

China-India Brief

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Guest Column

The 'Post-Dalai Lama Era' Looming for China and India

By David Scott

The 14th Dalai Lama in China-India Relations

On July 6, 2026 in Indian Union region of Ladakh, the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, turned 91; at a time when “India and China are **fighting** for the future of Buddhism.” As in previous years, India’s Prime Minister **Narendra Modi** sent birthday greetings and Indian Ministers attended the celebrations; this time the Guest of Honor being Virendra Kumar Khatik, India’s Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment. In the past, Modi’s birthday


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The *China-India Brief* is a monthly digest focusing on the relationship between Asia’s two biggest powers. The Brief provides readers with a key summary of current news articles, reports, analyses, commentaries, and journal articles published in English on the China-India relationship. It features a Guest Column weighing in on key current issues in China-India relations.

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greetings and the presence of Indian ministers have been strongly criticised by China and its state media, but this year there was studied silence from China.

Part of the reason for the silence from China surrounding the 14th Dalai Lama's 91st birthday is the thaw in China-India relations during the past year. China's focus this year, in the run-up to the Dalai Lama's birthday, was on the future arrangements to be made after his death, for what some observers have termed the "**Post-Dalai era.**"

Buddhism believes in the cycle of rebirth, with attention increasingly focusing on the circumstances of recognition and validation of the 15th Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama announced on his previous birthday that responsibility for finding and recognizing the next Dalai Lama would rest exclusively with his Foundation, the Gaden Phodrang Trust, based in India at Dharamshala. India, the host since 1959 of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan government-in-exile, has been **cautious**, continuing to avoid taking a formal position in advance on the process for the next Dalai Lama, but it cannot insulate itself from the outcome. China views the finding and recognition of the next Dalai Lama as central to its continuing control of its Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), inherently an internal affair of China, and is particularly sensitive to any Indian involvement in this process. A disputed succession is looming.

China's Leverage on India

In May 2026, Yu Jing, Spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in India, **warned** India on

X to "avoid interference in the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama." Indian commentators like **Vijay Kranti** considered such warnings as demonstrating there was a "threat" to India's sovereignty and national security in the Himalayan region from a future "puppet" Dalai Lama controlled by Beijing. In June, Yu Jing **reiterated** that the Dalai Lama's rebirth was an internal matter to be handled solely by Beijing, warning India to remain mindful of China's sensitivity on the matter and "avoid actions that could adversely affect the broader trajectory of India-China relations."

China is applying pressure on India over the Dalai Lama succession, though the modalities of so doing tend to change. Beijing's current position is evidently that India, for the sake of sustaining the current improvement in bilateral relations, should neither recognise a successor identified outside Chinese jurisdiction nor oppose a Beijing-appointed figure. The succession question will thus become a condition, implicit or otherwise, attached to broader China-India normalisation. That would be very much a geopolitical victory for China.

Admittedly, India could recognise neither claimant, and adopt a stance of deliberate abstention that preserves formal neutrality. However, this position would be difficult to hold. A Dalai Lama emerging on Indian soil could hardly be ignored by the Indian government, which would almost inevitably have to take a position. Silence from New Delhi risks being interpreted as concession and weakness by Beijing.

India's counter-leverage on China?

Conversely, a reincarnation identified on Indian soil, could present New Delhi with a strategic opportunity. A successor recognised by India would give New Delhi religious standing among Tibetan Buddhist communities which Beijing cannot match. This Dalai Lama card carries practical weight. It could help India maintain control of those Tibetan Buddhist areas of the Himalayas, support its diplomacy with Bhutan and Nepal, and limit China's ability to play Buddhism as an instrument of influence against India across the region.

With regard to future rebirth of the Dalai Lama on Indian soil, attention has turned to India's Tibetan-populated areas of the Himalayas, notably Arunachal Pradesh (Tawang) and Ladakh (Leh), as well as Dharamshala the seat of the Gaden Phodrang Trust and the Tibetan government-in-exile.

Tawang, the monastery-town administered by India as part of Arunachal Pradesh and claimed by China as Zangnan ("South Tibet"), is where the two countries' territorial and sovereignty disputes meet. It was also the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama, and could thus be a potential birthplace for the 15th Dalai Lama. The International Conference on the 6th Dalai Lama, held in Tawang, and organised by the Arunachal Pradesh state government in December 2025, drew an **immediate accusation** from Beijing that "India has now wrapped its territorial and sovereign provocations.... by reconstructing cultural narratives."

complicates the succession question further. China controls the Aksai Chin portion of the region and does not recognise Ladakh as an India Union Federal Territory, a designation India created in 2019. A Dalai Lama succession claim on Indian-administered Ladakh soil would therefore carry at once religious, territorial and administrative sensitivities.

A succession identified in Dharamshala would carry fewer immediate territorial complications for India. This is because Dharamshala is not subject to competing Chinese territorial claims. It would, however, intensify existing pressure on a separate front: as the seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile, Dharamshala is already a point of bilateral friction, with Beijing consistently demanding that India restrain what it characterises as separatist institutions operating within India's territory.

Impact on China-India Relations

It is almost certain that two rival claimants will be proclaimed as the next Dalai Lama incarnation: a Chinese-appointed figure in Tibet and an India-recognised figure emerging in India. This scenario would present both China and India opportunities for increased influence and power but would be very much unknown territory for them in handling their bilateral relationship. The 15th Dalai Lama will be a card to be played by both Beijing and New Delhi.

The succession question of the Dalai Lama will shape India-China relations well beyond the bilateral. Both states deploy Buddhism

as an instrument of regional diplomacy across Buddhist Asia. China and India support different wider Buddhist organisation, who will inevitably take positions over the 15th Dalai Lama. On the one hand, India supports the International Buddhist Confederation (IBC), headquartered in New Delhi, in which the Dalai Lama has played a prominent role. On the other hand, China supports the World Buddhist Forum, which meets in China, in which the China-appointed Panchen Lama already operates, but which the current Dalai Lama does not.

The Post-14th Dalai Lama era will be “one of the defining geopolitical stories of the coming decade” **precisely** because of the interplay, and different strategic interests, between China and India over the next Dalai Lama. The rival recognitions of a 15th Dalai Lama would bring that competition into direct confrontation. With the Dalai Lama’s advancing age, the moment of reckoning is no longer distant.

David Scott is a member of the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC). He **writes** regularly on India and China foreign policy, including India-China relations, and can be contacted at **davidscott366@outlook.com**.

Beyond Bilateralism: Can China and India Cooperate in South Asia?

By Constantino Xavier

After several years marked by severe diplomatic strain and military confrontation along their shared border, China and India have undertaken a cautious process of bilateral normalisation. Over the past two years, high-level political exchanges have resumed, ministerial contacts have been restored, and both governments have extended practical gestures of engagement: new air routes, eased trade corridors, and partial relaxation of Indian restrictions on Chinese investment.

The significance of this thaw extends beyond the bilateral relationship itself. Both powers are deeply embedded in the broader South Asian geography stretching from Afghanistan in the northwest to Myanmar in the east, and from Nepal in the north to Sri Lanka and the Maldives in the south. New Delhi has long regarded this arc as its primary sphere of strategic and economic interest. But over the past two decades, China has established itself as a resident actor across the region — a major financier, infrastructure provider, trade partner, and increasingly also a security actor and political interlocutor.

As both countries recalibrate their bilateral relationship, this moment presents an



Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/ Prime Minister's Office, India

opening to probe whether improved Sino-Indian relations might spill-over from the bilateral into the regional. Can Beijing and New Delhi work towards closer consultations and cooperation to address many structural challenges facing over a billion people across the region?

Competition and conflict

China and India have navigated a shifting and often uneasy relationship across South Asia's third countries **since the 1950s**. Cooperation, coexistence, and competition have each characterised different phases of their engagement in South Asia. The balance between these modes has been closely linked to the state of the bilateral relationship itself.

The last critical turning point came after the 2000s, especially with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as China's growing economic weight translated into an **expanding regional footprint**. Through trade, investment, infrastructure financing,

and security arrangements, Beijing established new **instruments of influence** across India's neighborhood. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) became emblematic of this broader trend, but the pattern extended well beyond Pakistan — into Sri Lanka's ports, Bangladesh's manufacturing ecosystem, and Nepal's infrastructure projects.

The deterioration of bilateral relations, most sharply following the military confrontations in Doklam (2017) and the Galwan Valley (2020), intensified competitive and conflictual dynamics across the region. India and China increasingly found themselves on opposing sides of domestic political contests, competing for contracts and investment opportunities, and advancing rival visions of regional connectivity.

New Delhi, in response, **sharpened** its own regional instruments. Development assistance was scaled up, disaster relief was reframed as strategic statecraft, and India invested in new multilateral architectures, including through Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), while also working closer with the United States, Japan and Australia under the Quad initiative. Beyond the traditional economic driver, the logic driving Indian regional policy became increasingly geopolitical — oriented not merely toward promoting prosperity but toward limiting Chinese influence.

Three opportunities for cooperation

For smaller states in the region, this escalatory spiral created both opportunities and hazards. Governments became adept at extracting financial and other concessions from both powers, through a mix of **hedging** and balancing strategies. But the breakdown in Sino-Indian relations also placed them in the uncomfortable position of being caught between two competing centres of gravity, with diminishing room to manoeuvre.

The tentative normalisation underway raises the question of whether a different regional dynamic is now possible. The timing is significant. South Asia is navigating an unusually dense cluster of structural crises. Political upheaval has reshaped governments in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh since 2021. Military conflict between India and Pakistan has intensified. Sri Lanka's financial collapse, the most severe in Asia since 1997, exposed the fragility of sovereign balance sheets across the region.

Against this difficult backdrop, the withdrawal of the United States from many of its regional commitments — in development finance, climate assistance, and technical cooperation — has created significant demand for alternatives. Both India and China are positioned to respond to that demand. Whether they do so in parallel, at cross purposes, or through coordinated frameworks will materially affect the region's developmental and security prospects. A realistic assessment of where Sino-Indian coordination could gain

traction suggests three areas offer the most immediate promise.

Political stabilisation in Myanmar presents one possible opportunity. Both India and China have substantial economic and security interests in Myanmar's stability: infrastructure investments, connectivity corridors, and border security are all at risk from the ongoing civil conflict. Both countries have also been affected by the proliferation of criminal networks operating from ungoverned spaces along the Myanmar border, including large-scale scam centres that have ensnared thousands of Chinese and Indian citizens. The convergence of interests might be sufficient to support discreet policy dialogue between New Delhi and Beijing aimed at incentivising the Myanmar military to advance the peace process and meaningful reform.

Climate and clean energy transitions offer a second domain. South Asia's climate vulnerability is severe, and the Himalayan ecosystems — the so-called "Third Pole" — are central to regional water security. Since the 1990s, India and China established habits of **technical consultation and cooperation** on river monitoring, ecological research, and natural resource management in the Himalayan zone.

Some of these could now be revived across the region. Concerns among South Asian governments about being caught in the decoupling of Indian and Chinese clean energy supply chains create additional incentive for coordination. A concrete near-term goal would be to develop frameworks

for grid connectivity linking South and Southeast Asia, which would require both powers to engage constructively with smaller regional economies on shared infrastructure. In the long run, the achievement of South Asia's net zero horizons will hinge on **calibrated India-China engagements on climate policies**.

Finally, connectivity corridors represent the third and most structurally important opportunity. South Asia is among the world's least economically integrated regions, with a large unmet financing gap in cross-border transport and energy infrastructure. India's decision to remain outside the BRI has complicated cooperation on regional connectivity for over a decade. Bilateral normalisation may create space for a selective course correction, beginning with two corridors where both sides have historically expressed interest: trans-Himalayan linkages through Nepal, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor.

None of these opportunities will be realised without top-level direction and political willingness to manage competing sensitivities on both sides. Normalisation between India and China remains tentative. The regional dimension will require additional effort. China will need to demonstrate sensitivity to Indian interests across the subcontinent and regulate its behavior accordingly; and India will need to both understand **how China views South Asia**, and accept that China is now a permanent feature of the regional landscape, not a mere temporary intrusion.

This will be hard work, forcing both Beijing and New Delhi to break with habits of thought and practice that decades have entrenched.

Dr Constantino Xavier is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP), New Delhi, where he directs the program in Foreign Policy and Security Studies. He is also a non-resident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, in Washington DC, and visiting professor at Ashoka University's Department of International Relations. His research explores how India navigates the geopolitics of a changing regional and global order by balancing national security interests and growing economic interdependence. He holds a Ph.D. in South Asian studies from the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, an M.Phil. and M.A. in International Politics from Jawaharlal Nehru University, and a B.A. with undergraduate studies at Nova University Lisbon and Sciences Po Paris.

News Reports

Bilateral Relations

China sets up high-altitude drone R&D centre in Tibet near Mount Everest to boost border patrols

Telegraph India, July 30

China has opened its first high-altitude drone research centre in Tibet to develop UAVs for border patrols, logistics and emergency operations in extreme plateau conditions.

China "Ready" To Handle Sensitive Issues With India, Says Foreign Minister

NDTV, July 23

China has said it is ready to manage sensitive issues with India and strengthen cooperation across trade, media and people-to-people exchanges. The remarks came during talks between Wang Yi and S Jaishankar in Manila.

China backs India's BRICS chairship, seeks stronger bilateral ties

Economic Times, July 22

China reaffirmed support for India's BRICS chairmanship and called for expanded diplomatic and military engagement, reflecting continued efforts by both sides to consolidate the gradual normalisation of bilateral relations.

Modi adviser urges India to seek more Chinese investment, trade

Straits Times, July 17

An adviser to Prime Minister Narendra Modi has urged India to deepen economic ties with China, arguing that greater Chinese investment could create jobs and boost exports as US reliability comes into question.

China and India in the Region

Nepal PM Balen Shah's big climbdown, will meet India and China envoys separately

India Today, July 22

Nepal's Prime Minister Balen Shah is set to abandon his self-imposed rule against one-on-one meetings with foreign envoys by holding separate discussions with the ambassadors of India and China.

India joins Quad partners in call for Indo-Pacific peace, ASEAN centrality amid Chinese assertiveness

The Hindu, July 22

India joined its Quad partners in reaffirming support for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, while backing ASEAN's central role amid rising tensions in the South China Sea.

India ramps up missile sales in Indo-Pacific as China's assertiveness turns neighbors wary

CNBC, July 10

India will supply BrahMos and Astra missiles to Indonesia under its third Indo-Pacific defence export agreement. The deal comes as regional states strengthen their deterrence capabilities amid concerns over China's actions in the South China Sea.

China, Russia and India make inroads in Myanmar with transit corridors

Nikkei Asia, July 7

China, Russia and India are deepening their involvement in Myanmar through transport and energy projects as the country becomes an increasingly important logistics gateway in Southeast Asia.

Trade and Economy

India pushes China for better market access, trade balance

Straits Times, July 23

During talks with Wang Yi, India called for greater market access, more reliable supply chains and measures to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance.

Skyroot rocket puts India alongside U.S., China in private orbital launch

CNBC, July 22

Skyroot's successful orbital launch marks a milestone for India's private space industry, placing it alongside Chinese and US firms in the fast-growing market for small satellite launches.

Indian companies look to Chinese LLMs as AI costs bite

Nikkei Asia, July 13

Indian companies are increasingly adopting Chinese AI models to reduce costs, highlighting continued technological dependence despite longstanding tensions between the two countries.

India allows four Chinese-linked power equipment firms to bid for government projects

Reuters, July 3

India has granted a two-year exemption to four Chinese power equipment manufacturers with domestic factories, allowing them to bid for critical power projects to support the country's growing transmission network.

Energy and Environment

India's solar push idles factories unable to shake reliance on China

Reuters, July 23

India's solar manufacturers are shutting factories as new sourcing rules create shortages of domestic components to replace Chinese imports. Industry warns the disruption could threaten jobs, investment and renewable energy targets.

India and Myanmar signal closer rare earth mining ties

Reuters, July 23

India and Myanmar are expanding cooperation on rare earths as New Delhi looks to diversify supplies of the strategic minerals beyond China.

China's Oil Strategy Opens the Door as India Steps Up Refined Fuel Exports to Ease Asia's Supply Crunch

Japan Times, July 23

BRICS countries generated more than half of the world's solar power in 2024, led by China, a new report says. India ranked second within the bloc, underscoring its expanding role in clean energy.

US eases Russia sanctions bill, cuts tariff threat on India and China from 500% to 100%

Times of India, July 15

US senators have introduced a revised Russia sanctions bill targeting Moscow and major buyers of its energy, including India and China, while softening some of the proposal's toughest measures.

Analyses

India's China doctrine of selective derisking East Asia Forum, July 28

By Soumya Bhowmick, Fellow at the Centre for New Economic Diplomacy (CNED) at the Observer Research Foundation

India is shifting from broad post-Galwan restrictions to selective de-risking, easing investment and visa rules while strengthening critical sectors to reduce dependence on China without disrupting economic interdependence.

Two Visits, Two Models: China and India's Approaches to Myanmar Stimson Center, July 27

By Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow with the China Program at Stimson Center

India's security-focused engagement contrasts with China's state visit diplomacy, which secured deeper political commitments from Myanmar, but both remain constrained by limited influence over contested border regions and non-state armed groups.

'Chokepoint Politics': China's Rare-Earth Statecraft and India's Search for Strategic Autonomy

Observer Research Foundation, July 15

By Kalpit A Mankikar, Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF; Amit Ranjan Alok, a PhD Candidate in Chinese Political and Tech Economy, Jawaharlal Nehru University

China is leveraging its dominance in rare earth processing through export controls to translate supply-chain dependence into geopolitical influence over high-tech and defence industries. India is responding by combining domestic industrial reforms with strategic partnerships to reduce reliance on Chinese critical minerals.

America's new India doctrine: Never repeat the China mistake

Japan Times, July 13

By Brahma Chellaney, Professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research

Washington is shifting from supporting India as a counterweight to China toward a transactional strategy that limits India's technological and economic rise while preserving its regional security role.

Books and Journals

India's De-Risking Paradox: The Political Economy of Strategic Dependence on China

Strategic Analysis, July 2026

By Bintul Islam, PhD student at the Department of Political Science, Lovely Professional University; Humaira Iqbal, PhD student at the SACMS, University of Kashmir; Bashir Ahmad Dar, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Lovely Professional University

India is pursuing strategic de-risking as a response to the profound strategic vulnerabilities arising from its relationship with China, particularly amid mounting geopolitical tensions. Employing a quantitative analysis of recent trade data alongside a qualitative review of India's policy architecture, the article assesses the extent of the challenge and the effectiveness of countermeasures. Macro-level data analysis shows a 5 per cent decline in China's dominance index in the top 5 importing countries for India, amid the growing trade deficit with China. Significant structural vulnerabilities are the outcome of this imbalance, which stems from an established reliance on Chinese supplies.



Capsule Review

What Does China Want?

International Security, August 2025

Reviewed by Wint Wah Thit Thit Zaw, student at the International Affairs programme at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

The authors challenge the conventional US views of China: as an expansionist power seeking global domination, and hence an existential threat to the United States. They characterise Beijing's goals as unambiguous, enduring, and limited, remaining relatively static even as China's power expands. The authors posit that Chinese leadership is preoccupied with regime stability and domestic governance, rather than harbouring expansionary ambitions warranting American caution. On this basis, they argue that Washington's posturing is too dismissive of potential peaceful US-China engagement, even dangerous, potentially promoting tensions unnecessarily.

The authors' method of proving consistency and unambiguity of Beijing's goals is innovative: qualitative readings of party rhetoric are coupled with quantitative text analysis of key terms across official sources, demonstrating far greater emphasis on domestic concerns and little mention of global domination. This focuses the debate on what Beijing actually say, rather than the potentially overblown anxieties the US extrapolates from frameworks such as the Thucydides trap.

However, the piece's response to the critique that Chinese rhetoric may not reflect actual preferences is less convincing. They argue that these statements remain consistent across time and audience, and nevertheless still reveal what Beijing wants the public to believe. This may not settle the concern: a power with expansionist aims has every incentive to dress them in defensive language. The analysis of Chinese disinterest in global dominance is also unpersuasive, especially where the authors rely on semantic distinctions to establish the sincerity of Chinese rhetoric, noting that the Chinese term for hegemony carries pejorative connotations. This does not demonstrate Beijing's restraint. A state can pursue dominance while simply framing its own conduct as virtuous leadership rather than hegemony.

Nevertheless, the article is valuable. It cautions against Washington's reflexive posturing toward a supposedly expansionary China, grounds its argument in goals explicitly articulated by Chinese leadership and presents peaceful engagement with China as an option that would serve the interests of the US.

Selected Literature for Next Issue's Capsule Review

India's De-Risking Paradox: The Political Economy of Strategic Dependence on China

Strategic Analysis, July 2026

By Bintul Islam, Humaira Iqbal, and Bashir Ahmad Dar

China's and India's "Neutrality" in the Russia–Ukraine War: A Comparative Perspective

Pacific Focus, May 2026

By Raj Verma and Björn Alexander Düben

The Sino-Indian Rivalry and Balance-of-power Theory: Explaining India's Underbalancing

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, May 2026

By T.V.Paul

Capsule Review Submissions

China-India Brief invites concise review essays from LKYSPP students assessing recent and significant contributions to the literature.

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- Contributors are invited to choose from the journals listed above.
- [Submission guidelines](#) (linked) are available on our website.

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OTHER CAG PUBLICATIONS

- *Indira Gandhi and the Years that Transformed India* by Srinath Raghavan (Yale University Press, 2025)
- *Partnership or Polarization? Southeast Asian Security between India and China* edited by Evan Laksmana and Byron Chong (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2023)
- *Asian Conceptions of International Order: What Asia Wants* edited by Kanti Bajpai and Evan Laksmana (International Affairs, 2023)
- *How Realist Is India's National Security Policy?* edited by Kanti Bajpai (Routledge, 2023)
- *Deterring Conflict and Preserving Peace in Asia* edited by Drew Thompson and Byron Chong (Centre on Asia and Globalisation, 2022)
- *What Can the United States Learn from China about Infrastructure?* by Selina Ho in *The China Questions 2* (Harvard University Press, 2022)
- *India Versus China: Why they are Not Friends* by Kanti Bajpai (Juggernaut Books, 2021)



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