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Senior Research Advisor

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Academic Qualifications:

1. Ph.D., London School of Economics, 1986-91 (with work experience in 1990-91).
2. M.Sc. (Econ), London School of Economics, 1980-81.
3. B.Soc.Sc., University of Hong Kong, 1977-80.

Work Experience (before retirement):

1. Dec 1999 – Jun 2022, Associate Professor in Economics, Nanyang Technological University (NTU).
(Jul 2006 – Jun 2007, Visiting Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong.)
2. Jun 1997 – Nov 1999, Senior Manager, Bank of China, HK-Macau Regional Office.
3. Jun 1996 – Jun 1997, Manager, Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
4. Sep 1995 – May 1996, Head, Economic Research Department, the Bank of East Asia.
5. Jul 1991 – Sep 1995, Lecturer, Division of Banking and Finance, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University.
6. Jul 1990 – Jul 1991, Research Officer, School of Management, Imperial College.
7. Jan 1985 – Apr 1986, Lecturer, Hong Kong Polytechnic and City Polytechnic.
8. Sep 1982 – Aug 1984, Teaching Assistant, London School of Economics.
9. Sep 1981 – Aug 1982, Demonstrator, University of Hong Kong.

Current Adjunct or Part-time Positions (after retirement):

1. Sep 2023 – now, Senior Research Advisor, Asia Competitiveness Institute, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.
2. Sep 2023 – now, Part-time Lecturer (two popular undergraduate courses on “Money and Banking” and “China and the Global Economy”), Economics Department, Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK).
3. Jan 2023 – now, Part-time Lecturer (one Master course on the Chinese Economy and another Undergraduate course on the Asia-Pacific Economies), Economics Department, Business School, Hong Kong Baptist University (HKBU).
4. Sep 2022 – now, Part-time Economic Advisor and Investment Consultant, KSH Holdings Limited (a listed company in Singapore).

Research Interest:

- International Monetary Economics,
- Chinese Economy,
- Exchange Rate Systems and Exchange Rate Policies, especially in China, Singapore and Hong Kong,
- Exchange Rate and Macroeconomic Policies,
- Characteristics of Asset Bubbles and Financial Crises,
- Property Market Problems and Housing Policies in Asia,
- Applied Econometrics in economics, finance and management studies.

Publications

Number of journal papers: 23

Number of books: 4

Number of book chapters: 2

1. (Journal Paper) Yip S.L., Tse Y.K. and Dong Y.J., 2022, The Exchange Rate System Reform in China: Some Important Results, *Singapore Economic Review*, <https://doi.org/10.1142/S0217590822500576>.
2. (Journal Paper) Yan F.L. and Yip S.L., 2021, Nonlinear Adjustment of Exchange Rate and Exchange Rate Policy: Lessons from Singapore, *International Journal of Finance and Economics*, Vol 26, No. 1, pp.171-84.
3. (Book) Yip Paul S. L., 2019, *From the Global Financial Tsunami to the Property Bubbles in Asia: Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy Management*, World Scientific: Singapore.
4. (Policy Paper in an Open Access Journal) Yip Paul S.L., 2018, Some Important Characteristics of Asset Bubbles and Financial Crises, *Modern Economy*, Vol. 9, pp.1137-68.
5. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., 2016, China's Exchange Rate System Reform: Two Potential Mistakes and the Recommended Long-Term System, *Singapore Economic Review*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 1640025, pp.1-40.
6. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., 2014, The Risk of Property Bubbles in Hong Kong and Singapore: Another Aftershock Crisis of the Global Financial Tsunami, *Singapore Economic Review*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 1450026, pp.1-53.

7. (Book) Yip Paul S. L., 2011, *China's Exchange Rate System Reform: Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy Management*, World Scientific: Singapore.
8. (Journal Paper) Tsang Eric W.K., Yip Paul S.L., 2009, Competition, Agglomeration, and Performance in Beijing Hotels, *Service Industries Journal*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp.155-171.
9. (Journal Paper) Tsang Eric W.K., Yip Paul S.L., Toh Mun Heng 2008, The impact of R&D on Value Added for Domestic and Foreign Firms in a Newly Industrialized Economy, *International Business Review*, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp.423-441.
10. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., Tan K.C., 2008, Impacts of Ageing Population on Monetary and Exchange Rate Management in Singapore, *Singapore Economic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp.245-259.
11. (Book) Yip Paul S. L., 2008, *The Exchange Rate Systems and Policies in Asia*, World Scientific: Singapore.
12. (**A* Journal Paper**) Tsang Eric W.K., Yip Paul S.L., 2007, Economic Distance and Survival of Foreign Direct Investments, *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 5, pp.1156-1168.
13. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., 2007, China's Exchange Rate System Reform, *Singapore Economic Review*, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 363-402.
14. (Editorial Overview) Yip Paul S.L., 2007, Editorial Overview: Important Lessons from Some Major Exchange Rate and Monetary Experiences in Asia, *Singapore Economic Review*, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 269-283.
15. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., Tsang Eric W.K., 2007, Interpreting Dummy Variables and Their Interaction Effects in Strategic Research, *Strategic Organization*, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp.13-30.
16. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., Yao S.T., 2006, Removing Foreign Direct Investment's Exchange Rate Risk in Developing Economies, *International Review of Economics and Finance*, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp 294-315.
17. (Journal Paper) Tse Y.K., Yip Paul S.L., 2006, Exchange Rate Systems and Interest Rate Behaviour: The Experience of Hong Kong and Singapore, *International Review of Economics and Finance*, Vol. 15, No.2, pp 212-227.

18. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., 2005, On the Maintenance Costs and Exit Costs of the Peg in Hong Kong, *Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies*, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp 377-403.
19. (Book) Yip Paul S. L., 2005, *The Exchange Rate Systems in Hong Kong and Singapore: Currency Board vs Monitoring Band*, Prentice Hall: Singapore.
20. (Book Chapter) Yip Paul S. L., 2004, *The Debt Market*, in Ho S.M. (ed) *The Hong Kong Financial System*, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, pp 205-221.
21. (Journal Paper) Tse Y.K., Yip Paul S.L., 2003, The Impacts of Hong Kong's Currency Board Reforms on the Interbank Market, *Journal of Banking and Finance*, Vol. 27, No. 12, pp 2273-2296.
22. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., 2003, A Restatement of Singapore's Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies, *Singapore Economic Review* (Singapore), Vol. 48, No. 2, pp 201-212. [Also presented as a seminar paper in the *Monetary Authority of Singapore*.]
23. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., Wang R.F., 2002, Is Price in Hong Kong That Flexible? Evidence from the Export Sector, *Asian Economic Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp 193-208.
24. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., 2002, A Note on Singapore's Exchange Rate Policy: Empirical Foundations, Past Performance and Outlook, *Singapore Economic Review*, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp 173-182.
25. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., Wang R.F., 2001, On the Neutrality of Exchange Rate Policy in Singapore, *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* (Singapore), Vol. 18, No. 2, pp 251-262.
26. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., 1999, The Speculative Attack in Hong Kong Amid the Asian Financial Crisis, *Asian Pacific Journal of Finance* (Singapore), Vol. 2, No. 1, pp 79-92. [Extended from an anti-crisis proposal against the speculative attack and interest rate hike in Hong Kong in 1997-98.]
27. (Journal Paper) Driver, D., Yip Paul S.L., Dakhil, N., 1996, Large Company Capital Formation and Effects of Share Turbulence: Micro-data Evidence from the PIMS Data Base, *Applied Economics*, Vol. 28, No. 6, pp 641-651.
28. (Journal Paper) Yip Paul S.L., Yeo H.H., Tan T.M., Tan C.H., 1996, The Asian Consumer Durable Market: With Special Reference to China, *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* (Singapore), Vol. 12, No. 3, pp 380-396.

29. (Book Chapter) Yip Paul S. L., 1996, *Exchange Rate Management in Singapore*, in Lim C.Y. (ed) *Economic Policy Management in Singapore*, Addison-Wesley, pp 237-252.

Book in Progress

Yip Paul S.L., *Macroeconomics for the Chinese Economy*, World Scientific: Singapore.

Teaching Experience:

- Money and Banking (for a Bachelor degree in CUHK and B. Soc. Sc. at NTU)
- Macroeconomic Issues and Policies in China (for both M.A. and B. Soc. Sc. at NTU)
- Chinese Economy (for M. Soc. Sc. at HKBU, and a Bachelor degree in CUHK)
- Asia-Pacific Economies (for a Bachelor degree at HKBU)
- International Trade (for B. Soc. Sc. at NTU)
- International Finance (for Banking and Finance students at NTU),
- International Monetary Economics (for Economics students at NTU),
- Macroeconomics (for a Bachelor degree at HKU and B. Soc. Sc. at NTU)
- Economic Principles (for MBA) , and
- Exchange Rate System Reform and Macroeconomic Policies in China (for the “Mayor Class” at NTU) as well as talks on China’s exchange rate system reform and banking reform, housing market, stock market bubbles, capital flight, monetary and exchange rate policies in various Executive Programs organized by the Economics Department and the Nanyang Business School (NBS) at NTU.

Major Policy Contributions

1. 1997-98: **I published an in-depth policy proposal to stop the financial crisis at that time.** The proposal recommended the use of an exchange rate undertaking (guarantee) to revitalize interest arbitrage between the USD and HKD. Once revitalized, the interest arbitrage would bring the very high HK interest rate down to the US level ($\approx 6\%$) at that time. During the stock market battle against the hedge funds in late August 1998, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) modified my proposal to a verbal exchange rate undertaking. This had in turn pulled the high HK interest rate down to the US level through interest arbitrage, and hence help the HKMA to win its stock market battle against the hedge funds.
2. **2001-2007: I have published a classical book and 6 influential journal papers on the exchange rate system, the monetary and economic system, and the exchange rate policy in Singapore.** During that period, I have also **made policy recommendations on Singapore's exchange rate policy amid the changing economic environment at that time. These recommendations were seriously considered and then adopted by the related authorities in Singapore.**
3. 2002: To solve the “high unemployment” and “lack of growth” problem at that time, I managed to **convince the then Financial Secretary Mr. Anthony Leung** that HK might not have the comparative advantage to develop high-tech industry. Instead, HK should **develop the “high employment” and “high value-added” tourist industry** that HK had comparative advantage. With the adoption of the proposal, HK's tourist industry flourished, which in turn helped HK recover from the recession.

Because of the established relation with the Financial Secretary, **I also managed to convince him not to impose sales tax in 2003**, as this might not be a good policy for HK and the political damage might be too large for him to bear.

4. 2004-07: **I was the original proponent of China's exchange rate system reform and banking reform at that time.** During that period, I published hundreds of in-depth policy proposals on every detail of China's exchange rate system reform and banking reform. These proposals had helped China to successfully implement the two stages of the transitional reform and the medium-term reform on its exchange rate system. The banking reform proposals had also helped China's state-owned banks to transform to much stronger banks. Because of the significant policy contributions, **the Governor of the PBoC sent a director of the SAFE to meet me in Singapore.** A direct contact was built so that **my policy proposals submitted to the press will also be circulated within the PBoC's Monetary Policy Division a few days before the formal publication in the press.**

5. 2006-07: Because of policy impacts on China's exchange rate system, I was thrice invited to China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) which is closely related to the People's Bank of China (PBoC). During the first visit, through replies to the related officials, I managed to **convince the PBoC and the SAFE not to set up the renminbi futures market and renminbi options market in China at that time, as setting up of these markets will destroy China's capital control on portfolio flows, which is a core building block of China's exchange rate system at that time.** In the next two keynote speeches in the SAFE's policy conference, I provided the **short-term and long-term solutions to offset the monetary effects of speculative capital inflows** through the illegal channel or the abuse of legal channels.
6. 2006-07: Through in-depth policy analyses, I managed to **convince the Chinese Government not to set up the stock index futures, margin financing and short-selling facilities. These in turn avoided the facilities being abused to engineer a bursting of the stock market bubble at that time.** Unfortunately, the facilities were set up in 2012, which were abused to trigger a stock market bubble in 2014 and then a bursting of the bubble in 2015.
7. 2006-07: During the seeding stage and development stage of the stock market bubble at that time, I had been publishing a lot of policy analyses and proposals highlighting the importance of curbing the bubble at the early stage. In September 2009, I finally published a policy article highlighting further growth of the bubble and its subsequent bursting could cause not only economic disaster but also political and social instability. **The article managed to convince Chinese President Hu Jintao to curb the stock market bubble before it was too late.**
8. 2006-07: Through a visit to the PBoC, meetings with the CEO of Hong Kong Stock Exchange, a letter to the Hong Kong Government and policy articles published in the press, I managed to **stop the setting up of the renminbi futures market in Hong Kong.** Unfortunately, the market was set up in 2012, which allowed the hedge funds to trigger panics on the renminbi exchange rate and hence the three renminbi crisis and stock market crisis in 2015, 2018 and 2019.
9. 2007-12: Through in-depth housing policy proposals, I managed to convince Chinese **President Hu Jintao to build large number of public housing as a long-term solution to China's housing problem.** Thereafter, there were more types of public housing (e.g., two-limit flats and low-rental flats on top of the economy flats). The higher target of public housing was included in the Five-Year Plan, and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development was set up.
10. **2007-2008: Convinced the Singapore government to (gradually) extend the retirement age from 55 and 65.** In 2007, I posted my research paper and policy proposal to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, who forwarded the paper and policy

proposal to the CPF Board and the related authorities for in-depth consideration. The research paper first explained that ageing population (and hence the implied change from net CPF contribution to net CPF withdrawal) would substantially weaken the MAS's ability to influence Singapore's nominal effective exchange rate. It then made a few policy suggestions (including an extension of the retirement age from 55 to 65) to contain the pace of change towards net CPF withdrawal, and hence maintain the MAS's ability to implement its exchange rate policy. After in-depth consideration, the Singapore Government finally announced a package of policies which included a gradual extension of the retirement age from 55 to 65. Other than helping to solve the problems highlighted in the research paper, **the extension of the retirement age had the significant effect of keeping the huge amount of Singapore's labor resources productive for another ten years over all future generations.**

11. **2007-2020:** I developed the following **two new theoretical frameworks on (1) the market structure and characteristics of the property markets in Singapore, China, Hong Kong and other Asian cities; and (2) the characteristics and effectiveness of curbing policies during the seeding stage, development stage and final stage of a property bubble or stock market bubble.** With the new theoretical framework, I visited the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and managed to **convince the MAS to implement severe enough curbing measures** such as the fifth, the seventh and the eighth rounds of curbing measures. These MAS measures had in turn helped Singapore avoid a property bubble such as that in Hong Kong. **In the subsequent years, I have on and off made my recommendations for further curbing measures.**
12. **2008-09:** Through in-depth policy proposals in the press, I managed to **convince the Chinese government to implement ultra-expansionary fiscal policy (later known as the four trillion fiscal expansion), drastic cuts in interest rate and quantitative easing before the spillover effect of the US financial crisis started to affect the Chinese economy.** Because of the early implementation of the stimulation policies, **China was able to avoid being pulled into a severe recession and then a financial crisis similar to those in the US.** Instead, there was only moderate slowdown in China's GDP growth.
13. **2015-16:** In view of the **2015 renminbi crisis** in which there were enormous capital flights, gigantic losses of foreign reserves, plunges in the renminbi exchange rate, collapses of Chinese stock prices and vicious cycles among the four, **I published a journal paper and a few in-depth press articles explaining that (i) on top of the triggering cause, the underlying cause of the crisis is the capital flight loopholes; and (ii) plugging the loopholes will be able stop the crisis and enable the renminbi and stock market to stabilize.** [As mentioned in point 1 above, the eventual adoption of the proposal in 2019 proved to be the correct policy.] In the same journal paper, **I also made my proposal on the long-term exchange rate system that will suit China the most.**

14. 2018-19: **During the two episodes of Sino-US Trade War in 2018 and 2019, I published policy proposals to stop the plunges in the renminbi and the Chinese stock market.** In the proposals, I first explained that the triggering cause is the Trade War, but the underlying cause is the capital flight loopholes created by years of financial liberalization in China. If the loopholes are not plugged, the vicious cycles among capital flight, plunges in renminbi and collapses of stock prices will continue. **After the Chinese government adopted the proposal of plugging the loopholes, the capital flight dropped drastically, and the renminbi and the Chinese stock prices started to stabilize at the lower level.** With the gradual fading out of the effect of the Trade War, both the renminbi and Chinese stock prices rose to the pre-crisis levels.
15. 2021-22: Through persistent policy analyses in the press, I managed to **convince the Chinese Government to urge the new HK Government to aim at building large number of public housings as a long-term solution to HK's housing problem.**
16. **2021-2022:** In the policy analyses published in Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao and the Business Times, we (1) **pointed out a neglected inflation transmission channel and its role in the initial spike of the recent global inflation;** and (2) **used the Expectations-augmented Phillips Curve** developed by two Nobel Prize winners **to explain that the global economy is already locked in a mid-high inflation era.** After pointing out Fed Chairman Jerome Powell's policy mistake in the subsequent article, we **make policy recommendations on Singapore's exchange rate policy and property price curbing measures.**
17. 2022: make a quite a number of interviews with **中国中央电视台** on the **Sino-US disputes, the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict, the One Belt One Road Initiative** and the **global inflation.**
18. 2022-now: wrote a few **policy recommendations** on how **to reduce the damages of the property-firm crisis.**
19. 2023-now: Through the Mingpao, the Chief Executive's Policy Unit and other channels, making a series of policy recommendations and comments on Hong Kong's housing policy, medical reform, economic development policy, retirement policy, risk of bursting of Hong Kong's property bubble, and risk of financial and banking crises.