The Future of Regional Order in Southeast Asia
A Report

6-7 October 2017

The Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG), Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, was established in 2006 to study geopolitical, economic, and social trends in Asia and to examine the relationship between developments in the region and globalisation. As part of this effort, it has developed collaborative networks and relationships with major think tanks, research centres, and policy institutions in China, Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States. Through such collaboration, the Centre aims to provide a platform for constructive dialogue between leading scholars and experts on vital regional and global issues.

On 6-7 October 2017, CAG organised a workshop on the future of regional order in Southeast Asia. The aim of the workshop was to explore research directions on regional order. Regional order, so often equated, with ASEAN and its workings, is more than the norms and practices embodied by the regional organisation. Southeast Asia confronts change at several levels – the global, the continent, the region, and the domestic. These intertwining changes are affecting a regional order that is thought to have endured with a fair degree of stability going back to the end of the Cold War if not earlier. What are the changes and how are they influencing regional order? The workshop brought together 17 scholars and the research staff of the Centre for a day and a half to answer those questions. This report draws on the discussions of the proceedings but does not purport to summarize all the views expressed. Nor does it restrict itself to ideas and arguments tabled at the sessions. Rather, the report reflects an attempt to capture leading lines of analysis and to build on them.

As the discussions were wide-ranging, free-wheeling, and exploratory, we do not attempt to provide an executive summary. Suffice to say that the group explored the effects of geopolitical, environmental, bilateral and multilateral (i.e. ASEAN), economic, and political-social change on regional order. The discussions showed that Southeast Asia remains a complex regional system and that, at the very least, there are competing possibilities and conceptualisations of order. The Centre hopes to build on this promising beginning and to convene further study of the region and order.

On behalf of the Centre, I thank all the participants, research staff, and CAG administrators for the success of the workshop – with special gratitude to those who came from abroad.

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Director, CAG

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List of Abbreviations

1MDB	1Malaysia Development Berhad
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADMM Plus	ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and (the Republic of) South Africa
CAG	Centre on Asia and Globalisation
EAEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EAS	East Asia Summit
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
LKYSPP, NUS	Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
MSR	21st Century Maritime Silk Road, part of OBOR-BRI
NSR	Northern Sea Route
OBOR	The *One Belt, One Road* initiative. In this report it also refers to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), Maritime Silk Road (MSR) as well as the closely-related Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) and China-Pakistan Economic Corridors (CPEC)
RCEP	Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RSPO	Roundtable on Sustainable Oil
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
TPP	Trans-Pacific-Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Trade Organisation

I. Geopolitical Change and Regional Order

One way of conceptualising the prospects of regional order in Southeast Asia is through the lens of Muthiah Alagappa's arguments in *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* (Stanford University Press, 2003). Alagappa suggested that the security order in East and Southeast Asia following the end of the Cold War had been relatively stable and that intra-Asian relations were largely predictable as a function of four factors. In his view, East Asian regional order rests upon (i) the U.S. security umbrella; (ii) rapid economic growth; (iii) the emergence of normative structures, such as the "ASEAN Way" in Southeast Asia, that facilitated and encouraged cooperation and dialogue; and (iv) the consolidation of East and Southeast Asian countries into modern nation-states. Alagappa's prognosis was that this order would last a decade.

Clearly, with China's rise, the US security umbrella no longer looks as reassuring as before. During the Cold War, US assurances extended formally to the countries of Northeast Asia and, more implicitly, to the ASEAN 5. While Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea remained tied to the US, the situation in Southeast Asia has become far more fluid over the past decade.

In Southeast Asia, the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US is shaping both countries' relationships in the region. As China rises, it is attempting to win over states to its side. Southeast Asian states are therefore finding it hard to stay neutral. Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines, and even Malaysia are increasingly tilting towards China, while the region's biggest prize, Indonesia, plus Brunei and Myanmar, are hedging. Only Vietnam and Singapore are close to the U.S. and even they are reluctant to alienate Beijing beyond a point.

Having said that, excepting perhaps Cambodia, no states' choice is cast in stone. In the economics and trade realms, China has effectively replaced the US as the top trading partner of virtually every state in the region. Many Southeast Asian states have expressed a willingness to cooperate with China, especially in trade and investment, and now connectivity. However, China's power, its territorial claims in Southeast Asia, and the presence of overseas Chinese communities and growing numbers of Chinese businesses in Southeast Asia make regional states wary of Beijing.

While Southeast Asia continues to be comforted by the US military presence in Northeast Asia and the South China Sea, regional governments are watching US policies closely as well. The Obama administration's criticism of the Thai military coup prompted Bangkok to move closer to China. In the Philippines, President Duterte's historical suspicions of the US were aggravated by American criticism of the 'war on drugs'. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak moved closer to China after the US Justice Department deepened its investigation of the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) corruption case. With President Trump's arrival, the US could claw back some influence in Southeast Asia, as the new president seems uninterested in the domestic affairs of its partners. On the other hand, he and a section of the American public are wary of maintaining an Asian military presence and placing boots on the ground. The US's credibility as a reliable partner has also been weakened by Trump's decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

This confluence of developments suggests that Southeast Asia will remain split and uncertain. Some countries will side fairly openly with either China or the US, but virtually all will keep their options open. Unles s a U.S.-China condominium emerges, great power tensions for the forseeable future will likely undermine the existing security environment that facilitated economic growth and stability.

In terms of economic growth, East and Southeast Asia represent a mixed picture. The more developed economies have slowed down considerably as their economies have matured. On the other hand, the less advanced countries are showing signs of heading into a middle-income trap. The developing economies in the region are still growing at a decent rate, but their prospects cannot not be divorced from the state of the world economy as well as the regional economy. Still, in comparison to other parts of Asia and other regions worldwide, East and Southeast Asia continue to be dynamic.

As for the normative congruence between Southeast Asian states, the ASEAN way remains a key factor of regional order. It is however under pressure as never before. The South China Sea dispute has put ASEAN cohesion under strain. The failure of the organisation to agree on a joint communique at its summit in 2012, for the first time in its 45-year history, arose from disagreement over the maritime dispute with China. The Rohingya refugee problem too has put ASEAN solidarity under strain, with Indonesia and Malaysia publicly criticising Naypyidaw over the flight of over 600,000 Rohingyas.

Over sixty years, the US security umbrella, rapid economic growth in the region, and ASEAN norms laid the foundation for the consolidation of Southeast Asian states. Governments and elites were in effect given the requisite time and resources to establish the political, economic, and social practices of modern nation-states. This internal consolidation, while substantial, is showing signs of strain. As the US security umbrella has come into question, as economic growth has led to inequality, corruption, and periodic crises, and as ASEAN's norms and institutions have come under challenge, the operating space for governments and elites is shrinking. Their approach to security, economic development, and regional relationships may all have to change.

How should one analyse an order that is in transition? One way is to study the region at a systemic level, focusing on structural changes that lead towards ruptures, violent or peaceful. Here the most popular way of seeing Southeast Asia's evolving order is to focus on the power transition between the US and China and the polarising pressures it is exerting on the region. As US power diminishes, calculations about relations with China, economic development pathways, the role of ASEAN norms, and internal politics could well change.

A second way of studying the region is to focus on the day-to-day adjustments and resulting incremental changes. Instead of tracing through the effects of a power transition, analysis would look more closely at the calculations and actions of pivotal regional states as they deal with the great powers, the challenge of economic development, regional relationships, and internal political stability and regime survival. Among these pivotal states are Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore. What kind of policies will they choose? Taking Vietnam as an example, with China, the U.S., and even Russia vying for influence in the country and the region, will Hanoi lean towards one power over the others? In a world where globalisation is under scrutiny, what kind of economic development policies will it pursue? Can export-led and light manufacturing-based growth continue to be viable and are its social effects manageable? As ASEAN shows signs of polarising, how should Hanoi position itself on the future of the organisation? Should it stick with its heretofore enthusiastic embrace of it? Is the legitimacy of the Communist Party assured in the midst of these changes, and how can it be maintained?

This statecraft perspective on regional affairs asks how rulers and elites act in various domains – international and domestic – to preserve their dominance. One way of conceptualising the perspective is through the notion of “interlocking bargains” discussed in Steve Chan’s *Looking for Balance* (Stanford University Press, 2012) and his 2005 article in *Asian Survey*. In this view, Southeast Asia’s regional order can be thought of as consisting of a set of interlocking bargains, both internationally and domestically. Thus, the U.S. offered nations in the region access to its market and a guarantee of security protection in exchange for acceptance of its hegemony. In this view, with export-led growth tied to the American (and other Western) markets and US security protection, a series of regional and domestic bargains were struck. The primary regional bargains related to norms of inter-state interactions (“the ASEAN way”). Domestically, internal consolidation was made possible by a set of bargains in which domestic elites provided rapid economic gains in exchange for regime security.

The question for the future of Southeast Asia therefore is not just the US-China power transition and its effects on the foreign and security policy choices of regional states. It is also whether a series of bargains made both internationally and domestically will survive. Will a series of incremental changes and adjustments in Southeast Asian countries lead to change in the overall norms, institutions, and practices that constitute regional order? While some analysts predict fairly violent and turbulent change in Southeast Asia, this perspective suggests a far more gradual transition in prevailing norms, institutions, and practices.

A third perspective on Southeast Asia suggests that the region is affected not just by US-China relations and by a set of interlocking bargains, but also by more remote actors and developments. Clearly, Southeast Asia is linked to Northeast Asia in a variety of ways. For instance, Japan is a major market for Southeast Asian goods, and Tokyo provides aid, capital, connectivity, and know-how that are vital for Southeast Asian economies. In 2015, Japan invested twice as much in Southeast Asia as China. A more assertive Japan, which gradually loosens its interpretation of its constitution regarding military roles and capabilities, might also become a factor in regional security. Taiwan and South Korea, too, are important economic players for the region. Instability in the Korean peninsula would be massively disruptive for Southeast Asia and would have both security and economic implications. A rising India can be expected to play a greater economic and security role in the region, and this is already evident in its Act East policy under Narendra Modi. The European Union is a significant economic player in the region. While attention is fixated on China's economic presence in Southeast Asia, the combined trade of the EU, Japan, and the U.S. is twice as large as China's trade with region. While China's trade is dominated by processing products, the EU, Japan, and the U.S. are more deeply embedded in regional production networks and structures.

Fourth, Southeast Asia is prone to 'black swan' events – disasters, an epidemic, a massive terrorist strike, large-scale ethnic violence, even war (e.g. in the South China Sea). These by their nature are unpredictable in their actual occurrence and timing, but what is certain is that the region will be the site of disruptions at some point. The scale of them could up-end established order. Not surprisingly, intra-ASEAN conversations and conversations with outsiders have increasingly dealt with these possibilities and the kinds of resources and systems that would be required to manage large-scale disruptions. This is quite a different view of the construction of regional order for the future.

Finally, it is worth saying that these perspectives are not mutually exclusive but can be seen as a complex set of variables that impact the institutions, norms, and practices that comprise regional order. The power transition between the US and China, the nature of interlocking domestic and inter-state bargains, the interests and actions of non-regional actors, and the expectation of and preparation for black swan events will bear on the institutions, norms, and practices that define regional order in Southeast Asia.

II. Environmental and Other Transnational Changes and Regional Order

When ASEAN was established in 1967, the original five members had very different political and social orientations and had to deal with domestic uncertainties and conflicts. Emerging out of colonialism and the intrusions of foreign powers into Southeast Asia, the members sought to ensure that they had sufficient autonomy to govern and chart their own path. In doing so they adopted a normative framework, or the ASEAN way as it has come to be called, with associated values, institutions, and practices. The normative framework emphasised the principles of national sovereignty, member equality, and non-interference in the affairs of other member states. However, the onset of climate change and trans-boundary environmental issues as well as other transnational challenges are increasingly disrupting the status quo in Southeast Asia and the relationships between member states.

For instance, dealing with problems such as air pollution, depletion of resources, and even natural disasters has become more complex with the onset of climate change. Environmental issues could create trans-boundary problems, such as population displacement and the outbreak of disease, that go beyond the capacity of individual states to manage and thus require a concerted multilateral and regional approach.

Rising urbanisation in Southeast Asia needs to be taken into consideration when analysing the impact of climate change and environmental challenges facing the region. As urbanisation increases worldwide, the significance of urban populations and cities has risen in climate change calculations. With the rise of cities, it is necessary to analyse municipal and metropolitan orders in addition to global, regional, and domestic orders. Emerging initiatives have begun focusing on cooperation across countries at the city level. For example, the C40 Cities Forum brings together over 90 major cities around the world to combat climate change problems. New cooperative relationships are also emerging, such as partnerships between national and metropolitan governments. The Japanese national government and Tokyo metropolitan government are working with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to provide water solutions in Myanmar. Different and overlapping levels of authority have facilitated the emergence of new relationships that not only impact the traditional structure of state-to-state interaction but also create new patterns of international interaction.

Focusing on non-traditional security issues led by climate change and its consequences is a fruitful way to consider Southeast Asia's future. But there are other challenges facing the region which affect the policy space within which regional governments must operate. The fourth industrial revolution, i.e. the rise of machines and artificial intelligence in manufacturing and services, is a global phenomenon. It is not just a trend in developed Western countries and in large economies such as China, it is also of growing importance in Southeast Asia. It could profoundly affect both the domestic and regional policy space by altering conceptions of work and employment. Since manufacturing and services are concentrated in cities and given the increasing urbanisation of Southeast Asia, the fourth industrial revolution could have enormous social and political effects, including eroding the status of the traditional middle and professional classes and deepening inequality.

The region also faces the challenge of religious extremism and terrorism. Right across Southeast Asia, ethno-religious consciousness has increased. Majoritarian assertions, sometimes aided and abetted by governments, could have larger regional effects. They could inspire hitherto quiescent groups in other countries to imitate their campaigns. They could elicit a reaction from neighbouring states who have ethno-religious kin next door. The Rohingya crisis in Myanmar shows that majoritarianism could affect neighbouring countries through population displacement. Developments in Myanmar prompted Indonesia and Malaysia to criticise a fellow ASEAN state, thus violating the preferred regional norm of non-interference. The rise of Islamist groups advocating and resorting to violence is already a serious concern. The Marawi conflict in the Philippines shows how quickly these groups can grow in power, influence, and ability to challenge governments.

These and other developments have called into question the traditional state-centric view of Southeast Asia. The emergence of new issues has raised concerns over the quality of domestic and regional governance, the salience and efficacy of established norms, institutions, and practices, and the emergence of new and multiple sites of authority. Environmental and other challenges may threaten the legitimacy of states in the eyes of domestic populations, produce instability, and adversely impact the state's capacity to govern. The growing incidence of transnational challenges suggests that Southeast Asia's regional order could well evolve in quite a different direction from the traditional inter-state model that is conventionally assumed.

There are possible alternatives to a state-centric order. At the most state-centric end of the spectrum of possibilities is the notion of regional order as a regime complex. Drawing on Robert Keohane and David Victor's argument, a Southeast Asian regime complex might be defined as a set of loosely-related and intersecting norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures between regional states across issue areas. States "produce" regimes, but regimes can take on a life of their own: norms, rules, principles, and decision-making procedures may well begin to regulate the way states think about their interests and actions. Order might consist not just of states acting on each other directly but also through the lens and constraints of regimes. The constituent regimes in a complex may be hierarchically arranged but, more often than not, intersect and are placed more horizontally in relation to each other. Further, a regime complex may consist of constituent regimes that are not altogether consistent with each other.

Also at the state-centric end of the spectrum of regional order is Anne-Marie Slaughter's notion of trans-governmental networks. Slaughter suggests international order is increasingly understood as the product of a series of regular interactions between executive, legislative, judicial, and semi-autonomous regulatory agencies (e.g. central banks) across national boundaries that set the rules and norms not just for states but also for other actors. In this model, the state and its agencies are at the heart of regional order, but there also exists a complicated lattice-work of interactions and understandings that regulate regional policy and practice.

At the other end of the spectrum are notions of order that can be described by Keohane and Nye's articulation of complex interdependence. In complex interdependence, states continue to be important but other actors are of consequence too – multinational corporations, trade unions, transnational organisations, domestic and international civil society groups, among others. States unable to use force or define a clear hierarchy of issues must bargain and deal with a range of other actors to define the norms and rules of interaction among themselves and these other actors. In this perspective, regional order is a series of networks and nodes defined by key domestic, regional, and global actors which evolve the norms and rules in an issue area. Amitav Acharya's notion of multiplexes lends itself to this kind of formulation.

A somewhat different way of putting this is to suggest that regional order is the product of three types of authority: public authority i.e. state authority domestically and inter-state authority such as international law; private authority i.e. the authority of private bodies to set standards and rules within a domestic jurisdiction; and transnational authority i.e. the authority of transnational bodies to set standards and rules across national boundaries. Regional actors, both public and private, including governments, must take account of the standards and rules that these various authorities provide: they must operate in a web of standards and rules, and some of these standards and rules may well contradict each other. Regional orders may therefore be "messy" in the way that Jagdish Bhagwati has suggested in his characterisation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as constituting "spaghetti bowls".

In between these possibilities stands a model of regional order in which states continue to be important but have willingly relinquished authority to a central decision-making body in key economic, functional, and even political areas. In the work of Andrew Moravscik, the European Union represents this possibility of regional order, where states' preferences have led them to cede authority to a supranational body in certain areas.

Except for supranationalism, Southeast Asia would seem to have elements of alternative regional forms. It has intersecting and loosely-related regimes in various areas; it features increasingly direct interactions between different levels and agencies of member governments which influence government actions and behaviours, both domestically and regionally; and the region features nodes and networks around which state and non-state actors gather to define norms and rules.

It bears saying that Southeast Asia may have always featured a more complex order, one that was influenced by non-traditional security challenges. The idea that managing the great powers and inter-states relations was the central problem of order building may never have been an accurate depiction. In addition, if order is suggestive of stability, then Southeast Asia may never have had the kind of stability that analysts often celebrate: disruptions, natural and man-made, have a history in Southeast Asia going back to the emergence of the region after World War 2. Examples of "disruption" going back to the 1950s include communist insurgencies, Indonesia's *konfrontasi*, terrorist attacks, economic crises, and humanitarian disasters.

III. Bilateral Relations, ASEAN, and Regional Order

Assessments of Southeast Asia's regional order have tended to focus on the role of ASEAN and the norms it has propagated. Much of the diplomatic activity of the region, though, is defined by bilateral interactions or sub-regional complexes. ASEAN is not therefore the sum total of regional order-building. Any depiction of order in Southeast Asia must take account of both these other levels of analysis.

The bilateral and sub-regional levels define a good deal of Southeast Asian affairs. At the bilateral level, there are tensions over ties to extra-regional states, relative power, territory, the treatment of ethnic kin across national boundaries, the rise of religious extremism, economic relations, environmental problems, and even the movement of ideas and people. In addition, there are issues that go beyond the bilateral level but are not fully regional in nature, namely, sub-regional conflicts. One example of a sub-regional conflict formation is Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. Historically, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore formed a sub-regional conflict formation. Not surprisingly, Southeast Asian order has also been defined by bilateral and sub-regional ways of dealing with differences.

One way of dealing with bilateral quarrels in Southeast Asia has been to sweep them under the rug – to neither solve a problem decisively nor to escalate it. Another way of managing potential conflict has been to respect the non-interference principle, which for the most part means that Southeast Asian states do not comment on domestic disputes, nor do they aid and abet each other's internal dissidents. In the case of territorial disputes, Southeast Asians have resorted to international arbitration: three bilateral disputes have been resolved by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In trade disputes, too, Southeast Asia has turned to arbitration, ignoring its own dispute settlement mechanism and resorting to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) instead. Smaller countries have also dealt with the threat of conflict by finding ways not to be overly provocative with bigger neighbours and by seeking forms of reconciliation.

ASEAN has not directly resolved bilateral or sub-regional conflict, but it was never intended to play this role. As Michael Leifer argued, to view ASEAN as the region's peacemaker and to make judgments about its success and failure on that basis is the wrong way to assess the organisation. ASEAN was founded at a difficult time for the region in the 1950s and 1960s given numerous regional conflicts and the demise of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and Maphilindo. To charge it with resolving domestic or sub-regional conflicts would have jeopardised ASEAN's survival.

While ASEAN is not a bilateral or sub-regional conflict resolution mechanism, it has had an impact on regional quarrels and instabilities. ASEAN held together against Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979 and helped galvanise international diplomacy against Hanoi. When Myanmar was under pressure from the Western powers on human rights violations and its imprisonment of Aung Sang Suu Kyi, ASEAN led the way in engaging Naypyidaw and nudging it back to civilian rule.

ASEAN has also helped regional leaders and elites get to know each better. It encouraged discussions and dialogue between various departments and agencies, allowed for regular high-level summitry, and increased economic exchange. Improved knowledge of each other's interests and enhanced trust at the highest political levels helped build networks between regional bureaucracies and promoted interdependence, making it easier to manage domestic, bilateral, and sub-regional conflicts.

However, ASEAN's greatest contribution to regional order has been its engagement of the great powers and other non-regional powers. The organisation has established a regularised means of interaction with the major powers and extra-regional states through an ASEAN-centric security architecture. This architecture consists of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), ASEAN Summits and Dialogues, and East Asia Summit (EAS). Together, these various meetings have given the region a range of platforms on which to engage outside powers in both the strategic and economic realms. At the heart of this conception of regional order is the view that it is futile to insulate the region altogether from major powers: they are too big to be stopped from intruding into regional matters; and regional states, especially smaller ones, are likely to reach out to them for their security against bigger neighbours anyway. Better then to have the major powers "inside the tent" to have them check and balance each other and reassure the smaller states against their bigger neighbours. This is a process of enmeshment and balancing, as described by Evelyn Goh in her work on regional security in Southeast Asia.

In sum, over time, the Southeast Asian ten have developed several norms for dealing with conflict, putative or real, between themselves and with powerful outsiders. These include:

1. A preference for bilateral conflict resolution between regional states, but a willingness in select cases to turn to third party adjudication;
2. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs;
3. Managing conflict by postponement, that is, by sweeping differences under the rug;
4. Having smaller states avoid offending bigger neighbours and big neighbours eschewing hegemonic or coercive behaviour;
5. Forgoing the use of force in regional quarrels;
6. Refusing to align with extra-regional powers against one's regional neighbours;
7. Promoting elite and leadership trust, cross-national networks between bureaucracies, and economic interdependence, and;
8. Engaging the extra-regional big powers rather than seeking to exclude them from regional affairs, thereby trying to regulate the role of powerful outsiders.

These norms are not absolute. While states prefer bilateral conflict resolution, they have turned to third party arbitration. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other is not an absolute prohibition: regional states have from time to time commented on each other's domestic politics. While smaller states have tried to avoid offending bigger states in the region, they have stood up for their core interests as well. Southeast Asians have not always avoided the use of force. In a number of bilateral conflicts, they have resorted to force, though these episodes have been relatively minor and few. In managing bilateral differences, they have generally avoided using powerful outsiders against fellow Southeast Asian states; but clearly relations with extra-regional powers are not without implications for relations with troublesome or more powerful neighbours. ASEAN has built trust, inter-governmental networks, and interdependence, but these have seemingly levelled off. Over the initial 20-30 years of ASEAN, the first generation of leaders overcame differences to develop intersubjective understandings that could be relied upon to manage conflict. However, among subsequent generations, the level of intersubjective convergence may have diminished despite the proliferation of ASEAN meetings.

IV. Economic Change and Regional Order

What is the relationship of economics and regional order in Southeast Asia, what do economic and other regional changes presage for Southeast Asia, and how will these changes affect conceptions of regional order? A conventional view of the region is that it adopted an export-led growth model inspired by Japan and other economic tigers in which the government played a key role. This is the well-known 'developmental state' argument. The relationship of the development state to regional order was reciprocal: the developmental state flourished in a regional order that provided for regime security; and sustained economic growth at home was the foundation for amicable relations between Southeast Asians.

Export-led growth was only possible within a larger regional order that delivered geopolitical stability if not peace. It is hard to imagine export-led growth being possible in a region marked by serious security challenges. US power protected the original ASEAN states from the turmoil in Indochina. American alliance arrangements with Japan and South Korea also ensured that Northeast Asia remained stable. This meant that for much of the Cold War period Southeast Asia was not disturbed by exogenous shocks from Indochina or Northeast Asia. It also meant that Northeast Asia became a factor in Southeast Asia's rise. Under US protection, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were exemplars, investors, and markets for export-led Southeast Asian countries. In addition, with peace and stability in Southeast Asia, foreign investors were willing to establish a presence in the region.

Concurrently, export-led growth led to rapid economic development, lifting millions out of poverty and providing gainful employment. Large-scale migration from the rural areas released pressure on the land. Rural migrants became labour in the export-producing factories for Northeast Asia and the West. The new economic prosperity was the condition for greater social and political stability at home: stability allowed domestic elites to consolidate their position and to deepen nation-building. With economic prosperity, social and political stability, and a sharper sense of national identity, Southeast Asian countries could downplay bilateral quarrels amongst themselves and reinforce the region's security under the shadow of American power and protection.

The developmental state model and regional stability model went hand in hand and eventually led to the incorporation of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam into regional arrangements. The "CLV" countries adopted the export-led model and benefited from a regional security order that was stabilised by US power, ASEAN, and status quo states in Southeast Asia. Despite the economic crisis of 1997, the region flourished and remained at peace.

It is worth noting that even as peace and prosperity in the region depended in part on rapid economic development, there was little if any coordination of economic policy between ASEAN member states. Instead, these states independently pursued their trade-led growth strategies and indeed competed against each other for export markets and foreign direct investment (FDI). This is in stark contrast with the history of integration in Europe, where the European Union (EU) traced its origins to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) before integration was expanded to other areas.

In the case of Southeast Asia, ASEAN only tentatively established its economic community, nearly half a century after it was founded. In comparison to the EU, economic linkages are relatively weak in ASEAN, with intramural trade not exceeding 25 per cent (as opposed to 70 per cent in Europe). In addition, services and cross-border infrastructure is far more fragmented than in the EU. Even in the aftermath of the tumultuous 1997 Asian financial crisis, there was no significant pan-Asian institution formed to foster economic integration, which stands in contrast to the initiatives undertaken in the West where following financial crises, states and international organisations closely coordinated to stabilise the existing order. By contrast, in Asia, each state tackled the issue differently depending on the resources at its disposal.

How is Southeast Asia placed for the future? Will the US-backed security system and the developmental state model of economic growth continue? Washington’s role and staying power in the region are under question as never before. Barack Obama’s pivot to Asia and the TPP was part of an effort to invigorate US commitment to security in East Asia. Donald Trump’s signalling has been rather different. His more transactional approach has created doubts about US commitments, and his decision to withdraw from the TPP has reinforced the new ambivalence towards the US. Also, China’s rise has meant that the US’s near-hegemonic role in Southeast Asia is being challenged as never before. Southeast Asians must countenance the presence and interests of another great if not super power. Geopolitical contestation has returned to the region as not seen at least since the late 1970s: Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand look to China for diplomatic, political, and economic support as never before. Southeast Asian no longer have the luxury of leaving security to the US and concentrating their efforts on economic growth at home.

At the same time, domestic stability and consensus in Southeast Asia have come under stress. The end of the Cold War raised questions about the acceptability of autocratic rule in several Southeast Asian countries. Corruption and inequality caused democratically-elected governments to come to power. With democracy, social and political processes became less predictable and more volatile. The elite consensus on domestic order has therefore frayed. Democracy and the breakdown of consensus has stymied reforms for the next phase of growth. Cronyism, corruption, infrastructure limitations, mediocre higher education and technical education systems, inefficient banking sectors, and the lack of technological innovation are just some of the factors that could well consign the region to the middle-income trap after the halcyon years of export dynamism. Much will depend on overcoming vested domestic interests. For instance, Malaysia's government had to significantly scale back key elements of its Economic Transformation Plan as this would have eroded support from sections of Malay voters. The dependency on cheap foreign labour in Malaysia may also leave the country stuck in the middle-income trap, as the incentive to move up the value chain is diminished by less costly workers. In Thailand, domestic elites have resisted calls for economic and political reform. This is ominous for the regional economies, which otherwise hold great promise.

The developmental state model thrived within an economic order marked by openness to cheap imports from Asia and by the fact that, as Japan and the various small Asian tigers moved up the value chain, Southeast Asian states had few competitors in producing cheap goods for industrialised countries. That openness is under threat globally from growing protectionism and anti-globalisation movements in the US and Western Europe. In addition, Southeast Asia has competitors as never before in Latin America, Africa, other parts of Asia, and most of all, China. China's economic rise had taken away a substantial portion of Southeast Asia's comparative advantage in exports. It is now challenging Southeast Asia's other emerging strength, namely, services. China’s emerging technological sophistication could well further undercut Southeast Asia’s competitiveness. While the CLV countries have moved into some of the areas that Chinese manufacturing is gradually exiting, China’s rise has been problematic for Southeast Asia’s export-led growth.

Two other longer-term worries complicate the region’s economic thinking. The first is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India’s Act East, and Japan’s Partnership for Quality Infrastructure in the region. These could be an economic boon and help transform economic interactions and development; but they could also saddle regional states will high levels of debt. China’s BRI is potentially massive in scale, and there are already instances of debt difficulties with China, as for instance in the case of some projects in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

A second, more structural worry is the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the use of robots and artificial intelligence in production processes. As machines replace human labour, not just workers but also middle class, white-collar personnel may find themselves redundant. The Fourth Industrial Revolution could usher in jobless growth, with implications for employment and inequality. While smart machines may be a boon in ageing societies, they would be serious social and political disrupters in societies with large numbers of young people.

What, then, are the future possibilities?

The first is that a US-backed or protected order persists and Southeast Asians transition from an export-led growth model to a more sophisticated economy. In this view, while the US is seemingly reducing its role in the region and China is on the rise, ruling regimes will not risk placing all their eggs in one basket by disavowing American involvement in both the economic and security spheres. While the U.S. is still seen as predictable despite recent shifts in its orientation, China's intentions remain unclear, which has left regional leaders wary. Furthermore, American military power has provided maritime security and the dollar's status as the unquestioned reserve currency has provided economic security: both may be in decline, but they will be the dominant factors in regional security and economy for the forseeable future. Most importantly, the economic arena is not generally seen as a zero-sum game. Hence, there is little incentive for regional states to defect from the U.S., despite the apparent decline of its power since the global financial crisis and Trump's unpredictable, often ambivalent statements about American commitments in Asia.

Domestically, Southeast Asian states could move on from the old export-led model to a newer export-oriented model. Under pressure from anti-globalisation protectionism and from export competitors in other parts of the world, including China, Southeast Asians could undertake domestic reforms to move up the value chain. Skilled labour, technology, improved infrastructure, financial reforms, a continuing ability to attract FDI (including from China), and government nimbleness in identifying new export areas including services could bring a new phase of prosperity. Southeast Asians would seek out new, non-Western markets and increase trade within Asia. The Comprehensive Agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) or even a renegotiated TPP-12 with the US and perhaps an agreement on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) would bring renewed economic dynamism to Southeast Asia, and the region could overcome the middle-income trap.

A second possibility is that China's continuing rise makes it the security provider for the region, and Southeast Asians move on from the old export-led model to a new economic reality in a Chinese-brokered economic order. As the US focuses on its internal economic challenges and tries to renegotiate trade and investment norms and arrangements, and the EU continues to deal with its financial problems, Southeast Asians could look to China's leadership in the global economy. China's BRI could be the route towards economic prosperity in Southeast Asia. Regional economies would benefit from improved connectivity within and across countries, as this would increase efficiencies throughout Asia. Southeast Asia would be at the crossroads of both land and maritime connectivity and would find new economic opportunities in Africa and Europe, the Eurasian heartland, and in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia. China could also advance the successful conclusion of RCEP and possibly a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific as well, thereby increasing the market for Southeast Asian goods and services.

Domestically, in a Sinicized regional order, Southeast Asian states might well regress to a more authoritarian model of governance as external pressures for political democratization and openness would diminish. BRI-led economic growth could well favour quite different kinds of business interests that would flourish under more authoritarian governments. Chinese companies could well move into Southeast Asia to match US and European companies. Southeast Asia might increasingly become a series of switching points for trade across the BRI network. Rather than turn to technological innovation and producing the requisite ecosystem for innovation (anti-corruption reforms, improvements in higher and technical education, research and development investments, and incentive systems for start-ups, etc.), Southeast Asia could in this situation become a vast entrepot between China and the rest of the world. Connectivity could increase debt, which could in turn lead to debt traps, but it is also possible that the danger of being mired in debt could cause regional governments to be financially more disciplined. In addition, China might swap debt for ownership stakes, or for strategic reasons, might even forgive debts.

A third possibility is that ASEAN would continue to manage regional security by steering between the US and China, dampen bilateral differences within Southeast Asia, enhance capabilities to deal with non-traditional security threats, and deepen the feeling of community and regional identity across national boundaries. In this ASEAN-centric model, the organisation would steward the various institutions that populate East Asia's international relations – the various ASEAN-related institutions as well as the East Asia Summit (EAS). These would keep US or Chinese dominance of Southeast Asia at bay and hold the region together.

With ASEAN centrality, Southeast Asian economies would move towards greater integration within the region. They would capitalise on the fact that they are at the centre of gravity of a larger economic super-region extending from Northeast Asia in the east to India in the west. The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is the inter-state element of cooperation. However, cooperation might well also flourish in the sub-regions of ASEAN: provincial and municipal administrations could play a significant role in enlarging regional trade and economic integration across national boundaries. An ASEAN sensitive to the sub-regions – which are rational, economic sub-regions, perhaps part of larger value-chains – could help to institutionalise cooperation between subnational units across different countries. By institutionalising cooperation between the differing levels of governance and actors, these new structures could have a profound impact in shaping and redefining order in the years to come.

V. Political and Social Change and Regional Order

Southeast Asia's political systems have been conceptualised in terms of what might be called *mandala* and galactic theories drawing on the region's Hindu-Buddhist-South Asian heritage. In this view, power and authority within Southeast Asian polities – and perhaps in the region's international politics – are organised around a centre of power and authority with concentric circles radiating out from the centre. The centre and concentric circles may be thought of spatially: a political centre which is the seat of authority that radiates its rule outwards to more distant parts of the polity. The centre may also be thought about symbolically and performatively: the centre may be Clifford Geertz's *negara*, the theatre state, a centre which is psycho-socially pivotal in terms of authoritative ritual performances and symbolic displays.

Southeast Asian polities could well be thought of in terms of both these notions of centrality. Implied in this is the thought that whether regional states were ruled by post-colonial nationalists, monarchs, communists, second-generation autocrats (military or civilian), or by populist democrats, whether they were autarkic-minded or export-oriented, Southeast Asian polities were marked deeply by centralised rule that flowed outwards and that depended on ritual and symbolic performances. This view is not necessarily inconsistent with the developmental state. Neo-mandala or neo-galactic states may well have authorised the power, social and economic changes, and governance modes that were behind the developmental state.

Will economic, social, and political change in Southeast Asia affect these centralised polities? Several changes are discernible, which signal a trend towards de-centering authority and the dispersal of power.

First of all, the economic stability associated with the centralised, developmental state has been called into question by a series of financial and economic crises and the rise of China and other dynamic economies. With strong, stable economic growth, Southeast Asian governments could afford to mitigate problems, such as unemployment, through generous handouts, direct hiring, and subcontracting. However, with weakened economies, regional governments are either unwilling or unable to alleviate these problems. As a result, citizen disaffection may grow to undermine the legitimacy and stability of those in power.

Another economic trend in Southeast Asia is rising inequality. During times of prosperity and growth, patron-client relationships and patronage politics were tolerated and even condoned as there was a trickledown effect that benefited specific industrial sectors and segments of the population. However, with the growing impact of globalisation and economic competition, the trickle-down effect has gradually diminished. As deeply-entrenched patron-client relations have prevented reforms, government inefficiencies have become politically more salient. The asymmetric distribution of growth has promoted discontent between classes and differing segments of society. Central authorities are experiencing a loss of control as a result.

A second change in Southeast Asia is the steady rise of ethno-religious identity, with parties and groups emerging to represent these identities. This is leading to a series of conflicts in the region, including the skirmishes between Islamic separatist and government forces in Marawi, Philippines, and the Rohingya humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. Buddhist extremism is emerging as well, in parts of Thailand and Myanmar. The emergence of growing identity consciousness and conflict is in part linked to the growing youth bulge. The growth in identity politics explains why political parties are increasingly organised around identity and why conflict is intensifying. Conflict is reinforcing identity awareness and consolidation. The new identity consciousness is challenging central authority and even the idea of the nation.

A third change is the generational shift in Southeast Asia with its growing youth population, which currently represents 58 per cent of the overall population. Established political authority is being challenged by this new generation, not so much by protests on the street and visible organisations that mobilise youth, but rather through social media commentary. This too amounts to a de-centering of the political system.

Economy, identity, and generational change are interacting to produce political tensions. As under-employed young college graduates increase in numbers, a growing sense of dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement is spreading. The youth is commanding greater attention and forcing dialogue with political elites. The question is whether the elites are listening. If they turn a deaf ear, they may become victims of discontent, leading to regime change.

Fourth, social media and other channels of communication are opening a debate between conservative and liberal ideologues in Southeast Asia. Modern technology has made it easier for different groups to establish connections through social media and engage a wider and larger range of people. A segment of the younger generation is increasingly vocal about LGBT rights, human rights, and other causes, and are challenging conservative and status quo forces on these issues. The increase in social media use could produce a more progressive politics, but it could also lead to a more reactionary politics. The challenge to the centralised polity could come from a conservative reaction as well as from more progressive forces.

Fifth, urbanisation in Southeast Asia is increasing rapidly and has already tipped over 50 per cent of the population. The migration of the rural population to urban areas has several key implications. It places a strain on local governments who have not been prepared for the speed and extent of migration. As rural areas hollow out, this has an adverse impact on the local economy, agriculture, and traditional industries. Migration is also shaping new local and national identities. Urban migration means that the old political system, built on the existence of a core that radiated power outwards, no longer quite holds. Southeast Asia now features megacities and a series of large cities and towns, not just one focal point of political, social, and economic power. Not surprisingly, mayors and provincial leaders in several countries are moving on to contest for national power. Political, social, and economic elites are more dispersed than ever before.

Sixth, with these various decentring trends, several countries are formally decentralising power. For example, Indonesia and Vietnam have undergone political decentralisation. Southeast Asian systems are allowing more space and autonomy to provinces and cities/towns, and therefore to governors and mayors. This decentralisation means that newer political patronage and patron-client relationships are emerging in urban centres and under provincial and municipal governments. The new clientelism especially in the emerging centres of power could even bring foreign patrons into a regional political economy where production, investment, and value chains are increasingly transnational. Southeast Asia's massive connectivity projects could be the vehicles for foreign patronage. The new centres of power could well attempt to influence foreign policy and economic relations with neighbouring and distant powers – an area of public policy that had traditionally been firmly in the hands of the central authorities in the capital city.

Finally, internal instabilities have transnational consequences, and therefore governments in Southeast Asia must be aware that domestic politics is not altogether domestic: internal issues elicit comment and concern from other regional governments and peoples. Southeast Asian decision makers operate less than ever in magisterial autonomy within a sovereign space. The tragic events of Rakhine aroused popular and governmental reaction in Indonesia and Malaysia. The rise of Buddhist and Muslim extremism is worrying all regional governments. Much of the focus has been on Muslim extremism that could spread from one country to another and lay the foundations for religion-linked terrorism and insurgency. The conflict in Marawi has shown that extremists from all the world including neighbouring countries can be drawn to a local, seemingly internal matter. How regional governments deal with the rise of majoritarian religious identity and minority militancy has always been a concern for the region, but with the rise of identity consciousness, increasing awareness of developments across national boundaries, and ease of communication and even movement across borders, this concern has only grown.

The centralised and paternalistic post-colonial states of Southeast Asia have transitioned to more decentralised states. Their authority is increasingly shared, hemmed in, or even contested by other claimants and actors, both national and regional. This suggests that regional order will shift from a largely inter-state architecture to one that is more complex in which governments no longer have a monopoly of authority, and indeed can no longer pretend they have a monopoly.

VI. Future Research: Where Do We Go From Here?

Discussions in the preceding sessions surfaced a range of perspectives on the future of regional order in Southeast Asia. Here we turn to thoughts more methodological/theoretical as well as to emerging challenges and opportunities for the region that merit further thinking.

First, the absence of inter-state war in Southeast Asia over the past several decades does not mean that the region is therefore ‘peaceful’. Quite the contrary: violence within states is a regular phenomenon. Yet what is striking about Southeast Asia is that, except in a few cases, violence has not risen to the level of regional significance. This is a puzzle that merits more research.

Secondly, we also need better risk mapping and assessment to understand the worries that Southeast Asian states face on a regional level, while identifying the different challenges that they must confront individually. As more resources are being deployed to analyse and mitigate risk, Asian countries could collaborate and devise a customised, region-specific risk map to enhance awareness on the common threats that they face. As Ulrich Beck has argued, a risk perspective suggests that even as states modernise and develop new policy capacities and structures, their awareness and sensitivity to ‘danger’ and ‘vulnerability’ increases. In a mass society, risk becomes a rolling, permanent challenge for governments. Mitigating one set of risks creates new risks or concern over other risks, risks that perhaps existed but were not widely regarded as being salient and actionable. Risk assessment and mitigation is therefore a constant, not an intermittent, crisis-driven activity.

Thirdly, in terms of ontology, one should distinguish between two different elements: Southeast Asia as a region made up of disparate states; and ASEAN as an institution. It is important not to conflate these two separate entities or refer to them interchangeably. ASEAN is a political construct and institution that binds Southeast Asian nations together, albeit an important one; yet the study of Southeast Asia is much more than ASEAN studies.

Fourth, the wide divergence of socio-political and economic conditions within the region in turn affects how analysts approach ASEAN. For example, Singaporean views tend to be more sceptical of ASEAN’s efficacy and see the institution as past its prime, whereas the organisation is viewed much more favourably in newer member states. Perceptions in individual countries also differ with both geography and history. Mainland states inherently have different security considerations compared to maritime states, as the former need to grapple with challenges from shared land borders with immediate neighbours while the maritime states must deal with threats from the sea and more distant parts. Even within states, the political dynamics in the heartlands vis-à-vis border zones can diverge considerably. Furthermore, scholars should avoid viewing all contemporary challenges as novel. While youth activism today might appear to be a potent force as a result of demographic change, rising educational levels, and the social media explosion, in some respects this is simply history repeating itself. Young people were not necessarily quiescent in the past: they played important roles in the nationalist movements and in post-independence change right up to the present.

Fifth, spatial ties outside the region can also vary. These ties could be planetary (e.g. environmental issues), global (e.g. economic issues), or international (e.g. security issues). Each of these affects regional dynamics in different ways. Moving beyond the terrestrial realm, outer space is likely to become more salient in discussions of regional order. Amid closer cooperation between regional states and major Asian powers, such as Japan and India, on satellite data-sharing and space management, outer space is an area that deserves more focus.

Sixth, when it comes to examining the region and ASEAN, scholars need to guard against assumptions and preconceived notions that could lead to bias specifically in comparing the Europe and Southeast Asia, the European Union (EU) and ASEAN. While the European experience is usually seen as the gold standard of integration and regionalism, it should not be the sole model of comparison or the benchmark when evaluating Southeast Asia’s achievements. Given the unprecedented scale of integration within the EU, most if not all of ASEAN’s efforts appear to fall short of these standards. Other regional groupings, including

Mercosur in Latin America and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), need to be taken into consideration to reach a more balanced conclusion about Southeast Asia and ASEAN.

Finally, conceptual clarification of the term ‘order’ itself may be required, as its definition and scope remain contested. One view of order, broadly, is that it refers to a ranking and distribution at any given time. This view makes no judgment as to the appropriateness of the ranking and distribution. Order is simply the enduring existential arrangements under which actors typically operate. Another, more normative, view is that order refers to a preferred set of values and processes that a social collective seeks to establish and maintain. Here order is an aspirational standard for actor behaviour. Order in this perspective may or may not exist at any given moment: actors may fail, or they may succeed, in meeting approved normative standards. If they succeed in doing so, we can say that order exists. Clearly, these two perspectives may not be as far apart as it seems. Enduring existential arrangements may develop normative respectability and acceptance. Normative standards may lead to behavioural conformity with those standards over time and become existentially encrusted and normalized. A way out of this polarizing debate is to ask if we could we more usefully use an alternative set of terms such as ‘peace’, ‘stability’, ‘resilience’, ‘structure’, or ‘security’? While this may be a way out of the difficulty of fixing the term order, these other terms come with their own definitional challenges.

Conference Programme and Agenda

Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
National University of Singapore
6-7 October 2017
Li Ka Shing Seminar Room 1-2

6 October 2017

9:00 – 9:15	Opening Remarks Speaker: Kanti Bajpai
Session One 09:15 – 10:45	**Geopolitical Change and Concepts of Regional Order** Southeast Asia's regional order has come under strain as differing conceptions of order begin to challenge the status quo. How will China's rise, growing clout, and initiatives impact the region – is a China-centered order on the cards? Will the US's hub-and-spokes defence system remain intact and can the region rely on the US? Will China and the US strike a G2 deal? What roles do India and Japan play in shaping Southeast Asia's regional order? How is the conception of the Indo-Pacific affecting the conception of order in Southeast Asia? Will Russia be a player, perhaps in partnership with China? Speakers: Khong Yuen Foong Evelyn Goh
10:45-11:15	Tea Break
Session Two 11:15 – 12:45	**Environmental Change and Regional Order** Asia and Southeast Asia in particular are increasingly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The increased incidence of extreme weather events – typhoons, famine, drought, and flooding – could set in motion not just physical changes but also economic, social, and political changes. How will these changes shape regional order in the years to come? Will global warming bolster regional cooperation on issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief? How will issues such as haze and rising sea levels shape regional relations? Speakers: Mely Caballero Anthony Jochen Prantl
12:45 – 13:30	Lunch
13:30 – 14:00	Presentation on Asian Connectivity – Chinese, Japanese, and Indian Initiatives

	Speaker: Blake Berger
Session Three 14:00 – 15:30	**Bilateral Relations, ASEAN, and Regional Order** ASEAN helped suppress bilateral conflicts in the region, but these conflicts have not been altogether transcended – Vietnam-Cambodia, Cambodia-Laos, Cambodia-Thailand, Philippines-Malaysia, Malaysia-Singapore (Pedra Branca), and differences over the South China Sea. Indonesia's resort to the term North Natuna Sea may have implications for other Southeast Asian states, and Malaysia-Thailand worries over the insurgency in southern Thailand may affect their relationship. In addition, how are bilateral differences affecting the workings of ASEAN? What is the future of the ASEAN Economic Community, the ASEAN Political-Security Community, and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community? Speakers: Tan See Seng Jürgen Haacke
15:30 – 16:00	Tea Break
Session Four 16:00 – 17:30	**Economic Change and Regional Order** While Southeast Asia has experienced tremendous economic growth, the middle-income trap threatens to stifle economic growth and development. While the region has experienced sterling economic growth, inequality and poverty are significant economic, social, and political challenges. The Fourth Industrial Revolution additionally poses challenges to employment, competitiveness, and the future of established businesses? What are the implications for domestic stability, regional trade, and the ASEAN Economic Community? Speakers: Danny Quah Helen Nesadurai
18:00 – 20:00	Workshop Dinner

7 October 2017

9:00 – 09:15	Morning Remarks
Session Five 09:15 – 10:45	**Political and Social Change and Regional Order** The relative tranquillity of politics in Southeast Asia has been challenged by the rise of populism, majoritarian politics, separatism, and ethno-religious conflict. Evidence of these trends are visible throughout the region. For example, Malaysia has witnessed increasing tension between urban and rural populations, between Chinese and Malay groups, and the rise of Islamic extremism; Indonesia is confronting the challenge of Islamic radicalism and Aceh separatism; Myanmar must deal with the Rohingya issue and separatism; Thailand has Muslim disaffection in the south and continuing differences between red shirts and yellow shirts; and the Philippines is facing numerous challenges with the rise of populist politics, a drug war, and Islamic separatism. At the same time, key leaders in the region have passed from the stage. In addition to political issues, social factors such as an increasingly aged population and rapid urbanisation pose further challenges to the region. How will these social factors shape the future of regional order? Speakers: Tang Siew Mun Terence Lee
10:45 – 11:15	Tea Break
Session Six 11:15 – 12:45	**Future Research and Projects: Where Do We Go from Here?** Speakers: Heng Yee Kuang Itty Abraham
12:45	End of workshop

Workshop Participants

Itty Abraham	Associate Professor, Faculty of Arts and Social Science	National University of Singapore
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Evelyn Goh	Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies	Australia National University
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OEI TIONG HAM

First row (L-R): Akio Tanahashi, Terence Lee, Danny Quah, Helen Nesadurai, Evelyn Goh, Mely Caballero Anthony, Kanti Bajpai, Khasan Redjaboev

Second row (L-R): Itty Abraham, Heng Yee Kuang, Kei Koga, Jochen Prantl, Khong Yuen Foong, Tomoo Kikuchi, Jurgen Haacke

Third row (L-R): Byron Chong, Blake Berger, Tan See Seng, Toh Wei Zheng

Not pictured: Tang Siew Mun, James Crabtree, Francesco Mancini

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