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Guest Column

Sino-Indian relations have been deteriorating since the 2020 border clashes in the Himalayas. With tensions escalating, both India and China have taken assertive steps to secure their respective strategic geopolitical and security interests. The race to secure their security interests have led to concerted steps to strengthen their domestic defence capabilities and strategically engage in arms deals as a foreign policy tool to advance their interests in the Indo-Pacific.

While China has been investing heavily in its domestic arms industry over the past two decades to feed its security interests and desire to be recognised as a great power in the region, India’s efforts to do the same has been slow, and only recently begun to gain momentum. India’s renewed interest in developing indigenous capabilities, coupled with its expanding arms engagement with Southeast Asian countries suggests a more assertive posture and an intent to pushback against the Chinese. Consequently, this is a warning sign of a looming arms competition between India and China that could potentially undermine the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific.

Building Domestic Military Capabilities

Enjoying rapid economic growth since the 1990s, China has been able to consistently increase their military budget and dedicate resources towards nurturing their domestic arms industries. Through substantial investments in research and development, acquiring modern technologies, and increasing civil military integration, the Chinese were able to make bold strides towards becoming a military powerhouse in the region. Particularly in the last few years, the Chinese armed forces have begun to display their military prowess in the South China Sea—part of what it considers to be its “friendly backyard.”

Even though India’s domestic defence industrial sector had a slower start than China’s, New Delhi’s determination to secure its borders and safeguard its security interests grew in response to the increasing threats along its shared borders with Pakistan and, especially, against an increasingly formidable and assertive China. Facing pressure to upgrade its own military capabilities, India shifted from procuring arms from Russia towards developing its own “Made-in-India” strategy to strengthen its own indigenous military capabilities.

After the 2020 border clashes between India and China, both sides sought to secure their borders by placing an additional 50,000 to 60,000 troops close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Since the start of this year, India has reported that the number of Chinese troops, arms and military infrastructure along the border has continued to increase. In response, India has not only sought out a “next generation defence partnership” with the United States to boost its defence capabilities, but has also proposed a 13 percent increase in defence spending (INR 5.94 trillion) for the upcoming 2023-2024 financial year to acquire more fighter jets and improve infrastructure along the disputed borders.

Following the heightened tensions and increased militarisation between the two neighbouring rivals, it is likely that both China and India will continue to take more assertive actions to build their domestic military capabilities.

Greater Regional Competition between India and China

The arms race between China and India has already expanded beyond their borders and spilled over into the Indo-Pacific.

Over the past few years, the Chinese have established themselves as a key defence exporter to the region. Between 2008 and 2018, Asia accounted for 82.8 percent of China’s global arms exports, of which, 61.3 percent went to South and Southeast Asian countries. In their purposeful outreach, the Chinese have not only bolstered India’s adversaries and neighbours in South Asia but also secured their own economic and security interests in the Bay of Bengal—a potential “chokepoint” for China’s access to the Straits of Malacca.

A prime example would be China’s expanding military footprint in Pakistan, a country that not only shares a disputed border with India, but also maintains a relatively hostile relationship with India. From 2018 to 2022, Pakistan accounted for 54 percent of China’s military exports. The majority of Pakistan’s military capabilities are procured from the Chinese. This includes J-10 CE fighter jets, rockets, and the use of Chinese LY-80 Low to Medium Altitude Air Defence System. The Norinco Group, a Chinese state-owned enterprise that manufactures military equipment, is also working with Pakistan Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT), to manufacture the Al Khalid tank, which is used domestically and exported to Bangladesh. In June 2023, the Chinese also helped to bolster the military capabilities of the Pakistan Army along the Line of Control, the borderland area between Pakistan and India that remains highly disputed. This will invariably allow Pakistan to assert their security interests against potential attacks by India and exert pressure on India’s borders. In response, India has deployed the S-400 missile defence system “with an eye toward Pakistan.”

While China has been exporting defence capabilities to India’s neighbours, India has also recently begun to promote the sales of its weapons in China’s Southeast Asian “friendly backyard.” Offering a lucrative concessional line of credit and identifying potential further areas of joint patrols and exchange of information, India has tried to promote its defence equipment and overcome the financial constraint of the Southeast Asian countries.

In addition to siding with the Philippines against China’s claims over the South China Sea, India has finalised a USD 375 million deal for the sale of three artillery batteries that will be used by the Philippine Marines and an onshore version of the supersonic BrahMos anti-ship missile that is likely to be deployed along its coasts. With a firing range of 300 km off the coast, the BrahMos missile will likely be deployed as a response to China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, targeting its installations on Mischief Reef (217 km west of Palawan), as well as its naval presence at the Scarborough Shoal (222 km west of Luzon). Discussions over sales of India’s BrahMos missiles have also been underway with other Southeast Asia countries including Indonesia, Vietnam and Malaysia—which are all involved in maritime disputes with China. India has also secured an arms contract for 40 mm naval gun systems to the Indonesian Navy and is in “advanced discussions” to secure an additional USD 200 million supersonic cruise missile deal, while the Philippines and Vietnam have shown interest in procuring the Akash missile air defence system.

While India’s progress is still in its early stages, it has begun taking small but steady strides in an impending arms race in the region. Moreover, India holds a more strategically advantageous position compared to China. Currently, India has more long-standing joint military exercises with ASEAN member states than the Chinese. Through these exercises, India can showcase its military capabilities, cultivate trust and confidence, and allow potential buyers to build familiarity and interoperability with India’s weapons. Furthermore, unlike China, whose aggressions have caused apprehensions and uneasiness in the region, India is neither embroiled in territorial and resource disputes with countries in the Indo-Pacific, nor is it entangled in a geopolitical rivalry with the US. As such, India can be a viable arms partner for Southeast Asian countries trying to strengthen their defensive capabilities against an increasingly aggressive China, all the while avoiding entanglement in the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China.

Nevertheless, India still faces stiff competition with already established arms suppliers, such as Russia, the US, and rising middle powers like South Korea.

Implications

India’s build-up of its military capacity and engagement in Southeast Asia’s arms trade not only reflects an increasingly assertive stance vis-à-vis China, but also indicates its active pursuit of seizing opportunities that will strengthen its strategic autonomy and respond to China’s unwarranted actions of arming its adversaries and attempting to influence the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Through this, India aims to exert greater pressure on the Chinese and make it more difficult for them to dominate the region.

At the same time, despite some push back from other neighbours bordering the Indian Ocean, China’s efforts at increasing its military footprint in the region have not faltered. China’s deep pockets and political ambitions would likely see the country taking more aggressive steps to secure their interests in the near future.

As China and India seek to secure their strategic geopolitical interests and expand their respective spheres of influence in a tit-for-tat cycle, there are concerns that an arms race could emerge and spill over into the Indo-Pacific. Such a situation would aggravate existing security concerns and amplify fear, hostility, and threat perceptions in the region, and increase the likelihood of a conflict breaking out. While countries in the Indo-Pacific have shown an increased demand for arms, as well as a desire to secure their strategic autonomy, India and China’s success as key arms suppliers for the region will depend on the quality and cost effectiveness of their hardware, their after-sales service, and their ability to continually develop cutting edge military technologies to attract buyers.

Mae Chow is a Research Assistant at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation.

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/wiki_Vitaly V. Kuzmin

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