

China-India Brief

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Guest Column

China and India Largely Converge in Their Visions of the Asian Security Order

By Richard Ghiasy

Existing literature and commentary generally discuss Chinese and Indian visions for the Asian security order individually and often with a regional focus. In turn, this commentary analyses Chinese and Indian visions at the continental, conceptual, and processual levels—highlighting Asian security order *and* ordering, i.e., the process of creating an order.

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 CENTRE ON ASIA
AND GLOBALISATION

The *China-India Brief* is a monthly digest focusing on the relationship between Asia's two biggest powers. The Brief provides readers with a key summary of current news articles, reports, analyses, commentaries, and journal articles published in English on the China-India relationship. It features a Guest Column weighing in on key current issues in China-India relations.

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First, however, we must be conscious of two facts: the concept of Asia and the concept of security order. In both cases, there is a conceptual challenge. Concepts matter. Asia's historical and contemporary canvas is unique, as is the current constellation of major and great powers. Moreover, territorially, Asia is huge. Geography and proximity are critical determinants in threat perception, power balancing, and security ordering realities. 'Asia' is a geographic concept that Western historians, cartographers, and strategists have primarily advanced, and we cannot simply extrapolate security thinking and concepts of, e.g., the Transatlantic to Asia.

Asia is ethnically, religiously, (socio-)politically, and economically *exceedingly* heterogeneous. This diversity is in stark contrast to, for instance, Europe. The diversity of Asia does not facilitate a pan-Asian identity. For all these reasons, a pan-Asian security order is, almost by definition, a cul-de-sac. Chinese and Indian analysts and policy practitioners are aware of this.

Moreover, there is **no consensus** among scholars and practitioners regarding the definition of polysemic concepts such as "order," "security," and, therefore, an Asian security order. This leads to imprecise use of these concepts and, hence, also inaccurate interpretations. In this commentary, 'security order' is the concept of maintaining security and stability in a given environment. It refers to establishing formal frameworks, rules, and policies that

guide security relations between states, and aim to prevent conflicts and ensure the safety of states. With this set out, let us focus on China and India.

In sync with their reemergence, China and India are stepping up to ensure their prosperity and safety and shape the Asian security order. China, more advanced across most metrics of power and arguably more ambitious than India, has progressed its vision for **thinking on security** and the Asian security order since around the **turn of the century**. It has strongly picked up pace in conceptualisation and operationalisation in President Xi Jinping's administration. Meanwhile, India is gradually mending its vision for the Asian security order, currently a bit of a patchwork of emerging concepts and principles.

China's vision for the Asian security order is based on "indivisible security." Contrary to the US collective security approach through NATO in the Transatlantic community and its so-called hub-and-spokes alliance system in the Asia-Pacific with partners Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand, China's vision is much less material and more comprehensive also to encompass **development and non-traditional security (NTS)**. However, China's indivisible security is 'divisible,' as it wants to exclude non-Asian powers in the Asian security order.



Image Credit: Flickr/GovernmentZA

Still, China is realistic and pragmatic enough to realise that it cannot unilaterally shape and dominate a pan-Asian security order like the US did for the Western Hemisphere. Neither does China want to convey an image to Asia that it has a set-in-stone unilateral vision for the Asian security order. Therefore, China adopts an open-ended, multipolar, multilateralist vision for Asia's security order. China is (as is India) **aware** of Asian realities across Asia's scope and geography, civilisational diversity, geopolitics, power balancing, and its own lack of legitimacy to lead a contemporary (East-)Asian security order.

In essence, China's open-ended vision is **processual**, attempting to—as orderly as possible—transform Asian security perceptions and principles through **dialogue and cooperation**. China concentrates on security ordering rather than security order, including through its

unfolding 3i's: the **global security, global development, and global civilisation** initiatives. Through this approach, China hopes to take the edge off the perceived threat of its rise, evade costly power-balancing vis-à-vis the US and allies and partners that it is unlikely to “win,” and delegitimise US-led binary collective security ordering norms. For many economically underdeveloped nations in Asia (and beyond), the reinterpretation and re-hierarchisation of security, revolving around development and socio-political stability first, is appealing.

China is quite savvy about how it goes about security order and ordering in Asia. It first sought to fill security vacuums where there was least resistance, primarily in continental Asia. Not materially, but by creating political consensus and sharing operationalisation across NTS by politically securing its continental flanks: Russia, Central Asia,

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, to an extent, Southeast Asia. It has mainly pursued cooperation and coordination through low-hanging non-traditional security fruits, such as counter-terrorism, but also because large swaths of continental Asia are authoritarian or politically frail. Thus, regime security, like in China, features prominently. Indeed, in maritime Asia, particularly the Asia-Pacific, where the US-led hub-and-spokes security architecture prevails, China's attempts to reshape the security order and sell indivisible security have been mostly brushed aside.

In turn, India has a more fragmented and, therefore, less propagated vision. But it is slowly coming together. India is primarily interested in developing its economy and sustaining **strategic autonomy**. India does not want to be pushed, coerced, or even incentivised by anyone: it simply wants its policies to be a product of homegrown thinking and free choice and to do what it concludes is best for India. For this, India needs a stable neighbourhood and a **stable Asia that co-develops economically**. While its neighbourhood, South Asia, is not very stable and one of the world's least integrated, for now, it is not threatening enough to hamper India's economic ambitions.

India's security ordering principles for Asia revolve around multilateralism, inclusive and consensual processes, and multipolarity. An overarching vision is partially emerging through the *Vasudhaiva*

Kutumbakam (or 'the world is one family') concept, conceptually broadly similar to indivisible security. This concept, too, sees security for all family members as a given, as the insecurity of one member affects the cohesion and harmony of the entire family.

Beyond this concept, India needs to act by strategic realities: India wants to make sure that China does not come to dominate Asian security affairs. The scenario of an Asia dominated by China compels India to support shared-leadership notions of Asian security and to welcome the US and European actors (for now) to play a role in the Asian security order and the Indo-Pacific, with the former falling within the latter. Indeed, India's vision of the Asian security order has a **more maritime focus** and extends far and wide into the Indian Ocean. India's foreign and security establishments are pursuing multi-alignment multidirectional trajectories with strong maritime orientations in an agenda to deal with China, the bipolarity that the China-US rivalry produces, and to make sure that the growth of its comprehensive powers is not hampered.

At the same time, India does not currently have the means to shape Asian security affairs amply. This is contrary to China, an example being China's ability to set up the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which has now spread widely, or its reinvigoration of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Beyond its

immediate region of South Asia, India has not yet got such convening power. But it is likely a matter of time before it does.

So, where do the visions converge? The degree of convergence between the two Asian giants' visions significantly exceeds divergence. Both India and China are looking to establish a peaceful, stable multipolar and multilateral Asia that sustains their aspirations of national and civilisational revival. Importantly, and in a significant departure from Western collective security approaches, both reject collective security and promote cooperative security. Though, in their most security-critical regions, the Asia-Pacific and South Asia, they do not necessarily always abide by cooperative security norms and power play when their core interests are at risk.

Both actors propagate “oneness” and “indivisibility” and thus inclusive and consensus-driven security ordering and promote cooperation as building blocks for this process. As a result, both pursue security cooperation through development-oriented outreach, though to coalesce the Global South into their respective folds.

This, though, is where the convergences end. As said, China's vision for the Asian security order is conceptually and operationally more coherent and mature than India's. China, of course, also has more material prowess and (partially due to that) diplomatic clout to promote its vision. Contrary to India, China's vision for the

Asian security order has a strong “Asia for Asians” and anti-West rudiment. To corrode China-US bipolarity and limit Chinese power, India does not object to extra-Asian actors engaging in Asian security ordering, including the US and Europe. Nor does India actively delegitimise US security ordering principles the way China does. China's multipolarity is, in fact, Asian multipolarity. India's vision is also driven by creating a more equitable Indo-Pacific instead of China's marginally more continental focus.

To conclude, China primarily concentrates on security ordering rather than a set-in-stone security order. It welcomes Asians to think and discuss ways forward. Through this approach, China hopes to take the edge off the perceived threat of its rise, evade costly power-balancing with the US and its allies, and delegitimise US-led binary collective security ordering principles. India has a more fragmented and, therefore, less propagated vision. It is yet to blossom fully. The tenets of ordering are present, including multilateralism, inclusive and consensual processes, multipolarity, and shared leadership. An overarching values-driven vision is emerging through the “the world is one family” outlook, conceptually similar to China's “indivisible security.” China and India's visions converge substantially through principles, an objection to collective security, and a preference for cooperative security. The primary divergence is China's distaste for

Western involvement in Asian security ordering, whereas India is receptive to extra-Asian multipolar involvement.

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The Semiconductor Long Game—the Way Forward for India and China?

By Konark Bhandari

In August 2009, the Indian Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) established a task force to look into strategies that could be used to further spur the growth of India’s vaunted information technology (IT) software and information technology enabled services (ITES) sectors. At the same time, the task force was also entrusted with the task of developing a plan to boost manufacturing in India’s hardware sector. In its **report** published in December 2009, the task force recognised that the electronics hardware sector was at an inflection point similar to where the Indian IT software industry was a decade earlier in 2000. Among one of the three sub-sectors identified by the report where manufacturing of hardware should be boosted, was the electronics systems and design manufacturing sector (ESDM), with a heavy emphasis on semiconductors. In addition, the **report** stressed that since most of India’s electronics imports were from China, it may want to “reckon this from a strategic perspective.” These words have now become prescient, given the global recalibration of semiconductor supply chains away from China, with the aim of establishing more resilient and secure supply chains.




Image Credit: iStock/sefa.ozel

However, no coherent policy outcomes regarding semiconductors came out of the 2009 MeitY report. Fast-forward a few years, with many companies pursuing a China+1 strategy and there being a heavy emphasis on de-risking from China, India introduced a semiconductor incentive scheme in December 2021. It also set up an agency within the MeitY, called the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) that was tasked with building a sustainable semiconductor ecosystem in the country.

At the same time, Chinese semiconductor companies face an increasingly challenging business environment due to US export controls, which bars companies placed on Washington’s Entity List from receiving US exports. In October 2022, these rules were updated to especially block China’s access to high-end AI chips, as well as US chip design software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME), and US-built

components. High-end AI chips could no longer be sold to any entity operating in China, regardless of whether it was Chinese or not. This subsequent broadening of the purview of the export controls to all entities operating in China, and not just those on the Entity List, has led to a noticeable surge in momentum in China's quest to pursue indigenous technology.

This essay attempts to make sense of these parallel initiatives by both India and China to build their semiconductor ecosystems. While India attempts to integrate itself into a global supply chain from which it was largely missing, China, at the same time, is seeking to pursue self-sufficiency. While the latter may be a tall order, given that the semiconductor global supply chain is dispersed all over the world, China is at the very least seeking to avoid being held hostage by US export controls on 'chokepoint' technologies.

Industrial Policy 2.0

A lot of the success in onshoring semiconductor supply chains for India, and for building resilient and domestic capability in semiconductors in China, is due to the revival of semiconductor industrial policies. India and China are far from the only countries pursuing such industrial policies, with the US also keen on rebuilding its capability in semiconductors through the CHIPS and Science Act.

With its semiconductor incentive scheme, India has gotten off to a fairly respectable start. In June 2023, a **fact sheet** released by

the White House highlighted recent investment announcements by US semiconductor companies in India. Cumulatively, these investments were worth billions of dollars and included notable projects like Micron's \$825 million investment for a new assembly and test facility, as well as Applied Materials' \$400 million commitment to set up a collaborative engineering center in the country. The promising domestic market in India and the fact that the Indian government moved in record time to clear up taxation issues with certain key players certainly played a part. India introduced new initiatives, like the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes—incentive packages for certain sectors, including mobile handset and electronic items—which have become the foundational basis for India to position itself as an investment destination for companies pursuing a China+1 strategy. The **PLI schemes** provide incentives based on the incremental sales achieved over the overall base of the previous year at a rate of 4-6 percent for most sectors and 4-7 percent for telecom and network products manufacturing. Therefore, the incentive system is predicated on the applicant company meeting incremental targets, and in the process, scaling operations in India. The scheme for mobile handset manufacturing has been a runaway success, at least when judging by the number of exports, which in FY2024 so far, have already jumped to **\$15.6 billion**.

Critical takes on the PLI schemes do persist, however, inasmuch as the scheme for mobile handsets has only led to an increase in mostly assembly operations and not large-scale manufacturing. That being said, even the requirement for more assembly operations necessitates importing the chips that go into the handsets and other devices as well. For instance, since major original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) like Apple have announced plans to move operations to India, suppliers such as Foxconn have followed suit.

China, on the other hand, recently announced **plans** to set up a new state-run semiconductor investment fund, with a corpus of \$47.5 billion. This is China's second major attempt. Indeed, in 2014, China had announced a "Big Fund" worth approximately \$15 billion for semiconductors to promote domestic semiconductor companies. This was accompanied by a plan by the State Council in 2014 for China to become a leader in various stages of the semiconductor supply chain. However, there was little to no prior experience required for companies to apply for the Big Fund, and at one point, as per **Chinese state media**, 58,000 companies were registered as semiconductor companies in China over the period January-October 2020! A **massive crackdown** on semiconductor firms ensued, as many could not repay their debts. Why should things be different with the second iteration of China's semiconductor fund?

Reports say that the managers of the new fund will play a more hands-on role and that is the key change from the earlier Big Fund. However, what may have prompted this move is the ratcheting up of US export controls on key SMEs. Also, China's perceived success in successfully managing to create 7 nm chips, which was not thought possible a few years ago, may have encouraged Chinese planners to try again.

Interestingly, both **India** and **China** are reportedly planning to hike the local content requirement (LCR) for products manufactured in their countries. It should be noted, though, that India's plans are centred around federal procurement only and are likely to exempt the electronics and manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, China's LCR plans mandate that carmakers in China should target using only Chinese chips for their manufacturing operations by 2025. The supposed benefits include the creation of more jobs and greater involvement of local small-medium enterprises in supply chains. However, the longer-term goal may be to attain technological self-sufficiency when it comes to the supply chains for mature node chips or legacy chips, which are used largely in automobiles.

To sum up, this is India's first sincere attempt at an industrial policy on semiconductors, where it seeks to use both the ISM's semiconductor incentive scheme and the PLI scheme for electronic items to address both the upstream supply component of semiconductors and the

downstream demand component through providing incentives to OEMs. On the other hand, for China, the newly announced fund is the next iteration for building an increasingly self-reliant semiconductor ecosystem. However, given its recent success in manufacturing leading-edge node chips more swiftly than was expected, this could lead to better results, this time around.

Can Asia's Giants Innovate?

Somewhere in this discussion on semiconductors is also the underlying question of whether India and China can truly innovate in hardware manufacturing and migrate from low-cost manufacturing. For instance, China's quest to innovate has been labelled as "**quixotic**" by a few observers, even as it catches up to the US in **several areas**. However, recent developments in both China and India have been encouraging. For instance, **recent reports** have estimated that China has largely managed to wean off its reliance on foreign suppliers and that some of its flagship technology companies spend as much on research and development as mainstream American Big Tech companies. India too, has managed to see an exponential surge in its **patent filings** over the last decade. This could have been driven by India's wave of fresh policies in the semiconductor, space, robotics, drones, and with more policies on a deep-tech ecosystem in the offing, the momentum when it comes to patent filings may well continue.

How Do Their Respective Semiconductor Policies Impact Trade between India and China?

In the short run, more Indian imports from China, particularly in the electronic components segment, are quite likely. The reasons are not hard to fathom. For instance, as India increasingly becomes a **viable destination** for companies pursuing a China+1 strategy, it may see more assembly operations to start off with. This may lead to a surge in intermediate imports from China in the form of electronic inputs and components. Indeed, a recent **report** posits that there has been a surge in "industrial imports" from China in recent years. Therefore, we should expect more calls in India in the months if not years ahead for increasing LCR.

Next Battleground between India and China—Mature Node Chips?

Interestingly, mature node chips are currently the **focus** of a lot of the semiconductor policy world. They are defined by the US Department of Commerce as those built with 28 nm or older process technologies. China's surge in **global market share** and **robust projections** for an enhanced market share when it comes to mature node chips have led to fears of China leveraging its market power in this segment, as well as possibly creating a **price-war** in mature node chips. While this increased capacity in mature nodes may be a means of serving the domestic market in China—owing to restrictions on chip exports under US law, it does not quite

square up with the fact that Chinese foundries are running at **very high capacity** for mature node chips—which is unusual at a time when the Chinese economy is seeing a downturn. Alarmed by the rapid clip of such mature node chip production in China, the Biden administration recently announced its plans to impose **tariffs** of 25-50 percent on mature node chips from China by 2025. This could create an opening for India when it comes to accessing the US market, as India’s upcoming Tata-PSMC foundry is set to produce mature node chips.

What Could Change?

What could side-track the recent successes, however **modest**, of India’s semiconductor incentive scheme or of China’s new domestic semiconductor fund? India’s semiconductor investments were driven by commercial considerations, but also favoured by the US government under the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) with India, which was keen to see its enterprises de-risk from China. Could a change in US administration in the 2024 elections change things? There is talk that a Trump 2.0 administration would see further ratcheting up of export controls which are widely believed to have **spared legacy nodes and packaging industries**—sectors where Chinese firms still compete. Furthermore, **announcements** of a possible spike in tariffs imposed on China as well as a blanket

10 percent tariff hike on all imports, including from partner nations and allies, could trigger a fresh round of retaliatory tariffs that would make it difficult for India to access inputs from China as well as access the US market at competitive rates. India’s burgeoning partnership here with the US as well as Taiwan—which played a **key role** in advocating for the Tata-PSMC foundry in India—would be highly determinant of the way forward.

Conclusion

Increasingly, wielding power in the current state of geopolitics is not merely about hard military power but also about economic statecraft. The recent spate of semiconductor industrial policies the world over are a testament to that. Recent experiments in industrial policies in India and China have met with initial success. But the way forward is uncertain and will be decided by whether major semiconductor companies decide to invest.

Konark Bhandari is a Fellow with Carnegie India. He contributes regularly to discussions on the semiconductor ecosystem, with his contributions being acknowledged in semiconductor “readiness assessment” report under the iCET (initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology). He had also worked earlier at the Competition Commission of India (CCI), where he was a member of the Internal Coordination Committee on the Think Tank on Digital Markets.

News Reports

Bilateral relations

Jaishankar meets new Chinese envoy, stresses need for stabilisation and progress

Hindustan Times, June 25

This was the first meeting between S. Jaishankar and Xu Feihong, who arrived in New Delhi last month.

In message to China, India to rename 30 places in Tibet as bilateral ties hit new snag

South China Morning Post, June 21

India is reportedly planning to rename a number of locations in China's Tibet region in response to Beijing issuing official Chinese names for several places in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.

India shuns China's calls to resume passenger flights after 4 years, officials say

Reuters, June 20

China is pressing India to restart direct passenger flights after a four-year halt, but New Delhi is resisting as a border dispute continues to weigh on ties between the world's two most populous countries, officials said.

Post-election, India-China issues harder to resolve: Expert

The Straits Times, June 8

"Essentially, if the Chinese sense (that) Modi has weakened, the prospect for political accommodation from the Chinese side would be even less," said Professor C. Raja Mohan, referring to India's caretaker Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

China and India in the Region

Bangladesh chooses India's Teesta river project over China's proposal

Financial Express, June 26

Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina announced that her country would accept India's proposal to develop the Teesta River basin, effectively declining a competing offer from China.

US lawmakers meeting Modi after Dalai Lama signals New Delhi shift on China: analysts

South China Morning Post, June 21

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted American lawmakers, including former House speaker Nancy Pelosi, in New Delhi on Thursday (June 20), shortly after they had an audience with the Dalai Lama, a meeting that defied stern warnings from Beijing.

India's "Unwarranted References" Reply To China-Pak Joint Statement On J&K

NDTV, June 13

India has strongly criticised a joint China-Pakistan statement on Jammu and Kashmir as "unwarranted references".

Beijing objects after India's Modi thanks Taiwanese leader Lai for election message

South China Morning Post, June 6

Beijing warned New Delhi about Taipei's 'political conspiracy' following exchange between Taiwanese leader and Indian prime minister.

Trade and Economy

Thousands of Chinese tech workers fail to get Indian visas, industry says

Financial Times, June 27

Modi's ambitions to create a manufacturing power come up against souring diplomatic relations with Beijing.

Japan imposes trade curbs on Chinese, Indian firms for supporting Ukraine war

EFE, June 21

Japan on Friday (June 21) imposed trade restrictions against firms in China, India, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan over their alleged support for Russia's war on Ukraine.

EU, US tariff hikes on Chinese electric cars could drive automakers to turn to India

Channel News Asia, June 18

However, observers noted that New Delhi will be concerned about giving too much market access to its rival despite benefiting from increased Chinese investment.

India attracts chipmaking equipment companies as China alternative

Nikkei Asia, June 14

The chipmaking equipment industry is moving to set up bases of operation in India, as the country emerges as a promising alternative to China.

Indian traders demand resumption of border trade with China through Lipulekh pass

The Economic Times, June 10

The route has been closed for five years.

Energy and Environment

India Says Rising Solar Cell Output Will Curb Imports From China

Bloomberg, June 25

India's cells capacity is set to jump fivefold to about 30 gigawatts a year by March 2025.

India and China top buyers of Russian fuel oil in May, LSEG data shows

Reuters, June 25

The European Union's full embargo on Russian oil products went into effect in February 2023 and the bulk of Russia's fuel oil and VGO was redirected to other regions, mostly Asia.

China fears spark Indian race for cobalt in contested ocean waters

Al Jazeera, June 19

India is scrambling to secure rights to explore a cobalt-rich underwater mountain in the middle of the Indian Ocean but its bid has come up against competing claims at a time when Sri Lanka, too, is looking to mine the region for precious minerals.

India's scorching heat and lack of water leave Delhi's poor to suffer worst of climate crisis

CNN, June 1

Temperatures in Delhi have been hovering above 40 degrees Celsius and hit an all-time high of 49.9 degrees Celsius in one area of the capital.

Analyses

How Modi 3.0 could steer India-China relations

South China Morning Post, June 23

By Sagina Walyat, AsiaGlobal Fellow at the University of Hong Kong, and Sebastian Contino Trillo-Figueroa, AsiaGlobal Fellow at the University of Hong Kong

India's post-election period should catalyse a shift in domestic and international policies as it gradually assumes the role of a global power.

India's Spurning Strategy Toward China: Contestation in Indo-Pacific

The Diplomat, June 21

By Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, a Fulbright-Nehru Visiting Chair in Public Policy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst

As far as China-India bilateral relations are concerned, New Delhi has sent repeated signals that it will stick to its position that relations can't improve until the border mess is cleared up.

India Could Help the U.S. to Tech Victory Over China

Wall Street Journal, June 19

By Sadanand Dhume, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute

A promising partnership with a country that has a massive market and an impressive pool of talent.

India and the World in Modi's Third Term

The National Bureau of Asian Research, June 13

By Rohan Mukherjee, Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science

A longer view on India's rise suggests two major lessons that India watchers should keep in mind as they evaluate the prospects of India's new government.

Books and Journals


The Unfinished Quest: India's Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi

Oxford University Press, 2024

By T.V. Paul, Distinguished James McGill Professor, McGill University

In *The Unfinished Quest*, leading international relations and South Asia scholar T.V. Paul charts India's checkered path toward higher regional and global status, covering both the successes and failures it has experienced since the modern nation's founding in 1947. Paul focuses on the key motivations driving Indian leaders to enhance India's global status and power, but also on the many constraints that have hindered its progress. He carefully specifies what counts as indicators of greater status and uses these as benchmarks in his assessment of each era. In this manner, he also brings forth some important insights on status competition and power transitions in the contemporary international system.

Paul's analysis of India's quest for status also sheds important light on the current geo-strategic situation and serves as a new framework for understanding the China-India rivalry, as well as India's relative position in the broader Indo-Pacific theater. As the economies of China and India grow rapidly, the power balance between them will be determined by each country's ability to develop the hard and soft powers needed to outpace the other and solidify their place in the global hierarchy. Whether India can be a



"swing power" able to mitigate China's aggressive rise depends on its relative power position in that theater and its own evolution as an inclusive, tolerant democracy that can develop and utilize its most prized asset, the demographic dividend. This sweeping account of India's uneven rise in the global system will serve as the authoritative work on the subject.

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OTHER CAG PUBLICATIONS

- *Partnership or Polarization? Southeast Asian Security between India and China* edited by Evan Laksmana and Byron Chong (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2023)
- *Asian Conceptions of International Order: What Asia Wants* edited by Kanti Bajpai and Evan Laksmana (International Affairs, 2023)
- *How Realist Is India's National Security Policy?* edited by Kanti Bajpai (Routledge, 2023)
- *Deterring Conflict and Preserving Peace in Asia* edited by Drew Thompson and Byron Chong (Centre on Asia and Globalisation, 2022)
- *What Can the United States Learn from China about Infrastructure?* by Selina Ho in *The China Questions 2* (Harvard University Press, 2022)
- *India Versus China: Why they are Not Friends* by Kanti Bajpai (Juggernaut Books, 2021)
- *Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose* by Drew Thompson (Strategic Forum, 2021)
- *Routledge Handbook of China-India Relations* edited by Kanti Bajpai, Selina Ho and Manjari Chatterjee Miller (Routledge, 2020)



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