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Contextual sensitivity in Behavioural Public Policy: Adapting lessons from context-aware systems

Akshaya Balaji[1] and Anirudh Tagat[2]

Abstract

The effectiveness of behavioural public policy (BPP) depends on an intervention's sensitivity to local contexts; interventions that succeed in one country often fail in another due to contextual differences. This paper contributes to existing research on contextual heterogeneity by leveraging implementation science and adapting theories of context-awareness from computer science. Specifically, this study examines how differences in policy implementation across Asian countries can be attributed to varying levels of 'context-awareness' among policymakers. Our analysis is focused on conditional cash transfers (CCTs) employed in the domain of education aimed at improving school attendance and enrolment. Given that CCTs were first implemented in the Americas and their well-known feasibility in executing them across diverse contexts, this paper assess the various factors at play when a policymaker decides the various components of CCTs in different Asian contexts. Being context- aware in policy is related to leveraging diverse data sources to adapt and deliver services based on the user's needs, location, or interactions with their environment. Drawing on these principles, the authors identify key components of a context-aware system and evaluate their applicability to BPP frameworks. The authors recommend designing BPP with foundations in context-aware systems to allow for implementing interventions well-tailored to specific cultural settings.

Keywords: context-awareness, context-aware systems, conditional cash transfers, CCTs, education, Progresa

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1. Introduction

Following the success of Mexico's *Progresa (renamed Oportunidades and then Prospera)* (Parker and Todd, 2017), Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) attained popularity especially among developing countries, as a promising approach to tackle multiple issues like improving enrolment rates and learning outcomes in schools, mitigating child stunting and wasting, and promoting the uptake of nutritious food. As CCTs expanded, evaluations of their impacts, and more recently, their implementation methods and design structures have flooded the literature in the form of reviews and meta-analyses.

A major part of CCT design is setting the 'conditionalities'. CCTs are generally replicated in that a successful CCT in country A is imitated in country B, often without tailoring it to the latter's local context (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). This is despite the fact that transplanting a CCT (in terms of design) from one country to another is not straightforward, and that in many cases outcomes are context- specific. This is most clearly observed in education-based CCTs. For instance, documents rarely provide evidence-based justifications for enforcing a certain percentage of school attendance as a cut-off for eligibility into a CCT – they are either directly borrowed from past successful programs or taken as a standard rule of thumb (Wiseman, 2010).

In addition to the recent emphasis on context in behavioural public policy, researchers in other domains, such as computer science (where they design user interfaces), have adopted varying definitions of context in order to integrate it into their study. For instance, in computer science, context is defined as "*any information that can be used to characterize the situation of an entity* (Abowd et al., 1999, Section 2)." In this domain, context is therefore typically used to refer to information collected by a computing system that can help enrich the interaction between a human and the computer (Dey et al., 2001). For the purposes of this paper, we argue that policymakers can develop *context-aware* methods to design and implement policies in education (using the case of CCTs). This involves collecting relevant, rich, and rigorous data to be able to successfully replicate the success of CCTs such as *Progresa* in Mexico and also better integrate context into policy interventions. To be sure, this is not a novel argument: researchers in public administration and public policy have since long argued that formative research is a critical input to better-designed policy. Furthermore, work in behavioural science has argued for the importance of social,

cultural, and institutional factors in understanding why a policy brings about behaviour change (Bicchieri and Dimant, 2022). Policy design that relies on extensive field data is also more likely to be able to pick up the nuances of *why* certain policy elements are more successful in changing outcomes. However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to integrate this approach with context-awareness in computer science, with the goal of suggesting a framework for policymakers for effective policy design.[3]

To this end, this study examines 26 education-related CCT programmes implemented in South and Southeast Asian nations and evaluated across studies from 2009 to 2024 that measure outcomes of school enrolment, attendance and dropout rates, and learning outcomes. Specifically, this paper examines their conditions with respect to *Progresa*, the first CCT program in the world. It then considers the reasons given behind the conditionalities imposed, if any, and ascertains the level of context-awareness demonstrated by the policymakers across the countries covered in the sample. While highlighting the necessity of being context-aware, the authors also provide recommendations and a guiding framework for policymakers to incorporate context-awareness in designing CCTs and other social impact programs.

The authors find that, in comparing education-related CCTs implemented in South and Southeast Asia, the conditionalities lack local, evidence-based justifications and are often simply replicated from elsewhere. Given the diverse local contexts of these countries, this paper argues for the importance of context- awareness in designing and implementing CCTs in that seemingly small aspects of conditionalities – from the choice of attendance thresholds to the frequency and mode of payment disbursement – must be rooted in local evidence. A context- aware policymaker is more likely to design a CCT and its conditionalities to fit the unique context of their country in the best possible manner. This will help maximise the intervention's impact and accomplish policy objectives.

The paper is structured as follows: The next section presents a review of relevant literature to provide a basis for and motivate our argument and briefly discuss existing studies that examine policymaker beliefs across different contexts. Then,

[3] To be sure, there are competing theories in social psychology, such as the situated cognition hypothesis (Roth & Jornet, 2013) that suggests how social context can shape attitudes and beliefs. This has previously been applied in the domain of education research (Spillane et al., 2002), and we focus instead on emerging themes of context awareness from computer science as its applications have not yet been studied in policy contexts.

we proceed with studying the sample of CCTs implemented in South and Southeast Asia and assess each intervention's design and conditionalities for context-awareness. The paper concludes with policy implications and recommendations and a framework to guide policymakers in adopting context- awareness in design for tailor-fit interventions backed by locally-justified evidence.

2. Literature Review

A 'New Public Management' approach to CCT design

The intricacies of CCT design are contained in a few broad features – some big and some seemingly small. The first step is to define the policy objective and target population (Evidence and Lessons from Latin America, n.d.). In most cases, the overarching goal is common – poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, the sub-goals and the channels of mitigating poverty differ. Some policies target education-related outcomes like increasing school enrolment, attendance, and learning outcomes, while some others focus on health-related priorities like reducing disease incidence and raising vaccination rates. Since most CCTs aim to reduce poverty rates through human capital accumulation, the target population is mostly low-income households.

On the cash transfer front, policymakers must decide on the amount to transfer to an eligible household/participant, the mode of such transfer, and the person to whom the transfer should be made (Bastagli et al., 2016; Pellerano and Barca, 2014). For instance, an amount too small to cover a household's basic consumption expenses might hinder accomplishing programme objectives. Next, the decision to transfer amounts through electronic cards, physical cash, or periodically crediting them to the recipient's bank accounts is consequential. For example, electronic card transfers may raise a household's propensity to save (Pellerano and Barca, 2014). Finally, the characteristics of the recipient affect the intra-household decision-making dynamics; in most Latin American programmes, child benefits are paid to the women of the household since it is found that women are more likely to have preferences in line with the child's best interests and that they are more likely to spend the money towards human capital accumulation for the child (Doepke and Tertilt, 2019; Pellerano and Barca, 2014; Yoong et al., 2012).

It is in the policymaker's best interests to extract the greatest possible gains from conditioning transfers efficiently. Conditioning is a form of behaviour change – when informational campaigns like health camps fail to instil in the public the importance of schooling, healthcare, and nutrition, policymakers may perceive conditions in CCTs as a means for behaviour change (de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011; Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). Policymakers are often assessed by their performance indicators, like boosting school enrolment and immunisation rates. So, by conditioning cash transfers based on behaviours that can increase these indicators, policymakers can display these as 'accomplishments', potentially contributing to their longer stay in office (de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011).

Conditioning to achieve performance indicators is akin to the concept of New Public Management (NPM) in public administration (Gruening, 2001; Lane, 2000). Developed as a *"summary description of a way of reorganising public sector bodies to bring their management, reporting, and accounting approaches closer to (a particular perception of) business methods"*(Dunleavy and Hood, 1994), this business-like, KPI-driven approach was first used in the 1980s to describe approaches borrowed from private sector management models to improve the efficiency of public services. For public sector agencies, NPM implies that close attention must be directed towards framing the aims and objectives to achieve a defined, tangible outcome (Promberger and Rauskala, 2003). Additionally, performance measurement emphasises results rather than processes – the reverse was true before NPM took shape (Promberger and Rauskala, 2003).

KPIs have become a quantifiable way for public sector agencies to show accountability to stakeholders and the public and to 'tick the boxes' associated with a ministry's agendas. Furthermore, because the common applications of CCTs are in education and health, and they are typically conditioned on enrolment and attendance thresholds (for education) across the world, this raises the chance that CCTs shown to fulfil these KPIs in one country can be perceived as successful and replicable in another country. Given that policymakers are motivated by performance indicators and the KPI-informed manner of NPM, this can increase the likelihood of policymakers integrating these KPIs in CCTs and simply replicating the structure of a CCT and its conditions without providing local, evidence-based justifications, thereby not tailoring them to fit their own countries' unique contexts.

The significance of context in policy design cannot be overstated, as solutions manifest differently based on the local socioeconomic environment (Bason, 2014; Bogenschneider, 2010; Weyrauch et al., n.d.). This principle is particularly relevant to CCTs. To maximise the benefits derived from CCTs, it is essential to understand both the intended and unintended consequences that reach beyond the initial project scope (Reiners, 2025). Consequently, program design must be evidence-based and carefully adapted to local circumstances. Unintended effects or spillovers arising from CCTs can be beneficial or detrimental. For instance, a positive spillover occurs when conditions tied to school attendance decrease crime rates as children spend more time in educational settings rather than engaging in illicit activities (Lance, 2014; Machado et al., 2018; Mejía and Camacho, 2014). Here, conditionalities effectively raise the opportunity cost of missing school, making participation in crime less attractive. Conversely, negative spillovers may also emerge. For example, parental neglect towards children not targeted by a CCT is a documented adverse outcome, as parents might disproportionately focus their attention on children whose attendance directly influences the household's cash transfer (Reiners, 2025), leading to outcomes like the reallocation of household duties to the other children not eligible for the CCT (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2008) and their increased school absenteeism (Camilo and Zuluaga, 2022). Given the potential for CCTs to generate effects beyond their immediate goals, timeframes, and predefined outcomes based on the local environment in which it is executed, ensuring that their design and conditionalities are tailored to align with the local context is crucial.

Context-awareness

In computer science and application design, some components of context are considered crucial to better design. As Dey and Abowd (1999) state, these include location, identity, activity, and time. In a policy design scenario, these may translate to background or underlying characteristics of the target beneficiaries or stakeholders. More modern work in the domain of context-awareness has been applied to the study of artificial intelligence (Augusto, 2022), uses of social data (Kayes and Iamnitchi, 2013), and data privacy concerns (Lederer et al., 2004), among others. This strand defines a context-aware system as "*the ability of a system to use contextual information in order to tailor its services so that they are more useful to the stakeholders because they directly relate to their preferences and needs*. (Augusto, 2022, p. 701)." Understandably, much of the

focus in the computing systems literature with regard to context-awareness deals with application design, with recent extensions to artificial intelligence and the Internet of Things (Perera et al., 2014). Most importantly, it can be extended to study the efficient design of educational applications as well (Zheng et al., 2019).

Viewed more broadly in the case of a system of policymaking, this is not so different from how policy design choices are made. For instance, in the public policy literature, there are several studies that discuss how context can be incorporated by studying how policy stakeholders use evidence (Wiseman, 2010). Even within the education context, Wiseman (2010) suggests that there are pitfalls of excessive reliance of policymakers on predominantly quantitative evidence (especially those from randomized controlled trials, or RCTs), arguing instead that a more careful construction of context is possible by assessing qualitative and quantitative evidence together (e.g., in what context does schooling take place, how to compare curricula across settings).

Policymaker response to research outputs and belief updating

However, literature increasingly documents the disconnect between research evidence and context-awareness on the one hand and policy design on the other (Bogenschneider, 2010; Cartwright et al., 2009). The reasons primarily include how real-life policy contexts significantly differ from experimental environments (Weiss, 1995; Weyrauch and Langou, 2011) – even RCTs, considered the gold standard of impact of evaluation, suffer from issues of external validity (Deaton, 2010; Tipton and Olsen, 2018) – and how science relies on known ends and sound theories. In contrast, real-world social issues are characterised by uncertainty and a lack of agreement on ends, theories or solutions (Bogenschneider, 2010). Resistance to adopting research insights also stems from differences in the policymaking and research processes – the former is subjective; it weighs multiple conflicting factors (the policymaker's career, constituent views, party objectives, media attention, and views of interest groups, among others). Evidence is relegated to peripheral importance in the presence of these factors (Bogenschneider, 2010). For contentious social issues involving selective cash transfers and welfare payments, policymakers hold biases, deeply entrenched views, and preconceived notions about handling the issues (Banuri et al., 2019). In this respect, it is necessary to study how policymakers update their beliefs in the face of new evidence and how local contexts matter to them.

Vivalt and Coville (2023) observe that policymakers exhibit greater optimism than researchers regarding anticipated program impacts, updating their beliefs more substantially when receiving positive rather than negative evidence from previous interventions. This asymmetric optimism can lead policymakers to overestimate program effectiveness, particularly when frequently exposed to positive outcomes. Additionally, they show variance neglect where they update their prior beliefs with a heavy focus on point estimates and averages, ignoring a potential range of outcomes. Insensitivity to confidence intervals, over-optimistic priors, and asymmetric optimism can widen the gap between beliefs and reality. The authors also find that when policymakers are presented with clear information on an intervention's design, sample size and precision, they are more likely to show accuracy in updating their beliefs (Vivalt and Coville, 2023). This is important for context-awareness since presenting policymakers with explicit evidence on an intervention's design particulars can improve evidence-based decision-making when creating and implementing policies in their local contexts.

Policymaker priorities in education policies

Researchers have examined education policymakers' preferences and the factors influencing their priorities. Nakajima (2021), using a discrete choice experiment in the US, found that policymakers in state and local educational agencies prefer studies with larger sample sizes, multiple sites, and contexts similar to their own. Consistent with Vivalt and Coville (2023), Nakajima also observed that policymakers responded more positively to research presented with detailed explanations of methods rather than solely results. These findings are significant for evidence-based policymaking, highlighting the risks posed by policymakers' asymmetric optimism and variance neglect, which may encourage replicating successful interventions without adequate adjustments for local contexts.

Offering further evidence regarding policymaker beliefs and educational priorities, Crawfurd et al. (2021) surveyed around 900 senior officials in education ministries across 35 low- and middle-income nations to capture deviations between their education priorities and those of international donors. They find that policymakers tend to overestimate the levels of foundational literacy and prefer policies that bolster the vocational education of the masses (at odds with aid donor agencies). It was also observed that policymakers were less likely to update their beliefs when presented with an RCT study and more likely to do so if the study was carried out using larger sample sizes in other low- and

middle-income countries (Crawfurd et al., 2021). Then, Yarrow et al. (2024) showed that education policymakers in select Southeast Asian nations emphasise raising school competition rates over improving learning outcomes. This lends credence to NPM's KPI-based approach since it is easier to quantify school completion rates than to measure learning outcomes tangibly, letting policymakers demonstrate their 'achievements'. Furthermore, officials cited the lack of implementation capacity (bureaucratic or infrastructural) as the greatest barrier to improving learning (Yarrow et al., 2024).

These studies show that policymaker priorities are often at odds with evidence- based, contextually justified research outcomes due to the predominant preference for large-scale and mostly successful impact evaluations. This signals low sensitivity of policymakers to local contexts in designing interventions.

3. Context-Awareness and Design Choices in Education CCTs

One aspect under key consideration for context-aware policy relates to the *scale* at which the policy is expected to operate. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) argue that considerations of scale typically shape what role the CCT is expected to play in social policy within a country (p.34). Even beyond scale, policymakers have active choices to make around the design of a CCT. These are related to: (a) School attendance threshold (a target threshold typically decided beforehand, in order to qualify for the transfer); (b) Gender differentiation in stipend (whether and to what extent transfers may differ by gender of the target beneficiary); (c) Grade progression/performance requirement (a target threshold required to unlock the transfer); (d) Payments recipient (who will receive the payment/transfer, and how it will be delivered if conditions are satisfied); (e) Modality of transfer of benefits (what *kind* of benefits are to be delivered: cash only, kind [books/uniforms etc.] only, or cash + kind); and finally (f) Payment frequency (what is the interval at which transfers are to be delivered).

Although these are not meant to be exhaustive design choices in CCTs, they are the dimensions along which we can make transparent comparisons across different CCTs globally. Furthermore, details on these design choices are typically available either in policy documents or papers that evaluate these programs as they are often critical to understanding outcomes associated with the intervention. In terms of the benchmark program, *Progresa*, these details are also

provided with some justification, which helps in exploring if these were part of some context-aware process from the policymakers' point of view.

Table 1 (Appendix) summarises evidence across 26 education-based CCTs in South and Southeast Asia. In a few cases, the tables include studies that evaluate the same program intervention using different experimental methods and report on different outcomes, sample participants and time frames.

Summary of studies – outcome variables

Out of the 26 studies, 16 are partially effective, seven are effective, and three are ineffective in achieving their desired outcomes.

The common outcome variables measured are school attendance, dropout rates, enrolment, and basic reading and numeracy skills. However, some authors also focus on short and long term labour effects. Shamsuddin (2015) evaluates the long-term labour market effects (in terms of female labour force participation and wages) of Bangladesh's Female Secondary Education Stipend Programme (FESP). Then, Hidayatina and Garces-Ozanne (2019) examine the effectiveness of Indonesia's Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) in reducing children's participation in household chores. Edmonds and Shrestha (2014) measure the Nepal Schooling Incentive Project's impact on reducing child labour participation in carpet weaving. Finally, Ferreira et al. (2009) study the impact of Cambodia's Education Sector Support Project (CESSP) Scholarship Program on paid and unpaid child labour.

19 of the 26 studies measure multiple outcomes – some of which are all education-related, while others are more encompassing. With regard to the latter, besides education-related outcomes, Baulch (2011) studies Bangladesh's PES on child stunting and household expenditures, while Jain (2018) uses India's Ladli Laxmi Yojana (LLY) to measure its impacts on birth registration and fertility behaviour.

Finally, seven studies employ a gendered-angle, explicitly focusing on female enrolment and attendance, learning outcomes and gender disparity. Here, Xu et al. (2022) adopt a unique focus in analysing Bangladesh's Female Stipend Programs (FSPs) to assess the intrahousehold allocation of spending on education-related resources and ascertain pro-male or pro-female biases.

Summary of results

In general, while enrolment outcomes and attendance rates improve, learning gains lag behind or decline. For instance, programs like India's Kanyashree Prakalpa, the Philippines' 4Ps, Pakistan's FSSP, Indonesia's PKH, and Cambodia's JFPR raise attendance and/or enrolment but fail to translate into improved learning outcomes. But when CCTs were designed to explicitly boost learning, the results were promising. Li (2012) designed an experiment involving cash transfers to tutors assigned to underperforming tutees, conditional on the latter's score improvement. This incentivised peer tutoring program increased tutees' test scores significantly, even in the long term. Similarly, Barrera-Osorio and Filmer (2016) assessed Cambodia's Primary School Scholarship Program to find that between poverty-based and merit-based scholarships, the latter kind was more successful in raising test scores.

Programs that had a gendered focus increased girls' schooling. The Kanyashree Prakalpa raised enrolment among girls, and Bangladesh's FSSP additionally delayed marriage and childbirth. But Xu et al. (2022) find that Bangladesh's stipend programs boosted female enrolment but failed to address gender bias in education spending – families still spent more on boys' tutoring and core inputs. Another adverse effect was found by Jain (2018) in the context of India's LLY, where parents redirected resources from older daughters to eligible younger girls, reducing learning outcomes for older siblings.

Conditionalities

Table 1 also offers rich insights into the conditionalities across studies, producing some preliminary assessments. Firstly, the number and intensity of conditions do not always predict effectiveness – cash transfers in programs like Indonesia's PKH, India's LLY, and the Philippines' 4Ps are conditioned on multiple factors like attendance, grade achievement, marital status, and health visits. However, their impacts were partial, with challenges in compliance, monitoring, or even unintended spillovers. Indeed, these and other programs flag difficulties with enforcement, monitoring and compliance. For example, the FESP had no monitoring systems in place to track compliance with attendance and grade achievement, under the BSM, the cash disbursement was delayed, and with the PKH, the implementation was uneven, and parents were unaware of requirements.

Secondly, upon looking at the last column of the table to assess why a program was effective or ineffective, it is found that some conditionalities were imposed

without commensurate investments in supportive infrastructure. The mismatch between the conditions imposed on students and households versus what the education system could realistically deliver (teacher availability, overcrowded classrooms, lack of learning materials, and school facilities) was a recurring bottleneck that limited the effectiveness of several interventions. Kanyashree Prakalpa's experience highlighted how enrolment conditionalities were enforced alongside teacher absenteeism and overcrowded classrooms. This missing supply-side support may have contributed to the stagnant math proficiency. This was also true for PKH and the 4Ps, and Xu et al. (2022) found that, in the case of Bangladesh's stipend programs, since schools lacked learning inputs, learning outcomes suffered. Such supply-side capacities vary by state, province, region or country, signalling the need to exercise context-awareness in identifying these region-specific systemic bottlenecks and mitigating them alongside designing and enacting CCTs.

Table 2 (Appendix) presents a comparison of the overarching conditions across studies, with *Progresa* leading the list. This comparison is insightful because, after all, these CCTs were designed and implemented following the success of CCTs in the Americas, with *Progresa* as the pioneer. Hence, it is safe to assume that some, if not all, conditionalities and design structures were replicated from, inspired by or adapted from the pioneering programs.

Continuing the argument on supply-side measures, *Progresa,* besides mandating school attendance, requires families to visit public health clinics regularly and participate in health and nutrition workshops. Indonesia's PKH follows a similar design and also mandates prenatal visits and regular child check-ups to continue receiving the transfer. However, indicating a lack of adjustment of the PKH to Indonesia's local contexts, Hudang et al. (2024) found that prenatal visits dropped by 18.8 percent. This is attributable to a lack of awareness among eligible beneficiaries and the non-availability of sound healthcare facilities and medicines.

Thirdly, as mentioned in the Literature Review section, the transfer amounts, frequency of transfers and the recipient have behavioural repercussions for how the cash is utilised and the household's management of finances and savings (Doepke and Tertilt, 2019; Pellerano and Barca, 2014; Yoong et al., 2012). Our sample of studies also has variations in CCT design in this aspect, allowing us to examine whether they are justified by locally-backed evidence (refer to Appendix

– Table 3). The transfer recipients are predominantly the students themselves and households. The transfer frequencies include annual, monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, bi-annual, and one-time. However, almost all the studies fail to state a rationale backed by local evidence to explain why they designed the transfers to be disbursed monthly, bi-annual, or one-time fashion, or why a certain amount was chosen. For instance, in the case of Bangladesh's FESP, Khandker et al. (2021) find that the transfer amounts were arbitrarily chosen, not tied to the outcome, nor backed by local evidence. Next, with regards to Pakistan's FSSP, transfers were made every month, but inflation and cost of living realities were not factored into the amount decided. Some programs are rolled out nationally (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2017; Catubig and Villano, 2017; Purba, 2018), limiting the alignment of transfer amounts and frequencies to local poverty profiles or household cost structures and requirements.

Fourth, concerning the school attendance threshold, 75-85 percent is the common range in those studies that explicitly specify a percentage. Studies that do not mention a figure mostly just condition the transfer on enrolment. As observed in the case of transfers, these figures are quoted without a locally-backed reasoning accompanying them. The Philippines' 4Ps program is a case in point. Closely modelled after successful CCTs in Latin American programs, the 4Ps program targets poor households, focusing on the health, nutrition, and education of children aged 0-18, with a maximum of seven years of support. In the education space, it mandates enrolment and specifies 85 percent as the attendance threshold for children aged 3-18 years to be eligible. This figure is replicated from *Progresa,* as shown in Table 2. Catubig and Villano (2017) evaluate the 4Ps impact in the Philippines' Davao Oriental and find that the impact was limited at the primary education level since the pre-program enrolment rates were already high. This suggests that the program has the scope to modify its enrolment and attendance conditionalities, keeping in mind the high enrolment rates; the 85 percent is not locally justified.

That this analysis does not allow for causal inferences to be made or definitive trends to be drawn from the CCTs is a finding in itself. This is partly attributable to the diverse measurement methods used and the various mechanisms that temper the effects of cash transfers on education outcomes. However, the authors call for transparency and the justification of conditionalities by local evidence specific to each country or region. As discussed, decisions behind the vital

conditionalities – setting the attendance thresholds and choosing payment recipients, frequencies and amounts are rarely backed by local evidence.

Context-awareness in conditionalities

The studies reviewed have varying degrees of context incorporated into the policy design. Even there, the links between context-awareness and effectiveness are not immediately clear and certainly cannot be causal. Below, these linkages are explored in the case of specific policies.

The Foundation-Assisted Schools Program in Pakistan shows particularly strong context-awareness, with subsidy amounts determined through formative research conducted by the implementing agency in 2007 (footnote 10, Barrera-Osorio and Raju, 2015). Similarly, India's Kanyashree Prakalpa designed its targets based on existing data on child marriage rates (Das and Sarkhel, 2023; The Madhya Pradesh Ladli Laxmi (Balika Protsahan) Vidheyak, 2018). Both programs achieved positive results, with the latter showing significant improvement in school enrolment and basic literacy.

To be sure, programs with partial or unclear context-awareness often showed diminished effectiveness. At one point, Bangladesh's Female Secondary Education Stipend Programme had transfer amounts decided arbitrarily rather than linked to educational outcomes (Shamsuddin, 2015; Khandker et al., 2021). Indonesia's Program Indonesia Pintar appears designed around improving PISA test scores – an arbitrary metric for justifying policy elements (Samalo and Jasmina, 2024; Ninghardjanti et al., 2023). Programs influenced primarily by foreign aid priorities (as many education CCTs considered here were), such as Cambodia's Primary School Scholarship Program (Barrera-Osorio and Filmer, 2016) and various Indonesian CCT initiatives (Hidayatina and Garces-Ozanne, 2019), demonstrated less context-sensitivity in their choice of policy design elements.

Given that policymakers may not have an explicit goal or reward linked with incorporating context, it may be challenging to evaluate policies along these lines. However, as discussed in the following section, being context aware is more likely linked with a more robust policy approach, even if it does not always translate to greater effectiveness.

4. Policy Implications and Recommendations

The field of computer science and engineering is flooded with ways in which being context-aware can help application designers and others. This includes innovations in recommender systems (e.g., how an online platform might use information about a customer's location, past purchase history, and other details to suggest items to purchase), as well as in the case of more responsive educational / learning platforms (Zheng et al., 2019). The work in this domain points toward greater user engagement among other metrics as indicators that designing context-aware systems adds value.

While analysing context-aware policy among education-based CCTs, the authors note that there are several that include stakeholder engagement plans as well as some justification for policy choices. However, despite there being no clear causal link, the paper argues that incorporating the context of stakeholders and beneficiaries in policy design is critical to ensuring efficient and robust policy design. In this final section, actionable recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders to consider in their design are highlighted.

Figure 1 describes a framework that follows a four-step, iterative loop for policymakers to incorporate context-awareness in their choice of policy design elements.



Figure 1: A framework for context-aware policy design

A. Knowing the context

The first and most critical aspect of context-aware policy relates to having data or evidence to justify policy design choices. In the analysis, there was only one study that used a formative survey to determine the value of the cash transfer to households (Barrera-Osorio and Raju, 2014). Furthermore, the information on explicit justification of policy elements may not always be based on formative research but on existing economic conditions (e.g., post-war periods, pandemics etc.). Although this makes the task of gathering contextual data challenging for policymakers, it will still ensure a one-to-one correspondence between the policy goals and stakeholders (and beneficiary) concerns.

B. Using the context appropriately

The functional-technical aspects of using evidence for policymaking (Wiseman, 2010) may involve a policymaker choosing to emulate the success of one policy in an entirely different context. Indeed, as seen in various education CCTs, the tendency of policymakers to adapt from previously successful CCTs is cited as a key justification for certain policy components (Filmer and Schady, 2011; Edmonds and Shrestha, 2014). In the face of political concerns at home as well as abroad (e.g., in the case of foreign aid supported programs), it is likely that contextual factors explored in step 1 may be ignored or underweighted. Using the contextual data from formative research implies that policymakers must draw justifications for their design choices (such as conditions for a CCT, or the mode of transfer, as seen in section 3). In this manner, it is more likely that choices will be fine-tuned to the context in which the policy is being implemented, rather than in a vacuum.

C. Evaluating the context

How does one understand whether context has been sufficiently (and appropriately) taken into account? There is a risk that the context in which policy success is measured / observed varies widely from that in which the proposed policy is being considered. One solution involves collecting data on the set of indicators tied to the conditions (within a CCT, for example) in an iterative manner. This is the stage at which the importance of context will likely become clear to a (nearly) context-aware policymaker. If the policy has been designed without rooting in the formative research as well as the economic context, it may be more likely to result in inefficient outcomes (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009).

More importantly, it may become administratively infeasible, increasing costs associated with reworking the implementation and design. Focusing purely on measurable metrics here may also present risks for being able to account for context, as has been identified in the educational research literature (Wiseman, 2010).

D. Learning for the future

Finally, it is critical for this process to be ongoing and continuous. Evidence on successes (or failures) of new policies may emerge periodically, which policymakers have the onerous task of using to update their beliefs. In a world where this is typically challenging, there may be heuristic approaches that are more appealing. For example, one could argue that context-awareness can be approximated using culturally-close or similar country contexts in which policy design elements have been successful. This pre-empts the need for a policymaker to go through all the steps above, and instead simply adapt policies from culturally-proximate countries. In the case of Bangladesh for example, where many CCTs have been run, culturally similar countries like India and Pakistan may be able to quickly transfer policy choices, accounting for scale. However, much like heuristics used in decision-making, these may lead to systematic errors – leaving the door open for policy inefficiencies. It is thus recommended that policymakers must continue iteratively collecting data on the context-sensitive elements of their policy, and also adapt to changing social, economic, and institutional factors that may come into play.

Concluding Remarks

The proposed framework is flexible and iterative, and requires the four steps – knowing, using, evaluating and learning – to loop to account for a dynamic context; by the time a policymaker reaches the learning stage while framing a policy, the context may have changed from what it was in the knowing stage, requiring a repeat of the process.

Next, the authors refrain from specifying rigid, quantifiable indicators/metrics or hard criteria to determine context-aware policy design to avoid triggering Goodhart-type distortions. In simple terms, Goodhart's law (Goodhart, 1984; Ng, 2024) posits that anything that can be measured is susceptible to being gamed (Muller, 2018) and that when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure, as it may incentivise people to manipulate the metric to showcase better

performance, undermining the metric's effectiveness. In a policy perspective, this aligns with the KPI-based approach – excessive reliance on simplified or over- focused objectives may result in the creation of only those measures that can be counted, potentially overlooking nuances in context. Indeed, the use of indicators has been criticised in literature due to their narrow and reductionist analytical nature, risking a narrow focus on only those policies that can be measured at the expense of less measurable issues (Bell & Morse, 2012; Mair et al., 2018; Merry, 2011).

By incorporating a loop and preventing 'metric fixation' (Muller, 2018), the framework emphasises the importance of adaptive public policy (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Walker et al., 2001). Walker et al. (2001) advocate the need for an adaptive policymaking process which recognises that policymaking is an inherently future-looking exercise filled with uncertainty. This framework dovetails well with the one proposed by Walker et al., since it also stresses on continuous diagnosis and corrective action. In setting up this framework, it is hoped that robust policies are built on monitored indicators along with explicit flexibility, not on single static rules or ad-hoc heuristics.

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Appendix

Table 1: Summary of evidence across studies evaluating CCTs in South and Southeast Asia

Nameof paper	Author(s) and year	Research problem	Program evaluated	Outcome variable	Location	Possible hurdles in implementation/mechanisms	Experiment design and sampling	Condition(s) imposed	Findings	Implementing entity	Qualifies as a context-aware intervention?	Intervention effective?	Why effective or not?
Does more schooling imply improved learning? Evidence from the Kanyashree Prakalpa in India	Das & Sarkhel (2023)	Impact of conditional cash transfers on female school enrolmentand learning outcomes in West Bengal, India	Kanyashree Prakalpa (KP)	Female school enrolment, basic reading skills, and mathematics proficiency (3 by 1 division problems)	West Bengal, India	Poor school infrastructure, teacher absenteeism, and limited complementary resourcesfor higher learning levels	Difference-in-Difference (DID) regressions; control states were Assam and Tripura; data from ASER and administrative records; age group: 13–16 years.	Annual transfer(INR 1000) and lump sum (INR 25,000 at 18 years) for unmarried girls pursuing education	Significant increase in school enrolment; no improvement in higher-order learning (e.g., division skills); improvements in basic literacy; decline in classrooms and teacher availability hindered outcomes.	Government of West Bengal (with support from UNICEF)	Yes, targets are based on existing data on child marriage ((Government of West Bengal, n.d.))	Partially	Increased enrolmentand lower-level learning gains achieved. However, the program lacked complementary investments in infrastructure and teaching resources, leading to declines in higher-order learning outcomes like mathematics skills.
Remedial Education with Incentivized Peer Tutoring: Evidence from Migrant Children Schools in China	Li (2012)	Effectiveness of incentivized peer-tutoring as a remedial education strategy for underperforming students in migrant schools	Incentivized Peer Tutoring Program	Academic performance (test scores improvement)	Shanghai, China	Low teacher incentives, lack of structured peer interaction, limited teacher monitoring, high student-teacher ratio, and large class sizes.	Fieldexperiment in two migrant schools, with classesassigned to monetary, nonmonetary, or control groups; matched peer tutors (strong students) with underperforming tutees (weak students); used pre- and post-treatment test scores to evaluate impact; 9 monetary program classes, 2 nonmonetary program classes, and 11 control classes.	Tutors competedfor monetary prizes based on tutees' test score improvement. Nonmonetary groups received certificates and public recognition.	Monetary incentives significantly increased tutees' test scores by about 0.9 standard deviations, with some long-term gains observed. Nonmonetary incentives improved scores by 0.615 standard deviations.	Authors for the purposes of this paper	Partially, based off existing background of schooling, but not using any formative study of the site in which the intervention was carried out (sections 2 and 3).	Yes	Effective due to competition among peer tutors and alignment of incentives with effort; however, resource constraints (teacher monitoring, structured sessions) limited the scalability and effectiveness, particularly in less organized schools or for older students.
Labour Market Effects of a Female Stipend Programme in Bangladesh	Shamsuddin (2015)	Long-term labourmarket effects of a stipend programme aimed at improving	Female Secondary Education Stipend Programme (FESP)	Education level, labour force participation, wages, and sector of employment	Bangladesh	Lack of sufficient job opportunities for secondary-educated females, leading to low-productivity self-employment; no demand-side interventions to support labour marketabsorption	Difference-in-Difference framework using repeated cross-sectional data from Household Income and	Stipendfor secondary school girls conditional on 75% attendance, remaining	Increased education level by 1 year and female labour force participation by 6	Government of Bangladesh (with support from the World Bank, ADB and others)	No, as choice of design elements within the policy (especially early on, appear to have been driven by foreignaid	Partially	While the stipend increased education and labour force participation, it failed to

		female education and empowerment					Expenditure Surveys(HIES) (1995–2010); comparison of cohorts based on program exposure	unmarried, and scoring at least 45% in school exams	percentage points. However, wages decreased by 17% due to lack of productive employment opportunities.		concerns and not directly based on formative studies. In fact, Khandker et al. (2021) suggests that at one point, the transferamounts were decided arbitrarily and not linked to the outcome of secondary education for girls.		translate into meaningful economic empowerment due to insufficient job market demand and reliance on low-return self-employment. Demand-side interventions were needed.
Does More Cash in Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Always Leadto Larger Impacts on School Attendance?	Filmer & Schady (2011)	The diminishing marginal returns of increasing cash transfer sizes on school attendance	CESSP Scholarship Program (CSP)	School attendance	Cambodia	Diminishing marginal returns to cash transfer size; $45 scholarship covered direct schooling costs but $60 did not yield higher attendance rates.	Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD); 100 lower secondary schools; $45 vs $60 scholarships; attendance tracked through unannounced school visits over 4 rounds.	Cash transfers ($45 or $60/year) conditional on 7th-grade enrolment, regular attendance, and promotion to the next grade.	$45 scholarship increased attendance by 25 percentage points; $60 did not further increase attendance.	Government of Cambodia (with support from the World Bank, DFID and others)	Yes, partially designed taking into account past programs; but choice of design elements primarily drawn to avoid earlier implementation challenges (Filmer, 2008), but no evidence of formative research.	Partially	Effective in raising attendance to 70% from 44% for $45. However, additional $15 had negligible impact, suggesting direct costs of schooling are key, and opportunity costs remain unchanged.
A Study on the Academic Performance of Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) Recipients in a Selected Secondary School	Sasaki etal. (2019)	Effectiveness of 4Ps conditional cash transfer program in improving academic performance and attendance in high school students	Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps)	Academic performance (grades), school attendance, completion rates	Philippines	Decline in attendance and academic performance as students progress to higher grades; insufficientmonitoring and support mechanisms	Four-year monitoring of 4Ps recipients (2013–2017) in a secondary school; academic performance and attendance data compared for Grades 7 to 10.	Cash transfer of PHP 500/month for healthand nutrition and PHP 300/month for education, conditional on 85% school attendance	Attendance and grades declined as students progressed to higher grades. Completion rate for Grade 10 was 95% in 2017–2018.	Government of the Philippines (with initial support from the World Bank, ADB and others)	Yes, the program containsan underlying framework on which it is implemented, which cites an inclusive approach and involving stakeholders and beneficiaries in project consultations. It is unclear how much this translates into design choices (DSWD, 2021)	Partially	Attendance and completion rates were high, but academic performance declined due to limited support mechanisms and lack of sustained student engagement.
Assessing Gender Parity in Intrahousehold Allocation of Educational	Xu et al. (2022)	Impact of Female Stipend Programs (FSPs) on gender parity in intrahousehold	Female Stipend Programs (FSPs)	School enrolment, total educational expenditure, core	Bangladesh	Contradirectional gender gap: profemale bias in enrolment but promale bias ineducational expenditure and core share allocation	Double-difference estimation combined with an extended hurdle model	Stipendfor secondary school girls conditional on attendance and	Increased female enrolment but did not narrow gender gap in intrahousehold	Government of Bangladesh (with support from the World Bank, ADB and others)	Same as FESP, partial	Partially	Effective in increasing female enrolment, but persistent promale bias in

Resources: Evidence from Bangladesh		allocation of educational resourcesand schooling outcomes		expenditure share (private tutoring, textbooks, materials)			(three-part model); four rounds of nationally representative household surveys	passing requirements	educational resource allocation, especially in core expenditures.				educational expenditure and quality resources limited improvements in learning outcomes and parity in education quality. Complementary policiesare needed to address these gaps.
School Dropouts and Conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from a Randomised Controlled Trial in Rural China	Mo etal. (2013)	The role of conditional cash transfersin reducing dropout rates among poor junior high school students in rural China	Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)	School dropout rates	Rural China	Insufficient transferamount for the poorest families; high opportunity costs of staying in school; structural poverty in rural areas	Randomised controlled trial with 300 of the poorest students in 10 junior high schools; 150 in treatmentand 150 in control group; dropout rates compared between groups.	Cash transfer of RMB 500/semester conditional on 80% attendance and remaining enrolled in school	Reduced dropout rates from 13.3% (control) to 5.3% (treatment), mosteffective for poorer-performing students; no significant impact on academic performance or learning outcomes.	Authors for the purposes of this paper	No available information on formative research or prior interaction with local stakeholders and beneficiaries prior to policy intervention.	Partially	The program significantly reduced dropout rates but did not address academic performance. Limited effectiveness for the poorest families suggests that the cash transfer amount may have been insufficient. Structural poverty remainsa challenge.
Can Cash Transfers Mitigate Child Labour? Evidence from Indonesia's Cash Transfer Programme for Poor Students in Java	Hidayatina & Garces-Ozanne (2019)	Effectiveness of cashtransfers in reducing child labour participationin economic and household activitiesamong poor students	Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)	Participation in household chores, economic activities, total hours worked	Java, Indonesia	Self-selection bias in programme participation; cash transfer amounts may be insufficient to fully offset opportunity costs of child labour	Bivariate Probit model with endogenous binary regressor; data from Indonesian Family Life Survey (2014–2015); sample: 4512 children aged 6–14 years, 969 beneficiaries, 3543 non-beneficiaries.	Conditional on school enrolment, attendance, and promotion; cash transfers between IDR 450,000 to IDR 1,000,000/year	Reduced probability of child labour in household chores by 34% and in economic activities by 38%; significant reductionin total work hours; greater impact inrural areas.	Government of Indonesia (with initial support from the World Bank, ADB and others)	Partially based on public expenditure review report by the World Bank (2012), but initial design elements appear driven by foreign / multilateral aid as well as replicating the success of other programs.	Yes	Effective due to reduced child work participation and increased time for school-related activities. Less impact inurban areas and among girls due to cultural and opportunity cost factors. Targeting mechanisms were efficient in rural areas.

Evaluation of Poverty Alleviation Policy: Can Conditional Cash Transfers Improve the Academic Performance of Poor Students in Indonesia?	Hadna & Kartika (2017)	Impact of PKH conditional cash transfer on school enrolment, attendance, and academic performance in poor households	Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)	School enrolment, attendance, academic achievement (exam results for Bahasa Indonesia, Mathematics, English)	Indonesia	High teacherabsenteeism and inadequate school facilities; structural poverty affecting access to junior high schools	Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) across six provinces (2007–2013); panel data from 360 districts with treatment and control groups; Instrumental Variable (IV) method used to address endogeneity.	Fixed cash transfer(Rp 200,000) and variable transfer(Rp 400,000–Rp 800,000), conditional on school enrolmentand attendance	Increased enrolment by 7.1% for junior high schools, significant attendance improvement at elementary level, and better grades in UAS exams; minimal impact at primary level due to already high enrolment.	Government of Indonesia (with initial support from the World Bank, ADB and others)	Partially based on public expenditure review report by the World Bank (2012), but initial design elements appear driven by foreign / multilateral aid as well as replicating the success of other programs.	Partially	Effective for enrolmentand academic achievementat junior high school. Limited by poor infrastructure, teacher absenteeism, and difficulty in accessing schools in rural areas. Addressing these issues could enhance impact.
Does Conditional Cash Transfer Deliver? The Indonesian Evidence on PKH	Hudang et al. (2024)	Impact of PKH on food consumption, children's education, and prenatal health visits	Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)	Food expenditure, school attendance, educational attainment, frequency of prenatal health visits	Indonesia	Uneven distribution of benefits; lack of awareness about health and education; insufficient healthcare facilities and infrastructure	Difference-in-Difference (DID) method using Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) data from 2007 and 2014 to compare outcomes for treatedand control households.	Cash transfers conditional on 85% school attendance, remaining enrolled, prenatal visits, and child health checks	Significantly increased food expenditure (9.5%) but no significant improvement in educational attainment or prenatal visits; prenatal visits declined by 18.8%.	Government of Indonesia (with initial support from the World Bank, ADB and others)	Partially based on public expenditure review report by the World Bank (2012), but initial design elements appear driven by foreign / multilateral aid as well as replicating the success of other programs.	Partially	Effective in improving food consumption but failed to enhance education or healthcare outcomes due to low parental awareness, poor infrastructure, and economic vulnerability.
Does Conditional Cash Transfer Deliver? The Indonesian Evidence on PKH (only education-focused)	Hudang et al. (2024)	Impact of PKH on children's educational attainment	Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)	School attendance, educational attainment	Indonesia	Low awareness among parents and children about the importance of education; economic vulnerability leading to school dropouts	Difference-in-Difference (DID) method using Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) data from 2007 and 2014 to compare outcomes for treatedand control households.	Cash transfers conditional on 85% school attendance and remaining enrolled	No significant improvement in children's educational attainment levels; limited impact due to low parental awarenessand economic challenges.	Government of Indonesia (with initial support from the World Bank, ADB and others)	Partially based on public expenditure review report by the World Bank (2012), but initial design elements appear driven by foreign / multilateral aid as well as replicating the success of other programs.	No	Insufficient parental awareness about education's importance and persistent economic vulnerabilities hindered long-term educational gains despite increased attendance.
Conditional Cash Transfer and School Outcomes: An Evaluation of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program in	Catubig & Villano (2017)	Impact of 4Ps on school enrolment growth rates and educational attainment in a provincial context	Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps)	School enrolment rates (elementary and secondary schools)	Davao Oriental, Philippines	Lack of school infrastructure, poor implementationin remote areas, and limited programme coverage in some municipalities	Difference-in-Differences (DID) approach; school- and student-level data analysis comparing treated municipalities	Conditional cash transfer contingent on school enrolment, attendance, and health visits	Positive enrolment growth rates in secondary schools (+4.07%) compared to non-4Ps areas. Minimal	Government of the Philippines (with initial support from the World Bank, ADB and others)	Yes, the program containsan underlying framework on which it is implemented, which cites an inclusive approach and	Partially	Effective in improving secondary school enrolment but limited impact at primary level due to pre-existing high

Davao Oriental, Philippines							with control areas (2005–2011); sample of 360 schools and 400 students		impact in elementary schools where enrolment was already high before the intervention.		involving stakeholders and beneficiaries in project consultations. It is unclear how much this translates into design choices (DSWD, 2021)		enrolment rates. Structural challenges like insufficient classroomsand teacher shortages remain key issues.
The Medium-Term Impact of the Primary Education Stipendin Rural Bangladesh	Baulch (2011)	Assessing the medium-term impact of the Primary Education Stipend(PES) programme on education, health, and household welfare outcomes in rural Bangladesh	Primary Education Stipend (PES)	School enrolment, grade progression, stunting, household expenditures	Rural Bangladesh	Declining real value of the stipend, weak targeting, and limited programme coverage leading to insufficientimpacts.	Quasi-experimental approach with three-wave panel survey (2000, 2003, 2006); propensity score matching combined with Difference-in-Differences (DID) method.	Monthly stipend of BDT 100–125 conditional on 85% school attendance and primary school enrolment	Negligible impact on school enrolments and grade progression; modest improvement in height-for-age among girls and BMI for boys; ineffective in increasing household expenditures or school enrolment.	Government of Bangladesh (with support from the World Bank and UNICEF)	Yes, since PES was implemented as a re-worked version of an earlier program (Food for Education, or FFE), primarily in response to fiscal constraints. However, there is no information available on targeting parameters or whether any formative work was undertaken prior to implementation	No	Weak targeting, low cash transfer value, and declining real value of the stipend resulted in limited impacts on education outcomes and household welfare.
The Medium-Term Impact of the Primary Education Stipendin Rural Bangladesh (only education-focused)	Baulch (2011)	Assessing the impact of PES on primary school enrolmentand grade progression	Primary Education Stipend (PES)	School enrolment, grade progression	Rural Bangladesh	Declining real value of the stipend; weak programme targeting and geographical coverage; low enforcement of attendance conditions	Three-wave panel survey (2000, 2003, 2006); propensity score matching with Difference-in-Differences (DID)	Monthly stipend of BDT 100–125 conditional on 85% school attendance and enrolment	Negligible impact on primary school enrolments; grade progression loweramong PES beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries.	Government of Bangladesh (with support from the World Bank and UNICEF)	Yes, since PES was implemented as a re-worked version of an earlier program (Food for Education, or FFE), primarily in response to fiscal constraints. However, there is no information available on targeting parameters or whether any formative work was undertaken prior to implementation	No	The limited stipend amount, lack of robust targeting, and weak enforcement of conditionality contributed to poor educational outcomes.
Conditional Cash Transfers and Female Schooling: The Impact of the Female School	Chaudhury & Parajuli (2010)	Impact of the Female School Stipend Programme (FSSP) on enrolments in	Female School Stipend Programme (FSSP)	Female school enrolment, gender parity in public schooling participation	Punjab, Pakistan	Declining real stipend value, limited private school access, weak targeting of educationally deprivedareas, and insufficient programme monitoring	Difference-in-Differences (DID) with Triple Differencing (DDD) and Regression	Monthly stipend of PKR 200 conditional on 80% attendance and	Increased female enrolment by 9% and decreased dropout rates	Government of Punjab, Pakistan (with support from the World Bank, DFID and others)	Yes, the program, although funded by foreign aid, appears to be locally driven and implemented,	Partially	Effective in boosting female enrolmentand reducing dropouts but faced

Stipend Programme on Public School Enrolments in Punjab, Pakistan		public schools and female schooling outcomes in Punjab, Pakistan					Discontinuity Design (RDD) applied to school census data (2003–2005) and household surveys	enrolmentin public secondary schools	by 25%; estimated increase of 6 girls per school. Impacts stronger in rural areas withfewer private schools.		keeping in mind the education context in the Punjab region. Unclear if the specific design elements were based on formative research. The website contains a detailedmanual, including a stakeholder and beneficiary engagement plan.		challenges like declining real stipend value and limited access to quality education infrastructure.
You Get What You Pay For: Schooling Incentives and Child Labor in Nepal	Edmonds & Shrestha (2014)	Impact of scholarships and conditional stipends on school attendance, grade failure, and child labour among children associated with carpet factories	Nepal Schooling Incentives Project	School attendance, grade failure, and child labour participationin carpet weaving	Kathmandu, Nepal	Declining impact of one-time scholarships after funds are used; stipend only effective during the intervention period; economic necessity drives child labour	Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) with 660 children (aged 10–16) at risk of entering child labour; three groups: control, scholarship (school fees covered), and stipend (scholarship + monthly food credit if attendance met)	Scholarship covered schooling expenses; stipend recipients received food credit (NPR 1000/month) conditional on 80% school attendance	Stipend increased school attendance by 11%, reduced grade failure by 46%, and decreased child labour in carpet weaving by 48%. Effects disappeared 16 months after the intervention ended.	Authors for the purposes of this paper(with support from Nepal GoodWeave Foundation – a local NGO)	Partially, yes. Implemented by an NGO (Nepal Goodweave Foundation), it appears to be based on their field experience (though unclear how the targeting parameters were precisely derived.	Partially	While the stipend effectively improved schooling and reduced child labour during the intervention, its impact faded once financial support ended, indicating that economic constraints continued to drive child labour participation.
The Effect of Educational Cash Transfer for Students from Low-Income Families on Students' Dropout Rate in Indonesia	Samalo & Jasmina (2024)	Impact of Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP) on student dropout rates before and during the Covid-19 pandemic	Program Indonesia Pintar (PIP)	Dropout probability at primary, junior secondary, and senior secondary school levels	Indonesia	Delayed disbursement of funds, misallocation of cash for non-educational expenses, and insufficient support for higher education costs	Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method using cross-sectional data from SUSENAS (2019 and 2021); comparison between recipients and non-recipients of PIP	Fixedannual cashtransfers: IDR 450,000 (primary), IDR 750,000 (junior secondary), IDR 1,000,000 (senior secondary)	PIP reduced dropout rates for junior secondary students both before and during Covid-19; significant reductionfor senior secondary students during Covid-19; no impact on primary students in 2021.	Government of Indonesia (with initial support from the World Bank and others)	No publicly available information on how the program was designed, but one paper (Ninghardjanti et al., 2023) suggests that it was based off improving scores on the PISA test, suggesting an arbitrary metric for justifying policy elements.	Partially	The program successfully reduced dropout rates at junior and senior secondary levels but had no significant impact on primary education. Issues like delayed disbursement, cash misallocation, and insufficient funds for higher education

													limited effectiveness.
Own and Sibling Effects of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Theory and Evidence from Cambodia	Ferreira et al. (2009)	Examines how child-specific conditional cash transfersimpact school enrolment and work participation of botheligible children and theirineligible siblings	Cambodia Education Sector Support Project (CESSP) Scholarship Program	School enrolment, child labour participation (paidand unpaid)	Cambodia	Modest scholarship amounts; potential displacement effects where resources are reallocated within households; scholarship impact may not extend to siblings	Regression discontinuity (RD) design; comparison of children just above and below scholarship cutoff; household survey data on 3,453 randomly selected applicants and theirfamilies	Scholarship conditioned on school enrolment for middle-school-aged children	Eligible children were 20 percentage pointsmore likely to enrol in school and 10 percentage points less likely to work for pay. However, the program had no significant effect on the school enrolment or work participation of ineligible siblings.	Government of Cambodia (with support from the World Bank, DFID and others)	Yes, partially designed taking into account past programs; but choice of design elements primarily drawn to avoid earlier implementation challenges (Filmer, 2008), but no evidence of formative research.	Yes(for eligible children), No (for ineligible siblings)	Strong substitution effect for eligible children, but ambiguous effects for ineligible siblings due to competing income and displacement effects. The scholarship amount (2-3% of household expenditures) was too small to generate broader household-wide changes.
The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on the Matriculation of Junior High School Studentsinto Rural China's High Schools	Li etal. (2017)	Examines whether a CCT voucher, conditional on high school matriculation, increases transition rates for disadvantaged students	Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Voucher Program in Rural China	High school matriculation, junior high school dropout	Rural China (Shaanxi and Hebei provinces)	High opportunity costs of schooling; perceived unattainability of high school admission due to competitive entrance exams; small transfer amount relative to potential earnings from unskilled labour	Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) with 1,418 disadvantaged junior high school students across 132 schools in 15 poor counties; OLS and school fixed-effects models	Voucher conditional on enrolling in academic or vocational high school (1,500 yuan per year for three years)	No significant impact on high school matriculation or dropout rates. No differential effects by student academic performance. Some indication of positive spillover effects on non-recipients in treatment schools.	Authors for the purposes of this paper	No clear information on how policy context was derived and how specifics of design choices were arrivedat.	No	The CCT voucherdid not sufficiently reduce the perceived costs of high school. Studentsfacing high opportunity costs and academic barriers did not find the incentive strong enough to alter their educational decisions. The program timing (voucher given 3 years before matriculation) may have reduced effectiveness.
Own and Spillover Effects of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program Targeting	Jain (2018)	Evaluates both direct and spillover effects of a CCT program on birth registration, fertility	Ladli Laxmi Yojana (LLY), India	Birth registration, sex ratio at birth, fertility behaviour, schooling outcomes	Madhya Pradesh, India	Deferred payments may reduce immediate impact on education; high opportunity costs for schooling; program might reinforce son-preference as sterilization is required for	Difference-in-Differences (DID) and Triple-Difference (DDD) using state-level Civil Registration System Data,	Enrolment in program conditional on birth order (first or second-born girl), deferred	Increased birth registration for girls but no impact on sex ratio; increased parental	Government of Madhya Pradesh, India	The policy document (Government of Madhya Pradesh, 2022) states several goals that are targeted by	Partially	Increased registration but did not alter deep-rooted gender preferences; small effect on

Young Girls: Evidence from India		behaviour, and educational outcomes of girls		(enrolment, mathand reading scores)		parents of eligible second-born daughters	Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS), and ASER survey (2009-14)	cashincentives conditional on reaching schooling milestones and remaining unmarried till 18	sterilization rates; minor improvement in girls' school enrolment and test scores; negative spillover effect on ineligible older siblings' mathand reading skills due to resource reallocation		the policy, but no clear basis on which these have been identified. There is some provisionfor local stakeholder engagement, but this is largely for raising awareness around the policy and potentially not related to incorporating their views into policy design.		education due to liquidity constraints and delayed payments; negative spillovers for older siblings suggest reallocation of resources within households
Effects over the Life of a Program: Evidence from an Education Conditional Cash Transfer Program for Girls	Chhabra, Najeeb and Raju (2019)	Examines the long-term effects of an education-based conditional cash transfer(CCT) program on secondary school enrolment for girls in Punjab, Pakistan	Punjab Female School Stipend Program	Girls' secondary school enrolmentin government schools	Punjab, Pakistan	Declining real value of cash benefits due to inflation; potential Behavioral shifts and re-optimization byhouseholds over time; possible spillover effects to non-beneficiaries	Regression Discontinuity (RD) design with local randomization; administrative school census data from 2003-2015	Cash transfer conditional on 80% school attendance per quarter for girls in grades 6-10 in selected low-literacy districts	Positive, stable impact on girls' secondary enrolment (25–41% increase per school) despite a 60% drop in real cash transfer value over time. Suggests potential Behavioral explanations such as shifting social normsand increased salience of girls' education.	Government of Punjab, Pakistan (with support from the World Bank, DFID and others)	Yes, the program, although funded by foreign aid, appears to be locally driven and implemented, keeping in mind the education context in the Punjab region. Unclear if the specific design elements were based on formative research. The website contains a detailedmanual, including a stakeholder and beneficiary engagement plan.	Yes	Despite economic incentives weakening over time, stable long-term effects suggest that the program influenced household perceptions and social normsaround girls' education, leading to sustained school participation.
Impact Evaluation of Indonesia Conditional Cash Transfer Program (BSM) on Student Achievement	Purba (2018)	Evaluates whether Indonesia's BSM program improves student achievementas measured by national final exam scores	Bantuan Siswa Miskin (BSM)	Final school exam scores (UN/EBTANAS)	Indonesia	Weak targeting (50-70% of recipients ineligible), misallocation of funds, lack of monitoring, and delayed disbursements	Propensity Score Matching (PSM) using Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) Wave 5; treatmentgroup (205 students) vs. control (1,252 students)	Cash transfer conditional on school enrolmentand being classified as a poor student	Students receiving BSM scored 5.6% higher on exams than non-recipients; however, targeting inefficiencies reduced overall effectiveness	Government of Indonesia (with support from the World Bank)	Partially based on public expenditure review report by the World Bank (2012), but initial design elements appear driven by foreign / multilateral aid as well as replicating the success of other programs.	Partially	The program improved student achievement, but weak targeting and inefficient disbursement limited its full potential. Strengthening monitoring and refining targeting criteria would enhance impact.

Getting Girls into School: Evidence from a Scholarship Program in Cambodia	Filmer & Schady (2013)	Examines whether a targeted scholarship program improves school enrolment and attendance among poor girls transitioning to lower secondary school	Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction (JFPR) Scholarship Program	School enrolment, school attendance	Cambodia	Scholarships may not be large enough to overcome household barriers to schooling; program implementation relied on local selection committees that had discretion in selecting beneficiaries; potential misuse of funds since no enforcement mechanism ensured money was spent on schooling	Regression Discontinuity (RD) design; nearest neighbour matching; baseline and follow-up school enrolment surveys covering 93 lower secondary schools and 3,623 students	Cash transfer ($45 per year) conditional on school enrolment, passing grades, and less than 10 absences per year	Scholarship recipients were 30 percentage pointsmore likely to be enrolled and attending school than non-recipients. Largesteffects were observed among the poorest students and those living farthestfrom school.	Government of Cambodia, grant financed by JFPR and administered by ADB (with support from UNICEF)	Similarto other CCTs implemented with foreign aid and assistance, there is not much evidence to indicate that it was implemented based on formative research or that design parameters were chosen on the basis of local experience or expertise. Likely implemented to mirror success of other CCTs (Filmer and Schady, 2013)	Yes	The CCT successfully increased school enrolmentand attendance, especially for the most disadvantaged girls. However, lack of enforcement mechanisms meant funds could be used for other household needs.
Effect of Girls' Secondary School Stipend on Completed Schooling, Age at Marriage, and Age at First Birth: Evidence from Bangladesh	Sayeed (2016)	Examines the impact of a secondary school stipend program on school completion, marriage age, and first birth age in rural Bangladesh	Female Secondary Stipend Program (FSSP)	Completed years of schooling, age at first marriage, age at first birth	Rural Bangladesh	Potential selection bias in program implementation; convergence effects between treatment and control groups over time; weak enforcement of marriage age restriction	Regression Discontinuity (RD) and Difference-in-Differences (DiD) using Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS) data (1993-94, 1999-2000, 2011); 23,491 women sampled	Stipend conditional on school enrolment, passing grades, minimum 75% attendance, and remaining unmarried until age 18 or secondary school completion	Increased completed schooling byat least 0.4 years; delayed age at first marriage by 0.4 years and age at first birth by 0.3 years; DiD results suggest potential bias due to time-variant factors	Government of Bangladesh	Yes, the program, although funded by foreign aid, appears to be locally driven and implemented, keeping in mind the education context in the Punjab region. Unclear if the specific design elements were based on formative research. The website contains a detailedmanual, including a stakeholder and beneficiary engagement plan.	Yes	The stipend effectively increased schooling and delayed marriage and childbirth, though long-term effects on fertility and labour market outcomes remain uncertain. Weak enforcement of the marriage conditionmay have limited impact on social norms.
Can a Public Scholarship Program Successfully Reduce School Drop-outs ina Time of Economic Crisis? Evidence from Indonesia	Cameron (2009)	Evaluates the effectiveness of a scholarship program in reducing school dropouts during the Asian financial crisis	Social Safety Net (JPS) Scholarship Program	School dropout rate (primary, lower secondary, upper secondary)	Indonesia	Weak targeting accuracy; potential for elite capture in school committees; reliance on self-reported socioeconomic status for selection; scholarships might not fully offset economic hardships	Difference-in-Differences (DiD) and Probit regression analysis using Indonesia's "100 Village Survey" data (1997–1999); village fixed effects models	Cash transfer conditional on school enrolmentand attendance	Scholarships reduced lower secondary school dropout rates by 3 percentage points(38% reduction) but had no impact at primary or upper secondary	Government of Indonesia (with support from the World Bank and ADB)	Partially motivated by post-crisis fiscal expenditure to mitigate poverty, with targeting at the local levels (Reimers et al., 2006). However, some design elements are not clear and further	Yes(for lower secondary), No (for primary and upper secondary)	Effective at the most vulnerable education level, but lack of impact at primary and upper secondary due to already high retentionrates or insufficient

									levels. Cost-benefit analysis showed the program covered costs at lower secondary level.		information on formative research is unavailable.		financial incentives. The crisis context increased program effectiveness.
Delivering Education to the Underserved through a Public-Private Partnership Program in Pakistan	Barrera-Osorio et al. (2017)	Evaluates the impact of a public-private partnership (PPP) program that subsidized local entrepreneurs to operate tuition-free private schools in rural Sindh, Pakistan	Promoting Low-Cost Private Schooling in Rural Sindh (PPRS)	School enrolment, test scores	Sindh, Pakistan	Limited school infrastructure and teaching resources; weak enforcement of school input requirements; potential for misallocation of resources by school operators	Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) with 199 villages(82 received a gender-uniform subsidy, 79 received a gender-differentiated subsidy, 38 were control); administrative school census data; household and school surveys	Schools had to provide tuition-free education. In the gender-uniform subsidy arm, per-student payments were equal for boys and girls; in the gender-differentiated subsidy arm, schools received a higher per-student subsidy for girls.	Increased school enrolment by 30 percentage pointsamong children aged 6–10 and 12 percentage pointsamong children aged 11–17. Improvedtest scores by 0.63 standard deviations. No significant difference in enrolment or learning outcomes between gender-uniform and gender-differentiated subsidy models. Private schools were more effective than nearby government schools in raising student achievement.	Sindh Education Foundation, Government of Sindh, Pakistan (with support from the World Bank)	Unclear whether the implementing organization conducted any formative research or has stakeholder engagement plans in place. The specific targeting criteria developed in the paper do not mention anything about how these were arrivedat.	Yes	The PPP model significantly increased school enrolment and learning outcomes, but the gender-differentiated subsidy did not have additional effects. Private operators were efficient in resource allocation, and flexible management allowed schools to respond effectively to local conditions.
Evaluating the Impact of Public Student Subsidies on Low-Cost Private Schools in Pakistan	Barrera-Osorio & Raju (2015)	Assesses the impact of a performance-based per-student subsidy program on student enrolment and school inputs in low-cost private schools	Foundation-Assisted Schools (FAS) Program, Punjab Education Foundation	School enrolment, number of teachers, number of classrooms, student-teacher and student-classroom ratios	Punjab, Pakistan	Weak enforcement of accountability measures; potential school selection biases; subsidy may create incentives for manipulation of school inputs; unknown effects on student learning	Regression Discontinuity (RD) design using a sharp cut-off; school-level administrative data from Punjab Education Foundation (PEF); follow-up	Schoolsmust meet a minimum pass rate (67%) on a standardized test administered semi-annually to remain eligible for per-student cash subsidies	The program increased school enrolment by 59%, teacher numbers by 46%, and classrooms by 47%. Student-classroom ratios decreased by 14%. However,	Punjab Education Foundation, Government of Punjab, Pakistan (with support from the World Bank and DFID)	Yes, subsidy amount based off formative research (survey) from the implementing agency in 2007 (footnote 10, Barrera-Osorio and Raju, 2014). Otherinformation on the choice of design elements	Yes	Effective at expanding access to low-cost private schools and improving school inputs, but limited evidence on whether it improved student learning

							field survey of 319 schools		no significant impact on student-teacher ratios or the number of toilets. The cost-effectiveness analysis suggests it is one of the cheapest interventions forincreasing school enrolment.		could also be motivated by foreignaid.		outcomes. The design encouraged school expansion but may have led to resource reallocation rather than improved education quality.
Incentivizing Schooling for Learning: Evidence on the Impact of Alternative Targeting Approaches	Barrera-Osorio & Filmer (2016)	Evaluates the impact of two different targeting mechanisms—poverty-based andmerit-based—on school enrolmentand learning outcomes	Cambodia Primary School Scholarship Program	School enrolment, attendance, test scores (math, digit span)	Cambodia	Merit-based targeting improved learning but may have excluded the poorest students; poverty-based targeting increased school participation but had no effect on learning; potential framing effects influenced household and student motivation	Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) across 207 schools, with 103 assigned to the program in the first year; students were selected via poverty index or baseline test scores	Scholarship ($20 per year) conditional on school enrolment, attendance, and maintaining passing grades	Both merit-based and poverty-based scholarships increased school enrolment and attendance. However, only merit-based scholarships led to higher test scores: +0.17 SD in math and +0.15 SD in digit span. Poverty-based scholarships had no significant impact on test scores.	Government of Cambodia (with support from the World Bank, DFID and others)	Unclear, supported primarily by foreign / multilateral aid with clear targeting metrics but insufficient evidence on basis for these metrics.	Partially	Merit-based targeting improved learning by increasing student motivation and effort, while poverty-based targeting successfully increased school participation but did not enhance learning. A two-step targeting approach (poverty-based first, then merit-based) may balance efficiency and equity better.

Table 2: Comparison of Conditionalities across CCTs

Program	School attendance threshold	Gender differentiation in stipend	Gradeprogression/performance requirement	Payments recipient	In-kind educational benefits (books/uniforms etc.)	Payment frequency
Progresa	85% attendance required	Yes, higher stipends for girls at secondary level	Passing grades required, repeat only one grade allowed	Mother(except senior high students with maternal authorization)	Yes, provides school supplies	Bi-monthly
Indonesia (PKH)	No explicit threshold (assumed ~85%)	No gender differentiation	No explicit academic performance required	Mother or guardian via local post offices	No direct in-kind transfers	Quarterly
Bangladesh (FSP)	75% attendance required	Yes, exclusively girls	45% minimum exam score	Direct to student via bank account	Books allowance, tuition fees, and SSC exam fee covered	Semi-annual
Cambodia (JFPR)	<10 unexcused absences per year	Yes, exclusively girls	Passing grades required	Parents (cash distributed publicly at school ceremonies)	No direct in-kind transfers	Three times a year
India (LLY)	No explicit attendance threshold	Yes, exclusively girls	No academic performance required	Savingsbond directly in girl's name (deferred lump sum at age 21)	No direct in-kind transfers	Lump sum and milestone-based
Pakistan (FAS)	No explicit attendance threshold(schools monitored by enrolment)	No gender differentiation	Minimum pass rate (67% students must score >40% on tests)	Directly to schools	No direct in-kind transfers (but subsidies to schoolsfor operations)	Monthly
Nepal (SIPE)	80% attendance required	No gender differentiation	Regular enrolment (no specific performance required)	Parents via store credit (food rations)	School-related expenses (tuition, uniforms, books) covered by scholarship	Monthly (stipend), annually (scholarship)
India (Kanyashree Prakalpa)	75% attendance required	Yes, exclusively girls	Regular enrolment until age 18 (no specific academic performance required)	Direct to student via bank account	No direct in-kind transfers	Annual stipend plus one-time lump sum at age 18
China (Peer-Tutoring)	No explicit threshold(based on academic improvement of peers)	No gender differentiation	Improvement in peer academic performance required	Directly to tutors based on peer improvement	Certificates & public recognition	At end of academic year
Philippines (4Ps)	85% attendance required	No gender differentiation	Regular enrolment (no specific academic performance required)	Mother via Landbank cash cards	No direct in-kind transfers	Bi-monthly
China (Junior High CCT)	80% attendance required	No gender differentiation	Regular enrolment (no specific academic performance required)	Cash directly to parents	No direct in-kind transfers	Per semester
Indonesia (PIP)	No explicit attendance threshold	No gender differentiation	Regular enrolment (no specific academic performance required)	Direct to student's bank account	No direct in-kind transfers	Annually
Bangladesh (Primary PES)	85% attendance required	No gender differentiation	Regular enrolment (no specific academic performance required)	Directly to mothers via bank	No direct in-kind transfers	Quarterly
Pakistan (Punjab FSSP)	80% attendance required	Yes, exclusively girls	Regular enrolment (no specific academic performance required)	Directly via postal money orders to household	No direct in-kind transfers	Monthly

Indonesia (BSM)	No explicit attendance threshold	No gender differentiation	Regular enrolment (no specific academic performance required)	Direct to families annually	No direct in-kind transfers	Annually
Cambodia (CESSP)	Regular attendance required (threshold not explicitly stated)	No gender differentiation	Regular enrolment and grade progression required	Cash directly to parents	No direct in-kind transfers	Three instalments per year
Indonesia (JPS Scholarship)	No explicit attendance threshold	No gender differentiation	Regular enrolment required	Directly to students or families via post office	No direct in-kind transfers	Tri-annual
Pakistan (PPRS)	Enrolment required (schools receive subsidies based on attendance)	Gender-differentiated subsidy (higher for girls)	No explicit academic performance required	Schools receive cash subsidies	Free textbooks & supplies provided to schools	Quarterly
China (Voucher Program)	Enrolment in high school required (no explicit attendance during junior high)	No gender differentiation	High school enrolment required	Voucher paid to students via post offices	No direct in-kind transfers	Annually, after high school enrolment

Table 3: Cash transfer recipients, frequencies and amounts

Name of paper	Author(s) and Year	Recipient	Transfer amounts and frequencies
Does more schooling imply improved learning? Evidence from the Kanyashree Prakalpa in India	Das and Sarkhel (2023)	Unmarried school-going girls	Annual (INR 1000) + Lump sum at age 18 (INR 25,000)
Remedial Education with Incentivized Peer Tutoring: Evidence from Migrant Children Schools in China	Li (2012)	Peer tutors	One-time monetary/non-monetary prize
Labour Market Effects of a Female Stipend Programme in Bangladesh	Shamsuddin (2015)	Female students	Monthly stipend
Does More Cash in Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Always Lead to Larger Impacts on School Attendance?	Filmer and Schady (2011)	Students	Annual ($45 or $60)
A Study on the Academic Performance of Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) Recipients in a Selected Secondary School	Sasaki et al. (2019)	Households	Monthly PHP 300 for education
Assessing Gender Parity in Intrahousehold Allocation of Educational Resources: Evidence from Bangladesh	Xu et al. (2022)	Female students	Monthly stipend
School Dropouts and Conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from a Randomised Controlled Trial in Rural China	Mo et al. (2013)	Parents (household)	RMB 500 per semester
Can Cash Transfers Mitigate Child Labour? Evidence from Indonesia's Cash Transfer Programme for Poor Students in Java	Hidayatina and Garces-Ozanne (2019)	Households	Annual IDR 450,000 - IDR 1,000,000
Evaluation of Poverty Alleviation Policy: Can Conditional Cash Transfers Improve the Academic Performance of Poor Students in Indonesia?	Hadna and Kartika (2017)	Households	Bi-annual (fixed + variable)
Does Conditional Cash Transfer Deliver? The Indonesian Evidence on PKH	Hudang et al. (2024)	Households	Quarterly
Conditional Cash Transfer and School Outcomes: An Evaluation of the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program in Davao Oriental, Philippines	Catubig and Villano (2017)	Households	Monthly PHP 300 for education
The Medium-Term Impact of the Primary Education Stipendin Rural Bangladesh	Baulch (2011)	Mothers	Monthly BDT 100 - BDT 125
Conditional Cash Transfers and Female Schooling: The Impact of the Female School Stipend Programme on Public School Enrolments in Punjab, Pakistan	Chaudhury and Parajuli (2010)	Female students	Monthly PKR 200
You Get What You Pay For: Schooling Incentives and Child Labor in Nepal	Edmonds and Shrestha (2014)	Parents (stipend), schools (scholarship)	NPR 1000 monthly stipend
The Effect of Educational Cash Transfer for Students from Low-Income Families on Students' Dropout Rate in Indonesia	Samalo and Jasmina (2024)	Parents/Students	Annual IDR 450,000 - IDR 1,000,000
Own and Sibling Effects of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Theory and Evidence from Cambodia	Ferreira et al. (2009)	Students	Annual scholarship
The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on the Matriculation of Junior High School Students into Rural China's High Schools	Li et al. (2017)	Students	CNY 1500/year for 3 years

Own and Spillover Effects of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program Targeting Young Girls: Evidence from India	Jain (2018)	Parents (deferred)	Deferred incentives at milestones
Effects over the Life of a Program: Evidence from an Education Conditional Cash Transfer Program for Girls	Chhabra et al. (2019)	Female students	Quarterly PKR 200
Impact Evaluation of Indonesia Conditional Cash Transfer Program (BSM) on Student Achievement	Purba (2018)	Students	Annual
Getting Girls into School: Evidence from a Scholarship Program in Cambodia	Filmer and Schady (2013)	Female students	$45/year
Effect of Girls' Secondary School Stipend on Completed Schooling, Age at Marriage, and Age at First Birth: Evidence from Bangladesh	Sayeed (2016)	Female students	Monthly
Can a Public Scholarship Program Successfully Reduce School Drop-outs in a Time of Economic Crisis? Evidence from Indonesia	Cameron (2009)	Students	Quarterly
Delivering Education to the Underserved through a Public-Private Partnership Program in Pakistan	Barrera-Osorio et al. (2017)	Schools	Per-student subsidy(monthly)
Evaluating the Impact of Public Student Subsidies on Low-Cost Private Schools in Pakistan	Barrera-Osorio and Raju (2015)	Schools	Per-student conditional on test scores
Incentivizing Schooling for Learning: Evidence on the Impact of Alternative Targeting Approaches	Barrera-Osorio and Filmer (2016)	Students	$20/year