East Asian Internationalism in Regional and Global Order

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This paper asks: what role are China, Japan, and South Korea (hereafter Korea) playing in the global order? It is a given that the US plays, and has played, a leading role in the constitution and maintenance of global order. Global order appears almost as a gift of the US. In this view, the US is the order provider and the rest of the world is an order recipient.[1] In fact, this is not altogether the case: states big and small around the world contributed to not just the expansion but also the constitution of global order and regional orders.[2] Nonetheless, the dominant view is that the US delivered order both globally and regionally (in select regions). An emerging view is that China is on the rise and will be the dominant world power perhaps by mid-century and that a Sinic global order is likely: led by China, Asia will (once again) be the dominant force in order construction. In fact, as this paper tries to show, while China is rising, and the East Asian triumvirate of China, Japan, and South Korea are certainly playing an increasing role in provisioning order, the US and Western countries still lead. Judged by their financial contributions to various global orders, the East Asians are now firmly part of a triumvirate that sustains the norms, institutions, and practices of global governance. The broader argument of the paper therefore is that global order is being sustained by a range of countries/regions, even if differentially, and that order is neither a US gift nor will it be a Chinese gift.

[1] See for instance G. John Ikenberry, "Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 1 (2009): 71-87.
[2] See Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) on the expansion of Westphalia.

What are China, Japan, and Korea doing for global order compared to the US and European powers? If order is defined as a set of norms, institutions, and practices around which there is broad consensus, what have these three East Asian states done towards upholding those norms, institutions, and practices? Specifically, what have they done towards three orders – the economic, human security, and environmental orders. I exempt their role in the security order since that is an area that is much discussed in the literature on international security. In assessing the East Asian contributions, I mean material contributions, primarily financial provisioning. I argue that these contributions are not inconsiderable and that they have increased over the past decade or so, and global order is not simply an American and European gift. On the other hand, contrary to a growing impression, China is not taking over from the West though its contributions in virtually all the areas analysed here is growing. Global order is increasingly being financially sustained by the efforts of the triumvirate of the US, Europe, and East Asia. In sum, a more pluralist view of order building is worth exploring. In such a pluralist reckoning, it would be unwise to ignore Russia. Looking ahead, rising powers such as Brazil, India, and Turkey may well be more active in contributing financially and otherwise. Middle powers such as Australia and Canada have traditions of global engagement, particularly Canada. Finally, resource rich or regional powers such as Indonesia and Iran, Saudi Arabia and South Africa, and Nigeria and Norway have economic, military, and even ideological power to shape and sustain order.

Order(s) and Internationalism

In any order, according to Hedley Bull, the elementary goals of social existence must be sought to be preserved.[3] What are these goals? For Bull, they are (i) the society of states with its various norms, (ii) the independence of states or sovereignty, (iii) the promotion of peace

[3] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), 19.

as a normal condition, and (iv) the preservation of common social goals (i.e. the limiting of violence, the keeping of promises, and the stability of possessions). These are rather abstract and minimalist goals. More concretely and realistically in modern times, an order must include protection against large-scale inter-state violence, the production of economic welfare (howsoever that may be defined over time), the assurance of a measure of personal/communitarian freedom, and a sustainable ecology. In the interstate system, this means that there exist four (inter-related) orders – a security order, an economic order, a human security order, and an environmental order. The norms, institutions, and practices of the security order should protect states against violence from other states. The economic order should produce economic welfare such that the human desire for a comfortable material existence is "satisfied". The human security order should work to create an acceptable degree of personal and communitarian freedom in daily life. And the environmental order should protect the ecological structures that make human and other life sustainable.[4]

Virtually all governments make intellectual, political, military, and financial contributions towards these orders. In this paper, I focus on three orders: economic, human security, and environmental, and ask what financial resources China, Japan, and Korea have put towards them. I call these contributions "internationalism". The word has many meanings, but at base it connotes actions that contribute to the good of people beyond one's boundaries. Fred Halliday defines internationalism as "the idea that we both are and should be part of a broader community than that of the nation state."[5] This kicks the can down the road: what is

[4] See Andrew Hurrell, *Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), for a similar list of global order elements. Hurrell deals with "nationalism and the politics of identity", "human rights and democracy", "war, violence, and collective security", "economic globalization in an unequal world", and "the ecological challenge". I would suggest that these map on to the four orders I deal with in this paper. To be clear, communitarian freedom here refers to the freedom of ethno-religious communities which are vital for the sense of individual identity.

[5] Fred Halliday, "Three Conceptions of Internationalism," *International Affairs* 64, no. 2 (1988): 187

community? In any community, members must have a sense of belonging and see some obligation to the welfare of others. Internationalism suggests that states have a sense of belonging to a larger community – a society of states – and feel a sense of obligation to the good of other states and peoples. Internationalism does not thereby mean altruism altogether: states may well do things that are simultaneously good for themselves and good for others. This is clear for instance in the case of climate change where limiting carbon emissions is good for one's own population in an immediate sense (for their health) and for the world at large (in the mitigation of global warming). One may also do good by others to foster gratitude and reciprocity. Or one might do good by others by shaping the larger environment beyond one's national boundaries so that foreigners lead better lives and as a result are better disposed to oneself and to the world more generally.[6] All these are instances of doing good by others in the expectation that this will redound to one's own good.

Liberals argue that the US has done good for itself and others by propagating a liberal order. In his latest assessment of international order, G. John Ikenberry argues that after 1945, the US (and in a secondary role its allies) constructed a dominant order built around four principles:

> For seven decades the world has been dominated by a western liberal order. After the Second World War, the United States and its partners built a multifaceted and sprawling international order, organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity. Along the way, the United States became the 'first citizen' of this order, providing hegemonic leadership—

[6] This is what Arnold Wolfers called "milieu goals". See Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962).

> anchoring the alliances, stabilizing the world economy, fostering cooperation and championing 'free world' values.[7]

Quite a lot of this is historically questionable. Economic openness varied, even in the West. Multilateral institutions were not simply built by the US and the Western Europeans, and the UN increasingly was ignored or challenged by Washington and European capitals when it was in their interest to do so. Security cooperation, built around the US hub-and-spokes system, certainly was an element of the post-1945 order. But there were many other elements of international security cooperation – among others, the Soviet Union and its allies and friends; non-alignment in a world of alliances; regional security cooperation that had nothing to do with the US and its allies or the Soviet Union and its allies: UN peacekeeping; and Indian and other non-Western interventions on nuclear disarmament. And while the Western democratic countries displayed solidarity amongst themselves, they and other democracies were often not in solidarity at all. India stood out for not being part of Western democratic solidarism. The French were frequently at odds with the Anglo-American powers. If the US and its allies hoped to propagate democracy as the norm of domestic orders, at least until the "Third Wave" of democracy in the late 1980s/early 1990s, this was not the norm, indeed quite the opposite. Perhaps Ikenberry's meaning is that the US and the West *sought* to build a liberal internationalist order; in fact, between the idea and the reality there fell the shadow.

Liberal triumphalism is under at least intellectual challenge from elsewhere, particularly Chinese *tianxia* theory. Students of Chinese history and international relations are arguing that with the rise of China economically if not militarily, a rival order is in the making. Chinese theorists of *tianxia* argue that China has in the past done good by itself and others by

[7] G. John Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order," *International Affairs*, 94, 1 (2018): 7-23.

propagating an order based on a hegemonic centre. They argue that the hegemonic centre featured both hard power and soft power but exerted its influence primarily through the attraction of its cultural splendour and moral virtue. China, with its rise, can now be that centre, once again, as it was in East Asian from the 14th to mid-19th century.[8] Tingyang Zhao describes it as follows:

> The ancient Chinese practical project of the empire of All-under-Heaven had many sub-states…that were institutionally loyal to the empire, which were institutional centres, but independent in their governance. These sub-states were not nation/states at all but ruled by kings or noble families and politically recognized by the emperor. Before the centralized government of the vast Chinese Empire was set up in 221BC, China had been an 'ideal' empire, close to the concept of All-under-Heaven, consisting of many 'sub-states', independent in their economies, military powers and cultures, but politically and ethically dependent on the empire's institutional centre. There was a tributary system between the suzerain centre and the sub-states. And the suzerain centre enjoyed its authority in recognizing the legitimacy of the substates, but never interfered unless a sub-state declared war on another member of the family of All-under-Heaven.[9]

While Zhao interprets *tianxia* in a cosmopolitan sense in the contemporary setting, linking it to shared practices of global governance and One World universalism, David Kang in his work on East Asia before the West suggests that shared cultural attributes radiating out from

[8] See the well-known exposition by Tingyang Zhao, "Rethinking Empire from a Chinese: Concept 'All-under-Heaven' (Tian-xia)," *Social Identities,* Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 29-41. On the ideas and practices of the *tianxia*/tributary system, see also David C. Kang, *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
[9] Tingyang Zhao, "Rethinking Empire," p. 34.

China but deeply internalized by other East Asians will continue to pacify the region and provide a framework of order.[10] The problem with the *tianxia* view of order, too, is that is may be a poor fit historically. Thus, while there is broad agreement that a China-centred tribute system existed, it may have (i) operated more to regulate trade and economic interactions, (ii) been more symbolic than regulative, (iii) waxed and waned with the ups and downs of China's internal cohesion and the coherence of the political centre, and (iv) not have had as much cultural, political, and geopolitical influence as is claimed in the Sinicized world of Japan, Korea, and Vietnam.[11]

Between these two possibilities is a perspective that global order is produced by the contributions of many states, even if differentially. While there is no denying the greater contributions of powerful states, a pluralist conception of order suggests that it is not historically tenable to claim that only they matter. Secondary states have contributed in greater or lesser measure, over time and depending on the "issue area" or dimension of order – security, economic, human security, or environmental. The works of Adda Bozeman were an early attempt to make the case for a more pluralist view of global order.[12] John Gaddis, Rosemary Foot, and Andrew Hurrell in their volume on order and justice in international relations showed that the major non-Western states have a range of ideas – not necessarily altogether "native" in their provenance – on notions of order. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics was conscious that the study of international order and

[10] Kang, *East Asia Before the West*.
[11] See for instance Zhang Feng, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System': Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics," *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume 2, Issue 4, 1 December 2009: 545–574 and Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan, "The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice," *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Volume 5, Issue 1, 1 March 2012: 3–36.
[12] See Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and culture in international history: From the Ancient Near East to the Opening of the Modern Age* 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994); and Adda Bozeman, "The International Order in a Multicultural World," in Bull and Watson, 387-406.

"international society" needed to be more historical and comparative.[13] More recently, Amitav Acharya has argued that order is not just a Western product but rather was constructed by the ideas and practices of non-Western countries as well.[14] In his most recent book on American grand strategy in East Asia, David Kang suggests that reports of East Asian conflict, centred on China, are greatly exaggerated, in part because the region has cross-cutting conflicts that go beyond worries about China but also because it has evolved a localized order that makes for peace and stability. East Asia in his view is increasingly interdependent, is focused on economic betterment and economic openness, and has developed a regional comprehensive security model of dense and intertwining linkages both inter-state and transnational.[15] Thus, order at least in East Asia is not just based on shared (Chinese) cultural legacies going back to the tributary system but rather consists of local efforts and interests, including China's, combining to produce relatively peaceful, stable working relationships.

This paper locates itself in pluralist thinking about order which argues that it is not simply a gift of this or that powerful country. For example, post-colonial and world/global history studies suggest that the constitution of norms, institutions, and practices was also a function of inter-cultural, inter-civilizational, and inter-regional interactions even if these interactions were often unequal, varying in intensity, and scarcely understood or acknowledged at the time. Thus, the historian William H. McNeil argues that

[13] Rosemary Foot, John Gaddis, and Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Order and Justice in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and see Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Introduction to the 2009 Reissue" in Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society* (New York: Routledge, 2009) on the concerns of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics.
[14] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing Global Order: Agency and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[15] David Kang, *American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the Twenty-first Centur*y (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

> A would-be world historian…ought to be alert to evidence of contacts among separate civilizations, expecting major departures to arise from such encounters whenever such borrowings from (or rejection of) outsiders' practices provoked historically significant change.[16]

Chris Bayly in *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914* presents the case for world or global history in understanding the modern world[17]:

> On the one hand, the reverberations of critical world events, such as the European revolutions of 1789 or 1848, spread outwards and merged with convulsions arising within other world societies. On the other hand, events outside the emerging European and American "core" of the industrial world economy, such as the mid-century rebellions in China and India, impacted back on that core, moulding its ideologies and shaping new social and political conflicts.[18]

Not everything in contemporary order can be traced back to the transactions between different civilizations, countries, and regions; but it is a useful starting premise.

East Asian Internationalism and Global Orders

What is the East Asia contribution to various global orders – economic, human security, and environmental? What do China, Japan, and Korea do for other countries in these three areas

[16] William H. McNeil, "The Changing Shape of World History," in *Redefining History: Some Key Moments*, 147, http://homepage.univie.ac.at/berthold.unfried/braudelI.pdf.
[17] World and global history are often used synonymously, and I do so here, but there is a view that they are not the same subject. So, for instance, dramatizing the fact of their separation is the existence of two eponymous journals – the *Journal of World History* and the *Journal of Global History*.
[18] Chris Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.

of international life compared to the US and the key European powers (France, Germany, and the UK)?

Economic Order

A key element of global economic order is overseas development assistance (ODA). It is a norm that richer states are expected to make transfers to poorer states in the interest of the latter's long-term development and to improve the lives of ordinary people in disadvantaged societies. ODA represents such transfers. The standard definition of ODA is the one used by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD):

> Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount). By convention, ODA flows comprise contributions of donor government agencies, at all levels, to developing countries ("bilateral ODA") and to multilateral institutions. ODA receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions.[19]

To qualify as ODA, assistance must go to the least developed and poorest countries that feature in Part I list of the OECD's recipient list.

[19] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008), 376.

What is the record of China, Japan, and Korea on ODA, compared to other leading donors?

The tables below summarize their contributions:

Table: Annual ODA Contributions by Country 2006-2014 in USD millions[20]

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
China	6324.5	5662.5	2489.1	7504.2	4292.6	13853.9	11943.2	9554.7	6858.1
Japan	11,564.19	8,148.88	9,018.78	8,074.28	9,033.20	8,365.39	8,074.14	10,713.16	9,442.47
Korea	456.43	665.58	889.94	1,003.16	1,268.64	1,350.59	1,639.10	1,736.28	1,756.23
US	27,652.73	24,938.21	29,678.47	32,122.71	32,643.21	33,395.49	32,459.14	32,583.41	33,881.21
Germany	10,642.79	11,302.51	12,101.21	10,642.07	11,938.38	12,210.31	11,944.21	12,469.48	14,272.37
UK	10,934.69	7,748.59	9,732.77	10,894.87	12,551.06	12,561.02	12,565.84	16,077.62	16,179.79
France	10,420.75	8,686.41	8,886.62	10,623.67	11,325.29	10,755.29	10,643.53	9,639.56	8,983.00

Graph: Annual ODA Contributions by Country 2006-2014 in USD millions



Table: Annual ODA as Percentage of GNI by Country 2006-2014[21]

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
China	0.2302	0.1590	0.0538	0.1471	0.0707	0.1847	0.1398	0.1003	0.0653
Japan	0.2487	0.1752	0.1744	0.1507	0.1545	0.1321	0.1268	0.2010	0.1879
Korea	0.0453	0.0595	0.0888	0.1115	0.1158	0.1117	0.1327	0.1320	0.1240
US	0.1956	0.1710	0.2006	0.2216	0.2159	0.2113	0.1956	0.1908	0.1894
Germany	0.3485	0.3238	0.3194	0.3045	0.3426	0.3169	0.3293	0.3250	0.3597
UK	0.4037	0.2503	0.3373	0.4586	0.5100	0.4757	0.4755	0.5947	0.5467
France	0.4394	0.3195	0.2976	0.3875	0.4193	0.3673	0.3914	0.3385	0.3108

[20] Data on China's ODA compiled from Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley Parks, Austin M. Strange, Michael J. Tierney, "Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset," *AidData Working Paper* #46, (Williamsburg, VA: AidData, 2017), http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS46_Aid_China_and_Growth.pdf; and data on other ODA compiled from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Net ODA (indicator). doi: 10.1787/33346549-en (accessed on 17 April 2018).

[21] Data on GNI from The World Bank, "GNI (Current US$)," https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.MKTP.CD?end=2016&locations=CN-JP-KR-US-DE-GB-FR&start=2006, (accessed April 17, 2018).

Graph: Annual ODA as Percentage of GNI by Country 2006-2014



Table: Total and Average ODA by Country 2006-2014 in USD Millions

	Total	Average
China	68,482.80	7,609.20
Japan	82,434.49	9,159.39
S. Korea	10,765.95	1,196.22
US	279,354.58	31,039.40
Germany	107,523.35	11,947.04
UK	109,246.26	12,138.47
France	89,964.12	9,996.01

Graph: Total and Average ODA by Country 2006-2014 in USD Millions



The tables and figures suggest several conclusions about East Asian contributions. First, clearly, East Asians are far behind the US in terms of total amounts of ODA annually. From 2011 to 2013, China surpassed some of the Europeans, only to fall back to below European levels in 2014. Japan, despite being the third largest economy in the world, remained below France, the smallest European economy. South Korea remains well below European levels. Its GDP is about half of France and the UK, but its ODA levels, while rising over this period, remain well below even France, amounting to only one-quarter of French levels and one-ninth of UK levels in 2016. Second, among the East Asians, Japan was the biggest ODA provider in aggregate over 9 years but well behind the US and Europeans. Thirdly, as a percentage of their GNI, East Asians give far less than their Western counterparts, with Japan doing best of the three regional states.

Beyond ODA, countries contribute to the welfare of others by providing capital transfers in the form of Outward Bound Foreign Direct Investment (ODI). Clearly, investing abroad is motivated by the lure of profits. Yet, it can – and in East Asia's export-led development experience it dramatically has – led to high rates of economic growth, dramatic reductions in

poverty, and generalized welfare gains in the recipient countries. As the figures below show, East Asia has steadily increased its outward bound FDI, with China showing the most impressive increases:

Table: Outbound FDI in USD Millions[22]

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
China	17,634	26,506	55,907	56,529	68,811	74,654	87,804	107,844	123,120	127,560	183,100
Japan	50,266	73,549	128,020	74,699	56,263	107,599	122,549	135,749	129,038	128,654	145,242
Korea	12,769	22,074	19,633	17,436	28,280	29,705	30,632	28,360	28,039	23,760	27,274
US	224,220	393,518	308,296	287,901	277,779	396,569	318,196	303,432	292,283	303,177	299,003
Germany	116,680	169,320	71,507	68,541	125,451	77,929	62,164	42,271	99,519	93,283	34,558
UK	81,100	335,885	198,185	28,965	48,092	95,587	20,700	40,484	-148,303	-82,138	-12,614
France	76,767	110,643	103,281	100,866	48,155	51,415	35,440	20,369	49,783	44,373	57,328

Graph: Outbound FDI in USD Millions



The figures above show that the US is still the leading source of FDI despite the financial crisis of 2008. The UK was in second spot until 2009 when it fell to second last place just

[22] CEIC. *Foreign Direct Investment*, USD at Current Price, Outward, Flow. [Online]. Available: Euromonitor Institutional Investor (accessed April 17, 2018).

above Korea and, except for one spike in 2010-2011, has not recovered its place. Germany and France who ranked below the UK have dropped as well. Both have fluctuated but remain well below 2008 levels. On the other hand, the East Asian story is one of rising levels of ODI, with China on a steady upward trend, surpassing Japan by 2015, and standing second to the US. Japan has gradually moved up from a low point in 2010 to stand third behind China in 2016. South Korea remains well below the two East Asian giants but since 2013 has gone ahead of the UK. The big story clearly is China, which since the 2008-9 global crisis has seen a steady rise, with a sharp increase in 2015. In 2006, outward ODI from China was USD 17.6 billion; in 2016, it was USD 183 billion. This represents a more than ten-fold increase since 2006. Having said that, Chinese investments are mostly to offshore havens and to developed economies. More than half of it goes to Hong Kong. Other top destinations included the Cayman Islands, the Virgin Islands, Australia, Canada, Holland, Indonesia, Russia, Singapore, the UK, and the US.[23] The American Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation estimate that from 2005 and 2017, Chinese investment and construction abroad amounted to USD 1.78 trillion. This includes monies to the Belt and Route Initiative (BRI) countries.[24]

BRI is one of the biggest development in East Asian and arguably global affairs since Xi Jinping's reference in 2013 to the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in a speech in Kazakhstan.[25] Connectivity projects – and connectivity here refers to transport infrastructure – by East Asians, particularly Japan, have a much older history, going back at least to the 1960s and the investments of the Tokyo-led Asian Development Bank (ADB). With the launch of the BRI

[23] David Dollar, "Yes, China is investing globally—but not so much in its belt and road initiative," May 8, 2017, *Brookings*, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/08/yes-china-is-investing-globally-but-not-so-much-in-its-belt-and-road-initiative/.
[24] American Enterprise Institute. *China Global Investment Tracker*, 2016, http://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/, (accessed April 17, 2018).
[25] "President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfhshzzfh_665686/t1076334.shtml.

("One Belt-One Route") initiative, however, East Asians, and particularly China and Japan, are in contention for contracts and projects and are embarked on a connectivity race in Asia and beyond.[26] Beijing is involved in several high-profile projects such as the USD 62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) linking seaports in Gwadar and Karachi to parts of Western China and Central Asia, the USD 1.1 billion Hambantota port project in Sri Lanka and the USD 5.5 billion high-speed rail in Indonesia connecting Jakarta to Bandung.[27] While figures for their investments are hard to come by and may not be reliable, especially in the case of China, the numbers are substantial. Estimates on what China has committed to BRI range from USD 900 billion to USD 8 trillion.[28] In 2015, 68 BRI countries received 12 percent of all Chinese ODI.[29] In 2016, they received 8.5 percent of total Chinese ODI.[30] At the BRI Forum in Beijing in May 2017, President Xi Jinping promised USD 14.5 billion for the Silk Road Fund (SRF), USD 60 billion in loans and USD 9.5 billion in aid to developing countries and international bodies along the new trade routes. He also suggested that Chinese financial institutions would be encouraged to expand their overseas investing to the tune of USD 47 billion.[31]

[26] Connectivity here includes both hard and soft infrastructure.
[27] Tom Phillips, "The $900bn question: What is the Belt and Road initiative?" *The Guardian*, May 12, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/12/the-900bn-question-what-is-the-belt-and-road-initiative; Jessica Meyers, "Sri Lankans who once embraced Chinese investment are now wary of Chinese domination," *Los Angeles Times*, February 25, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-sri-lanka-port-2017-story.html; Ben Bland, "Chinese $5.5bn high-speed rail project held up in Indonesia," *Financial Times*, January 28, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/6ae46e68-c596-11e5-808f-8231cd71622e.
[28] Peter Wells and Don Weinland, "Fitch warns on expected returns from One Belt, One Road," *Financial Times*, January 26, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/c67b0c05-8f3f-3ba5-8219-e957a90646d1; David Ho, "Cost of funding 'Belt and Road Initiative' is daunting task," *South China Morning Post*, September 27, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/special-reports/business/topics/special-report-belt-and-road/article/2112978/cost-funding-belt-and.
[29] Dollar, "Yes, China is investing globally".
[30] Dollar, "Yes, China is investing globally".
[31] Brenda Goh and Yawen Chen, "China pledges $124 billion for new Silk Road as champion of globalization," *Reuters*, May 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-africa/china-pledges-124-billion-for-new-silk-road-as-champion-of-globalization-idUSKBN18A02I.

Japan too has launched a more aggressive connectivity programme, in response to China's BRI. It has a history of funding connectivity infrastructure, primarily through the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Since its establishment in 1966, Japan has contributed and committed USD 13.68 billion to ADB's Special Funds, making it the single largest contributor. As of end 2016, it has also contributed USD 22.27 billion in capital subscription. From 2012 to 2016, Japan was also involved in the co-financing of USD 7.17 billion for 60 projects and another USD 213.55 million in technical assistance for 164 projects.[32] Since the publication of the 'Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity" in 2010, Japan has become an even more active player in Asian connectivity. In Southeast Asia, it has committed itself to various schemes including the 'East-West and Southern Economic Corridors (Land Corridors)'; 'Maritime ASEAN Economic Corridor (Maritime Corridor)'; 'Soft Infrastructure Projects throughout the ASEAN Region.'[33] In addition, with India it has announced the building of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, as part of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific region". This would promote sea corridors linking Africa, India and South Asia, and Southeast Asia.[34] A partnership of Japanese companies has committed USD 878 million for Japanese-directed infrastructure projects worldwide including in Asia, Europe, and North America.[35] Overall, Japan has committed USD 200 billion towards its "Partnership for Quality Infrastructure" (PQI). Japan has also pledged USD 6.1 billion dollars in aid for five Mekong countries in July 2015, including Vietnam. Finally, Japan is involved in a range of connectivity projects in India. It is funding 81% of the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train project through a soft loan of

[32] Asian Development Bank (ADB), *Asian Development Bank Member Fact Sheet: Japan*, April 2017, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27772/jpn-2016.pdf
[33] Mission of Japan to ASEAN, "Japan's Cooperation on ASEAN 2025 (Connectivity)," May 2016, http://www.asean.emb-japan.go.jp/asean2025/jpasean-ec03.html
[34] Avinash Nair, "To counter OBOR, India and Japan propose Asia-Africa sea corridor," *The Indian Express*, May 31, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/to-counter-obor-india-and-japan-propose-asia-africa-sea-corridor-4681749/.
[35] Wade Shepard, "Japan Ups Its Game Against China's Belt And Road," *Forbes*, December 1, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/12/01/japan-ups-its-infrastructure-game-against-chinas-belt-and-road/#660693203223.

USD 16.9 billion.[36] Between 2000 and 2017, the Japanese poured more than USD 25 billion into various sectors across India. Currently, Japan is the third largest investor in India.[37] From 2014 to 2019, Japan has promised to invest USD 35 billion to boost India's manufacturing and infrastructure sectors.[38] In April 2017, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) signed an agreement to provide over USD 610 million for the first phase of India's North East Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project, which will focus on the enhancement of important highways and transport infrastructure in Meghalaya and Mizoram.[39]

South Korea's connectivity projects are largely in its Eurasia Initiative (EAI) which seeks to connect it to China, Russia and Central Asian and from there on to Europe. Seoul sees opportunities in northeastern China, Russia's Far East, and Central Asia in particular. It is supporting a connectivity plan from South Korea to China and Russia which will connect with the trans-Siberian and trans-Mongolian railway through Central Asia, and on to Europe. Korea is also trying to play a role in improving railway connectivity between China, Kazakhstan, and Russia. With the melting of glaciers in the Artic, various sea routes to Europe over the north pole will open and become commercially viable. Korea is working with an array of countries to explore this possibility: China, Russia, the Nordic countries, and the Visegrad 4 (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia).[40] Despite its increasing

[36] Tommy Wilkes and Kiyoshi Takenaka, "Japan's Abe to launch $17-billion Indian bullet train project as ties deepen," *Reuters*, September 12, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-japan/japans-abe-to-launch-17-billion-indian-bullet-train-project-as-ties-deepen-idUSKCN1BN15B.
[37] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, "Japan's investments in India getting diverse," *The Economic Times*, May 27, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/japans-investments-in-india-getting-diverse/articleshow/58863341.cms.
[38] "Japan promises Narendra Modi $35 billion inflows, but holds out on nuclear deal," *The Times of India*, September 2, 2014, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Japan-promises-Narendra-Modi-35-billion-inflows-but-holds-out-on-nuclear-deal/articleshow/41458837.cms.
[39] Tridivesh Singh Maini and Sandeep Sachdeva, "Japan's Outreach to Northeastern India," *The Diplomat*, June 12, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/japans-outreach-to-northeastern-india/.
[40] See Thomas Nilsen, "South Korea and Russia plan Murmansk hub," *The Independent Barents Observer*, November 7, 2017, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2017/11/south-korea-and-russia-plan-murmansk-hub; Patrick Barkham, "Russian tanker sails through Arctic without icebreaker for first time," *The Guardian*, August

involvement in Eurasian connectivity, Korea's private sector investments are rather modest. In 2013, FDI to the Greater Far East region stood at USD 25 million, accounting for only 1% of the FDI to this entire region.[41] By comparison, Japan's FDI in the region amounted to USD 913 million, India's USD 462 million, and China's USD 70 million. From 2008 to 2013, Korea's FDI to Russia was USD 203 million. Korean investors were involved in USD 70 million worth of projects inside SEZs in Russia's Far East; this could grow to USD 3 billion in the next 3 years.[42]

Human Security Order

East Asia is playing a more visible role in the global human security order. In the 1990s, Japan officially articulated and supported a human security programme worldwide.[43] While Tokyo no longer uses the human security language in public much, it continues to commit monies to initiatives that are aimed at protecting the safety and freedoms of people in other countries. China and Korea, by contrast, have not used the language of human security, but along with Japan they fund UN peacekeeping operations, and all three have sent troop contingents to keep the peace.

The table below indicates the extent of East Asia's human security efforts in comparison to the US and European powers:

24, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/aug/24/russian-tanker-sails-arctic-without-icebreaker-first-time; "S. Korea, Japan, China hold talks on Arctic affairs," *The Korea Times*, April 28, 2016, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/10/120_203592.html; Stephen J. Blank, "Enter Asia: The Arctic Heats Up," *World Affairs,* March/April 2014, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/enter-asia-arctic-heats; Leiv Lunde, "The Nordic Embrace: Why the Nordic Countries Welcome Asia to the Arctic Table," *Asia Policy* 18, (2014): 39-45.

[41] Jae-Young, Lee, "Korea's Eurasia Initiative and the Development of Russia's Far East and Siberia," in *The Political Economy of Pacific Russia*, eds., Jing Huang and Alexander Korolev (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 114.

[42] Inga Denezh, "South Korea targets increased investment in Russia's Far East," *Asia Times*, November 30, 2017, http://www.atimes.com/article/south-korea-targets-increased-investment-russias-far-east/

[43] See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) website on Japan's human security initiatives: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html.

Table: Personnel Contributions to Peacekeeping [44]

	Dec-06	Dec-08	Dec-10	Dec-12	Dec-14	Dec-16
China	1666	2146	2039	1869	2181	2630
Japan	31	38	266	278	271	274
Korea	32	394	633	379	612	627
US	324	91	87	128	127	72
Germany	1143	327	282	182	179	421
UK	358	297	282	283	289	345
France	1,988	2,198	1,540	968	922	872
Russia	291	271	258	86	75	105
India	9,483	8693	8691	7839	8139	7710
Pakistan	9,867	11135	10652	8967	7936	7156
Bangladesh	9681	9567	10402	8828	9400	6862

Graph: Personnel Contributions to Peacekeeping



Clearly, UN peacekeeping is dominated by the South Asian three of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. However, in 2016, China stood 12th in the list of peacekeeping nations. Korea was 34th in the list, but only two Western countries – Italy and France – stood ahead of it. Japan

[44] Data tabulated from United Nations Peacekeeping, *Troop and Police Contributors*, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors (accessed April 17, 2018).

features very low, but given its ambivalence towards deploying troops abroad, this is hardly surprising. In terms of financing peacekeeping the situation is as follows:

Table: Financial Contributions to UN Peacekeeping in USD Millions[45]

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
China	132.02	215.04	210.88	229.76	299.36	299.01	484.84	495.11	494.20	555.58
Japan	1,031.80	1,130.43	1,113.81	1,213.55	952.28	952.28	790.81	807.56	806.66	906.85
Korea	76.15	132.99	145.59	158.63	171.76	171.76	145.56	148.65	148.48	166.92
US	1,414.74	1,773.88	1,739.48	1,895.26	2,065.25	2,062.75	2,072.00	2,115.89	2,111.98	2,374.28
Germany	459.09	583.24	574.66	626.12	609.37	609.37	521.29	532.34	531.74	597.79
UK	394.01	535.55	525.17	572.20	619.95	619.20	487.76	498.10	497.18	558.93
France	387.77	508.06	498.21	542.82	574.80	574.10	526.76	537.92	536.92	603.60
Russia	70.74	96.76	94.88	103.38	150.39	150.21	229.65	234.48	234.05	263.11
India	4.46	6.12	6.03	6.57	8.12	8.12	9.72	9.93	9.92	11.15
Pakistan	0.58	0.80	0.79	0.86	1.25	1.25	1.24	1.27	1.27	1.42
Bangladesh	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08

Graph: Financial Contributions to UN Peacekeeping



[45] Data collected from International Peace Institute, *IPI Peacekeeping Database*, www.providingforpeacekeeping.org, (accessed April 17, 2018).

Between 2006 and 2015, China has quadrupled its financial contribution while Korea has roughly doubled its contribution. Japan has held steady (indeed, since 2010 has shown a slight decline) and is the second largest funder of UN peacekeeping, behind the US. China is the third largest funder. However, from 2017, China was slated to become the second largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget. Together, China and Japan still rank below the US by quite some distance.

Environmental Order

No conception of order makes much sense if planetary environmental order collapses. Climate change is the greatest to planet-wide environmental disorder. A series of climate agreements have been signed multilaterally, of which the Paris agreement is the most recent and important. States have made voluntary commitments to reducing carbon emissions. The richer countries have also promised to transfer technology or to provide funds to poorer countries so that they can transition from carbon-based economies to renewable energy sources. A third set of climate change actions is to transition from fossil fuel and non-renewable energy to clean and renewable energy.

In July 2017, the US withdrew from the Paris agreement, which means that it will exit the accord in November 2020. All other major signatories, including China, Japan, and Korea, remain committed to the agreement. In line with the agreement, signatories promised to submit voluntary emission reduction targets or Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) to the UN. China's INDC is to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 60-65 percent compared to 2005 levels in 2030. Japan has promised to make cuts equivalent to 40 percent of its 2005 levels by 2030. Korea has said it will come down by 37 percent from Business as

Usual levels (BAU) by 2030.[46] Before its withdrawal from the climate agreement, the US, by contrast to China and Japan, had committed to a much more modest 26-28 percent reduction compared to 2005 levels by 2025. [47]

Secondly, the Paris accord resolved that the rich countries would help "mobilize" a Green Climate Fund (GCF) of $100 billion per year until 2020 to help countries, irrespective of their economic status, with both climate change mitigation and adaptation. The USD 100 billion would consist of public, private, and public-private funding.

The following major countries promised to contribute to the GCF:

Graph: Amount pledged to Green Climate Fund in USD Millions



[46] "The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines a 'business-as-usual' baseline case as the level of emissions that would result if future development trends follow those of the past and no changes in policies take place." See "What is Business-As-Usual? Projecting Greenhouse Gas Emissions at the Regional Level" EPIC Energy Blog, https://epicenergyblog.com/2015/07/24/what-is-business-as-usual-projecting-greenhouse-gas-emissions-at-the-regional-level-2/.

[47] For the official commitments submitted to the UNFCCC, see "INDC as Communicated by Parties," http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx.

Table: Amount pledged to Green Climate Fund in USD Millions[48]

Contributor	Pledged Amount in USD Millions
US	3,000
Japan	1,500
United Kingdom	1,211
France	1,035
Germany	1,003
Korea	100

Of these amounts, the US has paid in USD 1 billion, but given its subsequent withdrawal is unlikely to contribute much more. China so far has not committed to paying into the GCF. However, it has announced the setting up of a South-South Climate Change Fund to which it is prepared to give USD 3.1 billion. The South-South fund would help developing countries deal with climate change but also assist them in accessing GCF funding.[49] As of 29 January 2018, Japan had transferred 75 percent and Korea just under half of its pledged amount. In per capita terms, at USD 11.81 per person, Japan is pledged to contribute the highest amount by far amongst the East Asian countries – roughly five times the effort of China and Korea. Of the 40 or so countries that are contributing to the GCF, Japan on a per capita basis stands 10th, behind four Nordic and five West European countries (France, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the UK).[50]

One way of reducing GHG emissions is by transitioning to the use of clean energy sources. While this is a national endeavour, we can think of this as a domestic policy with positive international externalities and so a contribution to global environmental order and a form of

[48] Green Climate Fund (GCF), "Resource Mobilization," January 2018, https://www.greenclimate.fund/how-we-work/resource-mobilization, (accessed April 17, 2018).
[49] "China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund benefits developing countries," *China Daily*, November 30, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/XiattendsParisclimateconference/2015-11/30/content_22557413.htm.
[50] https://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24868/Status_of_Pledges.pdf/eef538d3-2987-4659-8c7c-5566ed6afd19

internationalism. In terms of its promises to invest in clean energy, China is the leader by some margin, as indicated in the graph below.

Graph: Investments in Clean Energy 2004 – 2017[51]



Both China and Japan have accelerated their spending on clean energy. In China's case, the rise has been from a low of USD 3.1 billion in 2004 to a high of 132.6 in 2017 – a 40-fold increase. Japan in the same period has gone from a low to USD 8.1 billion to a high of USD 44.3 billion in 2014 before dropping steadily since to USD 23.4 billion in 2017. In total, over the 14-year period from 2004 to 2017, China invested USD 785 billion and Japan USD 292.3 billion in clean energy. The US clocked in at USD 617.6 billion in the same period, rising from a low of USD 10.4 billion to a high of USD 62.3 in 2011 but maintaining steady between 2011 and 2017.[52]

[51] Abraham Louw, "Clean Energy Investment Trends, 2017," *Bloomberg New Energy Finance*, January 16, 2018. https://data.bloomberglp.com/bnef/sites/14/2018/01/BNEF-Clean-Energy-Investment-Investment-Trends-2017.pdf?elqTrackId=2e6e6b2aa1f946bca67cd74d9e20babb&elq=14c5b6199be94983892a328b7a8f496d&elqaid=10316&elqat=1&elqCampaignId, (accessed April 16, 2018), p. 12.

[52] Abraham Louw, *Clean Energy Investment Trends, 2017*, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, January 16, 2018, https://data.bloomberglp.com/bnef/sites/14/2018/01/BNEF-Clean-Energy-Investment-Investment-Trends-2017.pdf?elqTrackId=2e6e6b2aa1f946bca67cd74d9e20babb&elq=14c5b6199be94983892a328b7a8f496d&elqaid=10316&elqat=1&elqCampaignId.

China's primacy in the clean energy and renewable energy area is not much in question. Looking ahead, it expects to invest USD 361 billion in renewable energy between 2016 and 2020. In 2015, it accounted for 40 percent of global renewable power growth and boasts half the world's solar power capacity. In 2017, global clean energy investment stood at USD 333.5 billion. China accounted for nearly 40 percent of that figure. By 2030, it hopes that non-fossil fuels will amount to about 20 percent of its total energy consumption, a figure that could rise to over 50 percent by 2050.[53] The only country that could match China is the US, but under Trump it is turning the clock back to fossil fuels and coal production and use.

Conclusion

A good deal more work needs to be done to get a more complete picture of East Asian financial and other contributions to order building. A first cut, as presented here, suggests that China, Japan, and Korea are playing an increasing role in global order financial provisioning. Why is this the case? What are the drivers and motives of the three powers?

A brief answer, which will require far more detailed analysis in a separate paper, is that East Asian financial support for global order arises from four drivers – domestic welfare (environmental and economic); internal security and political problems; nationalism and status seeking; and cosmopolitanism and an ethic of transnational responsibility. It bears saying that these motives are hardly unique to East Asia.

First, it seems clear enough that domestic concerns over environmental decay are pushing governments to cooperate in reducing carbon emissions worldwide and to pay towards a fund

[53] "China to boost non-fossil fuel use to 20 percent by 2030: state planner," *Reuters*, April 25, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-energy/china-to-boost-non-fossil-fuel-use-to-20-percent-by-2030-state-planner-idUSKBN17R0QK.

that will help others in carbon mitigation. East Asians also support paying for clean energy at home as part of the effort at global mitigation and reducing smog and pollution levels in their towns and cities. Domestic welfare concerns are also at work in East Asian funding of connectivity projects abroad. While the motives behind the transport connectivity push by China, Japan, and Korea are complex, one motive seems to be that the projects will bring profits on surplus capacity/capital, generate employment, and stimulate economic growth at home.

Secondly, China's developmental assistance in unstable areas worldwide and its massive connectivity drives westwards through Xinjiang and onto Central Asia and beyond, as well as into Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), are related to its security concerns over restive populations as far away as Africa and the Middle East as well as Uighurs and Muslim radicals in the neighbourhood. Chinese investments in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are a huge effort to collaterally promote development and to "dry up the swamp" of Islamist extremism and terrorism. Roads and railways are dual-use technologies: they promote both development which in turn promotes security ("drying up the swamp"), but they also improve the capacity of states to control and police their own countryside. In the case of Japan, one can argue that its ODA and connectivity investments also are in part driven by fear of internal security problems arising from radical groups abroad who might target the homeland. It may well also arise from the fear that radical groups could attack Japanese projects and citizens abroad which would lead to enormous political blowback at home. Tokyo too may therefore have a "dry up the swamp" motivation, though it is clearly not the only or dominant motivation for Tokyo's assistance and investments abroad.

Thirdly, East Asian contributions to global order are being driven by a desire for influence and status. Here real concerns about regional rivalries and nationalism are at work. Surely it is clear that China and Japan but also Korea are expending treasure to attract the admiration and loyalty of others around the world but particularly in East Asia where they are rivals over territory but also diplomatic and political rivals. Beyond regional rivalry, both China and Japan's financial largesse is being driven by nationalism. China under Xi makes no bones about his vision for China, namely, for it to be the number one power in the world and to supplant the US. Japan's sense of nationalism finds it hard to abide by the possibility that China will be number one, and its assistance to others is part of an effort to stay in the status game. Japan likely also has an eye on the US. It may not have bested the US economically back in the 1980s, and the lost decades are an irksome reminder that things went wrong, but many Japanese do not want to be relegated to permanently being counted as "junior partners" of the Americans internationally. So also Korea is not just spending abroad simply to show North Korea its place internationally; it is spending to poke Japan in the eye.

Finally, East Asian assistance and investments abroad are not all driven by cynical, self-regarding motives. Chinese, Japanese, and Korea all have traditions of cosmopolitan thought. For Japan, post-war cosmopolitanism is a function of its desire to rehabilitate itself before the court of global public opinion. Its aid is a form of restitution, particularly in areas that it invaded and ruled. East Asian cosmopolitan also comes from the Spiderman view of power and responsibility: with great power comes great responsibility. As East Asia has grown richer and more powerful, it feels impelled to a "responsible stakeholder". Big powers help others because they can and because that is what big powers are expected to do.

To sum up: the three East Asian states have not supplanted the US and Western powers as internationalist financial backers of the current order. They are, however, playing a more prominent part, more so than at any time in the past 100 years, and their motives in doing so are varied and complex. The US and the European powers are still leading in terms of development assistance and foreign investment abroad. They are also generous donors to UN peacekeeping. The US was to lead climate funding; clearly, this is not going to be the case under Trump. China and Japan are increasing their contributions to development assistance. They are ramping up foreign investments abroad: China is second only to the US in outward bound FDI. Most importantly, China and Japan's commitments to transport connectivity, particularly in Asia, outstrip US and European funding by far. In every category of provisioning, Korea is too small to match either of its East Asian neighbours, nor can it match the US and Europeans, but it has developed a discernible internationalist profile.

The US, Europe, and East Asia are the three dominant legs of global order if we look at financial contributions towards the good of others and if we think of order beyond just a security architecture to include an economic order, a human security order, and an environmental order. That these three sets of players are dominant is not surprising since they are the most developed and dynamic economic zones in the world and dispose of the largest economic surpluses. East Asia is not, on this analysis, shaping global order in any radical or revolutionary way. It is sitting at the existing table of global order and not fashioning a new table, at least not yet, though if one goes beyond financial contributions, one can see that China may be shaping norms, institutions, and practices that do not sit easily with the present order.