

China-India Brief

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Guest Column

China and India in the Global Quantum ‘Race’

By Manoj Harjani

Quantum technologies have captured global attention in recent years across **three main application areas**—communication, computing, and sensing. Quantum communication offers the promise of secure information exchanges. Quantum computing seeks to outperform “classical” computers at certain tasks, while quantum sensing enables more precise measurement of time, gravity, and magnetic fields.


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CENTRE ON ASIA
AND GLOBALISATION

The *China-India Brief* is a monthly digest focusing on the relationship between Asia’s two biggest powers. The Brief provides readers with a key summary of current news articles, reports, analyses, commentaries, and journal articles published in English on the China-India relationship. It features a Guest Column weighing in on key current issues in China-India relations.

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As a result of their **dual-use nature**, quantum technologies have become increasingly central to countries' efforts to build economic and military power while competing on the global stage. However, it would be misleading to assume that the same competitive dynamics observed for other disruptive dual-use technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor chips apply neatly to quantum technologies.

This is because the three quantum application areas are at **different levels of maturity** in terms of commercialisation and operational military use. Quantum sensing is the most mature, followed by quantum communication, with quantum computing being the most nascent. In a similar vein, **concerns** about the sovereignty of disruptive technologies apply differently to quantum because there is no single, unified supply chain or technology stack.

Discussions of the global competition over quantum technologies often begin and end with the United States and China. This is understandable given the impact their rivalry has on the global economy and international security. However, in Asia, other rivalries also weigh on the region's economic and security environment, such as that between China and India.

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other rivalries also weigh on the region's economic and security environment, such as that between China and India.

On the surface, China and India do not appear to be peer competitors in quantum technologies, given the gap between their economic and technological capabilities. Nevertheless, the competitive and sovereignty dynamics that govern other disruptive technologies do not map neatly onto quantum. A simple capability comparison therefore misses what matters: how the two countries are advancing their quantum ecosystems, and how those differences will shape the rivalry between them.

Attention is better directed at what will shape each country's quantum ecosystem, and at the areas where neither has fully disclosed their intentions, particularly regarding military applications.

The Limits of a Straight Comparison

While there is no objective framework to compare two countries' quantum ecosystems, the table below highlights several indicators that point towards a clear gulf in capabilities between China and India. These indicators should be considered with caution. For instance, the **widely cited** figure of \$15.3 billion for China's public-sector quantum investments remains unverified and is likely inflated. Patent data, similarly, indicates **quantity rather than quality**, which qualifies the dominance of China's filings.

Indicator	China	India	Remarks
<u>Public sector investment in quantum technologies</u>	\$15.3 billion	\$1.7 billion	Based on publicly announced commitments up to 2023.
<u>Nature Index ranking for share of research output in quantum physics</u>	1/77	11/77	Based on articles published in 145 journals tracked by the Nature Index from 1 June 2025 to 30 May 2026.
<u>Quantum technology patents (2014-2024)</u>	43,458	1,281	Based on data from relevant national patent offices.
<u>Number of universities in top 100 of QS World University 2026 ranking for physics and astronomy</u>	8 (Peking University [13]; Tsinghua University [14]; Shanghai Jiao Tong University [36]; University of Science and Technology of China [43]; Fudan University [47]; Nanjing University [65]; Zhejiang University [74]; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences [85])	1 (Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore [90])	Based on a composite of indicators that also measures employer reputation and international engagement alongside research-related metrics.
<u>Number of quantum clusters in ECIPE 2026 ranking</u>	6 (Hefei [8/45]; Shanghai [26/45]; Beijing [29/45]; Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Guangzhou [32/45]; Hangzhou [34/45]; Suzhou [44/45])	1 (Bangalore [32/45])	Based on a composite of indicators for market orientation, collaboration intensity, and ecosystem maturity.

A direct comparison based on the indicators above ignores not only the complexity within quantum technologies across its application areas, but also India's record of achieving global standing through indigenous development, despite numerous economic and political constraints.

India's experience in fields such as **space** and **nuclear technologies** should prompt a rethink of any analysis seeking to declare China the outright winner in quantum at this stage.

Trajectories for China and India's Quantum Ecosystems

Indeed, the notion of a “race” between China and India obscures the more important question: what will drive each country's quantum ecosystem over the coming decade.

Both Beijing and New Delhi have made quantum technologies a high-level policy priority. China's 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) named quantum technologies a “**future industry**” expected to drive economic growth. India's **National Quantum Mission** (NQM), running from 2023/24 to 2030/31, set specific objectives, from developing domestic quantum computers to implementing quantum-secured communication infrastructure.

High-level policy attention is being complemented by broader mechanisms to sustain innovation. China, for instance, launched a **National Venture Capital Guidance Fund** in late 2025 to encourage patient capital and region-specific investments in priority technologies. India similarly set up a **Research, Development, and Innovation Fund** to draw in private sector participation in specific strategic technologies. In both cases, such public investment, aimed at sustaining innovation more broadly, can be expected to reach the quantum ecosystem.

At the same time, policy prioritisation does not guarantee a mature quantum ecosystem. For China, much will depend on how provincial and local administrations implement the 15th Five-Year Plan on the

ground. As the semiconductor chip experience has shown, competition between and within provinces can lead to **duplicative efforts and even fraud**. For India, prioritising quantum will mean little unless it addresses **fundamental weaknesses** in the national research and innovation base, without which the NQM will struggle to achieve its goals.

Another key determinant shaping the two quantum ecosystems will be the commercialisation and growth of private sector investment. In China, **exits** from quantum research by Alibaba in late 2023 and Baidu in early 2024 prompted concern about the sector's future. Since 2024, however, China's quantum startups have attracted **multiple funding rounds**, suggesting renewed momentum for commercialisation.

Data from the **Entangled Future** database as of October 2026 shows that China has a larger overall number of quantum commercial entities at forty-six compared to twenty-six for India. However, it is difficult to draw neat lines to define such entities, and they can evolve over time in terms of their focus and business model. Additionally, databases are limited in their fidelity and completeness by access to data sources, which can vary considerably by country.

Nevertheless, both China and India remain heavily reliant on public investment to drive their quantum ecosystems. China's National Venture Capital Guidance Fund and India's Research, Development, and Innovation Fund are steps in the right direction, but

both remain state-led. This partly reflects how nascent quantum technologies still are, which makes private sector investment over the next three to five years a key indicator to watch. Data from Tracxn **points** to a significant gap: \$1.01 billion in China against \$30 million in India.

Uncertainty Ahead in the Military Domain

A major uncertainty for how China and India will advance their quantum ecosystems centres around the military domain. In the absence of a published policy document or strategy, individual reports can be pieced together to indicate how the People's Liberation Army intends to operationalise quantum technologies.

Two recent trials illustrate this: a **miniaturised prototype device** for quantum-enabled communication in late 2025 and a **drone-mounted atomic magnetometer** for submarine detection in April 2025.

Unlike China, India has provided some information about how it views quantum technologies in the military domain, through its Military Quantum Mission Policy Framework **announced** in early 2026. While the full document is not public, available information **points** to progress concentrated in quantum communication applications. For example, the Indian Army and Navy have **procured** quantum-enabled communication systems, and the Defence Research and Development Organisation **completed** a trial of one in July 2026.

With only a **nascent conversation** globally on responsible use of quantum technologies in the military domain, there are few—if any—restrictions for countries like China and India that are competing for a strategic advantage. Nevertheless, technological advances in quantum do not immediately translate to operationalised military capabilities. The friction and lag between what is discovered in the lab and what is eventually used on the battlefield will likely remain an important constraint, until multilateral dialogue matures enough to address the implications of quantum technologies for international peace and security.

Conclusion

For now, quantum technologies are less likely to become a key determinant shaping competition and the overall bilateral relationship between China and India. This is partly due to greater potential economic and strategic gain in other dual-use disruptive technologies such as AI and chips, as well as the perceived gap in quantum capabilities and technological advancement. Nevertheless, both countries are competing on quantum within the larger global landscape and with an eye on military capabilities. It is in this area that the potential for quantum to tip the balance should be monitored closely.

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India-China Ties: Managing the New Normal

By Dinakar Peri

The period between Xi Jinping's two visits to India, 2019 and 2026, captures an eroding global order, changing power dynamics that, for India, present new realities in managing its China relationship.

On September 12, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a bilateral meeting in New Delhi that capped a series of engagements and steps in the ongoing rapprochement and normalisation of the bilateral relationship since the 2020 border standoff in the Himalayas. Far away on the Eastern front in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, Indian and Chinese troops were involved in face-offs in several locations, still continuing, as **confirmed** recently by a senior Indian official.

The last time Xi was on Indian soil dated back to October 2019. The India-China relationship has fundamentally changed since then, so has the world. The COVID pandemic, the **2020 standoff** that is still underway, and the global conflicts that followed were all shocks to the global architecture. The world's two most populous nations fared relatively better, though each faces challenges of different nature. And that has compelled both countries to take steps towards normalising



the ties that came close to the brink. But one outcome stands out clear and definitive: China's technological ascension as the US becomes isolationist, fracturing the post-Cold War international order.

Technology has emerged as the new currency in great power politics. For India, that sharpens an already difficult balancing act: managing a disputed border, and the larger imperatives to sustain growth and protect interests in a volatile world. The contrast between how the two countries manage the border and the wider relationship captures that tricky tango.

As India and China announced steps towards **normalisation**, and as India's ties with the US frayed over tariffs and immigration, one question kept recurring: does this mark a major realignment of New Delhi's strategic outlook and rethinking of its US relationship?

The answer is no. This is accommodation, not realignment. Two nuclear-armed

neighbours have to live with each other. And as both sides' appetites for growth and expansion sharpen, contestation for resources, space and influence becomes inevitable.

The altered reality

India has consistently held that maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas is of the "utmost importance." In contrast, the Chinese stance has been to dissociate the standoff from the larger relationship, an unacceptable proposition for New Delhi.

To appreciate this divergence, it is essential to understand the ground realities along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The 2020 standoff was precipitated by the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) ingress into Indian-held locations in eastern Ladakh along the LAC in April and May 2020. The standoff spanned seven locations in eastern Ladakh. India too mobilised troops and equipment to match the PLA deployment.

One such close encounter turned into a violent clash in June 2020, resulting in **deaths** on both sides. These were the first casualties along the LAC in over four decades. Both sides have since held a series of diplomatic, political and senior military talks, which resulted in disengagement from all the locations, the final two in October 2024. To avoid further escalation at those last two locations, Depsang and Demchok, the two countries agreed to **undertake** coordinated patrolling.

The standoff, however, is not yet over. The freeze on patrolling in the earlier areas of

disengagement, agreed as an interim measure, has yet to be lifted. After that comes the process of de-escalation: de-inducting the troops and equipment still deployed along the LAC.

Given the extent of permanent infrastructure and supporting elements built up by both sides, the ground reality has altered. The earlier call for a "return to status quo ante" has now all but disappeared. Even if it were achieved, that status would itself be an altered reality.

The alignment of the LAC is disputed in several locations, which leads to face-offs as patrols from each side go up to their respective claim lines. On many occasions, these face-offs have turned into prolonged standoffs, sometimes violent. The face-offs in Arunachal show that despite the normalising relationship, probing and testing by the PLA to make incremental territorial gains would undoubtedly continue, and India remains wary of it.

Even as bilateral normalisation progressed, China continued to **rename** geographical features in Arunachal Pradesh, which it claims as Zangnan (South Tibet). In the past few months, India in turn standardised several points in **Arunachal and Ladakh** under its control on its official maps.

India's technological disadvantage, growing economic dependence and widening trade deficit have narrowed New Delhi's room for manoeuvre. Separating the border dispute from the broader relationship could further erode India's already limited leverage.

Managing dependencies

At a macro level, India's greater concern is the widening trade deficit and growing dependence on Chinese inputs that sustain its economic growth. Despite the bilateral standoff, **trade between the two countries** continued to grow. Bilateral trade stood at \$86.4 billion in 2020-21, with India running a deficit of \$44 billion. Five years later, trade had risen to \$151.1 billion. In 2025-26, India imported \$131.63 billion worth of goods from China while exporting only \$19.47 billion, leading to a deficit of \$112.16 billion. Trade figures so far this year suggest that the trend is continuing.

Despite the trade deficit itself, policymakers in New Delhi are increasingly concerned about the **composition of imports**. India exports relatively low-value goods to China, while importing critical inputs that **underpin** its manufacturing base and broader economy, including pharmaceutical ingredients, electronics components, solar modules and critical minerals.

Since April 2020, India has introduced a **series of measures** to strengthen economic resilience and limit Chinese companies' access to key sectors. These include banning more than 300 Chinese applications, including TikTok, WeChat and PUBG; suspending direct flights between the two countries; and restricting Chinese state-linked telecom companies' participation in India's 5G network rollout. India also issued Press **Note 3**, which requires prior government approval for foreign direct investment from countries sharing a land border with India. Although the measure

applies more broadly, it has particularly constrained Chinese investment in India's technology sector. In parallel, India introduced several Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes after the COVID pandemic to strengthen domestic production and reduce dependence on critical imports in sectors like pharmaceuticals, electronics and solar manufacturing.

However, the continued growth of imports and their composition reveal the limits of India's effort to reduce its economic dependence on China. In recent years, New Delhi has gradually eased restrictions on trade and business, reflecting a growing recognition of the cost of limiting economic engagement. As bilateral relations thawed, India modestly **amended** Press Note 3 in March 2026. It subsequently **allowed** four Chinese-linked power equipment companies to bid for government projects.

At the same time, India continues to pursue supply diversification. It is set to announce a **new policy** to stockpile critical minerals, in addition to efforts to expand domestic refining capacity. These initiatives come as India pursues an ambitious renewable energy target: **500 gigawatts** (GW) of non-fossil fuel electricity capacity by 2030.

The geopolitical flux

At the broader geopolitical level, growing technological asymmetries and dependencies are adding to India's challenges, particularly as the US and China advance in chips, AI and critical minerals. A US preoccupied with Iran may have less

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capacity to focus elsewhere, giving Beijing greater room to manoeuvre. China has already used it: its reported assistance to Pakistan during **Operation Sindoor** in May 2025 presents new challenges for India. Emboldened further by its technological ascendancy, Beijing may expand grey-zone tactics along the LAC.

For China, facing an economic slowdown, an ageing population and mounting resistance to its firms in sensitive sectors worldwide, India remains a largely accessible market, despite some restrictions, with a younger population. That attraction may help explain Beijing's interest in stabilising bilateral relations. For New Delhi, the recent thaw presents an opportunity to press for a resolution to the border standoff, now in its seventh year. The question is whether India has conceded too much through normalisation without securing one? Only time will tell.

India's traditional balancing approach and commitment to strategic autonomy will face repeated tests. New Delhi must preserve peace along the LAC, normalise bilateral relations with China and reduce its economic dependence on Beijing, all while navigating a shifting geopolitical landscape.

News Reports

Bilateral Relations

India-China border face-offs test Modi six years after deadly clash

Al Jazeera, October 27

India's border force chief says face-offs with Chinese troops continue in Arunachal Pradesh despite a diplomatic thaw, raising questions about Modi's handling of border security six years after the deadly Ladakh clash.

India deploys extra forces after protests over dam on Chinese border escalate

Reuters, October 27

India has deployed hundreds of additional security personnel in Arunachal Pradesh after protests against a proposed mega-dam turned violent. The 11,200-megawatt project aims to counter China's planned upstream dam, but local communities fear it will submerge ancestral villages.

Sitharaman Says Trade Barriers A Hurdle to China-India Ties

Bloomberg, October 16

India's Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman flags China's non-tariff barriers as a key driver of its widening trade deficit and calls for fairer market access and trade arrangements with China and ASEAN.

Working to develop ties with China, last word not yet scripted: Piyush Goyal

Indian Express, October 15

India signals a cautious reset with China while pressing for fairer trade and market access, as Jaishankar and Goyal express confidence in advancing India-US trade negotiations and strengthening broader strategic ties.

China and India in the Region

In a first since 2023, Delhi invites Pakistan Minister for inaugural SCO Civilisational Dialogue in November

The Hindu, October 28

India has invited Pakistan's culture minister to the first SCO Civilisational Dialogue Forum in New Delhi on November 20 to 22, marking a potential ministerial visit from Pakistan since the countries' May 2025 conflict.

Taliban face civil war as China's Afghanistan-Pakistan mediation fails

Nikkei Asia, October 9

Failed China-led mediation between Afghanistan and Pakistan has deepened tensions and raised fears of renewed violence in Afghanistan. Clashes between the Taliban and the anti-Taliban Afghanistan Freedom Front come amid Pakistani airstrikes and growing concerns that the prolonged conflict could strengthen armed opposition groups.

Why India's missile deals in Central Asia matter to Russia and China

South China Morning Post, October 5

India's Akash missile exports to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan expand its defence footprint in Central Asia and strengthen its ambitions as a global arms exporter.

India, Pakistan summon top diplomats over border incident

Channel News Asia, October 4

India and Pakistan summoned each other's top diplomats after a border incident that killed two civilians, with both sides trading accusations.

Trade and Economy

China announces export curbs on key machinery used in India's infra projects

Deccan Herald, October 20

China's new export controls on tunnel boring machines and other heavy machinery could disrupt India's metro, high-speed rail and border infrastructure projects, highlighting its dependence on Chinese equipment.

China says ready to address each other's concerns after FM Sitharaman flags trade barriers

The Hindu, October 18

China has offered to address trade concerns with India after Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman criticised barriers to Indian exports.

China to add AI, biopharma and solar tech to export control list

Nikkei Asia, October 16

China proposes new export controls on 40 technologies spanning AI, biopharmaceuticals and solar energy, tightening oversight of sensitive technology transfers amid escalating global tech tensions.

AI boom bolstered growth in global trade, benefiting China and India, IMF says

Reuters, October 13

The IMF says AI-driven investment and trade are boosting growth in China, India and Asia, but concentrated supply chains, market corrections and uncertain productivity gains pose risks to global economic stability.

Energy and Environment

Indonesia energy minister to visit China, India to ensure gasoline supply

Reuters, October 26

Indonesia's energy minister will visit China and India to secure additional gasoline supplies as Middle East tensions disrupt fuel availability and shortages emerge across several Indonesian provinces.

India is a 'refining superpower', says Rubio, as the world faces a potential energy crisis

Straits Times, October 24

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has called India a "refining superpower" as attacks on energy infrastructure and limited new capacity elsewhere tighten global supplies of refined petroleum products.

China heats up race to develop solar thermal energy

Nikkei Asia, October 23

China is accelerating the development of concentrated solar thermal power, targeting 15 gigawatts of installed capacity by 2030. The technology uses mirrors and molten salt to store heat and generate electricity after sunset, offering an alternative to conventional solar and wind power.

Analyses

Beyond the AI Race: China's Bid to Shape Global Rules

Observer Research Foundation, October 26

By Soumya Awasthi, Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation, and Anubhuti Jain, former intern, Observer Research Foundation

China is using infrastructure partnerships and WAICO to build support for its AI governance model, while competing with US-led initiatives. India's exclusion from the body limits its institutional influence and raises the stakes for its own Global South AI strategy.

Apple's iPhone factories won't make India the next China

Bloomberg, October 20

By Andy Mukherjee, Opinion columnist, Bloomberg

Apple's expanding iPhone production in India is deepening the country's role in global electronics supply chains, but limited local component production and heavy government subsidies constrain the gains.

China's Strategic Reassessment of India War on the Rocks, October 16

By Yun Sun, Senior Fellow and Director of the China Program, Stimson Center

Beijing sees India's strained ties with Washington as an opportunity to recalibrate relations, while relying on China's economic leverage over Indian supply chains. However, unresolved disputes and uncertainty over future US policy limit prospects for lasting rapprochement.

China and India Want Much the Same Things From South Asia

Foreign Policy, October 14

By Chietigj Bajpae, Senior Research Fellow for South Asia, Chatham House

The India-China reset offers an opportunity to move beyond bilateral rapprochement towards cooperation on regional water security, disaster preparedness and development in South Asia, helping both powers advance shared interests while strengthening regional stability and autonomy.


Books and Journals

The European Union between norms and power: strategic recalibration across China, Russia, and India

European Politics and Society, September 2026

By Manish Barma, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Shreya Sinha, Postdoctoral Researcher at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University

The European Union's external action is undergoing significant strategic recalibration as it navigates tensions between its longstanding normative identity and emerging security imperatives. China's rapid economic expansion, growing clout, and intensifying competition have prompted the EU to reassess its engagement with Beijing, as China's deployment of soft power through cultural diplomacy and economic initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has acquired broader strategic and geopolitical significance. Concurrently, Russia's military aggression in Ukraine has fundamentally altered Europe's security calculus. As the EU reaffirms its support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, it has also been compelled to reconcile its longstanding normative commitments with the practical imperatives of hard power.



Meanwhile, the EU's expanding strategic partnership with India, particularly in maritime security, connectivity, defence cooperation, and the Indo-Pacific, reflects its growing emphasis on developing resilient partnerships with like-minded actors in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment. This paper argues that the EU's responses to China, Russia, and India demonstrate that its contemporary strategic recalibration does not constitute a departure from its normative identity. Rather, it reflects an effort to integrate normative commitments and hard power within a coherent strategic framework.

Capsule Review

The Cost of Restraint: India's Divergent Responses to China and Pakistan as Nuclear Rivals

International Security, May 2026

Reviewed by Sagarika Parab, student in the Master in Public Policy programme at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Joshi and Mukherjee ask why China's 1964 nuclear test elicited only tentative nuclear exploration from India, whereas Pakistan's programme drove New Delhi to weaponize in 1989. They argue that proliferation scholarship, preoccupied with the costs of acquiring the bomb (money, technology and sanctions), neglects the "cost of restraint" (the losses a state anticipates from forgoing one), which depends on a rival's revisionist aims and conventional strength. Indian leaders judged that China, militarily superior and seeking only limited gains after 1962, had no need to threaten nuclear use, whereas a weaker Pakistan, bent on revising the status quo in Kashmir and avenging 1971, would rely on such threats.

Declassified Indian records show officials concluding that China's bomb was a bid for prestige rather than a military danger, and that India's requests to Washington, London and Moscow for nuclear protection were, by the Prime Minister's Office's own admission, mainly meant to deflect domestic demands for an Indian bomb. As such, the authors dismantle the received image of a China-India-Pakistan proliferation "cascade", offering a unified account where explanations rooted in domestic politics, leader psychology or strategic culture capture only discrete episodes. They conclude that without Pakistan's bomb, India

would probably have kept only the latent capability shown in 1974, and its posture remains Pakistan-focused.

Yet the dyadic framework sits uneasily with the authors' own evidence, since Indian intelligence from 1975 linked Pakistan's progress to Chinese assistance, suggesting that New Delhi confronted less a separate rivalry than a China-Pakistan nexus that the theory sidelines. Vajpayee's 1998 **letter to Clinton** said as much, citing "an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders" that had helped "another neighbour ... become a covert nuclear weapons state." The memoranda dismissing the Chinese threat also stress that a bomb was unaffordable, leaving unclear whether officials actually judged China's aims limited or merely rationalised a choice dictated by cost.

India's Pakistan-focused posture may prove less durable now that China's arsenal **stands at roughly 600 warheads** and the 2020 Galwan clashes have **prompted analysts to ask** whether nuclear weapons are entering the rivalry, though the authors' logic implies India would respond by hardening gradually rather than abruptly. The framework is thus a valuable, if incomplete, yardstick for judging whether India's nuclear indifference towards China can endure.

Selected Literature for Next Issue's Capsule Review

Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity in Border Management: Reconfiguring Non-Traditional Threat Responses in the India-China Context

Strategic Analysis, April 2026

By Satish Irungbam

India's Strategic Response to China's Belt and Road Initiative: The Case of Economic Corridors

India Review, July 2025

By Gökhan Tekir

Strategic statecraft or symbolic coercion? A comparative study of trump's tariff doctrine in China and India

The Pacific Review, May 2025

By Mehmetali Kasim

Capsule Review Submissions

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- Selected submission will appear in the next issue.
- Contributors are invited to choose from the journals listed above.
- [Submission guidelines](#) (linked) are available on our website.

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OTHER CAG PUBLICATIONS

- *Indira Gandhi and the Years that Transformed India* by Srinath Raghavan (Yale University Press, 2025)
- *Partnership or Polarization? Southeast Asian Security between India and China* edited by Evan Laksmana and Byron Chong (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2023)
- *Asian Conceptions of International Order: What Asia Wants* edited by Kanti Bajpai and Evan Laksmana (International Affairs, 2023)
- *How Realist Is India's National Security Policy?* edited by Kanti Bajpai (Routledge, 2023)
- *Deterring Conflict and Preserving Peace in Asia* edited by Drew Thompson and Byron Chong (Centre on Asia and Globalisation, 2022)
- *What Can the United States Learn from China about Infrastructure?* by Selina Ho in *The China Questions 2* (Harvard University Press, 2022)
- *India Versus China: Why they are Not Friends* by Kanti Bajpai (Juggernaut Books, 2021)



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