ISSUE 268 1 JUN 2026 - 30 JUN 2026

China-India Brief

A publication of the Centre on Asia and Globalisation



Image Credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China

Guest Column

An Old China Hand is the New Ambassador in Beijing

By Brian Wong

Addressing the audience from a fourteen-year-old building complex in the Third Embassy District of Liangmaqiao, the gentleman **introduces** his surroundings in fluent, idiomatic Mandarin. The intentionally informal diction of "zán men" (咱們), a phrase most commonly found in Mandarin spoken by Northerners (much rarer amongst their Southern counterparts), reflects a culturally attuned and carefully calculated choice to appeal to the

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The *China-India Brief* is a monthly digest focusing on the relationship between Asia's two biggest powers. The Brief provides readers with a key summary of current news articles, reports, analyses, commentaries, and journal articles published in English on the China-India relationship. It features a Guest Column weighing in on key current issues in China-India relations.

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residents of Beijing – the heart of power in the 1.4-billion-strong country of China.

The gentleman in the forty-seven-second clip has the Chinese pinyin name "Wèi Jiāméng" (魏嘉盟). Whilst Wèi (魏) is a common surname mirroring the most powerful and populous member of the Three Kingdoms era, Jiā (嘉) is an auspicious term that broadly denotes excellence and praiseworthiness, and méng (盟) is most naturally associated with connotations of alliance and friendship. It is no wonder that **much buzz** has emerged over the choice of Chinese name by the veteran diplomat in question – His Excellency Shri Vikram Doraiswami, who was **appointed** as India's Ambassador-designate to China on March 19 and officially assumed his duties on May 2, 2026.

Since taking office, Doraiswami's public appearances appear to have been centred around cultural diplomacy – including **a visit** to the Jintai Art Museum, where he paid tributes to Mahatma Gandhi, and a **celebration** of the 165th anniversary of Rabindranath Tagore's visit to China, where the Ambassador' remarks, delivered in fluent Chinese, were met with exuberance. The culturally centric frame to his first month of office perhaps augurs an intention to deepen people-to-people exchanges between China and India – which remain heavily limited at present.

A Polymath, Polyglot, and Pragmatist

After working briefly as a journalist, Doraiswami joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1992, with his first posting being at the Commission for India in Hong Kong as a Third Secretary in May 1994. He received his language training at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, which had long been an established bastion for Chinese language and cultural competence training for diplomats and corporate executives from the US, India, amongst others. He then served at the Indian Embassy in Beijing, prior to a series of rotations through the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) HQ, the Prime Minister's Office, and roles in fellow BRICS nation South Africa and the UN mission.

Whilst the heterogeneity of exposure in his early-to-mid career was indubitably impressive and equipped him for handling multilateral disputes, Doraiswami's assumption of responsibilities for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and handling of the 4th BRICS Summit in New Delhi placed him in charge of two dynamically evolving and strategically significant sets of relationship for India. India's involvement in the former was undergirded by the "Neighbourhood First" policy, introduced under Manmohan Singh's tenure; as for the latter, the 2012 summit was India's first.

Having served as Joint Secretary at the Americas Division between 2012 and 2014, Doraiswami then spent the next twelve years helming ambassadorships in Uzbekistan, South Korea, Bangladesh, the UK, and, from May onwards, China. The geographical spread and political pre-eminence of these postings, coupled with the fact that he did not spend any time as Additional Secretary or Secretary in the MEA HQ, speak to his

reputation as a versatile and trusted pair of hands steering some of India's most intricate and complex relationships.

Indeed, first-hand accounts from those who have worked with Doraiswami across his SAARC, Bangladeshi, and UK tenures have noted his unconventional candour, openness to unconventional thinking, and robust capabilities to grasp the interests and priorities of his interlocutors. Whilst defending the Indian position with vigor in the wake of Indo-Pakistani clashes in 2025, Doraiswami played a key role in the India-UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement – hailed by many as a **crowning highlight** of British Prime Minister Keir Starmer's first year in office.

Observers of Doraiswami's profile would likely be struck by his ability to speak **at least five languages** – Hindi, English, Chinese, French, and Korean. A thread on X suggests that he has also delivered **speeches in Bengali** in the past.

The Importance of Timing

The Ambassador took office amidst a crucial juncture in Sino-Indian relations. The 2024 Kazan BRICS Summit and the 2025 Tianjin SCO Summit, interpolated with high-level meetings between Chinese Politburo member Wang Yi and Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar, have borne witness to the dethawing of the bilateral dynamic, in the aftermath of the deep-freeze induced by the June 2020 clashes.

Such shifts speak as much to the **acknowledgment of mutual economic synergy** – India offers China an immense and untapped market, Chinese firms can play a role in India's technological and infrastructural development – as the immense volatility and occasional umbrage India perceives in Washington's India policy under President Donald Trump. The May meeting between Xi and Trump has only **amplified** the angst in part, with Sino-skeptical analysts concerned that the US would walk back on its previously pledged attempts to contain China's regional influence in Asia.

More generally, the extended subcontinent has experienced dramatic geopolitical shifts in recent years. Pakistan has gained renewed international salience and recognition for its ostensibly serving as a mediator in the ongoing crisis in West Asia, with the **growing ties** between the Pakistani and US military leaderships drawing consternation from Indian observers.

Bangladesh, in the aftermath of the first democratic elections held after the resignation of Sheikh Hasina in 2024, has seen the election as Prime Minister of Tarique Rahman, who has declared a "Bangladesh First" motto whilst pursuing **cautious, technocrat-level re-engagement** with New Delhi. China's growing financial and infrastructural presence in Bangladesh and continuous support for Pakistan have further contributed towards the complexity and entanglement of interests in the subcontinent.

The Road Ahead

At times like these, there are few better candidates than Doraiswami to represent India in China. Yet he indubitably has his work cut out for him.

Whilst bilateral talks on border issues have certainly **made some progress**, and whilst commercial and investment ties are slowly on the mend, mutual mistrust and a dearth of strategic understanding remain integrally embedded in the Sino-Indian relationship. Mutual territorial disputes, Indian concerns about the Sino-Pakistani dynamic and Beijing's wariness of the "Indo-Pacific" discourse embraced by the policy communities in Washington and New Delhi (though the Quad has certainly taken a backseat in recent months), are but a few of the enduring obstacles to genuine rapprochement.

There is certainly growing interest amongst select Indian manufacturers for closer supply chain partnerships with Chinese counterparts, especially on renewable energy – **as epitomised** by the first visit to China in over five years of a delegation of Indian businesses in April this year. Doraiswami must navigate and harness such growing interest amidst broader concerns over the widening trade deficit between India and China, which **crossed USD 100 billion** for the first time in the past fiscal year.

A short-term priority for the Ambassador would likely be a comprehensive tour of key cities across China – especially one in which there exist Indian consulates. Key medium-term indicators of Doraiswami's tenure would include the level of access to the senior echelons of the Chinese bureaucracy – which could prove difficult, especially in the run-up to the 21st Party Congress next year – as well as a prospective articulation by Beijing of a new, constructive strategic doctrine (a "tí fǎ" 提法) laying out a positive roadmap for the Sino-Indian relationship.

May China prove to be a fruitful undertaking for the Ambassador.

Prof. Brian WONG is an HKU-100 Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong. His research examines the intersection of geopolitics, political and moral philosophy, and technology, with particular interests in the ethics and dynamics of authoritarian regimes and their foreign policies, responding to historical and colonial injustices, and the impact of automation on labour and human societies.

Brian is a Fellow at the Centre on Contemporary China and the World and Director of the Hong Kong Global AI Governance Hub at the University of Hong Kong. Having co-founded and served as the inaugural Editor-in-Chief at the Oxford Political Review, a publication aspiring to bridge the theory-practice gap, Brian serves as a columnist at the Hong Kong Economic Journal. His writings on Chinese political economy, Asian geopolitics, and public philosophy have been featured in publications such as

TIME, Foreign Policy, Aeon, Financial Times, Diplomat, Fortune, The Hindu, South China Morning Post, Nikkei, Japan Times, and the US-Asia Law Institute. Brian is also a Non-resident Honorary Fellow at the Center for China Analysis at the Asia Society. A Rhodes Scholar (HKSAR, 2020), Brian holds a DPhil in Politics, an MPhil in Political Theory (Distinction), and an MA in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from the University of Oxford.

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Guest Column

Chasing Mirages: India, China and Nuclear Deterrence

By Rajesh Basrur



Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/ Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation

India's **advances in nuclear capability**, proceeding at a canter, include a steady buildup of warheads (190, according to a recent estimate), the production of missiles with longer ranges, and apparent moves to shift from non-deployed to deployed warheads. Two technologies that stand out are the acquisition of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and the development of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) or ballistic missiles that can carry multiple warheads, each able to strike a separate target. What drives the quest for these capabilities?

Historically, Indian nuclear insecurities have been **preoccupied with Pakistan**, but China has been a major concern in relation to these two technologies. SLBMs, for instance, have little additional deterrence value in relation to Pakistan, which is a neighbour. China, however, presents a different challenge. It is a much larger and militarily sophisticated power with its political centre, Beijing, located far from the disputed frontier. Though Pakistan is an immediate concern because of its revanchism over Kashmir, **China is considered a long-term threat** and much of India's efforts to bolster its deterrence capabilities is aimed at countering it.

While considerable attention has focused on the acquisition of technologies, comparatively little attention has been devoted to questioning the strategic logic behind this pursuit, especially the potential benefits and costs associated with these technologies. Debate within India remains limited, partly reflecting the relatively modest attention that nuclear issues receive within the Indian strategic community.

Drawbacks of the New Technologies

The primary advantage of possessing SLBMs is widely said to be that they confer an "assured second-strike capability," enabling India to strike back if it is subject to a surprise attack. Because nuclear submarines are very hard to track, they are thought to be less vulnerable to a sudden strike compared to land-based and air-based launchers (the latter are normally based on land).

Against this, there are a number of drawbacks associated with SLBMs. First,

even if communications between submerged submarines and command centres are generally reliable, cyber-attacks or equipment failure could disrupt the chain of command and lead to an unintended launch. Second, the maritime domain complicates the signalling and interpretation of red lines. Unlike land borders, the sea lacks clear boundaries. Submarines may therefore threaten an adversary by operating in close proximity to its territory. Third, submarine tracking technology is becoming increasingly sophisticated, which undercuts the notion that the sea leg of deterrence is immune to surprise attack.

Similarly, MIRVed systems offer both putative advantages and risks. On the plus side, a MIRVed missile keeps costs down as a single delivery vehicle enables a state to strike at multiple targets. An Indian **Agni-V MIRVed missile is said to have the capacity to carry four to five warheads**, which would mean a substantial reduction in costs and a greater probability of striking targets even if some proportion are inaccurate. In addition, a MIRVed missile would enable India to increase the probability of evading Chinese missile defence systems.

On the negative side, a MIRVed missile can intensify competitive pressures. Because an adversary cannot accurately determine the number of warheads a missile carries, uncertainty about relative capabilities is likely to grow. Such uncertainty will likely produce an arms-racing dynamic involving both offensive and defensive systems. MIRVs also pose escalation risks during a crisis. A single missile launch, whether intentional or accidental, may be perceived as significantly more threatening if it involves a MIRVed system, increasing the likelihood of a rapid escalatory spiral.

The Competitive Cascade

Ironically, while India's attention regarding these technologies is focused primarily on China, **the latter is looking elsewhere – towards the United States**. Beijing does not perceive **India as a peer nuclear competitor**. Its self-image is that of an established great power, in contrast to India, whose economic and military capabilities remain significantly smaller. But the two are linked in a **strategic chain** that extends from the United States to Pakistan. China, competing with the United States, has abandoned its adherence to minimum deterrence and embarked on a **major nuclear buildup** from about 2019 that has produced a wide range of weapons systems and an expanding arsenal expected to grow from some 600 warheads in 2024 to about 1,000 in 2030.

India, while seeing China as its biggest long-term threat, has been relatively cautious in its nuclear strategy. There is little expression of an urgent need to compete with China and build a bigger arsenal or alter India's strategic posture. The main focus of policy makers has been on developing the two technologies discussed above, along with a moderate pace of capability growth in terms of longer-range missiles, hypersonic vehicles, and missile defence. In this sense, India's departure from its former minimalist doctrine has been less dramatic than that of China. Nevertheless, a clear departure from earlier practice is evident. Why is this so?

The Epistemological Trap

The bottom line is that the concept of nuclear deterrence is at best ambiguous. The concept emerged from World War II, where the gap between the actual damage caused by large-scale conventional destruction (as in the firebombing of Dresden and Tokyo) and nuclear damage (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) was relatively small. Consequently, the advent of nuclear weapons did not transform strategic thinking as fundamentally as might have been expected. On one hand, it quickly became a hallowed principle that nuclear war must never be fought (a revolutionary perspective), but on the other, deterrence remained rooted in a loose notion of balance of power, which shaped thinking about how many and what kinds of weapons would be required (an evolutionary perspective).

While India and China initially embraced minimalistic approaches to deterrence, both have increasingly adopted concepts associated with Cold War strategic thinking. This shift is evident in the language of deterrence adopted by both countries. Terms such as "credibility," "vulnerability," and "second-strike capability," which have always been central to American doctrine, have become embedded in their doctrinal discourse as the chief drivers of expansionary nuclear strategy.

Ultimately, every technological solution introduces new risks alongside new capabilities. To the extent that states believe greater technical sophistication enhances the credibility and durability of deterrence, it can reinforce restraint and stability. In this respect, the real balance is psychological. However, uncertainties associated with both SLBMs and MIRVed systems can also generate new escalation risks, potentially undermining that stability.

The evidence before us is that less sophisticated capabilities deter effectively, which North Korea has demonstrated vis-à-vis the United States. Why, then, are increasingly advanced capabilities often viewed as desirable? Orthodox nuclear strategy has long assumed that deterrence rests on the balance of capabilities, a premise inherited from the Cold War. Both China and India have fallen into the epistemological trap of allowing conventionalised thinking about nuclear weapons to shape their nuclear modernisation programmes. This perception of deterrence facilitates the quest to attain an ever-receding mirage about deterrence adequacy: a Cold War lesson that has yet to be properly learned.

Rajesh Basrur is an independent scholar based in Mumbai, India; and is an Adjunct Professor with Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Brisbane. Previously, he taught at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and at the University of Mumbai; and held numerous visiting positions at, among others, Stanford University, Sandia Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has authored six books, including Subcontinental Drift: Domestic

Politics and India's Foreign Policy (Georgetown University Press, 2023); and Minimum Deterrence and India's Nuclear Security (Stanford University Press, 2006). He has also edited twelve books and journal special issues, including (with Anit Mukherjee and T. V. Paul), India-China Maritime Competition (Routledge, 2019); and Challenges to Democracy in India (Oxford University Press, 2009). He has published research papers in journals such as Defence Studies, India Review, International Affairs, International Politics and Journal of Peace Research.

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Bilateral Relations

Indian PM meets China's top diplomat

CGTN, June 24

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met China's Wang Yi in New Delhi during the BRICS security advisers' meeting. Modi highlighted the two countries' long history of civilisational ties and called for stronger engagement.

China, India preparing for boundary talks: FM spokesman

China Daily, June 23

China and India are preparing for the 25th round of Special Representatives' talks on the boundary question, Beijing said, as both sides continue efforts to manage their border dispute.

India, China in talks over joint UNESCO nominations for Xuanzang's work

Indian Express, June 14

India and China are in advanced talks on a joint UNESCO nomination for Xuanzang's Great Tang Records on the Western Regions. The proposal signals growing cultural cooperation.

India's new envoy to China presents credentials copy to Chinese Foreign Ministry

Economic Times, June 12

Indian Ambassador Vikram Doraiswami visited Tibet to review preparations for the Kailash Manasarovar Yatra. The pilgrimage resumed last year after a five-year suspension caused by the pandemic and border tensions.

China and India in the Region

Bypassing India, Bangladesh PM Rahman picks Malaysia, China for first visit

Hindustan Times, June 21

Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman will make his first foreign visits to Malaysia and China, prioritising jobs and investment. The move bypasses India, traditionally an early diplomatic destination.

Trump Restores Pacific Command Name, Raising Strategy Questions

Bloomberg, June 18

Washington is reverting the Indo-Pacific Command to its former name, US Pacific Command, in a symbolic change that has prompted questions about the future direction of US policy in Asia.

Nepal's foreign minister visits China after calling on regional rival India

Straits Times, June 16

Nepalese Foreign Minister Shisir Khanal met China's Wang Yi in Beijing, days after visiting India. The trip was his first to China since his party's election victory in March.

China's export surge sparks Europe fears as G7 countries weighs response to 'China Shock 2.0'

Times of India, June 16

China's export surge has become a growing concern for Europe, with G7 leaders discussing ways to address widening trade imbalances. Officials fear a new "China Shock" could undermine European industry.

Trade and Economy

India will monitor Chinese steel imports before deciding on further curbs, source says

Reuters, June 23

New Delhi is holding off on fresh restrictions while it assesses steel imports, despite continued concern over low-cost Chinese shipments. Officials will review the situation in the coming months.

Reliance, Vedanta, Adani join India's drive to cut China rare earth dependence, sources say

Reuters, June 11

Indian conglomerates Reliance, Vedanta and Adani are exploring rare earth processing projects in Andhra Pradesh as New Delhi seeks to reduce dependence on Chinese supplies.

After rice, China turns up heat on Indian red chillies

The Hindu, June 10

China has rejected Indian dried chilli shipments and suspended three exporters after detecting excessive pesticide residues. The move follows recent rejections of Indian rice cargoes.

Energy and Environment

Chinese EV makers are shut out of India – but their tech isn't

Business Times, June 24

Despite restrictions on Chinese carmakers, Chinese EV technology is making inroads into India. Tata Motors' adoption of Chery's platform signals growing industry ties.

PetroChina, Indian Oil fail to secure tankers to load Iraqi crude, sources says

Reuters, June 8

Chinese and Indian state refiners are struggling to secure tankers for Iraqi crude despite the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under the US-Iran ceasefire. The shortage highlights continuing disruptions to regional oil logistics.

India's energy demand boom to reshape global markets, says Rosneft chief

The Hindu, June 7

India will drive about half of global oil demand growth and 15% of the rise in electricity consumption over the next decade, Rosneft chief said, highlighting the country's growing role in global energy markets.

Analyses

Why India Will Stick with America

War on the Rocks, June 19

By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, resident Senior Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI); Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor of international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

China's growing power leaves India with few viable strategic alternatives, reinforcing its partnership with the United States despite mounting bilateral frictions and preserving balancing against Beijing as New Delhi's overriding priority.

Why Trump's Pentagon Abandoned 'Indo-Pacific'

Foreign Policy, June 17

By Derek Grossman, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of Southern California

Renaming INDOPACOM to PACOM signals a shift from coalition-based Indo-Pacific balancing toward a more transactional U.S. approach to China, reducing India's centrality in Washington's regional strategy.

Why India Does Not Interest China

The Diplomat, June 16

By Akhilesh Pillalamarri, writer and attorney focused on civilization, geopolitics, security, governance across Asia and the Indo-Pacific

Historical narratives and developmental benchmarks have fostered enduring Chinese indifference toward India, despite New Delhi's expanding role in advanced technology, defence, and the regional balance of power.

Is India A Hinge State?

Hoover Institution, June 9

By Ajay Chhibber, Distinguished Visiting Scholar, Institute for International Economic Policy, George Washington University

India's strategic autonomy positions it as a hinge state whose alignment choices, maritime strategy, and economic partnerships will increasingly shape the Indo-Pacific balance amid intensifying US-China competition.

Books and Journals

'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' to 'Vishwa Guru': India's shrewd management of (In)security in Indo-Pacific

International Relations of the Asia-Pacfic, January 2026

By Jagannath Panda, Head of the Stockholm Center for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs (SCSA-IPA).

This study analyses how India's foreign policy is shaped by the concept of ontological insecurity within its regional and global engagements. Specifically, it explores how India's narratives of "Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam" (One Earth, One Family, One Future) and "Vishwa Guru" (World Leader) serve as strategic tools to address identity-based challenges, particularly those arising from China's growing influence and revisionist policies.

By analysing critical events such as the Doklam standoff, China's Belt and Road Initiative, and the Galwan Valley clashes, the article argues that India's foreign policy reflects an attempt to manage disruptions to its ontological security. Through these frameworks, India projects itself as a moral and cultural leader, utilising identity-anchoring strategies to navigate threats and assert leadership in the Global South and the Indo-Pacific.

The article also critiques the interplay between India's ontological insecurity and its evolving foreign policy routines, including its engagement with minilateral bodies like the Quad, as well as its focus on cultural diplomacy during events such as the G20 Summit. This analysis provides a notional contribution to understanding how ontological insecurity shapes state behaviour, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. It underscores India's strategic responses to external disruptions to its identity, offering insights into the broader implications of ontological security for International Relations theory and practice.

Capsule Review

India's Role in Global South: From Concepts to Practical Implementation

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, May 2026

Reviewed by Akshat Sogani, student at the Public Policy programme at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

In this article, Thanh and Loc set out to trace India's Global South positioning from rhetoric to action. They lay out a comprehensive list of initiatives undertaken by India, from aid disbursements to Pacific Island states, credit lines under the Neighbourhood First policy, ITEC scholarship numbers, and peacekeeping deployments across ten missions. Taken together, these data points indicate that India's Global South diplomacy goes beyond mere theatrics and is backed by a genuine, if modest, financial and institutional footprint.

The constructivist framing, however, does less work than the empirical material. The authors invoke identity construction at the outset, but the paper spends most of its length cataloguing initiatives rather than showing how identity and material interest actually interact. This leaves the theoretical lens serving more as a label than an analytical tool. The challenges section is the strongest part of the piece, where Thanh and Loc candidly weigh India's budget constraints against China's zero-tariff diplomacy and infrastructure dominance in Vietnam, Indonesia and Sri Lanka, without retreating into the celebratory tone that runs through the earlier sections.

The article also fails to account for other controversial postures taken by India in recent times, including on Gaza and the Iran war, where India received **condemnation for jeopardising its "strategic autonomy"** with Modi's visit to Israel and the UAE in a show of solidarity. Such incidents raise questions over whether India can remain a neutral, reliable partner capable of leading the Global South.

The article is most useful as a reference document. Anyone trying to get a single-source overview of India's lines of credit, cultural centres, or Pacific aid allocations will find this piece a handy starting point, even if its analytical ambitions remain underdeveloped relative to its data collection.

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Selected Literature for Next Issue's Capsule Review

'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' to 'Vishwa Guru': India's shrewd management of (In)security in Indo-Pacific

International Relations of the Asia-Pacfic, January 2026

By Jagannath Panda

The Sino-Indian Rivalry and Balance-of-power Theory: Explaining India's Underbalancing

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, May 2026

By T.V.Paul

What Does China Want?

International Security, August 2025

By David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong, and Zenobia T. Chan

Capsule Review Submissions

China-India Brief invites concise review essays from LKYSPP students assessing recent and significant contributions to the literature.

- Selected submission will appear in the next issue.
- Contributors are invited to choose from the journals listed above.
- Submission guidelines are available on our website.

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Our team

Srinath Raghavan is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow with the Centre on Asia and Globalisation. He is also Professor of International Relations & History at Ashoka University and non-resident Senior Fellow at Carnegie India.

Scarlet (Xu Ni) is the editor for the *China-India Brief*. She is a Research Assistant at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation. She graduated from LKYSPP with a Master's degree in International Affairs, specialising in Politics, International Relations and Law.

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The Centre on Asia and Globalisation is a research centre at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. It conducts in-depth research on developments in the Asia-Pacific and beyond, and aims to provide academics, decision-makers, and the general public with objective analysis on issues of regional and global significance. The Centre's motto "Objective Research with Impact" reflects its commitment towards ensuring that its analysis informs policy and decision makers in and about Asia.

OTHER CAG PUBLICATIONS

- *Indira Gandhi and the Years that Transformed India* by Srinath Raghavan (Yale University Press, 2025)
- *Partnership or Polarization? Southeast Asian Security between India and China* edited by Evan Laksmana and Byron Chong (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2023)
- *Asian Conceptions of International Order: What Asia Wants* edited by Kanti Bajpai and Evan Laksmana (International Affairs, 2023)
- *How Realist Is India's National Security Policy?* edited by Kanti Bajpai (Routledge, 2023)
- *Deterring Conflict and Preserving Peace in Asia* edited by Drew Thompson and Byron Chong (Centre on Asia and Globalisation, 2022)
- *What Can the United States Learn from China about Infrastructure?* by Selina Ho in *The China Questions 2* (Harvard University Press, 2022)
- *India Versus China: Why they are Not Friends* by Kanti Bajpai (Juggernaut Books, 2021)
- *Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose* by Drew Thompson (Strategic Forum, 2021)

Compiled and sent to you by Centre on Asia and Globalisation and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore

China-India Brief is supported by Wilmar International Limited

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