

China-India Brief

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Guest Column

Missile Engagements Across the Himalayas: Assessing Nuclear Risks of Standoff War in Sino-Indian Relations

By Masahiro Kurita

In January 2026, Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi mentioned that the establishment of a “rocket-cum-missile” force is under consideration, citing the fact that both China and Pakistan have similar forces. This intention to establish a dedicated missile force partly reflects the India-Pakistan war of May 2025. However,


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The *China-India Brief* is a monthly digest focusing on the relationship between Asia’s two biggest powers. The Brief provides readers with a key summary of current news articles, reports, analyses, commentaries, and journal articles published in English on the China-India relationship. It features a Guest Column weighing in on key current issues in China-India relations.

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this idea has been discussed **since at least 2021**. It has been envisioned as a force to **control India's conventional missiles across the three services**, while the existing Strategic Force Command (SFC) would keep its nuclear arsenal. India's strategic circle has conceptualised such a missile force not only to address Pakistan but also **China**, which possesses a formidable missile arsenal.

The resurgence of the missile force idea in Delhi, alongside last year's India-Pakistan conflict, raises an important question: can a similar form of standoff warfare be conducted in the Sino-India dyad as calibrated conflict without risking nuclear escalation?

While the contours of the missile force envisioned by India remain unclear, some observers **suggest** that missile engagements might emerge as a form of limited warfare between China and India. However, managing risks of nuclear escalation in such a form of limited conflict in the Sino-India dyad can prove more complicated than in the India-Pakistan context.

India's Conventional Missile Forces

Although the force has not been officially designated, India's prospective conventional missile force is likely to **include** the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket system, the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, and the Pralay tactical ballistic missile. Pinaka has a range of 120 km, while BrahMos ranges from 290 to 450 km, and Pralay from 150 to 500 km. All these missile systems are claimed to be highly accurate, which suggests their utility

for striking tactical targets near the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Meanwhile, India's strategic community recognises the need for longer-range missiles. As India intends to **segregate the command and control of nuclear and conventional missiles**, its longer-range Agni ballistic missile series, which are assigned nuclear missions under the SFC, cannot be used for non-nuclear strikes. As a result, India's conventional missile capabilities remain limited up to 500 km for the time being. This means that **India would face difficulty** striking strategic targets within the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s Western Theatre Command (WTC) beyond the border area and the Tibetan Plateau.

By contrast, China possesses a significant advantage in long-range strike capabilities. Its notorious DF-26 ballistic missile, which is **assigned both conventional and nuclear roles**, has a range of 4,000 km. Moreover, China's dual-capable cruise missile inventory includes the 1,500-2,000 km range CJ-10 LACM and its Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) variant, as well as the 2,000 km range CJ-20 ALCM carried by the H-6K bomber. This asymmetry enables Beijing to unilaterally conduct **deep penetration strikes** with conventional missiles against India.

Against this backdrop, India has sought to enhance its longer-range conventional strike capabilities. Efforts are underway to extend the range of the BrahMos for both **ground-** and **air-launched** variants, along with the

development of a **long-range land-attack cruise missile (LR-LACM)**. According to a **seasoned Indian analyst**, the foremost requirement for the prospective Indian missile force is the capability to strike targets anywhere in the area of PLA's WTC, such as "command and control centres, logistics installations, military troops/equipment concentrations, or industrial hubs."

Managing Unwanted Nuclear Escalation

India's acquisition of longer-range strike assets makes a calibrated missile conflict in the Sino-Indian dyad more plausible. As in last year's Indo-Pakistani conflict, both sides could target each other's hinterland using standoff weapons.

However, a Sino-Indian calibrated war of this kind carries greater risks than those observed in the India-Pakistan context. As some Indian experts have **noted**, what makes matters complicated is the entanglement of nuclear and conventional missile forces on the Chinese side.

Despite persistent mutual suspicions, India and Pakistan have been leaning toward the segregation of conventional and nuclear missile forces. This trend is reflected in efforts on both sides to develop missiles intended primarily for conventional roles and to establish dedicated conventional missile forces.

In China, by contrast, both nuclear and conventional missile arsenals are operated by the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), although command-and-control systems for nuclear and

conventional missiles are **reportedly separated** within the PLARF. Moreover, it has a large arsenal of dual-capable missiles. At the very least, its DF-26 missile **retains both nuclear and conventional roles**. The PLARF's 646 Brigade at Korla is said to be entrusted with **both nuclear and conventional missions** with DF-26.

Generally, such entanglement of nuclear and conventional assets **complicates the management of nuclear escalation risks**. Since adversaries may struggle to distinguish between the nuclear-tipped and conventionally-tipped versions, the launch of dual-use missiles can be misinterpreted as a nuclear strike, increasing the risk of hasty nuclear use by the other side. Moreover, in a calibrated conventional missile war, both sides may well target conventional missiles and supporting infrastructures, but not those associated with nuclear missions to avoid nuclear escalation—a norm observed in last year's India-Pakistan conflict. The presence of dual-role systems, however, makes this distinction difficult. The other side's attacks, supposedly aimed at assets for conventional missions, could inadvertently hit those associated with nuclear roles, thereby generating use-or-lose pressures that could precipitate nuclear use.

It can be argued that these risks, which have been emphasised in the US-China context, may not be acute in the China-India context. Given China's overall conventional superiority, it is highly unlikely that, during a limited conventional engagement between China and India, Beijing would feel the

necessity to go nuclear, and Delhi knows that well. Furthermore, given China's far larger nuclear arsenal, it is doubtful that a few inadvertent hits on China's nuclear assets by India's conventional missiles would immediately create serious use-or-lose pressures on Beijing.

Even so, inadvertent strikes on nuclear assets carry interpretative risks. Beijing may interpret them as indicating that Delhi regards nuclear assets as legitimate targets in a conventional missile war. This perception could prompt China to reciprocate, which in turn may force Delhi to respond in kind—this time deliberately. Then the conflict would shift toward an exchange of mutual conventional counterforce strikes. Such a dynamic is undoubtedly fraught with nuclear dangers, arising both from risks of accidental use and from use-or-lose pressure, which may be particularly acute for India given China's rapidly expanding nuclear capabilities.

Conclusion

This analysis is necessarily hypothetical, as the contours of India's missile force remain unclear. Also, given that actual military clashes between India and China have not escalated beyond localised skirmishes since the 1970s, it remains unclear how a situation could develop into such an exchange of conventional missiles beyond border areas.

Nevertheless, last year's India-Pakistan conflict established a precedent for

calibrated conventional standoff between nuclear-armed states and could shape India's strategic thinking in other theatres. It must be recognised, however, that this kind of limited war can be fraught with greater risks of nuclear escalation in the Sino-Indian context.

Dr. Masahiro Kurita is a Lecturer at the School of Global Studies at Chukyo University, Japan. He previously served as a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) of Japan and as a Researcher in the Research and Legislative Reference Bureau of the Japanese National Diet Library. His areas of expertise include South Asian security, nuclear deterrence, and wargaming.

Guest Column

India–China Critical Minerals Diplomacy: The Need of the Hour

By Neeraj Singh Manhas

The world is in the throes of an energy transition that **hinges** on critical minerals, including lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, and rare earth elements (REEs). These inputs are essential for electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, semiconductors, and defence technologies. According to the International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025, **demand** for these materials has surged, with battery metals such as lithium and graphite seeing production growth rates far outpacing those of traditional metals.

Yet supply chains remain dangerously concentrated in China. China dominates refining and processing for 19 of the 20 key critical minerals, with an average of 70 percent market share. This concentration exposes economies to volatility, price shocks, and geopolitical leverage. As two of Asia’s largest economies and major players in the green transition, India and China cannot afford to treat critical minerals as zero-sum battlegrounds. Diplomacy between New Delhi and Beijing is not a luxury but an urgent necessity to ensure stable, diversified, and sustainable supplies essential for India’s 30 percent non-fossil fuel target by 2030 and net-zero by 2070; for China’s clean-energy leadership (which



already accounts for over half of global demand for key battery metals); and for the resilience of international supply chains required to meet worldwide net-zero goals.

India’s Vulnerabilities and Aspirations and China’s Strategic Dominance

India stands at a pivotal juncture. The country has made notable discoveries, including lithium **reserves** in Jammu and Kashmir estimated at 5.9 million tonnes, and holds the world’s third-largest REE deposits at 6.9 million tonnes. It possesses substantial resources of graphite and nickel, estimated at 211 million tonnes and 189 million tonnes respectively. Yet production lags woefully.

India remains almost completely 100 percent import-dependent for lithium, cobalt, and several other critical minerals, with China supplying over 80 percent of its lithium and REE needs in recent years. The National Critical Minerals Mission (NCMM), **launched** in January 2025 with an

INR 34,300 crore outlay, seeks to secure long-term sustainable supply chains and strengthen India's end-to-end critical mineral value chains, from exploration and mining through beneficiation, processing, and recycling, while fostering technological self-reliance, innovation, skill development, and global competitiveness. Quantitatively, it aims to auction over 100 blocks, secure 1,200 deposits, and build recycling capacity. Khanij Bidesh India Ltd (KABIL), established by the Ministry of Mines, is **scouting** overseas assets in Australia, Argentina, and Africa. These steps signal ambition, but without reliable processing technology and international partnerships, India risks missing its EV and renewable targets while remaining exposed to supply disruptions.

Against this backdrop of acute import dependence, China's position is formidable. It accounts for **roughly** 70 percent of global rare earth mining and over 90 percent of refining and processing capacity. It also dominates midstream stages across multiple minerals, such as lithium refining. Through decades of state-backed investment, overseas acquisitions via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and integrated supply chains linking mining to battery manufacturing, Beijing has turned critical minerals into a strategic asset.

Export controls and pricing power have **repeatedly** demonstrated how this dominance can be weaponised. For instance, in July 2023, China introduced export licensing requirements on gallium and germanium—key inputs for semiconductors, LEDs, and solar panels—triggering immediate global price **spikes** of

50 percent within months and disrupting supply chains for electronics and renewable-energy manufacturers worldwide. While China itself imports raw materials from Australia and elsewhere, its refining chokehold gives it unmatched leverage. For India, this creates both risk and opportunity: dependence today, but potential for collaboration tomorrow.

The Case for India-China Critical Minerals Diplomacy

Persistent geopolitical tensions along the border, coupled with competing visions of regional order, make broad cooperation appear counterintuitive. Yet in the critical minerals sector—where weaponised interdependence and the treatment of resources as strategic assets remain pronounced—economic realities demand it. Both nations face surging domestic demand: India for its 30 percent non-fossil fuel **target** by 2030 and net zero by 2070, and China to sustain its EV and renewable-energy dominance while securing stable supplies of the raw ores it still imports in large volumes from Australia, Chile, and Indonesia. Unilateral diversification is slow and costly for both; joint diplomacy—through shared investments, technology transfer, and third-country ventures—can accelerate results and deliver mutual gains in supply resilience.

However, imagine trilateral or multilateral ventures in Africa or Latin America where India's geological mapping capabilities, hard-rock lithium exploration expertise, and community-inclusive sustainable practices, honed through GSI **operations** and KABIL's recent projects in Argentina, Chile, and

Zambia, complement Chinese processing scale. Shared investments in third-country mines could reduce reliance on volatile global markets and mitigate price manipulation. In forums like the BRICS and the SCO, critical minerals could serve as a confidence-building measure, transforming a flashpoint into a bridge. Industrially advanced countries have leveraged multilateral **groupings** such as the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and the Quad to friend-shore supply chains. India and China, aspiring leaders in the Global South, could pioneer a parallel non-Western approach that delivers more equitable, transparent partnerships to resource-rich nations in Africa and Latin America, strengthening South-South cooperation on the green transition.

Lessons India and China Can Draw from Each Other to Strengthen Their Critical Minerals Industries

India has much to gain by studying Beijing's playbook. China's success stems **from** long-term strategic planning, massive state-supported R&D in metallurgical processing, and seamless integration of upstream mining with downstream manufacturing. Its ability to rapidly scale refining capacity, i.e., turning raw ores into high-purity materials for magnets and batteries, offers a template India can **adapt** through public-private partnerships under the NCMM.

Beijing's overseas asset acquisition model, blending diplomacy, finance, and infrastructure, demonstrates how to lock in supplies early. India should emulate this focused execution: faster environmental

clearances, paired with technology-transfer incentives and targeted incentives for battery-grade processing hubs. By learning from China's discipline in building end-to-end value chains, India can move beyond mining raw materials to capturing higher-value segments.

China, in turn, can draw valuable insights from India's approach. Chinese overseas **operations** in critical minerals have frequently encountered project delays, community protests, and reputational damage due to insufficient stakeholder engagement and weaker ESG standards. For example, Zimbabwe's lithium projects (Chengxin Lithium's Sabi Star and Sinomine's Bikita) sparked local backlash and temporary government suspensions due to forced relocations, inadequate consultation, and environmental violations. New Delhi's emphasis on democratic stakeholder engagement and community consent in mining projects, therefore, highlights the importance of securing social licence and **upholding** high ESG standards. India's vibrant private sector and innovation ecosystem—evident in its pharmaceutical and IT successes—could inspire more agile, market-driven recycling and substitution technologies for critical minerals. India's federal structure and regulatory transparency offer lessons in balancing speed with sustainability and local benefits. By adopting elements of India's inclusive model, China could reduce project delays, improve environmental outcomes, and enhance its global image as a responsible supplier. Mutual learning would elevate both nations' practices, fostering greener,

more equitable mineral development worldwide.

Charting a Cooperative Path

The way forward is clear. New Delhi and Beijing should establish a bilateral Critical Minerals Dialogue within existing mechanisms, focusing on technology sharing for REE processing, joint R&D on recycling, and co-investment protocols for third countries. Confidence-building steps, like transparent data sharing on reserves and production, could pave the way for MoUs on sustainable mining standards.

India's **recent** outreach to Brazil, Australia, and others shows its intent to diversify. China could join selected initiatives as a partner rather than a competitor. Such diplomacy need not dilute strategic autonomy. Rather, it strengthens it by reducing collective vulnerability to external shocks. In an interdependent world, critical mineral diplomacy between India and China is the need of the hour. It promises not just economic gains but geopolitical stability and accelerated climate action. Rivals on the border, partners in the boardroom—this pragmatic pivot could redefine Asia's role in the 21st-century resource economy. The hour is late; the stakes are high. Both capitals must seize the moment.

Neeraj Singh Manhas serves as the Special Advisor for South Asia at the Parley Policy Initiative in the Republic of Korea and is a subject matter expert at the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, Ministry of Defence, Government of India. He is also a Non-Resident Visiting Senior Scholar at the Centre for National Security Studies and an Editorial Board Member for *World Water Policy*, a journal published by Wiley (Scopus, Elsevier).

His latest edited book, *Analysing the Current Afghan Context*, was published by Routledge (Taylor & Francis) in 2023. His forthcoming edited book, *Green Power Politics and Climate Change: The Future of Environmental Politics in the Indo-Pacific*, will also be published by Routledge, Taylor & Francis (2026). Neeraj's writings have been featured by renowned institutions such as the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP) in Sweden, the Pacific Forum in Hawaii, the Lowy Institute in Australia, the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, DC, and the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. He often writes columns on water security and transboundary river issues in India and South Asia for *The Indian Express* and shares his views on his X (formerly Twitter) account, @The_China_Chap.

News Reports

Bilateral Relations

China says policy to improve relations with India remains unchanged

The Hindu, April 14

China said its policy to improve relations with India has not changed as it defended its move to publish new names for various regions in Arunachal Pradesh.

India rejects China's 'mischievous attempts' to assign 'fictitious' names to places in Arunachal Pradesh

The Hindu, April 13

India's External Affairs Ministry said China should refrain from actions which inject negativity into relations.

China sets up new Xinjiang county near PoK as proximity to Ladakh raises India concerns

Telegraph India, April 12

China established a new county in its Xinjiang region close to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and the Afghanistan border. This move concerns India given its proximity to Ladakh and disputed territories.

Indian business delegation visits China after five-year gap; focus on EV, clean energy ties

Tribune India, April 1

An Indian business delegation is visiting eastern China from March 29 to April 4, the first such trip in over five years.

China and India in the Region

India turns to Russian missiles to counter China-backed Pakistan

Asia Times, April 27

India's planned purchase of Russian ultra-long-range air-to-air missiles aims to counter Pakistan's China-backed air network, but exposes deeper integration and escalation challenges.

India welcomes Japan scrapping its lethal weapons exports policy

Business Standard, April 23

India, US, Australia, and the Philippines have welcomed welcomes Japan's move to lift its ban on lethal weapons exports, while China has criticised it.

South Korea, India agree to boost trade and defense ties

DW, April 20

India and South Korea have agreed to broaden their trade, defence and technology partnership.

China, Bhutan push forward border alignment discussions

Times of India, April 2

China and Bhutan discussed boundary alignment in areas "where there are no disputes" as the two sides held 15th Expert Group Meeting on their boundary issues.

Trade and Economy

China deepens grip on India manufacturing supply chain with rising imports share

Telegraph India, April 29

China accounts for about 16% of India's imports but supplies over 30% of its industrial goods, highlighting deep sectoral dependence, Global Trade Research Initiative report flagged.

China surpasses US as India's largest trading partner in FY26

Hindustan Times, April 15

China has overtaken the US to emerge as India's largest trading partner in 2025-26, with bilateral trade reaching USD 151.1 billion, while the country's trade deficit with Beijing widened.

China calls for stronger trade cooperation with India after ministerial talks during WTO conference

Economic Times, April 3

Union Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal held a meeting with China's Commerce Minister Wang Wentao on the sidelines of the WTO's 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), aimed at strengthening bilateral economic and trade cooperation.

Energy and Environment

India receives first Iranian crude oil shipment after seven years

Business Standard, April 13

India received its first shipment of Iranian crude oil after nearly seven years amid the West Asia tension and US president Donald Trump's threat of blocking the Strait of Hormuz.

India turns to 'trusted friend' Russia for oil, LNG supply as Iran war energises ties

South China Morning Post, April 5

A US renewal of a temporary waiver for countries to buy Russian oil benefits India, which in March became one of the top buyers of Russian crude as a consequence of the Iran war.

India emerges as third-largest renewable energy market in 2025: IRENA

Business Standard, April 2

India became the third-largest renewable energy market globally in 2025, after China and the United States, driven by rapid expansion in solar and wind capacity, according to IRENA.

Analyses

The Quad Is on the Brink of Extinction Foreign Policy, April 23

By Derek Grossman, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, University of Southern California

The Quad's erosion reflects a deeper problem: US unreliability under Trump is undermining the strategic cohesion that sustained the grouping. Without a credible American anchor, the Quad risks fading into irrelevance as members hedge through narrower alternatives.

The United States-Iran Conflict: Economic Implications on India NUS-ISAS, April 23

By Vinod Rai, Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)

The US–Iran conflict and Hormuz blockade have exposed India's energy vulnerability, disrupting key sectors and straining macroeconomic stability. While diversification efforts are underway, pressure on the rupee and reserves is likely to persist.

China seeks greater leadership in ocean governance

East Asia Forum, April 20

By Edward Sing Yue Chan, Postdoctoral Fellow, Australian Centre of China in the World, Australian National University

Beijing is moving beyond developing its blue economy toward influencing maritime governance frameworks. Its growing institutional presence underscores a bid for greater agenda-setting power at sea.

Iran crisis puts China's UN diplomacy to the test

The Interpreter, April 9

By Courtney J. Fung, Associate Professor in Security Studies, Macquarie University; Andrea Ghiselli, Lecturer, University of Exeter

China's UN veto reflects a pragmatic calculus shaped by fears of mission creep and the need to balance ties with Iran, the United States, and regional actors. But as the conflict drags on, sustaining this calibrated posture will become increasingly difficult.

Books and Journals

Navigating Power Rivalry: Small South Asian States in China–India Competition **Asian Politics & Policy, April 2026**

By Zahid Shahab Ahmed is an Associate Professor of Security and Strategic Studies at the National Defence College in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Salman Ali Bettani, School of IR and Public Affairs, Fudan University, China

As China's influence in South Asia expands through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), small states face the challenge of navigating Sino-Indian rivalry. While existing scholarship examines the implications of this rivalry for the region, it pays limited attention to how small South Asian states have adjusted their foreign policies. This study analyses these adjustments since the BRI's launch in 2013, arguing that such states are shifting from traditional bandwagoning with India to hedging between India and China. By leveraging Chinese economic investment and India's strategic ties, they seek to preserve strategic autonomy while maximising benefits and limiting dependence. This shift underscores the agency of small states in managing major-power competition.



Capsule Review

Swaran Singh, *US–China Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific and India’s Strategic Recalibration of Its Policy Choices*

India Quarterly, March 2026

Reviewed by Patricia Nicole Naguit Mejia, student at the International Affairs programme at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

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Swaran Singh argues that intensifying US-China strategic competition has constrained India’s manoeuvring room in the Indo-Pacific, leaving it squeezed between growing asymmetry with China and US unpredictability. In this context, India seeks to preserve “strategic autonomy” by diversifying partnerships, de-militarising the Quad, and avoiding excessive dependence on either Washington or Beijing. Moreover, India’s ability to sustain meaningful strategic autonomy will shape whether the Indo-Pacific evolves into a bipolar order dominated by US- China rivalry, or into a diffuse, multipolar system where middle powers retain agency.

The author’s key contribution lies in tracing the evolution of US Indo-Pacific strategy, from Obama’s ‘pivot’, through Trump’s transactionalism, to Biden’s institutionalisation of the Quad, to its renewed fragility under Trump 2.0. Across these iterations, intra-Quad divergences, US domestic political shifts, and China’s systemic weight consistently undermine the coherence of a US-led regional order. India’s reliance on multilateralism reflects a calibrated effort to balance against China-led institutions like RCEP without formalising containment,

while also creating a stronger foundation against US unpredictability. Moreover, Singh also offers a hangover cure to analyses that otherwise treat the Quad as a durable strategic architecture, highlighting that it is fragile and demands restructuring.

Overall, Singh offers a measured account of how shifts in great power competition and domestic political cycles converge to simultaneously enable and constrain India. However, the article remains myopic on India’s ‘strategic autonomy’, which is not clearly defined despite being central to its claims. In practice, it seems more a pattern of abstention than a coherent doctrine. Singh’s call for a broadened Quad is also compelling but could be strengthened by developing a more rigorous metric for “strategic autonomy” that distinguishes it from mere geopolitical hedging. Testing the framework against high-intensity disruptions could reveal whether India is operationalising independent agency or simply optimising the optics of autonomy.

The views expressed in the review are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Selected Literature for Capsule Review

Navigating Power Rivalry: Small South Asian States in China–India Competition

Asian Politics & Policy, April 2026

By Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Salman Ali Bettani

Is India underbalancing China?

Journal of Strategic Studies, March 2025

By Christopher Clary

Perceptions, Positions and Realities in India–China Relations: A Zero-sum Game of Repeated Distrust

Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, June 2025

By Josukutty CA and Amina Reem VP

Capsule Review — Submissions

China-India Brief invites concise review essays from LKYSPP students assessing recent and significant contributions to the literature.

- Selected submission will appear in the next issue.
- Contributors are invited to choose from the journals listed above.
- [Submission guidelines](#) are available on our website.

Deadline: 20 May 2026

Our team



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OTHER CAG PUBLICATIONS

- *Indira Gandhi and the Years that Transformed India* by Srinath Raghavan (Yale University Press, 2025)
- *Partnership or Polarization? Southeast Asian Security between India and China* edited by Evan Laksmana and Byron Chong (Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2023)
- *Asian Conceptions of International Order: What Asia Wants* edited by Kanti Bajpai and Evan Laksmana (International Affairs, 2023)
- *How Realist Is India's National Security Policy?* edited by Kanti Bajpai (Routledge, 2023)
- *Deterring Conflict and Preserving Peace in Asia* edited by Drew Thompson and Byron Chong (Centre on Asia and Globalisation, 2022)
- *What Can the United States Learn from China about Infrastructure?* by Selina Ho in *The China Questions 2* (Harvard University Press, 2022)
- *India Versus China: Why they are Not Friends* by Kanti Bajpai (Juggernaut Books, 2021)
- *Winning the Fight Taiwan Cannot Afford to Lose* by Drew Thompson (Strategic Forum, 2021)



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