ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF SRI LANKA'S ETHNIC CONFLICT

Shreekant Gupta

ecsgs@nus.edu.sg

Visiting Senior Research Fellow

Institute of South Asian Studies

SRI LANKA'S ETHNIC CONFLICT: THE POLITICAL & ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS

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OUTLINE

- Society and demography
- Economy
- Evolution of economic policy
- Economic performance
- Economic impact of ethnic conflict
- Sri Lanka's economic future

Society


- Multicultural society
- Predominantly (Buddhist) Sinhalese (80%)
- Jaffna-based Tamils in north & east (7%)
- Up-country Indian Tamils on plantations (5-6%)
- Tamil Muslims (mainly traders) in east (7%)
- Two separate streams of education based on language and ethnicity

Demography

- A rural, ageing and densely populated country.
- Low level (and rate) of urbanisation, virtually constant at 15% since 1950.
- Biggest city (Colombo) only 0.65 million.
- Reached an advanced stage of demographic transition at a relatively low income level.
- Fertility below replacement levels (pop growth 0.9%).
- Increased life expectancy (men 72, women 77).
- 3rd highest proportion of old people in Asia by 2050.

Regional Imbalance → **discontent?**

- Relatively densely populated, 317 persons/km².
- Population and economy concentrated in southwest and centre.
- 3 of 9 provinces (Western, Central and Southern) -- 70% of national income, 55% of population, but 23% of total area.
- Western province alone accounts for half of national income (and 60% of industrial output), 30% of population, but less than 6% of total area. Has the port and airport.
- Implications for demand for 'federalisation'.





The Sri Lankan Economy

- Plantation economy at the time of independence in 1948 (tea, rubber, cinnamon and coconut).
- Share of **agriculture** in national income dropped from 50% (1950) to 35% (1970) to less than 20% at present. But employs a third of the workforce.
- Currently **industry** accounts for 25-26% of national income (no significant change since 1970s).
- **Services** account for about 55% of national income at present (trade, transport, finance, communications and tourism).

Evolution of Economic Policy

- Until late 1970s, extensive **state control** of economy (plantations, industry, etc.).
- Though Sri Lanka an 'early liberalizer', uneven implementation of economic reforms since then.
- Lack of **political consensus** on reforms (UNF-UNP more pro-reform than UPFA-PA-SLFP).
- At present economic reforms are **stalled** and several have been **reversed** by the UPFA government (fertilizer subsidy reintroduced, petroleum and electricity prices re-regulated, privatization halted, removal of hiring freeze and 20% pay hike to civil servants).


Economic Performance

- Despite ethnic conflict and political instability, the economy has consistently shown **resilience**.
- Real GDP growth averaged almost 6% in 2002-06.
- Real GDP grew by 7.4% in 2006—highest since 1978 when liberalization began.
- Vibrant **private sector** remains the main driver of economic growth.
- But growth performance below potential due to:
 - Ethnic conflict
 - Political uncertainty
 - Unpredictable pace of economic reform

The major economies of South Asia 2006

	Populatio n (million)	GDP (US\$ billion; market exchange rate)	GDP (US\$ billion; PPP)	GDP per capita (US\$; market exchange rate)	GDP per capita (US\$; PPP)	HDI value (rank)	Real GDP annual growth, EIU forecast (2008-12)
Bangladesh	156.0 (1.9)	62 (5.7)	290	397	1,861	0.347 (140)	6.2
India	1,095 (1.5)	923 (7.8)	2,743	842	2,504	0.619 (128)	7.5
Pakistan	160.9 (1.8)	127 (6.0)	415	788	2,587	0.367 (136)	5.8
Sri Lanka	19.2 (0.4)	27 (5.8)	85	1,404	4,411	0.743 (99)	5.7

Growth rate of major South Asian economies



Ethnic conflict only drag on the economy?

- Huge and inefficient **public sector**--state dominates financial sector and utilities. 1 million govt employees (one of the highest ratios of public employees to population in Asia), wage bill over a third of govt. current expdt (7.4% of GDP in 2006)
- Unsustainable **fiscal deficits**—averaged 8.4% of GDP in 2002-06.
 - low revenue—tax evasion, multiple tax
 exemptions, concessions, import duty waivers
 - high expenditure—reluctance to trim bureaucracy, rationalise welfare payments and subsidies, populist handouts, defence spending.

Other structural economic problems

- Inefficiencies in **financial sector**—two largest commercial banks state-owned. State is a large borrower, crowds out private debt market.
- State owns 90% of land.
- Low **agricultural productivity**—heavy state interference (restrictions on land use—major portion of agricultural land to be used for paddy cultivation)—post-harvest output loss 40% due to poor storage and transport facilities.
- Bad **infrastructure**—poor roads (fatalities since 1983 as high as those from the civil war), railways carry 5% of passenger and 2% of cargo transport.
- Chronic **power shortages**—inadequate generation, transmission losses and theft.

Strengths of Sri Lankan economy

- Skilled workforce.
- **Remittances** (second biggest forex earner).
- Exports and services (telecom, ports) are dynamic sectors, services principal driver of economic growth since 2002.
- Dynamic **telecom** sector (share in GDP doubled from 3.7% in 2002 to 7.4% in 2006).
- Port services doing well, 11% growth in 2007.
- **Manufacturing** doing well—80% of manufacturing output generated by private, export-oriented units—but narrow base (40% of mfg is textiles & garments, 22% food, beverages and tobacco). **Garments** account for 50% of total exports.
- Central bank highly independent in monetary policy.

Chronology of ethnic conflict

- Depressingly predictable cycle of ceasefire, negotiations, breakdown, fighting and ceasefire...
- Start of 'Eelam Wars' in 1983 (I, II, III, IV)
 - 1983 to 1987-88 (arrival and withdrawal of IPKF)
 - June 1990 to December 1994
 - mid-April 1995 to November 2001
 - mid 2006 to present

Economics of ethnic conflict

- Increased public (defence) expenditure—crowding out effect
- Fiscal deficits
- Reduction in investment, | of capital stock
- 45-50% of defence expdt on wages (bigger army), rest for military hardware and equipment
- Armed forces quadrupled in size 1986-96
- 200,000 in 1996 (Malaysia 114,500, Philippines 107,500 and Australia 57,800)

Economic cost of ethnic conflict

- Direct and indirect costs (Arunatilake and Kelegama 2001)
- Direct costs destruction of K and L stock,
 military expdt and refugee care
- Indirect costs capital flight, loss of potential foreign capital (FDI and FIIs), tourist inflows, emigration of skilled labour, human capital formation (trauma, education)

Some numbers...

- IPS (Institute of Policy Studies) estimate for 1984-96 using an econometric model: 168% of 1996 GDP.
- Kelegama (1999): US\$16 billion by 1994 or 131% of 1995 GDP.

- Richardson and Samarasinghe (1991): for 1983-88, US\$4.2 billion or 68% of 1988 GDP
- Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993): for 1983-88, US\$1.5 billion or 20% of 1988 GDP.
- Marga (1998): 13% of 1998 GDP

Peace → **Growth or Growth** → **Peace?**

- Peace dividend of resolution of conflict
- What if more rapid economic and job creation had occurred during the 'lost decades'?
- Would ethnic tensions/grievances been mitigated to some extent?

Sri Lanka's (Economic) Future?

- Imperative to resolve conflict
- Self-rule/autonomy?
- EIU medium term growth forecast (2008-12) is 5.7%
- Does not compare too badly with Pakistan (5.8%) and Bangladesh (6.2%)
- But Sri Lanka can (and will) do much better!
- Sound economic policies conflict notwithstanding are imperative