.9	4.7
	51-65	34.1	34.1	24.4	7.3
	Above 65	35.0	45.0	17.5	2.5
Islam	21-35	59.4	18.9	18.9	2.8
	36-50	64.4	11.9	23.7	0
	51-65	79.7	6.8	12.2	1.4
	Above 65	81.8	6.1	6.1	6.1
Hinduism	21-35	46.9	34.4	15.6	3.1
	36-50	60.8	17.6	13.7	7.8
	51-65	37.5	50.0	12.5	0
	Above 65	45.5	18.2	18.2	18.2
Buddhism	21-35	18.9	35.1	24.3	21.6
	36-50	26.8	24.2	34.2	14.8
	51-65	35.8	22.0	35.8	6.3
	Above 65	42.5	25.5	26.4	5.7

5.4.5 Singapore had among the highest proportion of respondents who indicated praying at least several times each week

There was a significant portion of the population who are quite conscientious about praying, but also a group who do not pray much. Overall, 26.8 per cent prayed several times a day, 18.3 per cent prayed once a day, and 8.5 per cent prayed several times a week. On the flipside, 13.4 per cent prayed less than once a year, and 13.7 per cent practically never pray. An overwhelming proportion of respondents in China (91.8 per cent) do not pray at all. This is much higher even when compared to polities with low frequencies of praying, such as in South Korea, Hong Kong, and Australia. In contrast, Malaysia had the highest proportion of respondents who reported praying at least several times a week (79.7 per cent). The US had the second-highest proportion of respondents who indicated the same (62.9 per cent) (see Figure 135).

Figure 135: Frequency of praying, by polity



When comparing the two survey waves for which this question was asked, it appears that the praying habits of Singaporeans have not altered very much across the past eight years. Similar proportions of respondents chose the available options, with the largest proportion indicating that they pray at least several times a week (see Figure 136).

Figure 136: Frequency of praying, across WVS waves



5.4.6 Comparing across religions, Muslims were likelier to pray several times a day; female Catholics, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists were likelier than their male counterparts to pray at least several times each week

When perusing results across religious communities, we find that 72.3 per cent of Muslim respondents pray several times a day; much higher than respondents of other religions. Christians also report higher frequencies of praying, with 42.4 per cent of Protestant Christians and 34.9 per cent of Roman Catholics indicating they prayed several times a day. Over a quarter of these two groups also indicated praying daily (see Table 213).

Table 213: Frequency of praying, by religion

Religion *N = 1,993*	Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray?							
	Several times a day	Once a day	Several times each week	Only when attending religious services	Only on special holy days	Once a year	Less often	Never, practically never
No religion	2.2	3.7	4.1	4.1	11.8	5.2	22.7	46.2
Catholicism	34.9	27.8	9.5	10.3	3.2	4.8	7.9	1.6
Christianity	42.4	26.5	15.9	5.5	1.4	0.6	6.1	1.7
Taoism / TCB	11.5	23.6	4.1	12.2	22.3	1.4	17.6	7.4
Muslim	72.3	11.8	4.8	2.6	1.5	1.8	4.4	0.7
Hinduism	24.8	37.6	12.8	4.6	11.9	0	6.4	1.8
Buddhism	17.1	23.8	9.3	9.0	15.6	2.9	15.4	6.9

Female Catholics, Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists were more likely than their male counterparts to pray at least several times each week. In contrast, male Taoists prayed more frequently compared to their female counterparts, who did it more often on special holy days. Meanwhile, there were no major gender differences in prayer frequency for Muslims (see Table 214).

Table 214: Frequency of praying, by religion and gender

Religion and Gender *N = 1,993*		Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray?				
		At least several times each week	Only when attending religious services	Only on special holy days	Once a year or less	Never, practically never
No religion	Male	11.9	3.8	9.8	25.5	48.9
	Female	8.0	4.5	13.8	30.4	43.3
Catholicism	Male	63.3	15.0	3.3	15.0	3.3
	Female	80.3	6.1	3.0	10.6	0
Christianity	Male	79.2	6.2	3.1	7.7	3.8
	Female	88.0	5.1	0.5	6.0	0.5
Taoism / TCB	Male	43.7	14.1	14.1	19.7	8.5
	Female	35.1	10.4	29.9	18.2	6.5
Islam	Male	89.8	3.9	0.8	4.7	0.8
	Female	88.2	1.4	2.1	7.6	0.7
Hinduism	Male	70.9	7.3	12.7	7.3	1.8
	Female	79.6	1.9	11.1	5.6	1.9
Buddhism	Male	42.5	12.9	16.7	21.5	6.4
	Female	56.5	5.8	14.7	15.8	7.2

For Catholics, Taoists, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists, older respondents were more likely to indicate that they pray at least several times each week. The majority of Christians pray at least several times each week, regardless of age. However, Christians aged 21 to 35 were slightly less likely to do so (see Table 215).

Table 215: Frequency of praying, by religion and age cohort

Religion and Age Cohort *N = 1,993*		Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you pray?				
		At least several times each week	Only when attending religious services	Only on special holy days	Once a year or less	Never, practically never
No religion	21-35	11.3	2.7	10.7	24.0	51.3
	36-50	8.3	5.3	11.3	27.8	47.4
	51-65	12.0	6.0	12.0	33.3	36.8
	Above 65	6.8	1.7	15.3	27.1	49.2
Catholicism	21-35	40.6	21.9	9.4	21.9	6.3
	36-50	78.4	10.8	0	10.8	0
	51-65	81.8	6.1	0	12.1	0
	Above 65^	91.7	0	4.2	4.2	0
Christianity	21-35	77.3	8.0	3.4	8.0	3.4
	36-50	83.5	8.2	1.2	7.1	0
	51-65	89.7	1.7	0.9	6.0	1.7
	Above 65	87.9	5.2	0	5.2	1.7
Taoism / TCB	21-35^	12.5	16.7	29.2	29.2	12.5
	36-50	34.9	20.9	20.9	20.9	2.3
	51-65	48.8	4.9	22.0	19.5	4.9
	Above 65	50.0	7.5	20.0	10.0	12.5
Islam	21-35	81.0	3.8	3.8	10.5	1.0
	36-50	89.8	1.7	0	8.5	0
	51-65	95.9	2.7	0	1.4	0
	Above 65	97.0	0	0	0	3.0
Hinduism	21-35	65.6	9.4	12.5	12.5	0
	36-50	78.0	2.0	12.0	4.0	4.0
	51-65^	75.0	6.3	12.5	6.3	0
	Above 65^	90.9	0	9.1	0	0
Buddhism	21-35	34.2	7.2	25.2	21.6	11.7
	36-50	38.3	9.4	18.8	27.5	6.0
	51-65	60.4	8.2	9.4	16.4	5.7
	Above 65	68.9	11.3	10.4	4.7	4.7

Chapter 6

Political Interest, Activism, and Awareness

CHAPTER 6 | POLITICAL INTEREST, ACTIVISM, AND AWARENESS

This chapter peruses survey questions and their accompanying responses pertaining to a broad range of political issues within contemporary society: (1) political interest, including propensity to discuss political matters and participation in voting; (2) perceptions of political systems and electoral processes; (3) activism in terms of interest and experience; and (4) knowledge of international organisations. *In toto*, these provide a broad-brush understanding of the lived political experiences of Singaporean individuals today.

6.1 DISCOURSE AND PARTICIPATION

6.1.1 Over a third of Singapore respondents have never discussed politics with friends, though close to eight in 10 indicated always voting in elections

The first two questions relate to actions of political interest. In tandem with descriptions of Singaporeans as typically politically apathetic, political discussions are not popular conversation topics with friends. Fifty-five per cent indicated only being engaged in such conversations occasionally, while 37.9 per cent indicated never talking about politics at all.

Meanwhile, 78.5 per cent indicated always voting in elections. This high degree of voting activity is likely influenced by Singapore's mandatory voting system. In addition, age is also a factor, as younger respondents were less likely to have been of legal voting age at the time of the previous elections. In addition, Singapore's political system has the walkover rule, which allows the incumbent in a constituency to win an election directly if there is no contest. The General Elections in 2015 was the first time after independence where all constituencies were contested, which means that even older respondents might not have been able to vote at every election before that. Given these characteristics of the political system, it is not surprising to have only a few findings when comparing results across demographic variables (see Figures 137 and 138).

Figure 137: Frequency of political discussion with friends



Figure 138: Frequency of voting when elections take place ("When elections take place, do you vote always, usually, or never?")



6.1.2 Singapore is one of the most politically apathetic polities globally

With regards to the frequency of political discussions, Singapore is among the more apathetic polities. Over a third of respondents indicated they never partook in such discussions. In general, Asian polities such as Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan had much lower levels of frequent political discussions. The US had the highest proportion of respondents who reported frequently discussing political matters with friends (69.2 per cent) (see Figure 139).

Figure 139: Frequency of political discussions with friends, by polity



The question on political discussions was asked in 2020 and 2002. It appears that respondents in 2020 were more likely to have frequent political discussions with friends compared to respondents polled in 2002. While only 3.8 per cent of those in 2002 indicated frequently discussing politics, this proportion increased to 7.1 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 140).

Figure 140: Frequency of political discussions with friends, across WVS waves



6.1.3 Females, older, politically disinterested, and less-educated respondents were likelier to have never discussed politics with friends

A higher proportion of males indicated they either frequently or occasionally discussed political matters with friends. Specifically, 10.2 per cent of male respondents, compared to only 3.9 per cent of female respondents, said that they engaged in political discussions frequently. Meanwhile, nearly half of the female respondents (45 per cent) said that they never did so (see Table 216).

Table 216: Frequency of discussing political matters, by gender

Gender *N = 2,001*	**When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?**		
	Frequently	**Occasionally**	**Never**
Male	10.2	59.0	30.8
Female	3.9	51.2	45.0

There were very slight differences in responses across age cohorts. The only exception was among those above 65 years old, for which 47.3 per cent indicated never discussing politics with friends. The corresponding proportion was less than 40 per cent for the rest of the age groups (see Table 217).

Table 217: Frequency of discussing political matters, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,001*	**When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?**		
	Frequently	**Occasionally**	**Never**
21-35	7.3	53.2	39.5
36-50	6.6	59.5	33.9
51-65	7.2	56.2	36.7
Above 65	5.7	47.0	47.3

There was a clear difference when comparing respondents based on political interest levels. While 54.4 per cent of those who had no political interest indicated never discussing political matters with friends, only 11 per cent of those with political interest said the same. Meanwhile, 16.3 per cent and 72.7 per cent of the politically interested reported frequently or occasionally discussing political matters with their friends (see Table 218).

Table 218: Frequency of discussing political matters, by political interest

Political Interest *N = 2,001*	When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?		
	Frequently	Occasionally	Never
Yes	16.3	72.7	11.0
No	1.3	44.3	54.4

Secular Liberals were most likely to discuss political matters with friends, while Conservative Autocrats were least likely to do so. Meanwhile, over 59 per cent of Conservative Democrats and Middle Grounders discuss political matters with their friends either frequently or occasionally (see Table 219).

Table 219: Frequency of discussing political matters, by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,001*	When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?		
	Frequently	Occasionally	Never
Conservative Democrats	6.6	53.1	40.3
Conservative Autocrats	0.9	26.5	72.6
Secular Liberals	12.7	63.0	24.3
Middle Grounders	5.6	58.4	36.0

There was a positive correlation between education and the frequency of political discussions. While the majority of the respondents with below secondary school education said they never discussed politics with friends, the majority of the other educational groups answered "occasionally". Respondents with university degrees were the most interested, with 9.5 per cent discussing politics frequently and 64.3 per cent discussing politics occasionally with friends (see Table 220).

Table 220: Frequency of discussing political matters, by education level

Education Level *N = 1,997*	When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally, or never?		
	Frequently	Occasionally	Never
Below secondary	3.2	38.0	58.8
Secondary / ITE	5.1	52.8	42.0
Dip. / Prof. qual.	8.0	57.6	34.4
Bachelor's and above	9.5	64.3	26.2

6.1.4 Singaporean respondents were among the most likely to always vote in national elections, just after Australia and Sweden

Comparably high levels of voting were found in Singapore, Australia, and Sweden. Societies such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Switzerland were similar in that less than a majority reported always voting in elections. All other polities had at least or around 60 per cent of their respondents indicating that they always voted (see Figure 141).

Figure 141: Frequency of voting when elections take place, by polity



In general, around three-quarters of respondents in both WVS waves of the survey indicate that they always voted in elections. Direct comparisons between the responses in 2012 and 2020 must be made with caution, considering a change in response options between the two waves (see Figure 142).

Figure 142: Frequency of voting when elections take place, across WVS waves



** In 2012, the option "not allowed to vote" was not included in the question.*

6.1.5 Older respondents were more likely to indicate always voting in national elections

The oldest age group voted the most frequently, with 92.5 per cent saying that they always voted. The proportions of answers in this category decreased for the younger age groups. While there is a possibility that younger individuals were less engaged in elections, it should be noted that walkovers — occasions when only the incumbent contests an area and thus wins without an election — happened quite frequently in Singapore before 2015. Therefore, some individuals might have chosen the "usually" or "never" options instead. Furthermore, the voting age in Singapore is 21 years old, so it is likely that a significant proportion of the youngest age group had not yet reached the voting age in 2015, when the previous elections were held (see Table 221).

Table 221: Frequency of voting when elections take place, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,998*	**When elections take place, do you vote always, usually or never?**			
	Always	**Usually**	**Never**	**Not allowed to vote**
21-35	64.0	7.9	8.3	19.8
36-50	76.3	6.2	5.5	11.9
51-65	88.0	5.7	2.7	3.6
Above 65	92.5	4.2	0.9	2.4

6.2 PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND ELECTIONS

6.2.1 Over seven in 10 respondents felt that they had at most some say in what the government does; older and politically interested respondents were more optimistic about their ability to impact government policies

The next set of questions pertains to political action. The first question asks how much people believe they have a say in government actions, while subsequent questions ask respondents to report on whether they have participated in different types of political actions before, or whether they would do so in the future. For the first question, the most popular options are “some” and “very little”, indicating that respondents believe that they do have some, but not much, power to effect changes on government decisions or politics (see Figure 143).

Figure 143: Perception of say in what the government does ("How much would you say the political system allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?")



Most respondents in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan felt that they had some say in what the government does. However, in Malaysia and Japan, most felt they had a lot of say (see Figure 144).

Figure 144: Perception of say in what the government does, by polity



Older respondents were more optimistic about their ability to affect government policies; compared with 34.8 per cent of those above 65 years old who answered “a great deal” or “a lot”, only 23.2 per cent of those between 21 and 35 years old answered in the same vein (see Table 222).

Table 222: Perception of say in what the government does, by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 1,973***	**How much would you say the political system in your country allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?**				
	A great deal	**A lot**	**Some**	**Very little**	**Not at all**
21-35	7.2	16.0	44.3	26.1	6.4
36-50	10.0	21.6	36.2	23.8	8.4
51-65	11.4	17.2	39.3	24.3	7.8
Above 65	13.1	21.7	35.2	21.1	8.9

Politically interested respondents were more likely to believe that the political system allows ordinary people a say in what the government does. While 25.3 per cent of those who were politically uninterested said that they had a great deal or a lot of say, 35.2 per cent of the politically interested gave the same answers (see Table 223).

Table 223: Perception of say in what the government does, by political interest

Political Interest *N = 1,973*	How much would you say the political system in your country allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?				
	A great deal	A lot	Some	Very little	Not at all
Yes	12.6	22.6	38.5	19.8	6.5
No	8.7	16.6	39.5	26.7	8.5

6.2.2 Respondents largely believed that votes were counted fairly, women had equal opportunities to run for office, and that election officials were fair; very few indicated that voters were bribed or threatened with violence

The next set of questions ask respondents about their perceptions of elections in Singapore. They span topics like fairness of the elections, media coverage, treatment of voters, and gender representation. There are varying responses to each of these questions. In general, treatment of voters was viewed quite positively, with under three per cent of the population perceiving voters being bribed or threatened with violence. For these questions, the proportions of respondents who stated they did not know how to answer or who refused to answer were included, as these responses can also provide an understanding of topics deemed by respondents as too sensitive or complicated to examine in the context of a survey (see Figure 145).

Figure 145: Perception of elections by frequency of occurence ("In your view, how often do these things occur in Singapore's elections?")



6.2.3 A majority of Singaporean respondents felt that their votes were counted fairly; older and higher-educated respondents were most likely to believe their votes were counted fairly

Over half of respondents (54.8 per cent) believe that votes are counted fairly in Singapore. Within selected polities of comparison, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, and the UK had a majority of its respondents who felt that their votes were counted fairly very often or fairly often, while Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong, and the US had lower proportions of its respondents who felt the same way (see Figure 146).

Figure 146: Perceived frequency of occurrence (votes are counted fairly), by polity



Compared to 2012, a slightly larger proportion indicated that votes are counted fairly very often. In contrast, a larger proportion of respondents in 2012 chose the “fairly often” option instead. Meanwhile, 10.4 per cent, compared to 5.9 per cent in 2012, did not answer the question (see Figure 147).

Figure 147: Perceived frequency of occurrence (votes are counted fairly), across WVS waves



Compared to the older age groups, respondents who are aged between 21 and 35 are more likely to choose "fairly often" rather than "very often". It was also the only group with less than half choosing "very often". It thus appears that the youngest group is slightly more sceptical about the fairness of vote counting (see Table 224).

Table 224: Perceived frequency of occurrence (votes are counted fairly), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	**In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Votes are counted fairly**					
	Refused	**Don't know**	**Very often**	**Fairly often**	**Not often**	**Not at all often**
21-35	0.5	13.9	44.6	34.8	5.1	1.1
36-50	0.9	8.1	56.5	29.2	3.2	2.1
51-65	0.7	8.6	59.5	26.2	3.9	1.1
Above 65	1.2	8.1	62.8	26.1	0.6	1.2

Respondents with diploma or professional qualifications were the most likely to choose "fairly often" – while 36.1 per cent chose this option, around 27 per cent of all the other groups did the same. In contrast, university graduates were the most positive about fair vote counting, with 60 per cent saying that it happens very often in Singapore (see Table 225).

Table 225: Perceived frequency of occurrence (votes are counted fairly, by education level

Education Level *N = 2,008*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Votes are counted fairly					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Below secondary	1.1	12.3	55.8	27.6	2.7	0.5
Secondary / ITE	0.7	9.0	55.4	27.6	5.3	1.9
Dip. / Prof. qual.	0.5	12.7	45.8	36.1	3.2	1.7
Bachelor's and above	0.9	7.5	60.0	27.8	2.5	1.2

Nearly four in ten Conservative Autocrats indicated they did not know if votes are counted fairly, the highest proportion amongst the four clusters. It was also the group that displayed the least amount of confidence in fair counting of votes during elections – while over 80 per cent of all the other clusters felt there was fair vote counting very often or fairly often, only 49.5 per cent of Conservative Autocrats felt the same (see Table 226).

Table 226: Perceived frequency of occurrence (votes are counted fairly), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Votes are counted fairly					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Conservative Democrats	0.2	5.8	57.8	31.9	2.9	1.4
Conservative Autocrats	7.4	39.7	26.4	23.1	1.7	1.7
Secular Liberals	1.1	6.0	57.5	31.2	2.8	1.4
Middle Grounder	0.3	11.5	55.6	26.4	4.9	1.3

6.2.4 Singapore respondents were among the least likely to feel that opposition candidates are very or fairly often prevented from running; higher-educated respondents were less optimistic about the prospects of a political opposition

The reactions to the question about the opposition being prevented from running were mixed. Overall, 6.2 per cent said this happened very often, 19.6 per cent said it happened fairly often, and 19.8 per cent either said they did not know or refused to answer. Within Asian countries, more than a majority of Malaysian, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese respondents felt that opposition candidates were very or fairly often prevented from running for elections, while respondents from Singapore, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea had less than 50 per cent who felt the same. In Australia, the US, and the UK, respondents largely felt that opposition candidates were not often or not at all often prevented from running for elections (see Figure 148).

Figure 148: Perceived frequency of occurrence (opposition candidates are prevented from running), by polity



Around 27 per cent in both waves indicated that opposition candidates are prevented from running in elections very or fairly often. Meanwhile, a slightly smaller proportion of respondents in 2020 felt that this event happens not at all often compared to 2012 (see Figure 149).

Figure 149: Perceived frequency of occurrence (opposition candidates are prevented from running), across WVS waves



While around 30 per cent of those with secondary school or ITE qualifications and below say that opposition candidates are not at all often prevented from running, similar proportions of the better educated chose “not often” instead. Meanwhile, 26.4 per cent of the respondents with diploma or professional qualifications indicated they did not know the answer to this question, more so than any other group. It appears that the respondents with lower education qualifications are slightly more positive about the political system allowing space for the opposition (see Table 227).

Table 227: Perceived frequency of occurrence (opposition candidates are prevented from running), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,008*	**In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Opposition candidates are prevented from running**					
	Refused	**Don't know**	**Very often**	**Fairly often**	**Not often**	**Not at all often**
Below secondary	1.3	21.7	5.4	17.4	23.3	30.8
Secondary / ITE	0.7	17.9	6.5	19.1	25.5	30.3
Dip. / Prof. qual.	0.5	26.4	6.7	18.7	28.1	19.7
Bachelor's and above	0.9	14.1	6.3	21.0	32.5	25.3

Conservative Democrats were the most confident about opposition candidates not being prevented from running in elections, with 32 per cent indicating that this does not happen often at all. In contrast, only 16.5 per cent of Conservative Autocrats and Secular Liberals indicated likewise (see Table 228).

Table 228: Perceived frequency of occurrence (opposition candidates are prevented from running), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Opposition candidates are prevented from running					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Conservative Democrats	0.3	21.3	6.2	15.8	24.4	32.0
Conservative Autocrats	9.1	54.5	1.7	8.3	9.9	16.5
Secular Liberals	0.4	8.4	9.1	27.4	38.2	16.5
Middle Grounder	0.3	14.2	6.0	22.4	31.5	25.6

6.2.5 Less than a third of Singapore respondents believed that TV news often favours the ruling party; politically interested respondents and those not confident in TV were likelier to express such sentiments

Overall, 30.6 per cent felt that TV news favours the governing party fairly often. This was the most popular option, while the rest of the respondents were distributed quite equally amongst the rest of the categories. Most polities in comparison had similar proportions of respondents (less than 20 per cent) who felt that TV news favoured the governing party very often. Only Malaysia and Taiwan had almost double the above proportion, with around 40 per cent indicating "very often" (see Figure 150).

Figure 150: Perceived frequency of occurrence (TV news favours the governing party), by polity



The proportion of respondents who felt that TV news favours the governing party increased slightly when comparing 2020 results with those from 2012. In addition, 19 per cent in 2020 did not answer the question, an increase from the 8.6 per cent in 2012 (see Figure 151).

Figure 151: Perceived frequency of occurrence (TV news favours the governing party), across WVS waves



Compared to those who were politically interested, respondents who were not were less likely to say that TV news favours the governing party very often. In addition, a larger proportion of those who were politically uninterested did not answer the question (see Table 229).

Table 229: Perceived frequency of occurrence (TV news favours the governing party), by political interest

Political Interest *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? TV news favours the governing party					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Yes	0.7	9.6	26.4	1.7	18.4	13.1
No	1.1	23.0	14.9	29.8	19.5	11.6

Secular Liberals were the most likely to say that TV news favours the governing party very or fairly often, with over three quarters indicating as such. Meanwhile, Conservative Democrats were most likely to say it does not happen often; 36.7 per cent selected either "not often" or "not at all often" (see Table 230).

Table 230: Perceived frequency of occurrence (TV news favours the governing party), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? TV news favours the governing party					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Conservative Democrats	0.4	20.8	14.6	27.5	20.3	16.4
Conservative Autocrats	9.9	59.5	1.7	14.9	7.4	6.6
Secular Liberals	0	6.0	35.4	40.0	12.3	6.3
Middle Grounders	0.4	12.4	21.4	33.3	22.4	10.1

Respondents who had confidence in television were more likely to indicate that favouritism does not occur often, with 21.1 per cent choosing "not often" and 13.4 per cent choosing "not at all often". In contrast, over 60 per cent of those who had no confidence in television chose the "very often" and "fairly often" options (see Table 231).

Table 231: Perceived frequency of occurrence (TV news favours the governing party), by confidence in TV

Confidence in TV *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? TV news favours the governing party					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Confident	0.8	23.2	13.6	27.9	21.1	13.4
Not confident	0.7	9.7	27.4	34.5	17.1	10.6

6.2.6 Singapore had the lowest proportion of respondents who believed that voters are bribed very or fairly often; older respondents were less likely to believe that voters are bribed

Nearly half, or 47.7 per cent, indicated that voters were not at all often bribed. However, 21.5 per cent refused to answer this question. Regardless, less than 10 per cent chose the "very often" or "fairly often" options. This is indicative that most perceived no widespread bribery of voters during elections. Given the absence of any recent criminal case or credible rumour about election bribes, those who reported that such bribery occurred may have been referring to offers of estate upgrading made by the ruling party to voters in previous elections. High levels of trust were also found in other Asian polities such as Japan, South Korea, and Hong Kong.

Comparatively, other Asian polities such as Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan saw lower levels of trust in the country's elections, with around or more than 20 per cent of its respondents believing that voters are bribed very often during elections. When compared to non-Asian polities, Australia, the US, and the UK had slightly higher levels of trust in elections relative to Singapore (see Figure 152).

Figure 152: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are bribed), by polity



There were fairly high levels of confidence in the country's elections being relatively free of bribery across WVS waves, with 12.4 per cent of respondents in 2012 indicating that voters are bribed very or fairly often, and 9.4 per cent indicating likewise in 2020. There was, however, an increase in the proportion of respondents choosing not to answer the question when comparing the 2012 and 2020 results (see Figure 153).

Figure 153: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are bribed), across WVS waves



Older respondents were more likely to choose "not at all often" compared to younger respondents. While 64 per cent of those above 65 years old chose this option, only 35 per cent of the youngest group did so, with a much larger proportion choosing "not often" instead (see Table 232).

Table 232: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are bribed), by political interest

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	**In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Voters are bribed**					
	Refused	**Don't know**	**Very often**	**Fairly often**	**Not often**	**Not at all often**
21-35	0.4	22.1	2.5	8.2	31.9	35.0
36-50	1.2	18.7	2.3	7.8	22.4	47.5
51-65	0.9	22.8	2.9	6.4	15.5	51.5
Above 65	0.9	18.3	1.8	3.3	11.7	64.0

Over 70 per cent of Conservative Autocrats did not answer this question. Amongst the rest of the clusters, Conservative Democrats were the most confident that there was no bribing of voters, with 70.1 per cent saying it happens not at all often or not often (see Table 233).

Table 233: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are bribed), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Voters are bribed					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Conservative Democrats	0.4	22.4	2.7	4.3	14.5	55.6
Conservative Autocrats	9.9	60.3	0	0	11.6	18.2
Secular Liberals	0	8.1	4.2	11.9	37.2	38.6
Middle Grounder	0.1	16.8	1.7	9.1	25.4	46.8

6.2.7 Singapore had the highest proportion of respondents who believed that journalists very often provide fair coverage of elections; older, lower-income, and those confident in the press were likelier to indicate so

There is a reasonable level of trust in journalism standards, with 16.7 per cent saying that journalists provide fair coverage of elections very often and 41.6 per cent saying that it happens fairly often. High levels of trust in journalists can be seen within Asian polities like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. However, less than 10 per cent of South Korean respondents felt that journalists very frequently provided fair coverage of elections. Amongst non-Asian polities, the UK had relatively lower levels of trust in its journalists compared to Australia and the US (see Figure 154).

Figure 154: Perceived frequency of occurrence (journalists provide fair coverage by elections), by polity



There was not much change in opinions about journalist coverage of elections when comparing 2012 and 2020 results. Over half of the respondents in both waves indicated that journalists provide fair elections coverage very or fairly often (see Figure 155).

Figure 155: Perceived frequency of occurrence (journalists provide fair coverage by elections), across WVS waves



While "fairly often" is the most popular response category for all age groups, there were differences in where each group skewed towards. Respondents older than 50 years old were more likely to answer either "very often" or "fairly often", but those younger than 50 years old were more likely to reply with either "fairly often" or "not often". Therefore, there seems to be higher trust in journalism fairness amongst the older respondents (see Table 234).

Table 234: Perceived frequency of occurrence (journalists provide fair coverage by elections), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Journalists provide fair coverage of elections					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
21-35	0.4	15.8	8.3	40.9	29.5	5.1
36-50	0.9	12.0	15.0	42.0	22.1	8.0
51-65	1.1	12.5	21.4	39.8	18.9	6.4
Above 65	1.2	9.9	28.5	39.3	15.6	5.4

Conservative Democrats were the most confident about fair journalist coverage of elections, with 22.3 per cent indicating "very often" and 45.7 per cent indicating "fairly often". Meanwhile, similar proportions of Secular Liberals and Middle Grounders (over 48 per cent) indicated the same (see Table 235).

Table 235: Perceived frequency of occurrence (journalists provide fair coverage by elections), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Journalists provide fair coverage of elections					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Conservative Democrats	0.1	8.4	22.3	45.7	18.0	5.5
Conservative Autocrats	9.1	54.5	9.1	18.2	6.6	2.5
Secular Liberals	0	6.0	10.2	37.9	37.5	8.4
Middle Grounder	0.7	14.2	14.8	39.1	24.0	7.2

Respondents who expressed confidence in the press were more likely to say that journalists provide fair coverage of elections very or fairly often. Compared to 67.7 per cent of this group, only 46.6 per cent of those who were not confident in the press chose these two options (see Table 236).

Table 236: Perceived frequency of occurrence (journalists provide fair coverage by elections), by confidence in the press

Confidence in the Press *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Journalists provide fair coverage of elections					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Confident	0.5	12.8	21.0	46.7	14.9	4.0
Not confident	0.6	10.9	12.8	33.8	32.3	9.6

When compared across income levels, most groups were more skewed towards answering "fairly often" and "not often". The only exception was the group earning between $1,500 and $2,999, where nearly equal proportions of respondents chose "very often" and "not often". Among those who had an income of $7,000 and above, 36.4 per cent believed that journalists did not often or at all often provide fair coverage of elections (see Table 237).

Table 237: Perceived frequency of occurrence (journalists provide fair coverage by elections), by income

Income *N = 1,224*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Journalists provide fair coverage of elections					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Below $1,500	0.5	11.1	19.8	42.4	22.1	4.1
$1,500 - $2,999	0.3	11.9	22.5	38.6	20.3	6.4
$3,000 - $4,999	0.8	14.8	9.9	45.4	23.7	5.4
$5,000 - $6,999	0	12.7	10.9	44.8	25.5	6.1
Above $6,999	0.6	8.8	9.4	44.7	28.9	7.5

6.2.8 Singapore had the highest proportion of respondents who expressed that election officials are very often fair; older respondents were likelier to hold such a view

When asked about whether election officials were fair, an overwhelming majority chose either "very often" (43.2 per cent) or "fairly often" (38.3 per cent). This indicates a high level of trust in the integrity of election officials in Singapore. Across selected polities, levels of trust in election officials are high. The only exceptions were Malaysia and South Korea, which reported relatively higher proportions who felt that their election officials were not often or not at all often fair (see Figure 156).

Figure 156: Perceived frequency of occurrence (election officials are fair), by polity



Compared to 2012, a larger proportion of respondents in 2020 said that elections officials are fair very often. Overall, 81.5 per cent said in 2020 that election officials are fair very or fairly often, an increase from the 78 per cent in 2012 (see Figure 157).

Figure 157: Perceived frequency of occurrence (election officials are fair), across WVS waves



While the vast majority of all ages chose either "very often" or "fairly often", there were some differences in the distribution of responses between these two categories. Older respondents were more likely to express very high levels of trust, with 49.6 per cent of those aged between 51 and 65 years old and 55 per cent of those above 65 years old choosing "very often". In comparison, the distribution of responses was more even for those aged between 36 and 50 years, while a larger proportion of the youngest group chose "fairly often" (see Table 238).

Table 238: Perceived frequency of occurrence (election officials are fair), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	**In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Election officials are fair**					
	Refused	**Don't know**	**Very often**	**Fairly often**	**Not often**	**Not at all often**
21-35	0.4	14.9	30.4	44.2	9.1	1.1
36-50	0.7	11.1	43.8	37.8	4.6	1.9
51-65	0.9	9.4	49.6	35.3	4.6	0.2
Above 65	1.2	9.3	55.0	31.5	1.8	1.2

Nearly half of Conservative Democrats felt that election officials are fair very often, while 44.9 per cent of Secular Liberals said the same. Meanwhile, Conservative Autocrats were least likely to choose this option, likely because more than half did not answer the question (see Table 239).

Table 239: Perceived frequency of occurrence (election officials are fair), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	**In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Election officials are fair**					
	Refused	**Don't know**	**Very often**	**Fairly often**	**Not often**	**Not at all often**
Conservative Democrats	0.3	5.9	49.5	39.5	3.7	1.1
Conservative Autocrats	7.4	48.8	17.4	25.6	0	0.8
Secular Liberals	0	7.0	44.9	38.9	7.7	1.4
Middle Grounders	0.4	13.8	39.9	37.4	7.5	1.0

6.2.9 Singapore had the lowest proportion of respondents who believed that rich people buy elections very or fairly often; older respondents were likelier to believe so

For the question on whether rich people buy elections, "not often at all" was the most popular option, with 46.2 per cent choosing this response. There thus appears to be quite a lot of confidence that elections are not affected by the wealthy. This confidence can also be found in other polities of comparison, including Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, other polities like Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, Australia, the US, and the UK had less confidence that elections were not swayed by the rich as a higher proportion of their respondents indicated that rich people buy elections very often (see Figure 158).

Figure 158: Perceived frequency of occurrence (rich people buy elections), by polity



Similar sentiments are expressed in both waves regarding this question. Overall, less than 11 per cent of each wave cohort indicated that rich people buy elections very or fairly often, while the vast majority indicate that it happens not often or not at all often (see Figure 159).

Figure 159: Perceived frequency of occurrence (rich people buy elections), across WVS waves



While the majority of respondents aged above 50 years old answered “not at all often”, the younger respondents were less cautious in their answers; 22.1 per cent of those aged between

36 and 50 chose “not often”, while 45.4 per cent chose “not at all often”. Meanwhile, there was a nearly equal distribution between these two categories (around 31 per cent) for those aged between 21 and 35 (see Table 240).

Table 240: Perceived frequency of occurrence (rich people buy elections), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	**In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Rich people buy elections**					
	Refused	**Don't know**	**Very often**	**Fairly often**	**Not often**	**Not at all often**
21-35	0.4	24.8	2.4	9.8	31.7	31.0
36-50	0.9	23.5	2.1	6.0	22.1	45.4
51-65	0.7	24.6	0.9	4.3	16.2	53.3
Above 65	0.6	22.2	0.6	2.1	10.8	63.7

Conservative Democrats were the most confident that the rich do not buy elections, with 52.7 per cent saying it happens not often at all. Secular Liberals and Middle Grounders were also quite confident, with over 70 per cent choosing the two least frequent options (see Table 241).

Table 241: Perceived frequency of occurrence (rich people buy elections), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	**In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Rich people buy elections**					
	Refused	**Don't know**	**Very often**	**Fairly often**	**Not often**	**Not at all often**
Conservative Democrats	0.2	25.9	1.3	3.5	16.3	52.7
Conservative Autocrats	7.4	63.6	0.8	0	4.1	24.0
Secular Liberals	0	11.6	4.2	13.0	30.5	40.7
Middle Grounder	0.3	19.5	1.0	7.2	26.9	45.1

6.2.10 Singapore had the lowest proportion of respondents who believed that voters are very or fairly often threatened with violence at the polls; older and wealthier respondents were likelier to believe that it never happens

Within this set of questions, respondents were mostly confident that voters being threatened with violence at the polls did not happen in Singapore; 66.3 per cent chose “not at all often”, while 12.1 per cent selected “not often”. Such high confidence in non-violence at the polls was also found amongst the Japanese, South Koreans, Hong Kongers, Taiwanese, Australians, Americans and British. Meanwhile, Malaysian and Thai respondents had relatively lower confidence about the lack of violence at the polls (see Figure 160).

Figure 160: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are threatened with violence at the polls), by polity



Compared to the results from 2012, a smaller proportion of respondents indicated that there are threats of violence towards voters very or fairly often. However, around two thirds in both waves indicated that this happens not at all often (see Figure 161).

Figure 161: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are threatened with violence at the polls), across WVS waves



While the majority of each age group chose “not at all often”, the younger respondents were more cautious in their responses. Compared to 74.2 per cent of the oldest group, only 57.1 per cent of the youngest group selected “not at all often”. Meanwhile, 18.8 per cent of the youngest group chose “not often” instead (see Table 242).

Table 242: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are threatened with violence at the polls), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections? Voters are threatened with violence at the polls					
	Refused	Don’t know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
21-35	0.5	20.5	0.4	2.7	18.8	57.1
36-50	0.9	16.3	0.9	1.6	12.2	68.2
51-65	0.5	18.2	1.2	2.1	8.0	69.9
Above 65	0.6	16.5	0.9	0.3	7.5	74.2

Respondents who earn over $6,999 are the most confident that violence against voters does not happen, as all the respondents who answered the question chose either “not often” or “not at all often”. Furthermore, 73.6 per cent answered the question with “not at all often”. In contrast, the groups earning between $1,500 and $4,999 were slightly more sceptical, with small proportions answering “very often” and “fairly often”, and around 59 per cent choosing “not at all often” (see Table 243).

Table 243: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are threatened with violence at the polls), by income

Income *N = 1,224*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections? Voters are threatened with violence at the polls					
	Refused	Don’t know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Below $1,500	0.5	12.0	1.4	4.1	15.7	66.4
$1,500 - $2,999	0.3	24.8	1.9	1.3	12.8	59.5
$3,000 - $4,999	0.8	25.8	0.3	1.6	12.6	58.9
$5,000 - $6,999	0	11.5	0.6	1.8	13.9	72.1
Above $6,999	1.3	13.8	0	0	11.3	73.6

Secular Liberals were the most confident that voter violence does not happen, with 17.2 per cent choosing the “not often” option and 73 per cent choosing the “not at all often” option. Middle Grounders were also quite positive about the situation, given that 15.7 per cent chose “not often” and 67.8 per cent chose “not at all often” (see Table 244).

Table 244: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are threatened with violence at the polls), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Voters are threatened with violence at the polls					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Conservative Democrats	0.2	21.0	0.7	1.3	8.8	68.0
Conservative Autocrats	5.8	54.5	1.7	0	4.1	33.9
Secular Liberals	0	6.0	1.4	2.5	17.2	73.0
Middle Grounders	0.6	12.6	0.7	2.6	15.7	67.8

6.2.11 Singapore had the second-highest proportion of respondents who believed that voters are offered a genuine choice in elections; male and older respondents were likelier to hold such a view

When asked whether voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections, 41.2 per cent said "very often", and 34 per cent said "fairly often". Respondents, therefore, seem quite happy with their electoral choices in general. Singapore had the second-highest proportion of respondents who believe that genuine choices are offered to voters in elections after Taiwan. Similar results were found in Thailand and Japan, whereas Malaysia, South Korea, and Hong Kong saw relatively lower confidence that voters were offered genuine choice during elections. Within non-Asian polities, Australian respondents had higher confidence in genuine choice during elections compared to the US (see Figure 162).

Figure 162: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections), by polity



Compared to 2012, there was a slight increase in confidence about voters being offered a genuine choice in elections. While 30 per cent in 2012 chose the "very often" option, the proportion increased to 41.2 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 163).

Figure 163: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections), across WVS waves



When compared to male respondents, female respondents appear slightly more content with their electoral choices, with 45.6 per cent (compared with 37.4 per cent of males) saying that voters are very often offered a genuine choice (see Table 245).

Table 245: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections), by gender

Gender ***N = 2,012***	**In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections**					
	Refused	**Don't know**	**Very often**	**Fairly often**	**Not often**	**Not at all often**
Male	0.6	10.3	37.4	34.2	12.7	4.8
Female	0.6	9.5	45.6	32.5	7.4	4.3

Older respondents were more likely to say that voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections very often. In contrast, younger respondents were more likely to choose "fairly often". In particular, a higher proportion of the respondents aged between 21 and 35 chose "fairly often" compared to "very often", while the rest of the age groups presented the opposite pattern (see Table 246).

Table 246: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections), by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 2,012***	**In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections**					
	Refused	**Don't know**	**Very often**	**Fairly often**	**Not often**	**Not at all often**
21-35	0.5	13.9	26.4	39.9	14.9	4.3
36-50	0.9	9.9	40.3	34.1	10.6	4.2
51-65	0.5	7.8	48.1	30.5	7.5	5.5
Above 65	0.6	6.3	59.5	25.8	4.2	3.6

Amongst the clusters, Conservative Democrats were most likely to say that voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections very often. 49.6 per cent chose this option, compared to 22.3 per cent of Conservative Autocrats, 31.6 per cent of Secular Liberals, and 39.4 per cent of Middle Grounders (see Table 247).

Table 247: Perceived frequency of occurrence (voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Voters are offered a genuine choice in the elections					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Conservative Democrats	0.1	6.0	49.6	33.8	6.0	4.4
Conservative Autocrats	7.4	40.5	22.3	22.3	5.0	2.5
Secular Liberals	0.4	7.0	31.6	18.2	5.3	1.4
Middle Grounder	0.3	10.6	39.4	32.8	12.2	4.7

6.2.12 Singaporean respondents were among the most likely to believe that women have equal opportunities to run for office compared with other polities; older and less-educated folks were likelier to believe so

Most respondents were quite positive about the opportunities for women in office, with 49.7 per cent selecting "very often" and 32.3 per cent selecting "fairly often". As this question was not asked in 2012, we compare the results only with selected polities. Singapore, Thailand, Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan were similarly optimistic about women's chances to run for office. Meanwhile, Malaysian and South Korean respondents were least optimistic about women having equal opportunities to run for office (see Figure 164).

Figure 164: Perceived frequency of occurrence (women have equal opportunities to run the office), by polity



Older respondents perceive greater gender equality in the political sphere compared to younger respondents; more younger respondents also chose “not often” compared to older respondents. While 35.9 per cent of the youngest age groups felt that women have equal opportunities to run the office very often, 67 per cent of the oldest age groups indicated likewise (see Table 248).

Table 248: Perceived frequency of occurrence (women have equal opportunities to run the office), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections? Women have equal opportunities to run the office					
	Refused	Don’t know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
21-35	0.7	14.9	35.9	36.6	10.0	2.0
36-50	1.1	7.2	48.9	33.6	6.9	2.3
51-65	0.5	7.3	54.5	31.0	4.1	2.5
Above 65	0.3	5.7	67.0	21.9	3.3	1.8

Overall, respondents with lower education levels were more likely to answer “very often”. Meanwhile, the response proportions for those with diploma and professional qualifications and university degrees were fairly similar; about 80 per cent of respondents in these groups felt that women had equal opportunities to run for office very or fairly often (see Table 249).

Table 249: Perceived frequency of occurrence (women have equal opportunities to run the office), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,008*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country’s elections? Women have equal opportunities to run the office					
	Refused	Don’t know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Below secondary	0.5	10.2	61.4	23.1	2.4	2.4
Secondary / ITE	0.5	8.8	52.2	30.4	5.7	2.3
Dip. / Prof. qual.	0.5	10.4	43.3	37.8	6.7	1.2
Bachelor’s and above	1.0	7.6	45.5	34.3	9.0	2.5

Conservative Democrats were the most optimistic about women’s chances of running for office, with 59.6 per cent choosing the “very often” option. Meanwhile, some Secular Liberals seem to be less positive about the situation, given that 16.5 per cent said women have equal opportunities to run for office not often or not at all often (see Table 250).

Table 250: Perceived frequency of occurrence (women have equal opportunities to run the office), by cluster

Cluster *N = 2,012*	In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections? Women have equal opportunities to run the office					
	Refused	Don't know	Very often	Fairly often	Not often	Not at all often
Conservative Democrats	0.2	5.2	59.6	29.9	2.7	2.4
Conservative Autocrats	6.6	38.8	28.9	19.8	3.3	2.5
Secular Liberals	0.4	6.0	40.7	36.5	13.3	3.2
Middle Grounder	0.4	10.3	44.7	34.3	8.8	1.4

6.3 ACTIVISM

6.3.1 More than one-fifth of respondents have donated to a group or campaign and searched for information about politics, while very few have organised political activities or events

With regards to the different types of political actions, the most popular ones amongst respondents were donations and contacting government officials. In contrast, they mostly shied away from anything to do with physical demonstrations or organising political events, with 91.6 per cent and 88 per cent saying they would never organise political activities and join strikes, respectively. In general, it appears that younger respondents and those from better socioeconomic backgrounds were more likely to have done many of these actions before, or at least say that they might do so in the future (see Figure 165).

Figure 165: Types of political action



6.3.2 Singaporean respondents were among the least likely to have signed a petition; politically interested and higher-educated respondents were likelier to have done so

Compared to the various forms of political action posed to respondents, signing a petition was relatively more common for Singaporean respondents, with 15.2 per cent having done it before and 28.7 per cent saying that they might do it in the future. With the exception of Japan, respondents in Asian polities like Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, China, Hong Kong and Taiwan had less than 30 per cent indicating that they signed a petition before. In contrast, non-Asian polities have high levels of signing petitions, with at least 60 per cent of its respondents having done so (see Figure 166).

Figure 166: Political action (Signing a petition), by polity



Compared to respondents in 2002, a larger proportion in 2020 indicated having signed a petition before. This is likely the reason for the group indicating “might do” decreasing from 38 per cent in 2002 to 28.7 per cent in 2020. Meanwhile, the proportion of respondents saying they would never sign a petition increased slightly from 52.2 per cent to 56.1 per cent (see Figure 167).

Figure 167: Political action (Signing a petition), across WVS waves



** This question was not asked in 2012*

There was a big difference in the proportions of respondents who have signed petitions before when comparing across political interest levels. While 23.8 per cent of the politically interested reported having signed petitions before, only 9.9 per cent of those who were not politically interested have done the same. Politically interested respondents were also more likely to indicate that they might do so in the future (see Table 251).

Table 251: Political action (signing a petition), by political interest

Political Interest ***N = 1,995***	**I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Signing a petition**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Yes	23.8	35.5	40.8
No	9.9	24.4	65.7

Individuals with diploma qualifications or above are much more likely to have signed petitions before, or indicate they might do it in the future. While 8.4 per cent of those with secondary or ITE qualifications and only 1.6 per cent of those with below secondary school education have signed petitions before, 18 per cent of those with diploma or professional qualifications and 26.5 per cent of those with university degrees have done so. In addition, 40.3 per cent of those with university degrees and 35.5 per cent of those with diploma or professional qualifications expressed that they might sign petitions in the future (see Table 252).

Table 252: Political action (signing a petition), by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,991***	**I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Signing a petition**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below secondary	1.6	9.2	89.2
Secondary / ITE	8.4	22.5	69.1
Dip. / Prof. qual.	18.0	35.5	46.5
Bachelor's and above	26.5	40.3	33.2

6.3.3 Singapore had the lowest proportion of respondents who indicated having joined boycotts; males, the politically interested, higher-educated, and more affluent were likelier to have done so

Joining in boycotts was not a very popular political action, with very few respondents saying they have done it before or might do it in the future. In general, there were very few differences across demographic variables for the proportion of respondents who have joined boycotts before. There was, however, more variation in the proportions that stated they might do so in the future. Compared to other selected polities, Singapore had the highest proportion of respondents who indicated that they would never join in a boycott (79.1 per cent). Singapore's low proportion of previous participation is similar to Japan, South Korea, and China.

In comparison, Malaysia, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan had relatively higher proportions of respondents who have participated in boycotts before. Meanwhile, non-Asian polities like Australia, the US, the UK, Sweden, and Switzerland report a majority of its respondents indicating that they have joined a boycott before or might join a boycott in future (see Figure 168).

Figure 168: Political action (joining in boycotts), by polity



Sentiments towards, and actual participation in, boycotts did not change very much from 2002 to 2020. The vast majority indicated that they would never join boycotts, while around 20 per cent said that they either have done or might do so in the future (see Figure 169).

Figure 169: Political action (joining in boycotts), across WVS waves



** This question was not asked in 2012*

While similar proportions of male and female respondents have joined boycotts before, males were more likely to be open to the possibility. Compared to 14.7 per cent of females who said that they might join boycotts in the future, 22.7 per cent of males gave the same answer (see Table 253).

Table 253: Political action (joining in boycotts), by gender

Gender ***N = 1,995***	**I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Joining in boycotts**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Male	2.5	22.7	74.8
Female	1.6	14.7	83.7

There was not much difference in participation rates when comparing across political interest levels. However, politically interested respondents were more likely to indicate that they were open to doing so in the future (see Table 254).

Table 254: Political action (joining in boycotts), by political interest

Political Interest *N = 1,995*	**I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Joining in boycotts**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Yes	4.2	28.2	67.6
No	0.7	12.7	86.6

Educational attainment seems to be a big determinant of whether individuals might be open to joining boycotts in the future. Compared to 1.9 per cent of those who had below secondary school education, 30.5 per cent of those with university degrees said that they might join boycotts (see Table 255).

Table 255: Political action (joining in boycotts), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,991*	**I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Joining in boycotts**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below secondary	0	1.9	98.1
Secondary / ITE	1.4	12.3	86.3
Dip. / Prof. qual.	2.0	22.4	75.6
Bachelor's and above	3.6	30.5	65.9

In general, respondents residing in larger housing were more likely to indicating joining boycotts in the future. While 11.1 per cent of those residing in 1- to 3-room flats were open to the possibility, 31.1 per cent of private property dwellers answered likewise (see Table 256).

Table 256: Political action (joining in boycotts), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,995*	**I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Joining in boycotts**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
1- to 3-room HDB	1.4	11.1	87.5
4-room HDB	1.4	16.6	82.0
5-room HDB	2.6	21.1	76.3
Pte. property	3.6	31.1	65.3

6.3.4 Singapore had the highest proportion of respondents who indicated they would never attend lawful/peaceful demonstrations; the politically disinterested and less-educated were less likely to express interest in demonstrations

Attending peaceful demonstrations was another unpopular political action, with only 1.9 per cent saying they have done so and another 24 per cent saying they might do it in the future. Compared to other selected polities, Singapore had the lowest proportion of respondents who indicated that they had attended peaceful demonstrations. In contrast to non-Asian polities like Australia, the US, the UK, Sweden, and Switzerland, Asian polities saw lower proportions of respondents who attended lawful or peaceful demonstrations (see Figure 170).

Figure 170: Political action (attending peaceful demonstrations), by polity



There were similar response patterns across waves when it came to attending lawful or peaceful demonstrations. Around three quarters in both waves indicated that they would never do so, while 1.9 per cent said they had done it before (see Figure 171).

Figure 171: Political action (attending peaceful demonstrations), across WVS waves



** This question was not asked in 2012*

Less than five per cent of respondents have attended peaceful demonstrations before regardless of political interest levels. However, politically interested individuals were more likely to indicate that they might attend demonstrations in the future (see Table 257).

Table 257: Political action (attending peaceful demonstrations), by political interest

Political Interest ***N = 1,985***	**I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Attending peaceful demonstrations**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Yes	3.4	35.1	61.5
No	0.8	17.0	82.2

While none of the respondents with below secondary school education have attended peaceful demonstrations before, 3.8 per cent of university graduates have done so. The latter group is also much more open to joining such demonstrations in the future, with 40.4 per cent answering "might do". In contrast, only 3.2 per cent of those with below secondary school education gave the same answer (see Table 258).

Table 258: Political action (attending peaceful demonstrations), by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,981***	I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Attending peaceful demonstrations		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below secondary	0	3.2	96.8
Secondary / ITE	0.7	16.1	83.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	1.5	26.1	72.4
Bachelor's and above	3.8	40.4	55.7

6.3.5 Singapore had the highest proportion of respondents who indicated they would never join unofficial strikes; females and the less-educated were likelier to express such sentiments

With only 0.3 per cent saying they have joined strikes before, this form of political action had the lowest "take-up" rate. Furthermore, only 11.7 per cent say that they might do it in the future. Across all polities of comparison, Singapore has the highest proportion of respondents who said they would never join unofficial strikes. Such high proportions of respondents indicating that they would never join unofficial strikes were also found in the Asian polities selected for comparison, although higher proportions indicated they might do so in the future. Meanwhile, higher proportions of respondents from Australia, the US, and the UK indicated having joined an unofficial strike before (see Figure 172).

Figure 172: Political action (joining strikes), by polity



While similar proportions of male and female respondents have joined strikes before, males seem more likely to participate in the future. Compared to 8.9 per cent of female respondents, 14.1 per cent of male respondents said that they might join strikes in the future (see Table 259).

Table 259: Political action (joining strikes), by gender

Gender *N = 1,987*	**I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Joining strikes**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Male	0.4	14.1	85.5
Female	0.2	8.9	90.9

Individuals who are more educated are more likely to be open to joining strikes in the future. However, it should be noted that even among the university-educated, nearly 80 per cent indicated they would never join a strike (see Table 260).

Table 260: Political action (joining strikes), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,983*	I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Joining strikes		
	Have done	Might do	Would never do
Below secondary	0	1.1	98.9
Secondary / ITE	0.4	8.1	91.6
Dip. / Prof. qual.	0.3	11.1	88.7
Bachelor's and above	0.5	20.0	79.5

6.3.6 Singapore had the lowest proportion of respondents who indicated they have or might donate to a group or campaign; younger, higher-educated, and wealthier respondents were more likely to donate

Donations appear to be a course of action that many Singaporean respondents had done or might do, with 26.8 per cent indicating that they had done so before while 27.1 per cent said that they might do so in the future. Compared to the other selected polities, Singapore has the lowest proportion of respondents who have donated before or would do so in the future (see Figure 173).

Figure 173: Political action (donating to a group or campaign), by polity



Younger individuals appear to be more active in donating to groups or campaigns, with 35.2 per cent of the youngest group having done so before. Similar proportions of those aged below 51 years old (around 33 per cent) also stated that they might donate in the future. In comparison, 70.9 per cent of those above 65 years old said that they would never donate (see Table 261).

Table 261: Political action (donating to a group or campaign), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,996*	**What about these forms of political action and social activism that people can take? Please, tell me for each of them if you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Donating to a group or campaign**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
21-35	35.2	33.2	31.7
36-50	26.6	33.0	40.4
51-65	25.5	22.4	52.1
Above 65	17.4	11.7	70.9

Individuals with higher education and income are more likely to have donated before. They are also more likely to say that they might do so in the future. However, given that donating requires individuals to have some excess resources, there is a possibility that fewer of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are donating because they cannot afford to do so (see Tables 262 and 263).

Table 262: Political action (donating to a group or campaign), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,992*	**What about these forms of political action and social activism that people can take? Please, tell me for each of them if you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Donating to a group or campaign**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below secondary	17.2	11.6	71.2
Secondary / ITE	26.9	22.6	50.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	30.0	31.0	39.0
Bachelor's and above	31.3	35.9	32.8

Table 263: Political action (donating to a group or campaign), by income

Income *N = 1,214*	What about these forms of political action and social activism that people can take? Please, tell me for each of them if you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Donating to a group or campaign		
	Have done	Might do	Would never do
Below $1,500	21.8	24.5	53.7
$1,500 - $2,999	28.2	24.0	47.7
$3,000 - $4,999	24.1	33.8	42.2
$5,000 - $6,999	33.3	38.3	28.4
Above $6,999	32.3	36.7	31.0

6.3.7 Singaporean respondents were the most divided on their interest in contacting a government official; higher-educated and wealthier respondents were likelier to have done so or expressed interest in doing so

Many respondents are open to contacting government officials, with 15.7 per cent having done so before and 32.5 per cent saying they might do it in the future. Given that many government agencies publicise their emails and contact numbers while elected politicians hold regular Meet-the-People Sessions (MPS) to help residents who need help in navigating policies and interactions with government agencies, these numbers are not surprising. Compared with other Asian polities, lower proportions of respondents from Singapore, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have contacted a local official before. Meanwhile, non-Asian polities like Australia and the US report higher proportions compared to Singapore (see Figure 174).

Figure 174: Political action (contacting a government official), by polity



Socioeconomic factors again have a positive correlation with responses for "have done" and "might do". A much lower proportion of respondents (around 10 per cent) who have below secondary school education and who earn below $1,500 have contacted government officials before compared to the rest of the groups. In fact, a large majority of these two groups say that they would never contact a government official. In contrast, only 32.4 per cent of those with university degrees and 26.6 per cent of those earning above $6,999 say that they would never do so (see Tables 264 and 265).

Table 264: Political action (contacting a government official), by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,989***	**What about these forms of political action and social activism that people can take? Please, tell me for each of them if you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Contacting a government official**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below secondary	10.8	8.9	80.4
Secondary / ITE	13.2	26.8	59.9
Dip. / Prof. qual.	16.9	36.0	47.1
Bachelor's and above	20.1	47.4	32.5

Table 265: Political action (contacting a government official), by income

Income *N = 1,212*	**What about these forms of political action and social activism that people can take? Please, tell me for each of them if you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Contacting a government official**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below $1,500	9.3	26.5	64.2
$1,500 - $2,999	18.2	29.0	52.8
$3,000 - $4,999	12.4	39.2	48.4
$5,000 - $6,999	24.1	42.0	34.0
Above $6,999	25.3	48.1	26.6

6.3.8 Singapore had the second-highest proportion of respondents who expressed aversion in encouraging others to take political action; males and higher-educated respondents were likelier to have done so or expressed interest in doing so

Very few respondents have encouraged others to take action about political issues. However, 22.4 per cent said that they might do so in the future. With the exception of Malaysia, Singapore, and other Asian polities like Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have a majority of respondents indicating they would never encourage others to take action on political issues. The opposite is true in Australia, where a majority had encouraged others to take action or would do so in the future (see Figure 175).

Figure 175: Political action (encouraging others to take action about political issues), by polity



A slightly higher percentage of male respondents (5.5 per cent) compared to female respondents (2.8 per cent) have encouraged others to take action on political issues before. Male respondents were also more likely to be open to doing so in the future as 24.8 per cent, compared to 19.6 per cent of female respondents, chose the "might do" option (see Table 266).

Table 266: Political action (encouraging others to take action about political issues), by gender

Gender *N = 1,987*	What about these forms of political action and social activism that people can take? Please, tell me for each of them if you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Encouraging others to take action about political issues		
	Have done	Might do	Would never do
Male	5.5	24.8	69.7
Female	2.8	19.6	77.6

Respondents who had higher education were slightly more likely to have encouraged others to take political action before, and much more likely to say they might do so in the future. About 7 per cent of those who had below secondary education said they might do so in the future, while a much larger proportion of those with university degrees (34.6 per cent) gave the same answer (see Table 267).

Table 267: Political action (encouraging others to take action about political issues), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,983*	What about these forms of political action and social activism that people can take? Please, tell me for each of them if you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Encouraging others to take action about political issues		
	Have done	Might do	Would never do
Below secondary	1.1	6.5	92.5
Secondary / ITE	3.0	15.1	81.9
Dip. / Prof. qual.	3.3	25.7	71.0
Bachelor's and above	7.0	34.6	58.4

6.3.9 Asian polities, including Singapore, were less likely to have encouraged others to vote; higher-educated and higher-income respondents were more likely to have done so

Of the population, 14.1 per cent had encouraged others to vote before, while another 27.1 per cent were open to doing so. With the exception of Malaysia, respondents from Singapore and other Asian polities report low proportions of respondents who had encouraged someone to vote before. Non-Asian polities like Australia and the US report much higher proportions encouraging others to vote (see Figure 176).

Figure 176: Social activism (encouraging others to vote), by polity



Less than 10 per cent of the respondents from the two lowest education levels reported having encouraged others to vote before, as did those who earn less than $1,500. In addition, only 9.2 per cent of those with below secondary education said they might do so in the future. Meanwhile, 27.1 per cent of respondents earning below $1,500 were open to the possibility of doing so in the future. In contrast, individuals from the highest education and income groups were most likely to have encouraged others to vote before, or say that they might do so (see Tables 268 and 269).

Table 268: Social activism (encouraging others to vote), by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,987***	**What about these forms of political action and social activism that people can take? Please, tell me for each of them if you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Encouraging others to vote**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below secondary	8.1	9.2	82.7
Secondary / ITE	8.4	24.1	67.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	12.9	33.1	54.0
Bachelor's and above	22.1	36.5	41.5

Table 269: Social activism (encouraging others to vote), by income

Income *N = 1,211*	**What about these forms of political action and social activism that people can take? Please, tell me for each of them if you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Encouraging others to vote**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below $1,500	8.9	27.1	64.0
$1,500 - $2,999	13.1	23.9	63.1
$3,000 - $4,999	10.0	33.9	56.1
$5,000 - $6,999	20.1	32.9	47.0
Above $6,999	29.1	31.0	39.9

6.3.10 Asian polities, including Singapore, had low proportions of respondents who have proactively searched for political information; younger, higher-educated, and more affluent respondents were likelier to have done so

Searching for information on the Internet is a relatively common action, with 24.2 per cent saying they had done so before, while 22.7 per cent indicated that they might do so. Singapore had the second-highest proportion of respondents among Asian polities who indicated that they would never search for political information online. In contrast, non-Asian respondents like Australia and the US have much higher proportions of their respondents, indicating they have searched for political information online (see Figure 177).

Figure 177: Political actions online (searching information about politics and political events), by polity



As expected for technology-based actions, younger respondents were more likely to have done or say that they might do compared to older respondents. While over 50 per cent of the two younger groups said they have searched for political information on the Internet or might do so in the future, less than 40 per cent of the two older groups gave the same answers (see Table 270).

Table 270: Political actions online (searching information about politics and political events), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,993*	**I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Searching information about politics and political events**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
21-35	33.4	29.6	37.0
36-50	26.7	25.9	47.4
51-65	19.6	18.9	61.5
Above 65	10.3	10.9	78.8

Comparing responses across housing types, income, and education levels, similar patterns were found. Those with higher education, income, and living in larger housing types are much more likely to have searched for political information on the Internet. However, similar proportions of each group – around 20 per cent – said that they were open to doing so. The only exception was the group with below secondary school education, of which only 3.5 per cent chose "have done" and only 6.5 per cent chose "might do".

It is likely that this low proportion is an effect of age, given that a majority of this group is aged above 50 years old. Looking at the overall patterns, it appears that the availability of resources might have created some differentiation between respondents of different socioeconomic backgrounds with respect to previous actions. However, the prevalence of the Internet and smartphones seems to have made doing online searches similarly accessible as a potential action to people of all walks of life (see Tables 271 to 273).

Table 271: Political actions online (searching information about politics and political events), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,989*	**I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Searching information about politics and political events**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below secondary	3.5	6.5	90.0
Secondary / ITE	12.7	23.4	63.9
Dip. / Prof. qual.	27.8	25.5	46.8
Bachelor's and above	42.3	28.9	28.8

Table 272: Political actions online (searching information about politics and political events), by income

Income *N = 1,215*	**I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Searching information about politics and political events**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below $1,500	12.5	23.6	63.9
$1,500 - $2,999	16.3	23.8	59.9
$3,000 - $4,999	24.1	25.9	50.0
$5,000 - $6,999	35.4	30.5	34.1
Above $6,999	49.4	22.2	28.5

Table 273: Political actions online (searching information about politics and political events), by housing type

Housing type *N = 1,993*	I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Searching information about politics and political events		
	Have done	Might do	Would never do
1- to 3-room HDB	14.2	19.1	66.7
4-room HDB	20.2	23.0	56.8
5-room HDB	28.9	23.4	47.7
Private apartment/ Landed property	41.1	26.1	32.7

6.3.11 Asian polities, including Singapore, had lower proportions of respondents who have signed electronic petitions; younger and higher-educated respondents were likelier to have done so

Amongst the overall population, 14.2 per cent reported having signed an electronic petition before, while 22.2 per cent said they might do so in the future. Within Asian polities, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan reported relatively higher proportions who had signed an online petition compared to Thailand, Japan, South Korea, and China. In contrast, over 40 per cent of respondents from Australia and the US indicated they had signed electronic petitions before (see Figure 178).

Figure 178: Political actions online (signing electronic petition), by polity



Compared to three per cent of the oldest age group, 23.4 per cent of the youngest respondents reported having signed an electronic petition before. The youngest respondents also appeared to be the most open about electronic petitions, as it was the only group with less than 50 per cent choosing the "would never do" option (see Table 274).

Table 274: Political actions online (signing electronic petition), by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 1,989***	**I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Signing an electronic petition**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
21-35	23.4	32.5	44.2
36-50	14.3	25.4	60.2
51-65	11.4	16.2	72.4
Above 65	3.0	7.0	90.0

There was a big difference between those with below secondary school education and those with university degrees. 0.8 per cent of those in the first group have signed electronic petitions before, and 5.2 per cent said they might do so in the future. In contrast, 26.9 per cent of university graduates have done so, while 31.4 per cent were open to doing so (see Table 275).

Table 275: Political actions online (signing electronic petition), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,985*	**I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Signing an electronic petition**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Below secondary	0.8	5.2	94.0
Secondary / ITE	6.8	17.8	75.4
Dip. / Prof. qual.	15.8	27.1	57.1
Bachelor's and above	26.9	31.4	41.7

6.3.12 The majority of respondents in Singapore and other Asian polities were reluctant to encourage others to take political action; younger, higher-educated, and more affluent respondents were likelier to have done so

Respondents were not very active in encouraging others online to take any form of political action. Only 3.2 per cent indicated having done so before, while another 17.7 per cent said they might do so. Over half of respondents from Singapore, Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan indicated that they would never encourage others online to take any form of political action, while the proportion was slightly under half for Malaysia. Conversely, a majority of respondents in Australia and the US indicated that they had done so and might do so in the future (see Figure 179).

Figure 179: Political actions online (encouraging other people to take any form of political action), by polity



Very small proportions of respondents across the different age groups have encouraged people online to take any form of political action. However, younger respondents were much more likely than older respondents to be open to doing so – 29.4 per cent of the youngest group, compared to only 5.5 per cent of the oldest group, chose the “might do” option (see Table 276).

Table 276: Political actions online (encouraging other people to take any form of political action), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,987*	**I’m going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Encouraging other people to take any form of political action**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
21-35	5.7	29.4	65.0
36-50	2.9	17.8	79.4
51-65	2.5	12.4	85.0
Above 65	0.3	5.5	94.2

Individuals with university degrees were the most likely to say that they might encourage other people online to take some kind of political action. In contrast, 95.9 per cent of those with below secondary school education and 87.5 per cent of those with secondary school or ITE qualifications said that they would never do so (see Table 277).

Table 277: Political actions online (encouraging other people to take any form of political action), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,983*	I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Encouraging other people to take any form of political action		
	Have done	Might do	Would never do
Below secondary	0	4.1	95.9
Secondary / ITE	1.3	11.3	87.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	4.8	19.8	75.5
Bachelor's and above	5.5	28.9	65.6

Respondents with higher income and who live in larger housing types were slightly more likely to say they have encouraged others online or that they might do so in the future. Compared to the results found when comparing across education, however, the effects of housing and income are not as strong (see Tables 278 and 279).

Table 278: Political actions online (encouraging other people to take any form of political action), by income

Income *N = 1,215*	I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Encouraging other people to take any form of political action		
	Have done	Might do	Would never do
Below $1,500	1.9	15.3	82.9
$1,500 - $2,999	3.2	14.0	82.8
$3,000 - $4,999	2.4	18.9	78.6
$5,000 - $6,999	4.9	25.6	69.5
Above $6,999	7.0	26.1	66.9

Table 279: Political actions online (encouraging other people to take any form of political action), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,987*	I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Encouraging other people to take any form of political action		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
1- to 3-room HDB	1.4	11.7	87.0
4-room HDB	2.8	15.2	82.0
5-room HDB	4.2	19.3	76.6
Private apartment/ Landed property	5.5	29.5	65.0

6.3.13 Singapore had the lowest proportion of respondents who indicated they have or might organise political activities; males, younger, and higher-educated respondents were likelier to express such sentiments

Organising political activities is the political action that garnered the lowest interest, with 91.6 per cent indicating they would never undertake such an action. This places Singapore as the society with the highest proportion of respondents who said they would never organise political activities online. Thailand, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan all had over half of their respondents choosing the "would never do" option. Meanwhile, a majority of respondents from Malaysia, Australia, and the US chose "might do" or "have done" when asked the same (see Figure 180).

Figure 180: Political actions online (organising political activities, events, protests), by polity



The same proportion of male and female respondents indicated having organised political actions before. However, 10.8 per cent of the male respondents said they might do so, a larger proportion compared to the 5.2 per cent of female respondents who gave the same answer (see Table 280).

Table 280: Political actions online (organising political activities, events, protests), by gender

Gender *N = 1,990*	**I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Organising political activities, events, protests**		
	Have done	**Might do**	**Would never do**
Male	0.4	10.8	88.7
Female	0.4	5.2	94.4

The younger respondents were more likely to have organised political activities before or say they might do so. In particular, the youngest group was the most active, with 0.9 per cent – compared to below 0.5 per cent of the other groups – to have organised political activities before, and 14.4 per cent saying they might do so in the future (see Table 281).

Table 281: Political actions online (organising political activities, events, protests), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,990*	I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Organising political activities, events, protests		
	Have done	Might do	Would never do
21-35	0.9	14.4	84.6
36-50	0.2	9.1	90.7
51-65	0.2	3.8	96.0
Above 65	0.3	1.2	98.5

Respondents who have at least diploma qualifications were more likely to say that they might organise political activities. Compared to 10.6 per cent of those with diploma or professional qualifications and 11.7 per cent of those with university degrees, only 1.4 per cent of those with below secondary school education and 5.5 per cent of those with secondary school or ITE qualifications chose the "might do" option (see Table 282).

Table 282: Political actions online (organising political activities, events, protests), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,986*	I'm going to read out some other forms of political action that people can take using Internet and social media tools like Facebook, Twitter etc., and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never under any circumstances do it. Organising political activities, events, protests		
	Have done	Might do	Would never do
Below secondary	0	1.4	98.6
Secondary / ITE	0.2	5.5	94.3
Dip. / Prof. qual.	0.8	10.6	88.7
Bachelor's and above	0.6	11.7	87.7

6.3.14 Overall, respondents were generally unwilling to participate in political actions; older, less-educated respondents living in smaller housing types were less likely to participate

Based on a long list of linear regressions undertaken to test the validity of various overarching theories, we present one especially salient model which encompasses various questions measuring the extent to which respondents were willing to participate in political actions.

These extended beyond "merely" talking to government officials and people around them, and included signing online or offline petitions, joining strikes, boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, or organizing political events using the Internet. The aggregated variable was calculated as follows: respondents scored 1 point for each political action they have participated in before, 0.5 points if they indicate potentially doing it in the future, and 0 points if they indicated they would never do it.

Against a maximum score of 6, the mean was 0.887, while the median was 0, which indicated that respondents were quite unwilling to participate in these political actions. Overall, 51.1 per cent of the respondents scored 0 points on this scale, 39 per cent scored between 0.5 and 2.5, while the remaining 9.9 per cent scored between 3 and 5.5. Given the distribution of this variable, we conducted logistic regression to tease out the differences between respondents who were likely to participate in political action and those who were unlikely to do so.

We find that people who (1) were politically interested, (2) felt less physically secure, (3) felt that they had more autonomy in life, (4) were less satisfied with the functioning of the political system, (5) had lower confidence in state institutions, (6) had higher support for democracy, and (7) felt that citizens have a lot of political say, were more likely to indicate that they participated in political actions before or might do so in the future. Political interest was a particularly strong predictor, with those who were politically interested being 2.725 times as likely to participate in political action compared to those who were not.

Meanwhile, overall trust levels, support for government surveillance, and evaluation of Singapore's democracy were not significant predictors of participation in political action. In addition, younger respondents were more likely to participate in political action. In particular, those aged between 21 and 35 were over six times more likely than those above 65 to do so. Meanwhile, respondents who were less educated or who lived in smaller housing types were less likely to participate in political action (see Table 283).

Table 283: Linear regression with political action as dependent variable

Variables	Model 1 Odds Ratio
Political interest (No versus Yes)	.367***
How secure respondents feel	.838***
Overall trust	1.213
Degree of autonomy in life	1.074*
Support for government surveillance	1.020
How democratic is Singapore today	1.004
Satisfaction with political system functioning	.849***
Confidence in state institutions	.656***
Support for democracy	1.045**
Amount of political say citizens have	
Not much	.674**
Some say	.827
Reference group: Quite a lot of say	
Gender (females vs males)	1.120
Age	
21-35	6.027***
36-50	3.068***
51-65	2.392***
Reference group: Above 65	
Education	
Below secondary school	.143***
Secondary school/ ITE	.335***
Diploma/ Professional qualification	.579***
Reference group: Bachelor's and above	
Housing type	
1- 3-room HDB	.520***
4-room HDB	.518***
5+-room HDB	.593**
Reference group: Private property	
Pseudo R^2 (Nagelkerke)	.376

6.4 AWARENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

6.4.1 Singapore respondents were most knowledgeable about Amnesty International and least familiar with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

There were three questions in the survey that required some knowledge about international organisations. The easiest question for Singaporeans appears to be the question about Amnesty International, given that it was the only one with more than 50 per cent of respondents giving the correct answer. Meanwhile, respondents were least familiar with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (see Figure 181).

Figure 181: Questions about international organisations



6.4.2 Singapore had the second-lowest proportion of respondents who know about the UNSC; males, higher-educated, more affluent, and respondents aged 36-65 years old were more likely to be familiar with the UNSC

When asked about United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 39.4 per cent gave the correct answer. Meanwhile, another 33 per cent attempted the question but did not choose the correct option, and 27.6 per cent did not give an answer. This places Singapore on the lower end of the spectrum when compared against other polities such as Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia, and the US, which had a majority of their respondents giving the correct answer. Meanwhile, Thailand has the lowest proportion of its respondents (12.6 per cent) identifying the correct answer (see Figure 182).

Figure 182: Countries with the permanent seats on the UN Security Council, by polity



Fewer female respondents (36 per cent) gave correct answers compared to male respondents (42.6 per cent). Meanwhile, the proportion of respondents who gave incorrect answers were relatively similar across the genders, as more female respondents gave up on answering the question altogether. One possibility is that females might have lesser interest in this topic compared to males (see Table 284).

Table 284: Countries with permanent seats on the UN Security Council, by gender

Gender *N = 2,012*	**Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Which one of the following is not a member? A) France, B) China, C) India**		
	Correct answer	**Incorrect answer**	**Don't know/ Refused**
Male	42.6	32.1	25.2
Female	36.0	34.0	30.0

When compared across age, it appears that respondents aged between 36 and 65 years old were more likely to know the correct answer and less likely to give up trying compared to the youngest and oldest age groups. In fact, they had very similar proportions of respondents who answered correctly – 43.1 per cent aged between 36 and 50 years old and 42.1 per cent aged between 51 and 65 gave correct answers. One possible reason could be that individuals from these two age groups have accumulated more current affairs knowledge compared to the youngest group, which might not be as interested in these topics. Education may also be part of the reason why the oldest age group has a lower proportion identifying the correct answer, since there is a significant number of older individuals with lower educational qualifications (see Table 285).

Table 285: Countries with permanent seats on the UN Security Council, by age cohort

Age Cohort ***N = 2,012***	**Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Which one of the following is not a member? A) France, B) China, C) India**		
	Correct answer	**Incorrect answer**	**Don't know/ Refused**
21-35	34.1	35.9	30.1
36-50	43.1	30.9	26.0
51-65	42.1	33.0	25.0
Above 65	35.4	32.7	31.8

There were clear differences between educational levels. Respondents with higher qualifications were more likely to give the correct answer, and less likely to give up. However, the proportion of respondents giving incorrect answers was quite constant across all the education levels, suggesting that there is a significant portion of respondents who are not familiar with the UNSC, and that besides education, interest may also be a factor determining whether people know about the topic (see Table 286).

Table 286: Countries with permanent seats on the UN Security Council, by education level

Education Level ***N = 2,008***	**Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Which one of the following is not a member? A) France, B) China, C) India**		
	Correct answer	**Incorrect answer**	**Don't know/ Refused**
Below secondary	26.3	32.2	41.6
Secondary / ITE	37.7	33.6	28.7
Dip. / Prof. qual.	37.8	37.1	25.1
Bachelor's and above	48.2	31.0	20.8

There were common trends found when examining the distribution of answers across different income levels and housing types. People with lower income and who live in smaller housing types were less likely to answer this question correctly. They were also more likely to not attempt the question – compared to 16.4 per cent of people earning above $6,999, 39.2 per cent of those earning below $1,500 said they did not know the answer or refused to give an answer (see Tables 287 and 288).

Table 287: Countries with permanent seats on the UN Security Council, by income

Income *N = 1,224*	Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Which one of the following is not a member? A) France, B) China, C) India		
	Correct answer	Incorrect answer	Don't know/ Refused
Below $1,500	32.7	28.1	39.2
$1,500 - $2,999	31.2	39.9	28.9
$3,000 - $4,999	41.4	32.0	26.6
$5,000 - $6,999	42.4	35.8	21.8
Above $6,999	49.7	34.0	16.4

Table 288: Countries with permanent seats on the UN Security Council, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,012*	Five countries have permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations. Which one of the following is not a member? A) France, B) China, C) India		
	Correct answer	Incorrect answer	Don't know/ Refused
1- to 3-room HDB	32.5	33.2	34.3
4-room HDB	38.5	33.1	28.4
5-room HDB	42.1	38.9	19.0
Private apartment/ Landed property	47.8	25.8	26.4

6.4.3 Majority of respondents in Singapore and most other polities were unsure where IMF's HQ was located; females, younger, and higher-educated respondents were more likely to give the right answer

The second question asked people whether they knew where the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was located. This question garnered the lowest proportion of correct answers in the population at only 30.5 per cent. 43.9 per cent attempted the question, but did not get the right answer, while 25.6 per cent did not try. Other than South Korea, all other selected polities had less than a majority of respondents who gave the correct answer (see Figure 183).

Figure 183: Headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by polity



When comparing against the genders, females were more likely to give the correct answer compared to males. Overall, 34.2 per cent of female respondents gave the correct answer, while 39 per cent gave an incorrect answer. In contrast, only 27.1 per cent of the male respondents answered correctly, but there were 47.8 per cent who attempted the question and provided the wrong answer (see Table 289).

Table 289: Headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by gender

Gender *N = 2,012*	Where are the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) located? A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Geneva		
	Correct answer	Incorrect answer	Don't know/ Refused
Male	27.1	47.8	25.1
Female	34.2	39.0	26.8

The youngest respondents were the most familiar with this particular international organisation, with 33.2 per cent giving the correct answer. While around 30 per cent of those aged between 36 and 65 answered the question correctly, 27.6 per cent of the oldest age group gave the correct answer. The oldest group also had the highest proportion of respondents saying that they did not know the answer or refusing to answer (see Table 290).

Table 290: Headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	Where are the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) located? A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Geneva		
	Correct answer	Incorrect answer	Don't know/ Refused
21-35	33.2	39.1	27.7
36-50	30.9	47.0	22.1
51-65	30.7	45.6	23.7
Above 65	27.6	38.4	33.9

For this question, the effect of education was not apparent. In fact, only 29.9 per cent of university graduates gave the correct answer compared to 36.1 per cent of respondents with diploma or professional qualifications and 31.5 per cent of respondents with secondary school or ITE qualifications. It was not for the lack of trying, given that only 16.3 per cent of university graduates said that they did not know or refused to answer. Hence, this group had the largest proportion of incorrect answers at 53.7 per cent (see Table 291).

Table 291: Headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by education level

Education Level *N = 2,008*	Where are the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) located? A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Geneva		
	Correct answer	Incorrect answer	Don't know/ Refused
Below secondary	26.3	29.5	44.2
Secondary / ITE	31.5	39.3	29.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	36.1	43.3	20.6
Bachelor's and above	29.9	53.7	16.3

There were varying responses across the income levels for this question. The proportion of correct answers were relatively similar across the different income levels. Respondents earning between $1,500 and $2,999 gave the correct answer more often. In comparison, higher proportions of respondents who earned $5,000 and above attempted the question, with only around 15 per cent who refused or said they did not know the answer. However, over half of these two groups gave the wrong answers. Similar patterns were found when the answers were examined across housing types. Respondents living in 4-room HDB flats had the highest proportion of correct answers at 33 per cent. However, more people living in 5-room flats and private properties attempted the question (see Tables 292 and 293).

Table 292: Headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by income

Income *N = 1,224*	Where are the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) located? A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Geneva		
	Correct answer	Incorrect answer	Don't know/ Refused
Below $1,500	27.6	34.6	37.8
$1,500 - $2,999	31.5	41.2	27.3
$3,000 - $4,999	29.8	48.1	22.0
$5,000 - $6,999	27.3	57.6	15.2
Above $6,999	30.2	54.1	15.7

Table 293: Headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,012*	Where are the headquarters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) located? A) Washington DC, B) London, C) Geneva		
	Correct answer	Incorrect answer	Don't know/ Refused
1- to 3-room HDB	29.0	39.1	32.0
4-room HDB	33.0	39.1	27.9
5-room HDB	30.6	50.0	19.4
Private apartment/ Landed property	30.9	48.7	20.5

6.4.4 The majority of Singaporean respondents indicated knowledge of Amnesty International; respondents aged 36-65 years old and those who are higher-educated and more affluent were likelier to know

The question on Amnesty International had the highest proportion of correct answers amongst the three questions. Sixty per cent answered the question correctly, 15.1 per cent attempted but gave the wrong answer, while 24.9 per cent did not give any answers. Singapore ranked fourth-lowest in terms of the proportion of correct answers. All other polities – Malaysia, South Korea, Hong Kong, Australia, and the US reported more than 70 per cent of its respondents answering correctly (see Figure 184).

Figure 184: Problems the organisation Amnesty International deal with, by polity



The proportion of correct answers to this question exceeded 50 per cent for all age groups. Around 64 per cent of respondents aged between 36 and 65 answered it correctly. In contrast, 54.1 per cent of those aged between 21 and 35, as well as 52.3 per cent of those above 65, gave correct answers. Compared to respondents aged between 36 and 65, there were also more respondents from the other two age groups who did not answer the question (see Table 294).

Table 294: Problems Amnesty International deals with, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,012*	**Which of the following problems does the organization Amnesty International deal with? A) Climate change, B) Human rights, C) Destruction of historic monuments**		
	Correct answer	**Incorrect answer**	**Don't know/ Refused**
21-35	54.1	16.8	29.0
36-50	64.0	14.1	21.9
51-65	64.7	13.9	21.4
Above 65	52.3	17.7	30.0

Respondents with better socioeconomic backgrounds were more likely to answer this question correctly. 72.6 per cent of those with university education gave the correct answer, much higher than the overall sample average of 59.5 per cent. In addition, respondents with lower educational levels were also more likely to not attempt the question, with 39.9 per cent of those with below secondary school qualifications indicating they did not know or refusing to answer, compared with just 17.1 per cent of those with university qualifications.

Similar trends were found when cut across income levels and housing types. Compared to 54.4 per cent of those earning lower than $1,500, 75.5 per cent of respondents earning above $6,999 answered correctly. Similarly, 70.6 per cent of respondents living in private housing gave correct answers, a much higher proportion compared to 52 per cent of respondents who live in 1- to 3-room flats (see Tables 295 to 297).

Table 295: Problems the organisation Amnesty International deal with, by education level

Education Level *N = 2,008*	**Which of the following problems does the organization Amnesty International deal with? A) Climate change, B) Human rights, C) Destruction of historic monuments**		
	Correct answer	**Incorrect answer**	**Don't know/ Refused**
Below secondary	39.7	20.4	39.9
Secondary / ITE	57.3	16.1	26.5
Dip. / Prof. qual.	59.7	18.2	22.1
Bachelor's and above	72.6	10.3	17.1

Table 296: Problems the organisation Amnesty International deal with, by income

Income *N = 1,224*	**Which of the following problems does the organization Amnesty International deal with? A) Climate change, B) Human rights, C) Destruction of historic monuments**		
	Correct answer	**Incorrect answer**	**Don't know/ Refused**
Below $1,500	54.4	13.4	32.3
$1,500 - $,999	55.9	17.0	27.0
$3,000 - $4,999	60.8	16.7	22.6
$5,000 - $6,999	64.2	14.5	21.2
Above $6,999	75.5	11.9	12.6

Table 297: Problems the organisation Amnesty International deal with, by housing type

Housing Type *N = 2,012*	**Which of the following problems does the organization Amnesty International deal with? A) Climate change, B) Human rights, C) Destruction of historic monuments**		
	Correct answer	**Incorrect answer**	**Don't know/ Refused**
1- to 3-room HDB	52.0	17.2	30.8
4-room HDB	57.2	16.9	25.9
5-room HDB	64.8	17.6	17.6
Private apartment/ Landed property	70.6	6.5	22.8

Chapter 7

National Identity and Governance

CHAPTER 7 | NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GOVERNANCE

This chapter examines national identity, including pride and perceived social closeness, as well as perceptions and experiences pertaining to local governance. National identity describes “forms of collective self-perception, sensibility, and conduct which are shared by the individuals who inhabit a modern nation-state” (Neiburg, 2001, 125). It is based on the notion that each country or nation can be considered a collective, with characteristics analogous to the empirical individuals who are its residents. Researchers have thus far built a largely ground-up framework of this concept from a global, Anglo-centric standpoint (see Wallace, 1991; Guibernau, 2004; Wodak, 2009; and Verdugo & Milne, 2016, amongst others).

Local researchers have advanced multiple small-n or case studies to show the various components of Singapore’s national identity (i.e., its history, state narratives, nationhood symbols such as the National Day Parade and even Singapore Airlines) and explicated the mechanisms through which identity is cultivated (Kong & Yeoh, 1997; Raguraman, 1997; Chua, 1998; Liu et al., 2002; Ortmann, 2009, and more). At present, a large-scale study quantifying content pertaining to Singaporean national identity such as newspapers, and local arts and culture to further develop a robust understanding of the concept is underway (see Hopf & Allan, 2016). The analyses presented below seeks to contribute to this body of literature by providing contemporary insights on participants’ opinions of national pride, alongside their views on the Singapore identity relative to the world.

In addition, this section rounds up the lived experiences of Singapore residents by perusing their views on governance, which comprises quality and effectiveness of governance, and democratic precepts such as elections and the treatment of human rights. It should be noted that analyses presented on these are meant to provide a broad-based treatment of the subject matter and function as a social sensing barometer; as opposed to an in-depth review of Singapore politics and governance, as there is no lack of scholarship on the latter. In sum, the next few sub-sections examine respondents’ experiences as Singaporeans and their perceptions of the local government. They include questions about government innovation, politics and democracy in Singapore, as well as how respondents relate to their country and the rest of the world.

7.1 NATIONAL PRIDE

7.1.1 Over nine in 10 respondents were very or quite proud to be Singaporean

A question was also asked in the survey regarding national pride. A majority of the sample population said that they were very proud, while 40.6 per cent said they were quite proud to be Singaporean. It, therefore, appears that respondents have a high level of national pride (see Figure 185).

Figure 185: National Pride ("How proud are you to be Singaporean?")



7.1.2 Singapore had the second-highest level of national pride among Asian polities; proportions indicating that they were "very proud" to be Singaporean increased since 2002

Amongst other Asian polities, Singapore has the second-highest level of national pride after Thailand. Malaysia, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan were Asian polities with relatively lower levels of national pride. Within non-Asian polities, Sweden had the highest levels of national pride compared to Australia, the US, the UK, and Switzerland (see Figure 186).

Figure 186: National Pride, by polity



Respondents in 2020 were the most likely to indicate being very proud to be Singaporean. While 42 per cent in 2002 and 46.6 per cent in 2012 said that they were very proud of being Singaporean, 51.8 per cent said the same in 2020 (see Figure 187).

Figure 187: National pride, across WVS waves



7.1.3 Females and older respondents were more likely to indicate a more emphatic response on whether they were proud to be Singaporean

Compared to males (47.5 per cent), female respondents (56.2 per cent) were more likely to say that they are very proud. A slightly higher proportion of male respondents (41.9 per cent) compared to female respondents (39 per cent) indicated they were quite proud to be Singaporean (see Table 298).

Table 298: National pride, by gender

Gender *N = 1,900*	**How proud are you to be Singaporean?**			
	Very proud	**Quite proud**	**Not very proud**	**Not at all**
Male	47.5	41.9	8.6	2.1
Female	56.2	39.0	4.3	0.5

The vast majority of respondents were either “very proud” or “quite proud” of Singapore regardless of age. However, the younger respondents were more likely to choose “quite proud”, while older respondents were more emphatic in their responses, with more selecting “very proud” (see Table 299).

Table 299: National pride, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,900*	**How proud are you to be Singaporean?**			
	Very proud	**Quite proud**	**Not very proud**	**Not at all**
21-35	40.2	52.3	6.2	1.3
36-50	52.4	39.3	6.5	1.8
51-65	55.9	36.1	6.8	1.3
Above 65	64.8	30.0	5.2	0

7.2 SOCIAL CLOSENESS

7.2.1 Singaporeans felt closest to their country, followed by their neighbourhood or estate, ASEAN, Asia, and the world

The next set of questions relate to how close respondents feel to various entities – those in their immediate vicinity and beyond. Over 70 per cent of Singapore respondents indicated they felt either very close or close to their neighbourhood and country. In contrast, over 60 per cent indicated they were either not very close or not close at all to ASEAN, Asia, or the world. As this set of questions differs from how they were phrased in previous waves, there are no comparable longitudinal data (see Figure 188).

Figure 188: Perceived closeness ("How close do you feel to...")



7.2.2 Less-educated respondents were more likely to express closeness with their neighbourhood or estate

When asked about their neighbourhood or estate, 15.9 per cent said they were very close, and 55.4 per cent said they were close to it. As this was a Singapore-specific question, there were no comparable data from other polities. Meanwhile, respondents with below secondary education feel the closest to their neighbourhoods. Compared to the rest of the population, of which less than 16 per cent say they feel very close to their neighbourhoods, 22.8 per cent of those with below secondary education selected the “very close” option (see Table 300).

Table 300: Perceived closeness (Your neighbourhood/estate), by education level

Education Level ***N = 2,004***	**People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: Your neighbourhood/estate**			
	Very close	**Close**	**Not very close**	**Not close at all**
Below secondary	22.8	57.5	18.5	1.1
Secondary / ITE	15.8	59.9	21.7	2.7
Dip. / Prof. qual.	15.7	54.2	26.1	4.0
Bachelor’s and above	12.0	51.4	32.8	3.7

7.2.3 Singaporean respondents were among the most likely to feel very close or close to their country; older and wealthier respondents were more likely to express closeness to Singapore

Overall, 25.1 per cent said they felt very close to Singapore, while 63.6 per cent said they felt close. All Asian polities, with the exception of Thailand, had large proportions of respondents who felt very close or close to their country. Such high levels of closeness to their countries can also be found in some non-Asian polities (see Figure 189).

Figure 189: Perceived closeness (Singapore), by polity



While responses were generally similar across age cohorts, smaller proportions of the youngest age cohort say they feel very close to Singapore. Compared to around 26 per cent of the other age groups, 20.9 per cent of the youngest group chose “very close”. Meanwhile, a larger proportion (15.6 per cent) of the youngest group compared to the rest of the population said that they do not feel very close to Singapore (see Table 301).

Table 301: Perceived closeness (Singapore), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,004*	**People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: Singapore**			
	Very close	**Close**	**Not very close**	**Not close at all**
21-35	20.9	61.8	15.6	1.6
36-50	26.5	62.5	9.6	1.4
51-65	26.8	65.2	7.4	0.7
Above 65	26.2	67.8	5.7	0.3

There was a slight increase in the proportions indicating that they feel very close to Singapore as income levels increase. Compared to 22.8 per cent of those earning below $1,500, 29.6 per cent of those who earn above $6,999 say they feel very close. Meanwhile, 13 per cent of those in the lowest income group say they do not feel very close, a higher proportion compared to the 5.7 per cent reported for the highest income group (see Table 302).

Table 302: Perceived closeness (Singapore), by income

Income *N = 1,218*	**People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: Singapore**			
	Very close	**Close**	**Not very close**	**Not close at all**
Below $1,500	22.8	63.3	13.0	0.9
$1,500 - $2,999	25.2	63.5	10.0	1.3
$3,000 - $4,999	24.7	63.7	10.8	0.8
$5,000 - $6,999	29.7	62.4	6.1	1.8
Above $6,999	29.6	64.2	5.7	0.6

7.2.4 Older, naturalised citizens/PRs, higher-educated, and higher-income respondents were more likely to express closeness to ASEAN

The most popular option when asked about ASEAN was “not very close”, with 56 per cent choosing it as their answer. As this was a Singapore-specific question in the survey, there is no comparable data from other polities. Each of the age groups had similar proportions for the different options. The only exception was the youngest group which appears to feel the least close to ASEAN; 68.6 chose the “not very close” or “not close at all” options (see Table 303).

Table 303: Perceived closeness (ASEAN), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,987*	People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: ASEAN			
	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all
21-35	7.5	23.9	57.1	11.5
36-50	5.0	32.8	54.4	7.8
51-65	5.5	27.0	57.9	9.7
Above 65	4.3	31.9	55.0	8.8

Naturalised citizens and PRs feel closer to ASEAN compared to local-born citizens. One possible reason could be that many of them moved to Singapore from ASEAN countries, and therefore still feel connected to some extent with the larger region (see Table 304).

Table 304: Perceived closeness (ASEAN), by citizenship status

Citizenship Status *N = 1,987*	People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: ASEAN			
	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all
Born citizen	4.9	27.0	57.9	10.2
Naturalised citizen/PR	8.9	35.2	49.2	6.6

Individuals with university degrees feel the closest to ASEAN, with 38.8 per cent choosing either “very close” or “close”. In contrast, those with diploma or professional qualifications feel least close, with 29.3 per cent selecting either “very close” or “close” (see Table 305).

Table 305: Perceived closeness (ASEAN), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,983*	People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: ASEAN			
	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all
Below secondary	6.3	27.7	55.3	10.7
Secondary / ITE	4.7	27.9	56.9	10.6
Dip. / Prof. qual.	6.5	22.8	62.7	8.0
Bachelor’s and above	5.8	33.0	52.3	8.9

While over 69 per cent of those earning $2,999 and below say they feel not very close or not close at all to ASEAN, the proportions decrease for the higher income groups. Respondents earning above $6,999 feel the closest to ASEAN, with 43.4 per cent saying that they feel either very close or close (see Table 306).

Table 306: Perceived closeness (ASEAN), by income

Income *N = 1,214*	**People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: ASEAN**			
	Very close	**Close**	**Not very close**	**Not close at all**
Below $1,500	3.3	27.6	57.5	11.7
$1,500 - $2,999	4.2	24.0	63.0	8.8
$3,000 - $4,999	8.4	26.9	56.5	8.2
$5,000 - $6,999	8.5	35.8	50.9	4.8
Above $6,999	8.8	34.6	47.2	9.4

7.2.5 Similar to other Asian polities, the majority of Singapore respondents reported not feeling close to Asia; non-local born citizens, higher-educated, and more affluent respondents were however more likely to feel otherwise

Of the overall sample, 54.1 per cent indicated not feeling very close to Asia. Similar to Singapore, around one-third of respondents from Malaysia, Japan, Hong Kong, and the UK indicated that they feel very close or close to their continent. Thais were the least likely to say so, with only 22.9 per cent giving similar responses. Meanwhile, respondents from the European polities of Sweden and Switzerland were most likely to say they are very close or close to their continent. Given that the European Union (EU) is a prominent regional organisation, with elections held to choose country representatives, it is not surprising to see a higher continental consciousness from these two polities, even though Switzerland is not an EU member but connected via various other bilateral treaties (see Figure 190).

Figure 190: Perceived closeness (Asia), by polity



Naturalised citizens and PRs express more closeness to Asia compared to born citizens. While 31.8 per cent of born citizens say they feel very close or close, 49.3 per cent of naturalised citizens and PRs gave the same answers. It is likely that some of the group are born in other Asian countries, and therefore feel closer compared to Singaporeans who were born and bred in the country (see Table 307).

Table 307: Perceived closeness (Asia), by citizenship status

Citizenship Status *N = 1,988*	People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: Asia			
	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all
Born citizen	2.8	29.6	56.6	11.0
Naturalised citizen/PR	8.2	41.1	45.2	5.6

When perusing results across education levels, we find that individuals with university degrees felt the closest to Asia compared to their less-educated peers; 43.8 per cent of degree holders answered either “very close” or “close”, compared with 29.6 per cent of those with below secondary education. The better educated may also have higher propensities to be involved in regional roles entailing frequent travel and time spent in other Asian countries, thus engendering feelings of greater closeness with the continent (see Table 308).

Table 308: Perceived closeness (Asia), by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,984***	**People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: Asia**			
	Very close	**Close**	**Not very close**	**Not close at all**
Below secondary	5.5	24.1	57.8	12.6
Secondary / ITE	3.6	27.9	58.0	10.6
Dip. / Prof. qual.	1.5	33.8	55.9	8.8
Bachelor's and above	4.5	38.3	48.6	8.6

Respondents earning below $2,999 feel less close to Asia compared to respondents earning above $5,000. While around 30 per cent of those in the two lowest income groups indicated feeling very close or close to Asia, approximately 44 per cent of those in the two highest income groups indicated likewise (see Table 309).

Table 309: Perceived closeness (Asia), by income

Income ***N = 1,215***	**People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: Asia**			
	Very close	**Close**	**Not very close**	**Not close at all**
Below $1,500	3.8	23.9	60.6	11.7
$1,500 - $2,999	2.6	26.9	61.7	8.8
$3,000 - $4,999	2.7	38.1	50.0	9.2
$5,000 - $6,999	3.6	40.6	51.5	4.2
Above $6,999	9.4	34.6	48.4	7.5

7.2.6 The majority of Singaporean respondents did not feel close to the world; naturalised citizens/PRs, higher-educated, and wealthier respondents were more likely to indicate otherwise

Respondents felt the least close to the world, with 62 per cent saying they did not feel very close and 14.2 per cent saying they did not feel close at all (see Figure 191).

Figure 191: Perceived closeness (the world), by polity



Naturalised citizens and PRs feel much closer to the world compared to born citizens. Given their experiences with migration, it is not surprising that they feel more connected with the world outside of Singapore (see Table 310).

Table 310: Perceived closeness (the world), by citizenship status

Citizenship Status *N = 1,982*	**People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: World**			
	Very close	**Close**	**Not very close**	**Not close at all**
Born citizen	1.8	19.0	63.5	15.7
Naturalised citizen/PR	5.1	29.8	56.1	8.9

Similar proportions of the first three education groups say they feel close or very close to the world. The respondents with university degrees feel closer to the world in comparison, with 2.9 per cent choosing “very close” and 26.9 per cent choosing “close” (see Table 311).

Table 311: Perceived closeness (the world), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,978*	People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: World			
	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all
Below secondary	3.6	17.8	63.0	15.6
Secondary / ITE	2.2	17.8	63.8	16.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	1.0	19.3	68.3	11.5
Bachelor's and above	2.9	26.9	56.2	14.0

A positive correlation was found between income level and closeness to the world. Compared to 20.2 per cent of those earning below $1,500, 31 per cent of those earning above $6,999 say they feel either very close or close to the world. Essentially, those who have degree qualifications and higher incomes are more likely to adopt a more globalised orientation, consistent with their greater likelihood to travel to various regions of the world for both work and leisure (see Table 312).

Table 312: Perceived closeness (the world), by income

Income *N = 1,212*	People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Would you tell me how close do you feel to: World			
	Very close	Close	Not very close	Not close at all
Below $1,500	3.3	16.9	64.3	15.5
$1,500 - $2,999	1.6	19.5	65.9	13.0
$3,000 - $4,999	1.4	21.2	65.9	12.5
$5,000 - $6,999	2.4	24.2	64.2	9.1
Above $6,999	5.7	25.3	53.2	15.8

7.3 GOVERNANCE

7.3.1 While close to four in 10 respondents believed that the Singapore government is innovative, close to three in 10 believed that government employees in Singapore are innovative

This set of questions asks respondents to rate the degree of innovativeness in the Singaporean government. These two questions were asked on a 10-point scale, and the answers were condensed into three categories for easy reference and comparison. The points on the scale, 1 to 3 indicate respondents disagreed to some extent; 4 to 7 indicate that respondents held more neutral stances, while 8 to 10 indicate respondents agreed to some extent. When compared with government employees, slightly more respondents felt that the Singapore government was innovative. However, most respondents indicated more neutral stances for both questions. As these two questions were specific to Singapore and the 2020 wave, there is no other available data for comparison (see Figure 192).

Figure 192: Innovativeness of Singapore government



7.3.2 Older, less-educated, and respondents who are confident in government institutions were more likely to believe that the Singapore government is innovative

Older respondents were much more positive about the government's innovativeness. Compared to 56.1 per cent of those above 65 years old who agreed to some extent, only 23.5 per cent of the youngest group gave similar answers (see Table 313).

Table 313: Innovativeness of Singapore government, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 2,003*	I believe that Singaporean government is innovative		
	Disagree	Neutral	Agree
21-35	10.4	66.2	23.5
36-50	10.6	51.2	38.2
51-65	7.5	50.0	42.5
Above 65	3.9	40.0	56.1

While 46.6 per cent of those with below secondary school qualifications agreed that the Singaporean government is innovative, it appears that those with higher qualifications are more critical. Only 34 per cent of those with university degrees agreed to this statement to some extent, while 12.9 per cent said they disagreed with the statement (see Table 314).

Table 314: Innovativeness of Singapore government, by education level

Education Level *N = 1,999*	I believe that Singaporean government is innovative		
	Disagree	Neutral	Agree
Below secondary	5.7	47.7	46.6
Secondary / ITE	6.6	52.2	41.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	7.0	59.3	33.8
Bachelor's and above	12.9	53.1	34.0

While nearly half, or 42.5 per cent, of those who are confident in government institutions believed that the Singapore government is innovative, only 22.5 per cent of those who were not confident gave similar answers (see Table 315).

Table 315: Innovativeness of Singapore government, by confidence in government institutions

Confidence in Government Institutions *N = 1,959*	I believe that Singaporean government is innovative		
	Disagree	Neutral	Agree
Confident	6.4	51.2	42.5
Not confident	17.5	60.0	22.5

7.3.3 Older, less-educated respondents living in smaller public housing and those who are confident in government institutions were more likely to believe that Singapore government employees are innovative

When asked about government employees in Singapore, 11.4 per cent felt that they were not innovative, 28.2 per cent felt they were innovative, while 60.4 per cent were on the fence. Slightly under two in ten of those aged between 21 and 50 years agreed to some extent that government employees in Singapore are innovative. A large majority of this group (69.9 per cent) instead indicated that they had more neutral stances towards this question. In comparison, the older respondents were more positive, with 43.3 per cent of those aged above 65 years old agreeing with the statement to some extent (see Table 316).

Table 316: Innovativeness of government employees in Singapore, by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,999*	I believe that government employees in Singapore are innovative		
	Disagree	Neutral	Agree
21-35	11.8	69.9	18.2
36-50	15.1	57.1	27.8
51-65	19.3	60.1	29.7
Above 65	4.5	52.1	43.3

Respondents who were not confident in government institutions were more likely to disagree that government employees are innovative. While only 8.4 per cent of those who are confident in government institutions disagreed, 21.8 per cent of those who are not confident said the same (see Table 317).

Table 317: Innovativeness of government employees in Singapore, by confidence in government institutions

Confidence in Government Institutions ***N = 1,956***	**I believe that government employees in Singapore are innovative**		
	Disagree	**Neutral**	**Agree**
Confident	8.4	60.0	31.6
Not confident	21.8	62.7	15.5

Higher-educated respondents and those residing in larger or private housing were more critical of innovation standards amongst government employees. Compared to 40.3 per cent of those with below secondary school qualifications and 32.5 per cent of those living in 1- to 3-room housing types, only 21.5 per cent of university graduates and 18 per cent of private property dwellers agreed with the statement to some extent (see Tables 318 and 319).

Table 318: Innovativeness of government employees in Singapore, by education level

Education Level ***N = 1,995***	**I believe that government employees in Singapore are innovative**		
	Disagree	**Neutral**	**Agree**
Below secondary	7.0	5.7	40.3
Secondary / ITE	8.0	62.3	29.7
Dip. / Prof. qual.	8.0	65.5	26.5
Bachelor's and above	18.5	60.0	21.5

Table 319: Innovativeness of government employees in Singapore, by housing type

Housing Type ***N = 1,999***	**I believe that government employees in Singapore are innovative**		
	Disagree	**Neutral**	**Agree**
1- to 3-room HDB	9.4	58.1	32.5
4-room HDB	9.6	59.8	30.6
5-room HDB	11.4	61.7	26.9
Private apartment/ Landed property	16.8	65.3	18.0

7.3.4 Over three-quarters of respondents indicated ordinary people like them would never have to bribe government officials or service providers to get the services they need; this proportion is the highest when compared with other polities

When asked to indicate how often they thought ordinary people like themselves would have to bribe government officials or service providers to obtain the services they need, 76.5 per cent of respondents indicated felt this would never be the case, while 21.7 per cent indicated this would rarely be the case (see Figure 193).

Figure 193: Perceived frequency of occurence ("How often do ordinary people like you have to pay a bribe to government officials to get the services you need?")



In comparison to other polities, Singapore has the highest proportion of respondents who reported the perception that ordinary people like themselves did not need to pay a bribe to government officials or service providers in order to attain the services they needed. Asian polities, with the exception of Taiwan, have less than a majority of its respondents who indicated this. Such results are similar in non-Asian polities in Australia and the US as well (see Figure 194).

Figure 194: Perceived frequency of occurrence (pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favour to local officials/service providers), by polity



7.3.5 Older, less-educated, and respondents living in 1- to 3-room HDB flats were more likely to believe that bribes were never needed in order to get access to services

Compared with 68.5 per cent of the youngest group, 83.5 per cent of the oldest group said that ordinary people never had to resort to bribery to obtain public services (see Table 320).

Table 320: Perceived frequency of occurrence (pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favour to local officials/service providers), by age cohort

Age Cohort *N = 1,990*	How often do you think ordinary people like yourself or people from your neighbourhood have to pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favour to these people in order to get the services you need?			
	Never	Rarely	Frequently	Always
21-35	68.5	29.1	2.2	0.2
36-50	77.9	20.1	1.2	0.7
51-65	79.6	19.5	0.7	0.2
Above 65	83.5	15.0	1.5	0

Respondents with below secondary school education were the most confident in public services, with 81.3 per cent of this group saying ordinary people never had to resort to bribery to obtain services. Given that there was a positive correlation found between confidence rates and age, this higher degree of confidence is likely to be partly due to age effects (see Table 321).

Table 321: Perceived frequency of occurrence (pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favour to local officials/service providers), by education level

Education Level *N = 1,986*	How often do you think ordinary people like yourself or people from your neighbourhood have to pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favour to these people in order to get the services you need?			
	Never	Rarely	Frequently	Always
Below secondary	81.3	17.3	0.8	0.5
Secondary / ITE	78.6	19.6	1.6	0.2
Dip. / Prof. qual.	72.6	25.4	1.8	0.3
Bachelor's and above	74.9	23.4	1.4	0.3

Compared to the rest of the sample population, respondents living in 1- to 3-room HDB flats were most confident about ordinary people not having to resort to bribery to obtain public services. While around 74 per cent of the rest of the housing groups said that they never had to resort to bribery, 82.8 per cent of those living in 1- to 3-room flats said the same (see Table 322).

Table 322: Perceived frequency of occurrence (pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favour to local officials/service providers), by housing type

Housing Type *N = 1,990*	**How often do you think ordinary people like yourself or people from your neighbourhood have to pay a bribe, give a gift or do a favour to these people in order to get the services you need?**			
	Never	**Rarely**	**Frequently**	**Always**
1- to 3-room HDB	82.8	15.3	1.4	0.5
4-room HDB	73.7	24.8	1.2	0.3
5-room HDB	74.3	23.6	1.9	0.2
Private apartment/ Landed property	75.0	23.8	1.2	0

Chapter 8

Concluding Analyses

CHAPTER 8 | CONCLUDING ANALYSES

This last instalment of the three-part IPS Exchange Series on the Singapore findings of the 2020 World Values Survey has attempted to provide a broad-based overview of local respondents' lived experiences. The six substantive chapters preceding this conclusion have spanned issues of 1) personal well-being, 2) safety and security, 3) work, finances, and SES, 4) trust, information, and civil society participation, 5) political interest, activism, and awareness, and 6) national identity and governance.

As the responses pertain to a broad range of themes and issues, we condense the myriad findings presented using structural equation modelling with confirmatory factor analyses to test whether measures of a construct are consistent with a theoretical understanding of the nature of that construct. One of the most salient models which connects several key variables found in this study to life satisfaction is presented in 8.1. We conclude in 8.2 with a summary and discussion of the key insights gleaned from the survey findings presented in this report.

8.1 STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELLING

To consolidate what we have found across all three reports, we employ structural equation modelling to examine different indicators to see what they might be able to tell us about the lives that Singaporeans are leading, what they are interested in, and what aspects of their lives are influencing their views on issues. The results examine how respondents' attitudes towards different government policies and institutions affect their overall satisfaction with life.

8.1.1 Respondents were likelier to feel satisfied with different aspects of their lives if they had higher levels of overall trust, supported government surveillance, were confident in state institutions, and supported neoliberal economics

The table below lists the variables included in this set of analyses, together with the components of the structural equation model (see Table 323).

Table 323: Variables included in structural equation model

Variables	Components	Descriptive Statistics
Sense of vulnerability	To what degree are you worried about: A war involving my country	Mean: 2.410 Median: 2.667 Range: 1-4
	To what degree are you worried about: A terrorist attack	
	To what degree are you worried about: A civil war	
Overall trust in people	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?	Mean: 1.374 Median: 1.357 Range: 0-2
	How much do you trust: Your family	
	How much do you trust: Your neighbourhood	
	How much do you trust: People you know personally	
	How much do you trust: People you meet for the first time	
	How much do you trust: People of another religion	
	How much do you trust: People of another nationality	
Overall satisfaction with life	Degree of control and choice over one's life	Mean: 6.767 Median: 7 Range: 1-10
	Degree of satisfaction with one's life	
	Degree of satisfaction with one's household finances	
Support for government surveillance	Govt has the right to: Keep people under video surveillance in public areas	Mean: 6.577 Median: 6 Range: 1-12
	Govt has the right to: Monitor all emails and any other information exchanged on the Internet	
	Govt has the right to: Collect information about anyone living in Singapore without their knowledge	
Confidence in state institutions	Degree of confidence in: Government	Mean: 2.41 Median: 2.667 Range: 1-4
	Degree of confidence in: Parliament	
	Degree of confidence in: the Courts	
	Degree of confidence in: the police force	
	Degree of confidence in: the armed forces	
	Degree of confidence in: the Civil Service	
Support for neoliberal economics	Support for greater individualised incentives vs more equal incomes	Mean: 0.626 Median: 0.620 Range: 0-1
	Support for private ownership of business and industry vs government ownership of business and industry	
	Support for people taking responsibility for themselves vs government supporting people	
	Support for competition is good vs competition is harmful	
	Support for hard work bringing about success vs luck and connections bringing about success	

The following six variables were found to have significant relationships with each other. Many of them were significantly correlated with the other variables (see Table 324).

Table 324: Correlation coefficients of salient variables

Correlations	Overall sense of security	Overall trust in people	Overall satisfaction	Support for government surveillance	Confidence in state institutions
Overall trust in people	-.147***				
Overall satisfaction	.057*	.215**			
Support for government surveillance	.152***	-.026	.132***		
Confidence in state institutions	.056*	.288***	.283***	.179***	
Support for neoliberal economic	.077***	.141***	.344***	.061**	.177***

The overall model is presented in the diagram below, with the relevant regression coefficients included along the relationship lines. The arrows represent the flow of the relationship. The model showed a good fit with the data[4,5]. Essentially, we find that respondents are more likely to feel satisfied with different aspects of their lives if they have higher levels of overall trust and support for neoliberal economics.

Meanwhile, the perception that Singapore is vulnerable to security threats (i.e., wars or terrorist attacks) has an indirect, negative effect on overall satisfaction via support for government surveillance and confidence in state institutions (see Figure 195).

[4] X^2 (3) = 11.416, p = 0.010, GFI = 0.998, CFI = 0.990, RMSEA = 0.038, SRMR = 0.015

[5] Bootstrapping to test the statistical significance of the SEM results including path coefficients has been performed to ensure model salience and fit, alongside ensure alpha (α) is within model parameters.

Figure 195: Structural Equation Model



We found that overall trust is linked to overall satisfaction both directly and indirectly. There are three statistically significant relationship pathways of interest engaging these two elements.

First, higher levels of overall trust are positively associated with higher levels of overall satisfaction with one's life. Secondly, being more trusting of different groups increases confidence in state institutions. In turn, confidence in state institutions both directly and indirectly (via support for government surveillance measures) brings about higher levels of overall satisfaction. Thirdly, those with higher levels of overall trust were less likely to believe that Singapore is vulnerable to security threats.

We also found that a strong sense of national vulnerability indirectly affected overall satisfaction levels in a positive way via (1) higher confidence in state institutions, and (2) higher support for government surveillance. Being more convinced that Singapore is vulnerable to security threats leads respondents to be more supportive of government surveillance measures, and subsequently engenders higher overall satisfaction levels.

Meanwhile, respondents who are more worried about Singapore's vulnerability to security threats also have higher confidence in government institutions. This relationship then both directly and indirectly (via support for government surveillance measures), engenders higher overall satisfaction levels. In *toto*, these linkages present a negative indirect relationship between overall trust and overall satisfaction due to the worry that Singapore is not fully secure.

Support for neoliberal economics also leads to higher overall satisfaction levels both directly and indirectly. Respondents who are more supportive of neoliberal economics are more likely to have confidence in state institutions, which leads to higher overall satisfaction directly as well as via stronger support for government surveillance. Those supportive of neoliberal economics are also more worried about Singapore's vulnerability to security threats, which leads to higher overall satisfaction via stronger support for both state institutions and government surveillance.

These findings illustrate how respondents who believe that Singapore is vulnerable to security threats are more supportive of government institutions and surveillance measures, which in turn affects overall satisfaction levels. This indicates that the vulnerability perception is still salient amongst Singaporean respondents. On the flip side, it also points to a reluctance for big government amongst those who feel that they are already living in a very safe environment.

8.2 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The findings in Chapter 2 illustrate how individuals who are older, more educated and with a higher income report higher levels of satisfaction and happiness. This is not surprising as research has found a significant and positive relationship between income and life satisfaction (Blanchflower & Oswald, 2004, for instance). Higher levels of income can be used to purchase material goods and services, resulting in higher life satisfaction (Masuda, Williams & Tallis, 2020).

Attaining higher levels of education have also been found to result in both monetary gains, such as higher income returns, and non-monetary gains, such as better health and stability in family life, resulting in higher life satisfaction (Powdthavee, Lekfuangfu & Wooden, 2015). Similarly, individuals with higher income reported better health conditions. Such individuals are able to afford better health resources to treat illnesses effectively as compared to those with lower salaries who may have limited access to health solutions due to their income.

A large majority of respondents perceived their standard of living to be better than their parents', indicating upward social mobility. Interestingly, higher proportions of naturalised citizens and PRs (85.1 per cent) felt they were better off than their parents as compared to born citizens (75.2 per cent). As many of Singapore's new citizens hail from Asian polities, some of which are less developed compared to Singapore, it is more likely that they have experienced an improvement in their standard of living. Migration clearly offers a strategy for upward mobility when the income gains and benefits from migration exceed its costs (Abdelmoneim & Litchfield, 2016).

In Chapter 3, we peruse issues of safety and security. When it comes to the safety of their homes, Singaporeans generally feel safe, with over 85 per cent who felt they have never felt unsafe from crime in their home. It also appears that there is a very high level of personal security as 92.1 per cent of respondents felt "very secure" or "quite secure" when asked about how secure they felt. While a high level of personal safety and security indicates that the very fundamental need of security is met in Singapore, it is worth noting that higher income groups and males feel more safe and secure. What changes to society are required so that females and those with less income also feel equally safe?

Notwithstanding the low level of crime in Singapore, unsavoury activities still occur from time to time in the neighbourhood. The most frequent activity reported to have been seen was alcohol consumption on the streets, with 12.8 per cent of individuals reporting such an act, followed by racist behaviour (5.7 per cent), street violence and fights (4.7 per cent), and sexual harassment (4.1 per cent). Individuals who were more likely to have seen alcohol consumption, robberies, police interference, and drug use on streets were from lower-income brackets and lived in smaller housing units, such as one to three-room HDB flats.

We find that younger and more educated respondents were more likely to report noticing racist behaviour and sexual harassment in the neighbourhood. This is likely a result of greater awareness among the young about the reality of racist behaviours further developed through their greater exposure to the accounts of racist encounters online. Similarly, this demographic is more aware of topics such as sexual harassment, given its currency on social media.

Personal and household finances, work, and notions of class are part of individual economic wellbeing – a key contributor to one's quality of life. In Chapter 4, we find that a majority of respondents had middling satisfaction levels, and a third of respondents had high satisfaction levels of their overall family financial situation. Unsurprisingly, individuals with higher socioeconomic levels, whether be it education, income, or housing type, were more satisfied compared with the rest of the population. It is also encouraging to note that a large majority of the population are in a good economic situation seeing that this majority has never gone without basic necessities, such as food, medicine, cash income or shelter over their heads, in the past year.

However, when it came to income flow in the past year, the responses were more mixed. Even though 57.2 per cent saved money, we find that 28.8 per cent only had just enough, 11.4 per cent spent their savings, and 2.6 per cent spent their savings and borrowed money. Those who were more likely to save money belonged to the younger age group, whereas those who were older were less likely to save money and dip into their savings.

In light of Singapore's ageing population, this finding serves to highlight the precarious financial situation that belies the older population. However, we also find that the older age groups have the highest take-up rates for CPF investment schemes, which could be helpful as a way to grow their savings as they age. Yet, this is not a catch-all solution; more can be done to reduce the income uncertainty surrounding the older population in Singapore.

Job satisfaction, which is another aspect of economic wellbeing, is high among the Singapore population, with close to half of the population indicating a high degree of job satisfaction. Older, more educated, and those holding full-time positions or who are self-employed appeared to be more satisfied with their jobs. Higher educational levels increase one's chances to attain a job that meet their expectations, hence resulting in higher job satisfaction.

Higher job satisfaction among those who hold full-time positions could be explained by the job security that a full-time job offers, as well as the better benefits and welfare that comes with such a position. Self-employed individuals may feel more satisfaction in their job as it gives them greater autonomy at work.

Moving on to the societal sphere of lived experiences in Chapter 5, we note that general trust appears to be low, with only one-third of the population indicating that most people can be trusted. This trend of general low trust follows into particularised trust, where trust was more likely to be accorded to people whom individuals interacted with more frequently, such as family, neighbours or family.

On the other hand, individuals are warier of people they met for the first time, people of another religion, and people of another nationality. However, it is reassuring to find that trust levels have increased over the years, as seen with the increase in the proportion of respondents indicating most people can be trusted from 13.9 per cent in 2002 to 36.4 per cent in 2020.

Across all groups, younger respondents were more trusting than their older counterparts. Respondents from better socioeconomic backgrounds with higher education, income, or living in larger housing types, also appear to be more trusting. Research has shown that education increases trust through many mechanisms, such as expanding one's knowledge about people who are different from ourselves, thereby becoming less wary of and more trusting of people (Österman, 2021). Those with lower income may express lower trust in others due to repeated interactions with individuals where their trust was violated, possibly as a result of their more vulnerable position in society (Park, Mosley & Grogan, 2018). Conversely, those with higher income express higher trust as they have more positive interactions with others.

Citizenship status also plays an important factor when it comes to trust towards neighbours and individuals of another nationality. We find that compared with born citizens, naturalized citizens and PRs were more trusting of the aforementioned groups. This could be a positive result of the integration efforts by the government to assimilate new citizens into Singapore, such as establishing the National Integration Council, which partners with grassroots organisations and immigration associations to help newcomers to settle into their neighbourhood. It is also natural for new citizens, who were once migrants, to be more open to other migrants of different nationalities.

When it comes to membership in organisations, the highest levels of membership can be found for religious organisations, followed by sports or recreational organisations and cultural groups. Political parties were the least popular. The high levels of membership for religious organisations are likely in part due to a large segment of the population actively practising religion – as noted at the end of Chapter 5. Close to a majority of the population attend religious services at least once a month, and 60.4 per cent indicated they pray several times a day, once a day, several times each week or when attending religious services.

These reveal that religion is important in the lives of Singaporeans. Pereira (2006) argues that the non-secularisation of Singaporeans despite modernisation and industrialisation (Inglehart, 1997) can be explained by three reasons: religion is deeply embedded in society due to the multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of Singapore; the (regulated) promotion of religion in Singapore by the state and a "rationalisation and intellectualisation" of religion (p. 172).

The next sphere of lived experiences this study tackles is that of the political in Chapter 6. In the second report of WVS, we found that Singaporeans are generally politically disinterested. This trend of political apathy can also be seen in this report, where 55 per cent of the population only had political discussions with their friends occasionally. This study found a positive relationship between education and political discussions.

This is not surprising since many may take courses related to politics, learn about politics, and critically evaluate political developments. As such, political socialization facilitated by the educational institutions encourages one to form their own view and perceptions about politics, enabling them to engage or even initiate political discussions with their friends (Grajcevci & Shala, 2018).

Singaporeans also learn about politics through other channels. The top three sources of political information were all technology-based: mobile phones, the Internet, and social media. More respondents below the age of 50 report using such media daily, whereas their older counterparts report using the newspaper, radio news, and email more frequently. This finding highlights the presence of a digital divide, or the differential access to information and communications technology, usually caused by unequal socioeconomic, gender, ethnic and age factors (Friernel, 2016).

In this case, age appears to be a large factor in the low usage of technologies to acquire political information. In light of the prevalent use of technology to disseminate political information such as key policies, policymakers need to ensure that the older population are not excluded from access to such information. In addition, more training or guidance to improve the digital literacy of the elderly can aid in reducing the digital divide.

Although Singaporeans may appear to be politically apathetic, this does not mean their lived experiences are devoid of political actions. But while they do participate politically, respondents are nuanced in their choice of political action. This can be seen from the findings that political actions involving physical demonstrations or organizing political events are least popular amongst the population compared to other political actions like donations, contacting government officials, or signing petitions.

Similarly, when asked about online political actions, the population veered away from more active forms of political actions such as organising protests online or encouraging others to take any form of political actions, preferring to partake in less controversial forms of online political action, such as signing electronic petitions, or searching information about politics and political events online. Such responses are not surprising considering the strict laws that Singapore has with regards to collective mobilisation and gatherings, one example being the Public Order Act, which makes it illegal to publicly assemble without a police permit.

Those who indicated that they might participate in more outward forms of political actions such as boycotts, peaceful demonstrations, unofficial strikes, or organise political activities, events and protests online, were more likely to be higher-educated individuals. This could be due to higher education exposing individuals to a more critical knowledge of politics, thus equipping them with a better understanding of possible political actions. However, actual participation rates from this population segment remain extremely low. Given the protest movements overseas, including sustained ones in Hong Kong between 2019 and 2020, it will be interesting to examine whether better educated and younger Singaporeans expect an updating of current restrictions for such political action.

This could be because higher education exposes one to more critical knowledge of politics, thus equipping them with a better understanding of possible political actions. However, actual participation rates from this slice of the population remain extremely low. Future studies are warranted in order to capture a more accurate picture of political participation by higher educated students.

In Chapter 7, we explore Singaporean's lived experiences in the national sphere. A key national event is the occurrence of elections in Singapore. In democracies, elections bestow the winning party legitimacy. However, democratic legitimacy can be affected by perceptions of electoral integrity, or the procedural integrity of elections (Bowler, Brunell, Donovan & Gronke, 2015; Birch, 2008).

In the Singapore context, we find that respondents view the treatment of voters positively. A majority (54.8 per cent) believed that their votes were counted fairly, with only 2.5 per cent believing that voters were bribed or threatened with violence. We do find mixed responses regarding the fairness of elections. For instance, with respect to perceptions of a level electoral playing field, about a third of respondents felt that opposition candidates were prevented from running in elections very or fairly often.

However, there appears to be a high level of trust in journalist's fairness in covering elections as well as the impartiality of election officials. Furthermore, 41.2 per cent of the population felt that voters were offered a genuine choice in the elections. Hence, electoral integrity in Singapore is rather strong in the eyes of the population. However, in order to maintain voter confidence, threats to electoral fairness such as voter bribery, corruption, and maladministration of electoral practices need to be prevented and eradicated if possible.

It is encouraging to find that an overwhelming majority (92.4 per cent) of Singaporeans feel either very proud or quite proud to be a Singaporean. In addition, Singaporeans feel closest to their neighbourhood, followed by their country. Nation-building efforts by the government through citizenship education, political socialization through channels such as National Service, education in schools, and home-ownership, appear to have paid off, given that Singaporeans generally harbour positive feelings towards the nation and its people.

The above explicates an individual's lived experience across four key domains: personal, societal, political, and national. We have also gleaned insights into the factors that are vital to a good quality of life, such as health, safety, security, economic wellbeing, and engagement in social organisations. However, it is key to note that these factors are also contingent on the quality of government. Recent studies focus on this relationship between quality of government and life satisfaction (for instance, Liu, Gao & Huang, 2020; for a comprehensive review, see Smith & Yonk, 2018). These studies highlight how aspects of government performance, such as its efficiency, responsiveness and trustworthiness, affect people's evaluation of life.

This holds true in Singapore as well. Using structural equation modelling in the preceding section, we find that confidence in state institutions has a positive relationship with overall satisfaction levels. In addition, we also find that overall satisfaction can be predicted directly by support for democracy. Hence, one suggestion to further improve the quality of life and life satisfaction of Singaporeans would be to apply greater focus on improving our quality of governance, providing high-quality public services, and, importantly, building strong democratic institutions.

Through structural equation models, we also find that overall trust can directly predict overall satisfaction levels. Trust, then, is a key contributor in achieving citizen's life satisfaction. In order to foster trust, there is a need to build social capital in society today. Although this study finds that Singaporeans are well embedded in religious organisations, they are still limited to the same group of networks and associations within the organisation. Hence, there is a need for associational networks to transcend beyond the organisation one is embedded within.

In this regard, more civic engagement programs where people from different backgrounds meet and strengthen networks outside of their respective social circles would be welcome. This may become more imperative in a post-COVID world, where physical interactions became limited, thus necessitating programming that fosters social capital and civic life.

This study also highlighted some potential factors that may cause the quality of life to decline. Firstly, many of the domains of life satisfaction, such as health, economic wellbeing, security, and trust have a positive relationship with income. Conversely, lower incomes would predict a lower quality of life. Second, in light of the large immigration populace in Singapore, there is much need to foster trust between the native citizens and new citizens as well as citizens and immigrants. Among other negative consequences such as crime rate, income inequality reduces trust and cohesion not just in the family but also in society, causing segregation rather than integration between these groups (Hastings, 2018; Voicu, 2014). Rising inequality and low trust between local-born citizens, naturalised citizens, and immigrants can result in decreasing trust in society and serve only to erode the hard-earned social cohesion and harmony in Singapore. Augmented efforts are hence needed to close the income gap between the rich and the poor, and strengthen integration between local-born citizens and immigrants in Singapore.

In conclusion, for Singapore to keep its place as one of the most liveable nations in the world, it is imperative that good governance remains a priority in our city-state. The diverse lived experiences of Singaporeans as articulated in this report are ultimately facilitated by a responsive, accountable, and democratic Singapore government.

Annex 1

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Annex 2

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Annex 3

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