

**Centre on Asia and Globalisation-King's College London
Conference on Regional and Global Order**

A Report

2-3 May 2018



Panel One: Concepts of Order

Danny Quah applied economic analysis to understand world order. Order is determined by both demand and supply. Supplier(s) of world order as a (public) good and entities demanding order collectively shape the regime. Some entities are changing their positions: for example, China has increasingly switched from order user to order provider. World order is marked by joint distribution of power/responsibility and a shared understanding of relations between states. Order is mostly conceptualized in terms of the supply side; but the demand side is vital too. By conceptualizing the quest for order in terms of a marketplace, we are better placed to perceive the forces shaping the international system, particularly the trade-off between desirability versus ease of obtaining order. The focus on the supply and demand for order will add focus on the power of smaller states, deconstruct the nation-state approach to world order (since there are non-state actors too that can provide elements of order and desire order), and most importantly, provide a new model of global power relations (given that big powers are not just suppliers of order). Finally, it seems clear that we are in an era where the demand for order is outstripping the supply.

Mervyn Frost argued that we can understand order as global practices. Practice theory in the form of radical interpretivism views order based on the internal viewpoint of the actors themselves – how do they attach meaning to their actions and behaviours as also the actions and behaviours by others in relation to rules and ethical norms. All actions (such as war, counterterrorism and balancing) can be understood only within a context of meaning. Rule following is important: to participate in practice, one needs to learn the right way of doing something. Social practices also have an ethical component. Key constitutive practices are the practice of sovereignty and global rights. All of us are involuntary participants in the above two practices; contrary to what many liberals think, no one can cease to be part of these practices and simply “contract out”. In turn, there are macro practices, which are practices of practices. An analogy would be the rules of the game; while actors of the game or the state of play may change, the rules do not.

Francesco Mancini argued the case for order as multilateralism and took stock of the UN system as a multilateral system. The UN had gone through six cycles, emerging out of each reinvigorated with new norms and practices. Multilateralism is a function of the balance of power and supply and demand for order. The US began to challenge the overall security order in the Security Council amid several international crises in the 1990s, by cutting its budget

and by circumnavigating the Council to deal with Kosovo and Libya, for instance. Meanwhile, China cast 8 joint vetoes with Russia over the last ten years, showing there is a power play within the Council. This shows that the big powers have a big impact on order. Fortunately, the UNSC remains united overall; since 2001, at least 90% of all resolutions were passed by unanimous consensus, especially on issues concerning Iran and North Korea. China will fit into the current order with adjustments. Unlike other emerging powers, China enjoys veto power and has been using this privilege actively. It is also emerging as the second-largest financial contributor and 11th-largest troop contributor to peacekeeping missions.

Nicola Philips elaborated on the relationship between global order and global value chains (GVCs). There are fundamental tensions in global order – between sovereignty and human rights; and between capitalism and labour rights. Global order rests upon and is connected to asymmetry and inequality in the capitalist order. GVCs harness asymmetry and produce inequality. Transnational corporations are using GVCs to produce and capture value. The increase in GVCs may or may not be shaped by the erosion of state power, but it does reflect the power of capital and powerful transnational business interests. However, the sole focus on market power, being firm-centric, is too narrow. One needs instead to examine three asymmetries: in market power, social power, and political power.

Brandon Yoder focused on conceptions of order in international relations theory and implications for the rise of China. Order is a pattern of equilibrium-perpetuating behaviour among the units of a system and a set of “observed rules” that regulate interactions among units which must be widely recognized and practiced. Both realism and liberalism are problematic: the former overstates the inevitability of conflict, while the latter understates it. The holistic conception of order as rules governing all states’ interactions across issues may be more helpful. It is also ontologically neutral, as rules can be derived from a wide variety of factors. Most importantly, this approach allows examination of the causal relationship between order and the outcomes it produces. The stakes in the shaping of international order are high. There is real potential for US-China conflict if preferences clash, but it is far from inevitable – credible communications will be key in determining the outcome.

Participants discussed the power of small actors. While unipolarity suggests a monopolistic supply of order, small states can collectively supply a joint order if they reject the predominant model. One view was that as the world comes out from American unipolarity,

the world is moving towards multiple providers of order. Another view questioned whether small states possessed sufficient autonomy to affect the supply of order, as states are constrained by overarching macro-level practices that inform, shape, or direct their course of action and these practices would rise or fall by the preferences of the biggest powers?

Participants also debated the idea of order as global practices. Within global practices, there are also regional practices, and there can be ethical puzzles in practices at the global and regional level. For example, a participant of a regional grouping may face a conundrum over values endorsed by a regional actor (e.g. African Union) which contradict the international actor (e.g. UN). There are also tensions between cosmopolitan and national values: for example, the fundamental ethical debate on Britain's place in relation to the European Union (EU), or Palestinian statehood.

The UN was a powerful element of order in terms of the focal point of multilateralism. The question is whether changes in US and Chinese attitudes and behaviours would derogate from the UN's centrality. The US has been ambivalent about the UN since the early 1980s, and China is in the process of launching new institutions. How could the UN remain a focal point under these conditions?

On the role of GVCs, were they all bad? Had GVCs not contributed to economic growth and prosperity and a levelling up for millions in Asia? Also, would GVCs survive the fourth industrial revolution? Would China's rise disrupt GVCs in Asia or would it provide a new set of GVCs as it rose in the production chain? Clearly, GVCs were an important part of order – both supplier and demander of order, but important questions remained about their impact.

The definition of order was a point of larger discussion. Did any patterned sets of behaviours amount to order? If order is equilibrium-perpetuating behaviour, what is that equilibrium, and under what conditions does it break down? How does one see World War I and II – as evidence of order or disorder? Was order better thought of as “peace” and “stability”? Did one infer order from behaviour; or was order in the “minds” of agents playing within a set of rules, and was it necessary therefore to describe it from within the structures of meaning of the agents? Was order instead a normative goal standard that governments and other actors aspired to even if they did not always honour?

Panel Two: Asian and Western Conceptions of Order

Magnus Ryner argued that transatlanticism was still to a large extent at the core of global order, albeit with significant challenges facing Europe and America. The global financial crisis (GFC) as manifest in Europe brought to the surface the challenges facing the EU as an entity but also the tenets of EU integration scholarship. This, alongside the Eurozone crisis, highlighted limitations in EU scholarship and secular stagnation within the bloc. Specifically, there has been an excessive focus on Ricardian economics as opposed to Kaldor-Verdoorn economics, and an underestimation regarding the importance of relative gains and productivity growth for social accords that underpin and remain central to social legitimacy in Europe. The complacency over productivity gains and the distribution of relative gains directly contributed to the rise of populism and negative ramifications on the welfare state in Europe.

Holger Stritzel pointed out that conventional IR theories, namely, realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism, do not adequately capture the internal dynamics taking place within the transatlantic community. These three major strands overlook that the transatlantic order contains contradictions and inconsistencies. In fact, this order results from a patterned politics of contestation of competing projects, and structural tensions are continually being renegotiated and adjusted. There have always been tensions within the conception of the transatlantic order and between Europeanism and Atlanticism which have been marked by ambiguity and ambivalence. As such we should view the transatlantic order as a negotiated community. To examine the complexity and contestations surrounding the transatlantic order requires that scholarship begins to take into consideration the networks and actors involved in the processes, the routines and practices, and the concepts of narrative and articulation.

Kanti Bajpai sought to unpack three views of order and examine Asia's contribution to global order which he described using the term "internationalism" The first is the dominant liberal internationalist perspective, which argues that the US has been the provider of global order, organised around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation, and democratic solidarity, and the rest of the world being the recipients of this order. However, alternative views have challenged this narrative. The China Rising/Tianxia view postulates that China will become the provider of global order and will emerge as a hegemonic centre of a neo-tributary system. The pluralist perspective differentiates itself from the previous two views by emphasising that global order is produced by the contributions of many states, even

if differentially. Having said that, counter to the narrative that the US and the West are retrenching in terms of their contributions to global order, the empirical data on financial contributions to economic order, human security, and ecology shows otherwise. East Asian states don't perform all that well in comparison, even though their contributions are growing, particularly China's in select areas. The drivers of growing East Asian internationalism were both domestic economic and security concerns as well as international power and cosmopolitan norms.

Participants discussed the issue of change and renegotiation of the transatlantic and European communities and questioned what kind of order might emerge. What comes next could very well be the rise of other order providers and the diffusion of power. In the case of Europe, who are the actors in the European community, and how does the EU scholarship analyse actors and agency? Between EU headquarters in Brussels and national governments, are there are there other actors? Is it helpful to think about networks and nodes where a range of European and international actors meet to negotiate norms and practices and to analyse trends and policies? The economic crises of Europe and Brexit were not predicted by the rich scholarship on the EU, by Brussels, or by key governments. This suggests that analysts must be more sensitive to contestation and turning points as well as micro practices in networks that in addition bring together think tanks, cross-governmental institutions, civil society, and private sector interests.

Participants also discussed whether emerging actors, especially China, are seeking to supply order or to undermine it. In particular, the value of official development assistance (ODA) vis-a-vis foreign direct investment (FDI) was questioned, as the motivations undergirding FDI and ODA are completely different, and ODA has proven controversial. On the other hand, criticism of China, such as utilising ODA to perpetuate dependency, could be applied to other countries that distribute ODA. To probe motives further would require a deep consideration of the rationale behind actors' decisions. Indeed, in thinking about internationalist actions by states and the provision of order, the issue of motives was worth thinking about. Could states be internationalist and order-providing even if their motives were selfish?

Overall, this session pointed to several general trends in the three "regions" – the transatlantic, EU, and East Asian region. The first is states and other agents are constantly torn between sovereignty and regionalist/partnership obligations. Secondly, while there are dominant

players in these three zones, and the US was dominant in at least two of them, order is constantly under negotiation and bargaining as between the bigger and smaller players. Indeed, order might be thought of a consistent set of contradictions within which states have to make choices and inflect their behaviour. Thirdly, all three zones are experiencing enormous change, and newer players are exerting themselves. The transatlantic order has been jolted by the coming to power of Donald Trump, and Germany under Merkel and France under Macron are playing a bigger role in the alliance. Brexit has shaken the EU zone, and once again Germany and France are playing a bigger role, while the UK and some other key European ‘remainers’ are pulling back. The rise of China and relative decline of the US as well as Trump’s finger pointing against his East Asian allies (“more burden sharing”) are causing East Asians to rethink order in this dynamic region. China and Japan are playing a more shaping role in East Asia as the US reviews its role. The drivers of change are not just international: they are domestic. Populism, nationalism, and anti-globalization are shaping new thinking and behaviours in all three regions. Finally, it was important in all three regions to pay attention to purveyors of ideas who both reflect changes and who help shape change.

Panel Three: Connectivity and Order

Jan Knoerich focused on membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and its implications for order. The establishment of AIIB is another reflection of China’s growing influence. Seen as a rival to other established bodies such as the Bretton Wood institutions, the AIIB has the potential to challenge the global order and upset accepted institutional structures of international development finance. Despite concerns over a lack of transparency and accountability, a total of 56 states joined this Chinese-led initiative. While motivations varied, most states were drawn by the potential gains which outweighed the perceived disadvantages of joining. Many found it desirable to establish a closer association with a rising China even if it meant widening the rift with the US. However, rather than representing a shift in global order, AIIB demonstrated how China was taking advantage of the existing US-led international economic order to advance its own agenda.

Khong Yuen Foong reflected on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – China’s biggest connectivity initiative – as grand strategy and the implications for order. The works of scholars like Parag Khanna and Thomas Barnett have broken new ground in linking enhanced connectivity as a key factor in peace and stability, and hence, order. However, there is scepticism over BRI as the harbinger of greater order. BRI is more likely a vital component

of China's grand strategy to challenge and eventually displace the US as the hegemon in Asia. Hence, it is more likely to sow disorder, as China's rise will lead to push-back from the US and its allies. Three pushbacks are already evident: the Free and Open Indo-Pacific led by Japan and the US; the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor led by Japan and India; and the Trump Administration's recent National Security Strategy review which posits competition between free and repressive countries. BRI also faces two kinds of disruptions: China-India conflict as in Doklam in 2017; and domestic turmoil and resentment towards China in response to BRI projects.

Selina Ho presented her research on China's infrastructural power and regional governance, using railway projects in Southeast Asia as empirical case studies. Beijing's many overseas infrastructure projects were being used to shape regional order and governance. This strategy, however, was less effective in Southeast Asia where member states have greater economic and investment alternatives. In particular, Japan is contesting the Chinese presence in the region by providing a competing vision for infrastructural projects. Being less dependent on China, countries in Southeast Asia have greater bargaining power and greater inertia in accepting China's overarching role in setting the regional agenda.

Yu Kaho focused on Chinese energy cooperation in BRI and its implications for regional order. In South and Central Asia, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been highlighted for its potential to promote regional economic cooperation and integration amongst the neighbouring states. Given China's massive investments, the region's economic reliance on the Asian superpower is likely to increase. Moreover, Beijing will be able to dictate the standards and norms for investments and trade in the region. In the long run, the CPEC and China would increasingly be able to shape the geopolitical and geo-economic landscape.

On why states joined the BRI, the various motives for joining China's initiative could be placed in one of two categories – economic or political. The question is: which was more important, the putative economic gains from BRI or the political incentives and opportunities of being a member? While it was attractive to boil the various motives down to these two, reality seemed far messier and the concerns of the smaller states were complex.

On the other side, that is, the supply side, participants debated in detail on whether BRI constituted a part of China's grand strategy. Grand strategy represents a combination of political, economic, military and technological resources to achieve security. While one

argument for BRI is that it would allow China to develop its relatively backwards western regions, which is a matter of internal security, the initiative also brings Eurasian countries into Beijing's orbit, enhancing its ultimate goal of matching or even surpassing American influence, which is more a matter of external security. BRI might also be seen as being powered by internal economic drivers – surplus capital that needs better returns on investment than is available within China; and the sectional interests of big Chinese construction and manufacturing companies looking to move into new markets. BRI could also be seen as a huge attempt at soft power, with Chinese largesse and expertise being deployed to showcase China's achievements and capabilities and thereby influence recipients but also non-recipients. Finally, it was noticeable that a considerable amount of BRI investments were in areas important for energy access or that contained energy sinks.

The efficacy of BRI as a projection of Chinese power was also discussed. Although China has pushed forward the narrative of infrastructure development as a gift to other regions and the 'sharing of wealth', there has been intense public debate over the efficacy of these projects. Many within and outside China have questioned the need for expensive infrastructure like high-speed rail in poor and undeveloped regions. Moreover, such projects could affect territorial sovereignty and integrity when governments fall into debt and must relinquish land, resources, or controlling stakes in infrastructure networks in order to fulfil their obligations.

An interesting but contested idea was that of 'infrastructural power' as proposed by Michael Mann and featuring in the work of scholars such as John Lucas. Mann suggests that infrastructural power (as against despotic power) is the power to penetrate society and exert control (and surveillance). Penetration occurs through state provisioning of services, of mass literacy, of weight, measures, and currency to facilitate the exchange of goods, and of communication and transportation. Can connectivity and China's infrastructure provisioning be seen as enlarging the infrastructural powers of recipient states to control their populations? Further, if China is providing communication and transportation, are recipient governments transferring some of their infrastructural power to Beijing and causing their populations to look more to China than to their own governments for welfare and regulation? Whether or not China intends it, is the BRI going to be a source of extraterritoriality in the governance of recipient states? Under BRI, will China gain information and access to data and populations it was heretofore unable to reach? China's accretion of power will not simply therefore be one

of “hard” or “soft” power (and everything that is connoted by those terms), but rather something far more profound.

Overall, connectivity projects would certainly affect regional if not global order. China was at the centre of the recent connectivity ‘goldrush’, though clearly Japan has played a huge role in Asia. China seems to have won the publicity and soft power competition at this point, even though historically it was Japan, largely through the Asian Development Bank, that helped Asians build more extensive and higher-quality infrastructure. Whether China would deliver on its promises and whether its projects would redound to its credit remained to be seen. Clearly, though, connectivity has set in motion both competition and cooperation between China, Japan, and India, and a new arena of order building has emerged. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s connectivity plans might be disrupted as a result of bilateral deals, particularly by China with its smaller neighbours.

Panel Four: Order as Public Goods Provisioning

Ramon Pacheco Pardo discussed financial governance in East Asia since the 1997 regional financial crisis and its implications for global order. While the emergence of region-centric initiatives such as the ASEAN+3 bodies and, more recently, AIIB appear to challenge the dominance of Western-led Bretton Woods institutions, stakeholders on the ground do not share such sentiments. Instead, while there is healthy competition between development banks, more importantly they also cooperate closely. Specifically, there are three factors in driving cooperation: The small pool of expertise that is inadequate to serve all these institutions separately; trust-building among different institutions to ensure that joint loans are repaid; and the incentive for global-level bodies to pass on issues of Asian interest to Asian-focused institutions. That said, such competition has also pressurised established banks, such as the World Bank, towards a race to the bottom in terms of standards.

Tikki Pang sought to understand Asia’s global health challenges and its contributions to regional and global health governance. Globalization and urbanization have increased the incidence of both infectious and non-communicable diseases (NCDs). The latter accounts for the greatest number of health problems worldwide and in Asia. Yet attention to NCDs has been slow in developing in the continent. Smoking has emerged as the clearest NCD threat to public health in Asia. All the ASEAN states except Indonesia are working within the global Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), but various domestic constraints are hurdles to doing more, including the power of tobacco companies and the lure of revenues

from tobacco products. Asian powers led by China and Japan but also including India, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia as well as ASEAN have all increased their involvement in global and regional health management. ASEAN's efforts extend to an agreement on disaster management which includes preparedness for pandemic control. China, Japan, and India increasingly contribute to global R&D efforts. Despite strong regional solidarity, there remains suspicion that one's neighbours cannot control their health problems from spilling over borders. Overall, Asian countries have shown leadership in promoting sustainable development goals and health security, but there are serious medical, financial, social, political, and diplomatic challenges ahead.

Vinod Thomas approached global climate disasters through the Southeast Asian lens. Climate issues have become everyone's problem, yet not enough is being done, at least in part because of fears that countries will lose economic competitiveness by regulating energy use. Lower-middle income countries in Southeast Asia are the most vulnerable to the hazards of disasters due to the scale of what they confront and the lack of policy capacity. Climate change disasters require a disaster risk framework and need capabilities at every point in the disaster risk management cycle beginning with pre-disaster protection through to post-disaster reconstruction. Most importantly, the region and the world at large need to build disaster resilience comprising six elements – a knowledge base, policies and governance, organization and management systems, funding, economic regulations for environmental protection, and social protection and insurance. In addition, movement towards a low-carbon economy and carbon mitigation are vital. ASEAN is trying to deal with climate change adaptation, but the region must invest more in resilience, partnerships with non-regional powers (China, Japan, Korea), agreement on increasing renewables in the energy mix, and cross-sectoral collaboration across national boundaries (central and provincial governments, municipalities, businesses, NGOs).

Nicola Leveringhaus analysed Chinese approaches to global nuclear ordering since President Xi Jinping took over the mantle of power. There are tensions and dilemmas that China faces in global nuclear norms. It has been perceived as a norm taker or even violator in nuclear order and has been accused of not following non-proliferation. But this is an incomplete picture. While it historically had not supported emerging norms, this changed from the 1970s, and by the mid-1990s it had joined global treaties on arms control. Now that it is a full-fledged member of the nuclear club, it faces dilemmas in navigating the nuclear order. It is most committed to no first-use rather than non-proliferation, and there remains a

disconnect between its attitude on nuclear norms compared to non-nuclear norms. Looking forward, while China has become unusually active in its nuclear policy since Xi took over, its ambitions have been scaled back by focusing more on the region than at the global level.

Participants discussed how Asia should shape its financial governance looking forward. Due to a lack of representation in global institutions, regional-level organizations provide more ownership. Joint measures to manage financial issues also showcases a rare example of Sino-Japanese cooperation rather than competition. The US clearly sees East Asian regionalization as endangering its privileged position and had repeatedly tried to thwart it. Even if regional institutions are not used, and its mechanisms not activated, they are unlikely to atrophy as they provide leverage against the predominance of the Bretton Wood institutions.

The panel also discussed the major challenge posed by tobacco companies to regional health governance. These companies possess a wealth of resources that allows them to pose legal challenges or exploit loopholes to counter any attempts at stricter tobacco control. They have also been known to pay researchers to counter certain findings and actively lobby to torpedo anti-tobacco articles. The industry wields huge political-economic influence in certain countries. In Indonesia, for example, tobacco companies account for 20 to 30 percent of the government's annual tax income and employ some 200,000 workers. This creates huge political pressure against instituting any framework to curb tobacco consumption.

Managing climate threats requires the active participation of everyone including individuals, state governments, and multilateral bodies. Although the US has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, it can still contribute as the global leader in technological innovation. In particular, US cities and towns are taking the lead in carbon mitigation in line with the Paris accords. The development of early warning systems and climate-proof infrastructure would help mitigate some of the consequences of climate change. Geographically, Southeast Asia is extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change, having faced major problems such as refugees and tsunamis. ASEAN should focus on resilience-building through financing and technology.

The hot issue of nuclear tensions in the Korean Peninsula was discussed. North Korea's nuclearisation is not in conflict with China's view, yet its behaviour shows otherwise. Ultimately, China aims for stability while stressing that proliferation is not particularly destabilizing. What is disturbing is that while China under Xi Jinping continues to disavow nuclear use in its foreign policy, it has started to increase the sophistication of its nuclear

weapons stock. A broad conclusion was that Asia, including Southeast Asia, faces growing risks from financial, health, climate, and nuclear proliferation challenges. Individual countries but also regional institutions including ASEAN are increasingly engaged in trying to construct common norms and rules and create the political setting within which all four challenges could be more effectively addressed and risks managed. Cooperation between ASEAN, the ADB, the World Bank, and AIIB could well deepen even though there were elements of competition between the various institutions. ASEAN did not have the institutional capacities of the EU, but ASEAN Community 2015 and ASEAN Community Vision 2025 were nevertheless increasing regional resilience. ASEAN unity was under pressure from outside powers, and there were growing questions surrounding ASEAN 'centrality' in Asia-Pacific security, but the institution had its strengths and, after the EU, was probably the most dynamic regional organization.

Conference Programme and Agenda

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
Manasseh Meyer Building, Seminar Room 2-1
May 2-3, 2018

Wednesday, May 2

- 9:00 a.m.** **Introduction by Kanti Bajpai and Ramon Pacheco Pardo**
- 9:15 a.m.** **Panel 1 Conceptions of Order**
- Chair: Khong Yuen Foong
- Panellists: **Danny Quah**, Searching for a New International Order
 Mervyn Frost, Understanding Global Orders as Global Practices
 Francesco Mancini, Changing Global Order: Challenge or Opportunity for
 Multilateral Institutions?
- 10:45 a.m.** **Tea Break**
- 11:15 a.m.** **Panel 1 continues**
- Chair: John Gearson
- Panellists: **Nicola Phillips**, Power, Governance and The Political Economy of Global
 Order
 Brandon Yoder, Conceptions of Order in International Relations Theory:
 Implications for Understanding China's Rise
- 12:15 p.m.** **Group Photo and Lunch**
- 2.00 p.m.** **Panel 2 Asian and Western Conceptions of Order**
- Chair: Francesco Mancini
- Panellists: **Magnus Ryner**, The Transatlantic Conception of Order and Limitations of
 European Integration Theory and Practice
 Holger Stritzel, Visions and Practices of Transatlantic Order: A Critical
 Reconstruction
 Kanti Bajpai, East Asian Internationalism in Regional and Global Order
- 3:30 p.m.** **Tea Break**
- 6.00 p.m.** **Workshop Dinner**

Thursday, May 3

10:00 a.m. Panel 3 Connectivity and Order

Chair: Nicola Phillips

Panelists: **Jan Knoerich**, Membership in the AIIB and the Implications for Order
Khong Yuen Foong, BRI as Grand Strategy and the Implications for Order

11:00 a.m. Tea Break

11:30 a.m. Panel 3 continues

Chair: Vinod Thomas

Panelists: **Selina Ho**, China's Infrastructural Power and Regional Governance: Railway Projects in Southeast Asia.
Yu Kaho, Chinese Energy Cooperation in The Belt and Road Initiative: Implications for Regional Order in Asia

12:30 p.m. Lunch

1:30 p.m. Panel 4 Order as Public Goods Provisioning

Chair: Danny Quah

Panelists: **Ramon Pacheco Pardo**, East Asia's Regional Financial Governance and Global Order
Tikki Pang and Gianna Gayle Herrera Amul, Global Health Governance Through an Asian Lens

2:30 p.m. Tea break

3:00 p.m. Panel 4 continues

Chair: Magnus Ryner

Panelists: **Vinod Thomas**, Global Climate Disasters Through the Southeast Asian Lens
Nicola Leveringhaus, Chinese Approaches to Global Nuclear Ordering Under Xi Jinping

4:00 p.m. Concluding Remarks

Workshop Participants

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Kanti Bajpai	Director, Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) and Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies
Danny Quah	Dean and Li Ka Shing Professor in Economics
Francesco Mancini	Associate Dean and Co-Director (Executive Education) and Visiting Associate Professor
Brandon Yoder	Research Fellow, CAG
Khong Yuen Foong	Li Ka Shing Professor in Political Science
Selina Ho	Assistant Professor
Tikki Pang	Visiting Professor
Vinod Thomas	Visiting Professor
Gianna Gayle Herrera Amul	Research Assistant
Toh Wei Zheng	Research Assistant, CAG
Byron Chong	Research Assistant, CAG
Khasan Redjaboev	Research Assistant, CAG
Blake Berger	Research Associate, CAG
Akio Tanahashi	Academic Visitor, CAG

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Ramon Pacheco Pardo	Senior Lecturer in International Relations
Mervyn Frost	Professor of International Relations
Nicola Phillips	Professor of Political Economy; Vice-President and Vice-Principal (Education)
Magnus Ryner	Professor of International Political Economy; Head of Department for European & International Studies
Holger Stritzel	Lecturer in German Foreign Policy
Nicola Leveringhaus	Lecturer in War Studies (East Asian Security and International Relations)
John Gearson	Professor of National Security Studies; Vice Dean - International, Faculty of Social Science and Public Policy
Yu Kaho	Non-resident Fellow
Jan Knoerich	Lecturer in the Economy of China



First row (L-R): Gianna Gayle Herrera Amul, Danny Quah, Kanti Bajpai, Ramon Pacheco Pardo

Second row (L-R): Jan Knoerich, John Gearson, Mervyn Frost, Vinod Thomas, Francesco Mancini, Khong Yuen Foong

Third row (L-R): Yu Kaho, Holger Stritzel, Nicola Leveringhaus, Selina Ho

Fourth row (L-R): Magnus Ryner, Nicola Phillips, Brandon Yoder, Tikki Pang, Akio Tanahashi

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